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Dedicated to Barbers, with their razors and leeches, or c-space points and best-matching: 
Oh, I am a little barber 
And I go my merry way 
With my razor and my leeches 
I can always earn my pay 
 
Though your chin be smooth as satin, 
You will need me soon I know 
For the Lord protects his barbers, 
And He makes the stubble grow. 
 
If I slip when I am shaving you 
And cut you to the quick, 
You can use me as a doctor 
'Cause I also heal the sick. 
(Darion and Leigh, Man of La Mancha) 
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Abstract 
One of Julian Barbour’s main aims is to solve the problem of time that appears in quantum 
geometrodynamics (QG).  QG involves the application of canonical quantization procedure to 
the Hamiltonian formulation of General Relativity.  The problem of time arises because the 
quantization of the Hamiltonian constraint results in an equation that has no explicit time 
parameter.  Thus, it appears that the resulting equation, as apparently timeless, cannot 
describe evolution of quantum states.  Barbour attempts to resolve the problem by allegedly 
eliminating time from his interpretation of QG.  In order to evaluate the efficacy of his 
solution, it is necessary to ascertain in what sense time has been eliminated from his theory.  I 
proceed to do so by developing a form of conceptual analysis that is applicable to the concept 
of time in physical theories and applying this analysis to Barbour’s account.    
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Preface 
 The overarching aim of this project is to develop a method by which one can analyse 
the concept of time as it appears in physical theories.  Over the course of this project, I argue 
that at least for Julian Barbour’s account, which is used as a case study, the method of 
analysis developed here is applicable to time as it appears in this account: it offers an analysis 
that indicates two ways in which the temporal features of his physical theories may 
reconciled such that his explicit ontological and metaphysical commitments are maintained.   
 The motivation for this project’s overarching aim is two-fold.   
First, there is a general call by, e.g., Butterfield and Isham (1999), for the use of 
conceptual analysis as a means of merging general relativity and quantum theory.  Certain 
interpretations of these theories offer conflicting concepts of time and space, for example.  
Thus, it seems that conceptual clean up and development of such interpretations may help 
point the direction towards a successful merger of the theories.   
Second, there has been explicit support for the usefulness of applying conceptual 
analysis to the particular concepts of time and space that appear in physical theories.  For 
example, DiSalle (2006) champions the reframing of historic debates concerning time and 
space in scientific theories in terms of concepts.
1
  In particular, he argues that the common 
misunderstanding of Newton as providing inadequate empirical support for time as being 
absolute can be remedied by modifying Newton’s apparent project.  Rather than merely 
assuming metaphysical claims regarding absolute time without justifying them, DiSalle states 
that Newton should be seen as proposing new theoretical definitions for concepts, such as 
that of absolute time, within a framework of physical laws.  However, though DiSalle 
illustrates the potential fruitfulness of examining past scientific theories in terms of the 
defining and defending of concepts, he does not develop or explicitly advocate a systematic 
means of conceptual analysis for temporal terms.  
                                                 
1 Torretti 2006 provides another example; he argues that we can achieve a better understanding of four historical 
cases, e.g., the retardation of clocks in special relativity, the problem of time’s arrow, through conceptual 
analysis. 
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In view of DiSalle’s suggestions, I here aim to provide a systematic means of 
analysing of the concept of time as it appears in physical theories.  Additionally, taking 
aboard the suggestion that such analysis may help merge general relativity and quantum 
theory into a coherent quantum gravity, I apply my conceptual analysis to the concept of time 
that appears in Julian Barbour’s account of quantum gravity.  In effect, his account, as 
developed up until 2002, serves as a case study to which I apply my conceptual analysis. 
I have chosen to use Barbour’s account due to his general aim and the allegedly 
timeless solution he proposes.  His aim in part is to solve the problem of time that appears in 
quantum geometrodynamics (QG).  QG involves the application of canonical quantization 
procedures to the Hamiltonian formulation of general relativity (GR).  The problem of time 
arises because the quantization of the Hamiltonian constraint results in an equation that has 
no explicit time parameter.  Thus, it appears that the resulting equation, as apparently 
timeless, cannot describe evolution of quantum states. 
 Barbour attempts to resolve the problem by allegedly eliminating time from his 
interpretation of QG.  In order to evaluate the efficacy of his solution, it is necessary to 
ascertain in what sense time has been eliminated from his theory.  Note that many critics who 
assess it, e.g., Butterfield (2002), Pooley (2001), Smolin (2001), Dowe (2008), have claimed 
that Barbour’s interpretation is committed to time at some level. However, each of these 
critics classify Barbour’s commitment to time in different ways, e.g., as substantivalist, 
relationist, A-theorist.  Given that each of these classifications of Barbour’s theory have 
plausible arguments supporting them, such disparate diagnoses of time in his theory indicates 
the general need for examining the methodology behind analysing time in physical theories.   
 In effect, it seems that Barbour’s account would benefit from the application of a 
systematic conceptual analysis to the concept of time that appears in it.  Moreover, due his 
focus on eliminating time in order to resolve the problem of time in QG, his account makes 
the role that time may play in it relatively salient.  Additionally, his basic ontological and 
metaphysical commitments are made explicit.  This is due to the fact that it is based on 
Leibnizian and Machian principles.  Thus, Barbour’s account, which seems to be in need of 
analysis given the disparate diagnoses of it, offers a case to which we may apply a conceptual 
analysis of time with explicit ontological commitments as well as a proposed solution of the 
problem of time in QG that focuses on some sort of timelessness.       
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 I approach my aim of developing a conceptual analysis applicable to the concept of 
time as it appears in physical theories as follows.  In Chapter1, I develop such a conceptual 
analysis that is somewhat tailored to Barbour’s account.  To do so, I first present Frank 
Jackson’s conceptual analysis and identify three failings of it if applied to applied to temporal 
concepts in physical theories.  In light of these failings, I develop my alternative account such 
that these failings are overcome. 
 In Chapters 2-5, I present Barbour’s accounts.  In the process, I apply my conceptual 
analysis’ first stage according to which multiple theories must be pounded into a single 
network, which is assumed to be underpinned by Barbour’s principles.  Moreover, as will be 
evident below, the presentation of his accounts requires much elaboration in places, 
especially with regard to his use of claims made by historical figures and his interpretations 
of quantum theory (QT) and QG.  This is due to the fact that he usually focuses on primary 
texts and makes his own, and often very quick, interpretations of them that are largely based 
solely on the primary material.  Further, his interpretations of QT and QG are very dense and 
not as well rehearsed as his GR.  
 I should also state the manner in which I present his accounts and the rationale behind 
this approach.  I am focusing primarily on Barbour’s own texts because I do not want to 
incorporate ontology or metaphysical commitments that others may read into Barbour’s 
theory when attempting to classify it in terms of standard categories, e.g., substantivalist v. 
relationist; presentist v. eternalist; A-series v. B-series.  Through such focus on Barbour’s 
texts, we can evaluate our analysis’ effectiveness without building standard dichotomies into 
his account.  In addition to getting a clearer account of what Barbour’s actual claims amount 
to, such a reading may cause us to re-evaluate these categories as well as their applicability to 
a certain domain. 
Chapter2 presents an overview of Barbour’s research and delineates the portion that I 
am using as a case study.  Due to space restriction, I cannot present and analyse his account 
in its entirety.  Thus, this chapter gives my rationale for focusing on a particular stage of its 
development.  Additionally, this chapter provides the Leibnizian and Machian principles on 
which he bases his account.  Finally, his nonrelativistic account is presented in this chapter 
because its structure mirrors that proposed for his GR.  Chapter3 provides his GR and 
assesses whether it fulfils his principles.  In Chapter4, I present an overview of approaches to 
xii 
 
quantum gravity as well as the problem of time that appear in canonical quantum gravity 
because he formulates his QT with the specific aim of resolving this problem.  Then, I 
present, unpack and develop his QT, such that his principles are fulfilled.  Chapter5 provides 
and develops his QG such that it is also in accord with his principles and makes clear the 
manner in which it resolves the problem of time. 
In Chapter6, I apply the remaining stages of my analysis to Barbour’s accounts.  
While this application does not result in a single concept of time that appears in his accounts, 
it does offer two options for further developing his account such that two single yet differing 
concepts of time are obtained.  Lastly, Chapter7 provides a general discussion of the results 
of our Barbouric case study for my conceptual analysis concerning its development as well as 
its applicability to non-Barbouric accounts. 
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Chapter 1: Conceptual Analyses and the Concept of Time in Physical Theories 
In this chapter, I examine some methods of analysis and evaluate their applicability to 
time.  In effect, the specific purpose of this meta-analysis of analyses is to legitimate and 
develop a means of examining time as it appears in Barbour’s interpretation.  Such 
examination, in turn, will allow me to evaluate the disparate categorizations of time in his 
interpretation and will inform my evaluation of the efficacy of Barbour’s solution to the 
problem of time.  Thus, the present chapter, while aiming to specify a means of analysis 
appropriate for Barbour’s interpretation, is general in that it surveys some methods of 
analysis and evaluates their applicability to time in other physical theories in an attempt to 
expose the analyses’ limitations, reveal what modifications are needed for a satisfactory 
analysis and to develop an initial, working account of such an analysis.  Moreover, it must be 
noted that this alternative analysis will be further developed via its application to Barbour’s 
account and discussed in Chapter7; the present chapter serves as a means of delineating and 
initially systematizing the facets that an analysis of time in physical theories requires in view 
of the problems with existent analyses. 
 This chapter’s evaluation of temporal analyses for physical theories focuses on 
conceptual analyses.  Taking aboard DiSalle’s (2006a) (2006b) suggestion that our 
understanding of time as it appears in scientific theories would benefit from reframing 
temporal questions in terms of conceptual analysis, I structure my meta-analysis in terms of 
modern conceptual analysis and develop a means of analysing the temporal concepts that 
appear in physical theories.   
To do so, I look at a prominent example of conceptual analysis.  While I do not 
provide a general survey of the debates concerning its plausibility, my criticisms of it focus 
on its suitability for analysing time across different scientific theories.  Ascertaining such 
suitability is required in order to provide a productive means of evaluating time in Barbour’s 
renditions of two specific theories, namely general relativity (GR) and quantum theory (QT).  
Furthermore, I limit my meta-analysis to the use of the term ‘time’ in existent temporal 
analyses which involve recourse to physical theories.  Though I must include our folk use of 
‘time’ since it is part of Barbour’s aim to explain such usage with reference to his physical 
interpretation, purely linguistic, metaphorical and phenomenological uses of ‘time’ are 
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beyond the scope of this work.  Lastly, note that when referring to a concept, I henceforth put 
it in italics, e.g., the concept of time is denoted as ‘time’.   
In order to develop a conceptual analysis suited for time, my meta-analysis is 
organized into three sections.   
The first section provides a number of introductory points regarding my approach to 
concepts.  The remaining two sections present and examine a different conceptual analysis.  
However, each of these conceptual analyses is a variant of “network” conceptual analysis, 
i.e., the general proposal that a concept is to be analysed in terms of the role it plays in a 
network of principles that underpin some theory.  In addition to its current prominence, I 
provide some rationale for limiting my discussion to network conceptual analyses at the end 
of §1. 
The second section presents and examines a form of network conceptual analysis that 
has been described as “perhaps the most explicit and detailed account [of conceptual 
analysis] available” (Laurence and Margolis 2003, 254): Frank Jackson’s (1998) conceptual 
analysis (JCA).
2
  While most of his framework appears straightforwardly applicable to 
features of time that appear in certain temporal debates, e.g., the present, A-theory flow, the 
allegedly a priori status of his concepts and the referents of such concepts severely limit the 
scope of its applicability.  The problems associated with the a priori restrict Jackson’s 
conceptual analysis to time that is known a priori.  Further, the presupposition that a concept 
must, at some level, have a property or object referent limits this analysis to time that has 
certain metaphysics and ontology and, thus, excludes, e.g., time as purely geometrical.   
Jackson’s view is also shown to suffer from assuming that we can just read our 
metaphysics and ontology off our best scientific theory.  I term such practice ‘naïve 
metaphysical and ontological realism’.  Further, I illustrate that this practice is problematic 
                                                 
2 One may think that since my goal is to find some conceptual analysis applicable to scientific theories, 
Jackson’s conceptual analysis, as focusing on folk concepts, is an inappropriate place to start.  However, 
because his analysis is one of the most developed regarding folk theory and since, as is later argued, the analysis 
applied to folk theory may be, with some modification, applied to scientific theories, Jackson’s conceptual 
analysis naturally offers the first step in our enquiry. 
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since it risks ignoring alternative metaphysics and ontologies that may be associated with the 
theory.  Additionally, this practice appears to lack a schematized means of obtaining its 
metaphysics and ontology.  Moreover, the problems of naïve realism suggest that a 
conceptual analysis of scientific concepts is needed. 
The third section consists of the development of an alternative conceptual analysis 
that overcomes JCA’s problems and that is applicable to time in Barbour’s view.  To do so, I 
first develop a folk analysis that addresses JCA’s problematic focus on a priori concepts that 
are supposed to have referents.  Since Miscevic offers some apparatuses to deal with such 
problems, I use them to obtain a working analysis of folk concepts.  Then, I initially use this 
Miscevic-driven conceptual analysis as a model for the analysis of concepts in physical 
theories.  However, this model has three central problems. 
First, it suffers from the problem of identifying concepts without relying on naïve 
metaphysical and ontological realism regarding scientific theories. 
Second, since it gives no explicit way in which one should incorporate more than one 
theory into one’s analysis, it may give rise to concepts that are limited to a single theory.  
This is exemplified by Esfeld’s discussion of directionality in QT and special relativity (SR).  
From the apparent clash of time as defined by QT with that of SR, I argue that this form of 
analysis potentially limits time to a particular theory.  Such a limitation will be problematic 
for our later examination of time in more than one theory, namely in Barbour’s GR and QT.  
Because, as we shall see, his account of GR is not explicitly intertwined with the 
interpretations he gives for QT and QG, we must do some work in evaluating whether these 
separate accounts are able to be unified on a conceptual level in the manner he suggests they 
are. 
Third, the application of Miscevic’s conceptual analysis to only scientific concepts 
creates a gap between our commonsense concepts and the scientific concepts.  I use time’s 
feature of directionality, which highlights this problem since it gives rise to a gap created 
between time as defined by experience and the time of SR.  Further, I argue that this gap 
needs to be bridged since Barbour’s view includes an explanation of our everyday time. 
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After laying out three desiderata, which result from the three problems with our 
application of Miscevic’s analysis to physical theories, I proceed to develop an alternative 
network analysis that has the desiderata.   
The alternative overcomes the problem of concept identification through initially 
picking out features of the theories involved that seem to be temporal.  However, rather than 
stopping there, we examine our list of temporal features, determine whether they clash or are 
apparently redundant with other features on the list and with apparently non-temporal 
features.  Thereby, we add in the ability to modify our list of temporal features.  Such 
modification allows us to stave off the problem of naïve metaphysical and ontological 
realism.  Furthermore, we assume that the theories under consideration, both folk and 
scientific
3
, are parts of a single network.  With this setup, we can have interplay between the 
theories.  This interplay can be developed via the process of analysis and offers a means of 
bridging the gap between commonsense, folk concepts and scientific concepts.  Additionally, 
by considering these theories as forming a single network, the analysis can accommodate any 
number of theories by adding them to the network. 
Thus, as fulfilling the desideratum and overcoming the problems of JCA, this 
alternative analysis is shown to provide a means of analysing time in Barbour’s view.  
1 Preliminary Remarks on Concepts 
 Before presenting the conceptual analyses, a number of preliminary points regarding 
concepts are required.   
First, since I am examining the use of the term ‘time’, I am focusing on analyses that 
examine lexical concepts, i.e., concepts like bachelor, hall and town hall that correspond to 
lexical items in natural languages.  Admittedly, ‘lexical item’ is rather vague; however, 
                                                 
3 While such a distinction may not be as clear cut in practice, I here mirror Jackson as well as the literature on 
conceptual analysis generally in making such a distinction.  Moreover, it does provide a useful means of 
referring to theories that focus on concepts that we gain and develop in view of our day-to-day experience, e.g., 
belief, knowledge, reference, and distinguishing them from theories that are less concerned with accounting for 
such concepts.   
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adopting Laurence and Margolis’ (1999) usage, such lexical items are usually single 
morphemes that can be phrases, e.g., being a vehicle, or a single word, e.g., vehicular. 
Second, I am bracketing the question of the ontological status of concepts; though 
some identify concepts with abstracta and others with particular mental representations, I do 
not take a stand on this issue.  However, I follow Jackson’s identification of concepts with the 
meanings of terms.
4
    
Third, I am assuming that certain concepts are complex.  The concepts that lack such 
complexity are called ‘primitive’ or ‘atomic’.  A complex concept is composed of a set of 
features, and I assume that these features just are concepts.
5
  
Fourth, the manner in which the features compose a complex concept depends upon 
the structure one adopts for concepts.  For example, a dual theorist holds that a complex 
concept, say, car necessarily has the core, essential features of having wheels, being a vehicle 
and used for transport which is accompanied by other features, like being a coupe, that an 
occurrence of the concept is likely, rather than necessarily, to have. While there are allegedly 
a number of different kinds of concept structure, e.g., classical theory, dual theory, prototype 
theory, I here focus on network theory, which, Jackson claims, is informed by theory theory.   
Theory theory is the view that concepts form a web in which they are inter-related, 
and a concept’s structure consists in its relations to other concepts as specified by a mental 
theory.  The theory theory structure of concepts is derived in view of the interconnections 
among concepts in a scientific theory.   
                                                 
4 Nevertheless, some advocates of concepts qua abstracta hold that concepts are just senses, e.g., Peacocke 2005.  
However, I do not believe that my equation of concepts with meaning presupposes the abstracta view since it 
seems to be a further question as to whether such meanings are cashed out in terms of particular mental 
representations or in terms of abstract objects.  Margolis and Laurence 2007, who argue against the rationale 
behind the equation of sense with abstracta and formulate a view in which senses correspond to mental 
representations, provide some support for my claim. 
5 This division between primitive and complex concepts follows that of Margolis and Laurence 1999. 
Furthermore, I follow Margolis and Laurence’s 1999 use of ‘feature’.  While they note that ‘feature’ is 
sometimes used to denote some primitive sensory concept, e.g., red, they adopt the concept component use 
since, they claim, this is the prevalent usage. 
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‘Network theory’ is coined by Jackson (1994, 102-7) in his characterization of his 
particular use of the Lewis-Ramsey-Carnap theory of reference of theoretical terms.  He uses 
this theory of reference to put the theory-theory-structured concepts of folk theories in 
propositions. So, just as, according to some accounts, e.g., Lewis (1970), the meaning of a 
theoretical term is determined by its role in a scientific theory, the structure of a concept is 
determined by its role in a theory.  This role can then be put in terms of a definite description, 
and the referent of this concept is whatever satisfies the description.
6
 
Jackson applies this setup explicitly to folk theory.  Thus, folk theory is considered to 
be a network of interlocking concepts, and it is by spelling out this network that one 
discovers the content of one’s folk concepts.  However, while Jackson limits the scope of 
network analysis to folk concepts, I use ‘network analysis’ below in a more general sense: 
analyses in which a concept is examined in terms of the role it plays in a network of 
principles that constitutes some theory(s), regardless of whether such theories are folk or non-
folk. 
Fifth, one may object that my focus on theory theory structured concepts omits 
discussion regarding alternative concept structures that may possibly be better applicable to 
our target concepts, i.e., temporal concepts.  In reply, since I am looking for a conceptual 
analysis that incorporates scientific theories, theory theory seems the obvious choice since it 
is modelled after scientific theories.  In effect, it will be easier to combine some theory-
theory-type analysis of our folk concepts of time with a similar treatment of time in scientific 
theories.  The reason for wanting such a combination will later be evident in view of a 
problem suggested by Esfeld and the need to include our experienced, commonsense time in 
our analysis of time in scientific theories. 
Further, theory theory’s metaphysics brings on certain problems associated with its 
concepts’ structures.  For example, the concepts in theory theory, as usually lacking some 
core, defining feature, face the problem of how one should identify them.  Since I am 
explicitly using theory theory structured concepts, I do raise and address this pressing 
                                                 
6 Although there are problems with this approach to terms in scientific theories, I do not address them here: see 
Papineau 1996 for discussion. 
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problem of concept identification in §3.2.1.  So, standard issues regarding concept structure 
are not completely ignored and do inform the development of my alternative conceptual 
analysis. 
2 Jackson’s Conceptual Analysis 
As Jackson (1998, 130) eventually frames his 1998 analysis in terms of network 
analysis, I am reading Jackson’s own conceptual analysis (JCA) as a form of network 
analysis.  I note this at the outset since Jackson’s analysis of water, the main example I use 
below, does not explicitly incorporate network analysis.  However, his subsequent analyses 
of colour and ethics do make recourse to network analysis explicitly.  So, in my presentation 
of Jackson’s water example, I have supplemented it with considerations from the network 
analysis in a fashion that parallels his presentations of colour and ethics. 
JCA is introduced as the required means of solving the location problem, i.e., the 
problem of showing the manner in which any given phenomenon can be reconciled with 
one’s lower-level ontology.  In other words, this is the problem of, so to speak, locating a 
place for some entity in one’s worldview given one’s ontological commitments.  The 
resolution of this problem is needed, Jackson argues, for doing serious metaphysics.   
‘Serious metaphysics’ refers to metaphysics, i.e., the field that concerns what there is 
and what it is like, that seeks a comprehensive account of some topic in terms of a limited 
number of ingredients and that investigates where these limits should be set.  Jackson uses 
physicalism as his primary example of serious metaphysics.  Physicalism attempts to give a 
complete account of the world with only physical properties.  Due to serious metaphysics’ 
limited ingredients, certain upper-level phenomena will not explicitly appear in one’s more 
fundamental, lower-level account.  For example, some higher-level psychological claims may 
not in appear one’s physicalist description of the world.  It is from the apparent juxtaposition 
of upper-level phenomena with one’s sparse lower-level account that the location problem 
arises; from the lack of apparent correspondence between psychological claims with a 
physicalist description, there arises the problem of showing how psychological claims are to 
be reconciled with one’s physicalist description of the world.   
According to Jackson, the relation between true upper-level claims about the world 
and lower-level descriptions is one of entailment; the truth of upper-level claims is entailed 
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by lower-level descriptions.  Thus, in order to show that a particular claim about the world is 
acceptable, one must show that it is entailed by the lower-level description.  However, if such 
entailment is lacking, then one must be an eliminitivist regarding the upper-level phenomena. 
(Jackson 1998, 4-5, 41-2)   
To assess the relation between claims and lower-level descriptions and, in effect, to 
solve the location problem, Jackson argues that conceptual analysis is required.  Since I am 
more concerned with JCA itself, I will not here present or defend Jackson’s argument for 
JCA as the required means of solving this problem; however, see Stalnaker (2001) for 
criticism of this argument. 
Jackson claims that the first step towards solving the location problem is to find out 
what exactly counts as the referents of the upper-level and lower-level terms.  In order to 
determine the scope of these terms, one must make recourse to concepts, e.g., to determine 
what counts as water, one must examine water through conceptual analysis.  Moreover, 
unlike, e.g., the conceptual analysis of Bealer (1996) that only applies to philosophical 
concepts like truth and knowledge, Jackson’s conceptual analysis is supposed to apply to at 
least all commonsense concepts.
7
 
The form of conceptual analysis that Jackson advocates involves examining our 
armchair intuitions to determine what users of a language mean by a term.  Because concepts 
just are terms’ meanings, this practice establishes and refines our concepts.  As a form of 
network analysis, JCA is committed to these meanings being identical with the role a concept 
                                                 
7 While Miscevic 2001 limits JCA’s range to all common sense concepts, Laurence and Margolis 2003 state that 
JCA is supposed to apply to just about any concept, including proton and molybdenum.  While Jackson 1998 
provides no such examples or explicit claims to the effect that JCA applies to the wider range of concepts, he 
(1998, 46-7) does briefly mention the possibility of restricting the domain of the folk to the set of scientists: if 
our audience should happen to be, say, theoretical physicists, and our subject happened to be phrased in terms 
local to theoretical physics, it would be the intuitions and stipulations of this special subset of the folk that 
would hold centre stage.  Yet, though this is introduced as a proviso for how one can better address the concerns 
of one’s audience, he does not pursue this line further.  With such specialized domains of folk, the alleged scope 
of JCA may be broadened to include the concepts Laurence and Margolis mentioned.  However, I will not 
pursue the implications of the application of JCA to such concepts since, as I argue below, JCA does not even 
work for Jackson’s exemplified common sense concepts. 
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plays in our folk theory.  So, these armchair intuitions must serve to reveal the role played by 
our concept in our folk theory.   
JCA employs intuitions to do so as follows.  In network analysis, a concept is the role 
it plays in a theory.  So, to determine what these concepts are, one must first establish our 
folk theory.  Jackson claims that appealing to our intuitions about possible cases, e.g., our 
intuitions about Twin Earth, reveals our folk theory about, e.g., water.  He reasons that each 
individual’s intuitions about such cases reveal one’s theory regarding the concept.   For 
example, what guides an individual in describing a substance as water is revealed by the 
individual’s intuitions regarding whether certain substances in possible cases are water.  
Furthermore, the extent to which the intuitions of individuals coincide reveals our shared folk 
theory and, in effect, the role of a concept in the folk theory.  These roles can then be put into 
a definite description that is indicative of some of the properties that a referent of the concept 
must have.  Jackson notes that while it is not necessary that a referent of, say, water have all 
the properties specified, it must have at least some of them.  For example, the role that water 
plays in our folk theory that involves water can be stated as the following definite 
description: the stuff that fills lakes, falls from the sky, is colourless, is odourless, etc., or 
which satisfies enough of the foregoing. Thus, the role of intuitions about possible cases is to 
make explicit our implicit folk concept, to reveal what role in a theory constitutes water and, 
in effect, to show which properties are central to something being correctly described as 
water.  
Furthermore, Jackson links intuitions with a priori knowledge.  Since Jackson does 
not provide a clear definition of a priori, I adopt the following definition of a priori 
knowledge: 
(K) S knows a priori that p iff S’s belief that p is justified a priori and the other 
 conditions on knowledge are satisfied, and 
(J) S’s belief that p is justified a priori iff S’s belief that p is nonexperientially 
justified, i.e., justified by some nonexperiential source.
8
  
                                                 
8 This is Casullo’s 2003 definition.  See Casullo 2003 for defence of it against alternative specifications of the 
standard Kantian definition, which involves an unspecified notion of dependence.  I am using this definition 
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A motivation, which Jackson (1993) advocates, for the link to the a priori is due to the 
presupposition that a priority is the hallmark of conceptual analysis.  The nonexperiential 
justification that Jackson uses in JCA is obtained solely from the armchair and, thus, does not 
involve going out into the world to obtain empirical data.
9
  Thus, in maintaining the a priority 
of conceptual analysis, Jackson can better carve out a niche for philosophical analysis that is 
neatly separated from empirical work via its strictly armchair method of enquiry, which 
allegedly allows one to derive substantial a priori truths.  However, as is argued below in 
§2.2.1, this combination of acquiring substantial truths through JCA’s armchair analysis and 
of maintaining the a priori status of these truths is problematic. 
                                                                                                                                                        
because Casullo has convincing arguments against proposed alternatives for (J) and since, as using a feature of 
experience that both rationalists and empiricists hold, namely experiential justification, its coherency does not 
require me to take a position in this debate.  
However, Chalmers and Jackson 2001 offer some definition of a priori knowledge, i.e., knowledge that is 
possible to have with justification independent of experience.  Save for the presence of ‘possible’, this definition 
parallels the traditional Kantian definition (Casullo 2006): (K) and (KJ) S’s belief that p is justified a priori iff 
S’s justification for the belief that p does not depend upon experience.  
I have not incorporated ‘possible’ in the above definition of ‘a priori’ because it is not explained by Chalmers 
and Jackson and may merely work in capturing the sufficient condition Jackson suggests, i.e., being known 
independently of which world is actual.  I will elaborate a bit on this condition in what follows.  Moreover, a 
straightforward way of incorporating ‘possible’ into their definition is problematic.  Suppose that one adds 
‘possible’ to the traditional Kantian definition of ‘a priori justification’, i.e., S’s belief that p is justified a priori 
iff it is possible that S’s justification for the belief that p does not depend on experience.  Using Tidman’s 1996 
modification of Plantinga’s example, it is possible that there is an invisible pink elephant in the room emitting 
radiation which invokes certain a priori knowledge.  Given such possible sources of a priori justification and 
their lack of connection with truth, Jackson would not likely incorporate ‘possible’ with his a definition of a 
priori justification.  So, I merely assume that ‘possible’ is supposed to capture Jackson’s sufficient condition 
and have opted for Casullo’s general definition of a priori here. 
9 I am assuming that empirical justification is a type of experiential justification.  This assumption is not without 
precedence; see, e.g., Henderson and Horgan 2001.  Further, while I acknowledge that there may be problems 
with this assumption because I have not specified what counts as experiential, I do not here offer such a 
specification because of Casullo’s 2003 argument to the conclusion that, at least in the standard epistemic 
debates, there is no unproblematic way of demarcating the experiential from the nonexperiential.  
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Jackson forges this link between intuitions and a priori knowledge as follows.  He 
reasons that the best explanation of our ability to evaluate possible cases is that competent 
speakers have implicit a priori knowledge of the conditions required for a concept to refer.  
Our evaluation of possible cases makes these implicit a priori conditions explicit via giving 
rise to certain shared intuitions.  In effect, Jackson legitimizes and explains our shared 
intuitions by claiming that they have an a priori source.
10
   
In what sense are the conditions of reference known a priori?  Jackson (1998, 51) 
provides a sufficient condition for the a priori: that which we know independently of the 
actual world.  So, to have a priori knowledge of the conditions required for a concept to refer, 
the conditions can be known without recourse to the actual world.  This world-independent 
criterion is supposed to be a priori in the sense of being knowable from the armchair alone.  
Consider the following claim: Water is the watery stuff of our acquaintance.  According to 
Jackson, the following claim is knowable a priori in this sense because one does not need to 
make recourse to the empirical features, e.g., being H2O, that distinguish the actual world 
from the possible ones.  To make this clearer, consider the claim: ‘I’ refers to the speaker.11  
This claim is a priori knowable since one needs not make recourse to empirical facts, e.g., 
ascertaining who the speaker actually is, to know that the claim is true.  Likewise, one does 
not need to consult empirical facts about what the watery stuff of our acquaintance actually is 
in order to know the claim.  Thus, Jackson’s a priori can seem to be legitimately termed since 
such statements are allegedly knowable from minimal semantic competence alone, rather 
than being dependant on particular empirical features of the world.   
Moreover, regarding (J), the armchair means of gaining a priori knowledge that fulfils 
this sufficient condition highlights JCA’s heavy reliance on armchair reflection as its source 
of allegedly nonexperiential justification; by considering possible worlds from the armchair, 
                                                 
10 While I do not here discuss this inference to the best explanation rationale for linking intuitions with the a 
priori, see Dowell 2008 for criticism. 
11 This parallel example is drawn from Laurence and Margolis 1999. 
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we can come up with a certain subset of propositions that are known a priori, i.e., 
propositions known independent of which world is actual.
12
 
To summarize JCA’s first step towards solving the location problem: one’s intuitions, 
which are indicative of a priori conditions required for a concept to refer, are consulted to 
determine the folk theory involving a concept.  From the role it plays in the folk theory, a 
concept can be given a definite description.  This description is indicative of a set of 
properties, the majority of which must be had by a particular thing in order for that thing to 
count as a referent of the concept.  In this fashion, one establishes what counts as the 
referents of the upper-level concept in a token of the location problem. 
After establishing the content of the concept in question, one can proceed to the 
second step towards solving the location problem.  The second step involves one making 
recourse to empirical claims to determine whether statements involving the concept are 
entailed by such claims.  Here is an example from Jackson (1998, 81-82) of such entailment 
regarding the statement that water covers most of the Earth. 
(P1) H2O covers most of the Earth. 
(P2) H2O is the watery stuff of our acquaintance. 
(P3) Water is the watery stuff of our acquaintance. 
(C1) So, water is H2O. 
(C2) So, water covers most of the Earth. 
(P1) is a premise that is a partial physical description of the world and assumable provided 
that one accepts physicalism.  (P2) is an empirically established claim; one must empirically 
investigate what the actual watery stuff of our acquaintance is in order to know (P2).  (P3) is 
known a priori as a result of JCA’s first step. Furthermore, (P2) establishes to what water 
refers in our world given (P3)’s condition as to what counts as water.  With the resulting 
                                                 
12 Though this subset of necessary truths may suggest the need to explore the link between knowledge and 
modalities, I do not address such issues here.  See Casullo (2003, Ch7) for discussion of the relations between 
necessity and the a priori. 
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(C1)’s identification of water with H2O, (C2) follows given (P1).  Thus, (C2) is entailed by 
our lower-level descriptions of the world in conjunction with our intuitive water.  In this 
fashion, one can use JCA to determine whether some higher-level descriptions can be 
reconciled with one’s lower-level ontology and, thereby, to solve the location problem. 
What one does with the result of such enquiry depends upon the role one gives to 
conceptual analysis.  Jackson states that conceptual analysis can have one of two roles: a 
modest role or an immodest role.  Suppose that a folk concept is not entailed by one’s lower-
level description.  In this case, modest conceptual analysis would merely point out the 
incompatibility.  Immodest conceptual analysis, on the other hand, would, in addition to 
citing the incompatibility, reject the lower-level description. (Jackson 1998, 42-4)   
Jackson (1998, 43) explicitly advocates modest conceptual analysis because, he 
claims, immodest conceptual analysis gives such intuitions too big a role in determining what 
the fundamental nature of the world is.  Nevertheless, despite Jackson’s apparent allegiance 
to the claim that conceptual analysis can only have either a modest role or an immodest role, 
there is at least one
13
 more-than-modest role that conceptual analysis may have: if a folk 
                                                 
13 There may be two other more-than-modest roles, depending upon one’s theory of concept identity.  First, one 
may modify the folk concept in view of the lower-level description with the aim of making the modified folk 
concept entailed by the lower-level description.  Second, one may modify one’s lower-level description in a 
fashion that allows the folk concept to be entailed.  This option is suggested by Laurence and Magnolis.  They 
exemplify this suggestion by stating that one’s conceptual analysis may result in one modifying the set of 
primitives in order to account for the folk concept.  However, the modification involved in these alternatives 
does not seem accommodatable in JCA alone. The first is problematic since the folk concepts of competent 
speakers are a priori.  As such, they seem immune to modification in light of conflicting with a lower-level 
description.    If Jackson assumes a characterization of the a priori, e.g., that of Putnam 1983, as being immune 
to all refutation or if he follows suit of, e.g., Kitcher 1983 who hold that the a priori is characterized as immune 
to experiential defeaters, then such a priori concepts cannot be modified in view of at least empirical findings.  
See Rey (2004, 9-10) for further discussion.  The second option is beyond the scope of JCA.  JCA does not deal 
with determining and defining one’s fundamental ontology.  Rather, it clarifies one’s folk concepts and 
determines whether such concepts are entailed by the fundamental ontology.  To be compatible with this option, 
JCA would require some means of modifying concepts in response to incongruities.  Moreover, one may not 
regard such options as viable since one may have a stringent view of concept identity, e.g., modification of a 
certain property that the referent of a concept is supposed to have leads to a different concept.  Nevertheless, 
because I am more interested in an analysis’ ability to take into account empirical data, which may manifest 
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concept is not entailed by a lower-level description, one may eliminate the folk concept.  
Stalnaker (2001) highlights this as the only alternative to modest and immodest to which 
Jackson alludes.  Jackson implicitly endorses this alternative with his claim that one should 
eliminate folk concepts that are not entailed by the lower-level description, as cited earlier.  
Call this alternative ‘immodest folk eliminativism’. 
Jackson’s adherence to immodest folk eliminativism is further supported by his 
assumption that all concepts have referents that are actual physical properties or objects, e.g., 
water, colour.  This assumption is widespread in current literature on concepts due in part to 
its focus on concepts that have referents that exist in the world.
14
  In view of at least his major 
examples of solidity, water, colour and ethical properties
15
, Jackson follows suit by focusing 
on concepts that have existent referents at some level.
16
  Further, given this assumption, a 
concept must have a referent that is a physical property or object in order to be a legitimate 
concept.  In effect, this assumption can be seen as an impetus for Jackson’s practice of 
immodest folk eliminativism, which allows him to reject concepts which do not have such 
corresponding referents. 
                                                                                                                                                        
itself through the elimination of certain concepts or modification of concepts that conflict with the physical 
theory, and since I do not have room to discuss the implications of concept identity here, I bracket these issues. 
14 Fodor (1998, 165), for example, makes this assumption explicit for at least all primitive concepts when he 
claims that there can be no primitive concept without there being a corresponding physical property.   See Rey 
2004 for further support of the wide scope of this assumption. 
15 Since Jackson advocates a form of moral naturalism, according to which ethical properties just are physical 
properties, e.g., the action that is the right thing to do just is the action that is apt to produce the most overall 
pleasure, ethical concepts are supposed to have a physical property as a referent. 
16 Jackson’s (1998, 8) use of physicalism appears to be the primary explicit reason he makes this assumption; he 
states that he is focusing on physical properties and relations, while setting aside mathematical properties, e.g., 
being a set, since their status in physicalism is debatable.  Another reason he may make the assumption is 
because of his use of the causal descriptive theory of reference.  However, such rationale is irrelevant for my 
later criticism of his inclusion of this assumption since, I argue, that the assumption itself is limiting if JCA is 
applied to time because time or its features may not have physically existing referents.  Thus, I do not here 
explain or object to the rationale behind this assumption. 
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Thus, due to Jackson’s implicit endorsement of immodest folk eliminativism, I here 
assume that JCA is to play a role in which entailed folk concepts are considered to be 
supported and unentailed concepts are eliminated.  
 To sum up, in JCA one first provides a priori sourced concepts via the assessment of 
one’s intuitions regarding possible cases.  Then, one uses these concepts in conjunction with 
lower-level claims in order to assess whether claims involving one’s higher-level concepts 
are entailed by one’s lower-level ontology.  If there is such entailment, then the higher-level 
concept is given some support.  However, if there is no such entailment, then the higher-level 
concept is to be eliminated.  Note that to simplify this discussion slightly and to make it 
relevant to our analysis of concepts that appear in physical theories, I henceforth only deal 
with cases in which the lower-level descriptions and ontology are those associated with a 
physical theory. 
2.1 Application of JCA to a Temporal Example 
 Now that I have presented JCA, we are in a position to apply JCA to a specific 
temporal concept.  For the purpose of simplicity in this example, I am assuming that the 
present is the only feature constitutive of our folk time. 
 The first step of JCA is to specify the properties required by time’s referent.  To do so, 
we examine our folk theory and figure out what role time plays in it.  Suppose that after 
engaging in armchair reflection upon our reactions to possible cases, we come up with a folk 
theory regarding time that is indicated by the following:  
People commonly believe that the present is an objective feature of the world.  They 
talk, think and behave as if there were a global now shared by all, and they talk, think 
and behave in a manner different from the way they do about what is here. (Callender 
forthcoming) 
We know a priori that time is the timey stuff of our acquaintance.
17
  From this folk theory, 
we derive the following specification of this role:  
                                                 
17 If ‘timey stuff of our acquaintance’ seems to be an odd way to talk about time, then it can easily be translated 
into something more palatable.  Given JCA’s network analysis, the content of water or time is supposed to be 
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(Rt) Time is an objective feature of the world, is a global now shared by all and is 
different from here. 
In accord with JCA, (Rt) is indicative of a set of properties, the majority of which must be 
had by something in order for that thing to be the referent of time. 
 Now that we have our results from JCA’s first step, we can move to its second step.  
In the second step, we make recourse to empirical claims to determine whether such claims 
entail time.  An example that is parallel to the earlier water example can be constructed for 
identifying our folk time with the time of some neo-Lorentzian interpretation of SR, which 
involves a preferred reference frame and absolute simultaneity
 18
.  I denote this time as ‘L-
time’.  To make the parallel more apparent, I do not use ‘L-time’ in the argument; just as the 
water example uses ‘H2O’, which can be regarded as a description of a chemical compound, 
the following example involving time uses the description ‘something that is characterized by 
a preferred reference frame and absolute simultaneity’.  Moreover, I am not presenting a 
parallel to the entire water argument above, rather I am omitting a parallel to (P1) and (C2) 
above to make the ensuing discussion less complex. 
(Pt2) Something that is characterized by a preferred reference frame and absolute 
simultaneity is the timey stuff of our acquaintance. 
 (Pt3) Time is the timey stuff of our acquaintance. 
(Ct) So, something that is characterized by a preferred reference frame and absolute 
simultaneity is time. 
Assuming for the sake of this example that there are empirical reasons to favour the neo-
Lorentzian interpretation, (Pt2) is an empirically established claim.  Since I am only using 
                                                                                                                                                        
filled out by determining what plays the water role or time role at each world.  So, such timey stuff can be 
translated into: whatever plays the time role in our world.  Moreover, I have used ‘timey stuff’ above to make 
the parallel with Jackson’s explicit example more apparent.   However, some commentators, e.g., Miscevic 
2001, do use the translated version for water. 
18 Craig 2001 is advocates this interpretation to defend presentism.  However, this is a nonstandard view of SR: 
see Wüthrich 2010 for discussion. 
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this interpretation in order to mirror the water argument in which a folk concept is identified 
with something, I do not argue for the legitimacy of the interpretation.
19
  (Pt3) is known a 
priori as a result of the previous step.  Moreover, (Pt2) establishes to what time refers in our 
world given the conditions as to what counts as water according to our folk theory, as laid out 
in (Rt).  Since the preferred reference frame and absolute simultaneity of L-time can provide 
us with folk time’s objective, global now that is shared by all, we can conclude by identifying 
L-time with our folk time. 
 Furthermore, suppose that we consider the time of the Einsteinian interpretation of SR 
(E-SR), which lacks a preferred reference frame and absolute simultaneity.  The time of (Pt3) 
is specified by (Rt).  If we assume, for the sake of this example, that E-SR’s lack of a 
preferred reference frame prohibits time from being an objective feature of the world and that 
its lack of absolute simultaneity entails that there is no global now that can be shared by all, 
then there is no feature of the world that is picked out by our folk time.  Thus, there is no 
identity between time and E-SR’s time.  Moreover, according to JCA, since nothing 
corresponds to our folk time given the truth of E-SR, this folk time must be eliminated. 
 In effect, JCA seems as applicable to water as to at least this version of folk time.  
However, JCA faces several problems. 
2.2 The A Priori and Referent Problems for Temporal Concepts 
 There are two major problems with JCA in regard to its application to temporal 
concepts.  The first concerns JCA’s focus on the a priori, and the second deals with the 
standard referents of the concepts that are used in JCA.  Below, I present each of the 
problems, apply them to our temporal example and state their ramifications for an analysis of 
time in scientific theories.   
2.2.1 JCA and the A Priori 
 The a priori, as explained above, plays a key role in Jackson’s development and 
legitimization of conceptual analysis.  He wants JCA to combine a priority and 
informativeness, i.e., substantial content, in a fashion that gets at substantial truths through 
                                                 
19 See Balashov and Janssen 2000 for criticism of Craig’s arguments for this interpretation.  
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armchair analysis and that, as an a priori enquiry, is demarcated from empirical enquiries.  In 
my exposition of JCA, following Jackson, I glossed over specifying which claims are 
supposed to be known a priori.  However, Miscevic (2001) argues that once this gloss is 
spelled out, the application of JCA to empirical matters results in claims that are either 
informative yet known a posteriori or are known a priori yet non-informative. 
 Miscevic’s (2001) argument, supplemented with Henderson and Horgan’s (2001) 
links among armchair analysis, epistemology and concepts, goes as follows.  In view of the 
considerations above, it appears that statements such as, (P3) ‘Water is the watery stuff of our 
acquaintance’ and (Pt3) ‘Time is the timey stuff of our acquaintance’, are a priori; on the a 
priori reading of (P3), ‘water’ denotes the watery stuff of our acquaintance regardless of what 
the list of properties that the watery stuff of our acquaintance turns out to have.  However, 
such statements, though known a priori, are tautologies and non-informative. 
In order for JCA to provide substantial a priori known truths, the a priori must not be 
limited to statements such as (P3) and (Pt3).  Recall that the first step of JCA is to refine the 
target folk concept.  This is done by determining the role of a folk concept in our folk theory.  
Once this role is specified, a list of properties of the concept’s referent, e.g., being wet, filling 
lakes, etc., can be acquired.   Jackson (1994, 105) does state that this step of JCA is to be 
done in the armchair a priori.   
As Miscevic (2001, 23) points out, Jackson suggests that the resulting specification of 
the folk concept’s role, e.g., (R) Water is the stuff that is wet, fills lakes, etc., must be 
considered a priori.  While he is vague regarding the status of (R) in his water example, 
Jackson makes explicit in other examples that the resulting specification of a concept’s role is 
supposed to be known a priori.
20
  This seems reasonable given that (P3) is known a priori 
and that one uses nonexperiential armchair justification to get (R) from (P3); from the a 
                                                 
20 For example, as Beaney (2001, 527) points out, Jackson spells out ‘Yellowness is the yellowy stuff of our 
acquaintance’ with these two claims which Jackson (1998, 89-93) indicates are also known a priori: Yellowness 
is the property of objects putatively presented to subjects when those objects look yellow, and The property of 
objects putatively presented to subjects when the objects look yellow is at least a normal cause of their looking 
yellow.  In effect, Jackson suggests the specification of a concept’s role is also known a priori. 
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priority of the starting point of P3 and of the nonexperiential mode of analysis used to derive 
(R), (R) seems also, thereby, known a priori. 
Provided that he can legitimately claim that the process used to derive (R) provides 
nonexperiential justification and that informative (R) is known a priori, Jackson can maintain 
that JCA is demarcated from empirical modes of enquiry and results in substantial truths for 
even empirical matters. 
However, the claim that armchair analysis is nonexperiential is problematic.  Recall 
that Jackson claims one utilizes only armchair activity in the first step.  The justification 
obtained from “‘the agent’s armchair,’ without ‘going out’ and collecting empirical evidence 
regarding what the actual world is like” is termed ‘epistemic justification by reflection’ by 
Henderson and Horgan (2001, 2-3).  So, in JCA, one justifies (R) by means of epistemic 
reflection.  
This epistemic reflection used in JCA’s first step requires an experiential source.  
Henderson and Horgan argue that it incorporates experiential justification.  According to 
them, a requirement for justification by epistemic reflection to yield a priori truths is that it 
must “draw on only what is accessible by virtue of having acquired the relevant concepts” 
(2001, 2).  This requirement is supposed to allow the justification to be nonexperiential by 
allowing one to only use meanings that are available in the armchair and, thus, by bracketing 
off such concepts’ empirical origins. 
However, Henderson and Horgan point out that the means with which one ‘acquires 
the relevant concepts’ depend upon experience in most cases.   While it is beyond the scope 
of this chapter to explore the various means of ‘acquiring a concept’, a particular means is 
required in JCA’s epistemic reflection given its use of folk theories.  Because a folk concept 
just is the role it plays in a folk theory in JCA, ‘acquiring the relevant concepts’ amounts to 
‘acquiring the relevant folk theory’.   
How does one acquire the relevant folk theory?  As stated earlier, Jackson claims we 
establish our folk theory by appealing to the consensus on the intuitions about possible cases.  
This consensus is supposed to establish claims like (R) by revealing that our shared intuitions 
indicate that our folk water refers to something that falls from the sky, is wet, etc.  
Nevertheless, contra Jackson’s claim that these intuitions must have an a priori source, these 
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shared intuitions and the folk theory that allegedly reveals these intuitions appear to have an 
experiential origin.   
In the case of water, as Miscevic (2001, 24) argues, the folk theory itself has 
experiential origins since it is, or is at least based on, an empirical folk-hydrology.  This folk-
hydrology relies on a community of speakers who are able to pick out the salient cases of 
water in local environments as the clear, wet stuff that falls from the sky, etc.  At the very 
least, the factual assumptions regarding water that are part of this folk-hydrology, e.g., fills 
lakes, falls from the sky, are appealed to while in the armchair examining our intuitions about 
possible cases.  In effect, to know to what stuff water refers one needs empirical information 
about one’s or a community’s local environment; to know that water refers to the stuff in 
lakes, one needs at least information about one’s or the community’s surroundings. 
So, to evaluate possible cases and, thus, establish our folk theory, the armchair analyst 
initially requires some empirical knowledge as to what stuff a community of speakers refer to 
with water.  Moreover, though a folk theory may be internalized in the sense of referring to 
one’s beliefs about water or upon one’s beliefs about the beliefs of a community of speakers, 
the folk theory is still initially obtained through experiential means.  Furthermore, rather than 
through appeal to a priori known intuitions, the apparent consensus regarding our shared 
intuitions can be explained by our shared experience of the wet, clear stuff that falls from the 
sky and fills lakes. 
 Miscevic’s argument can be extended to our earlier folk time. Like the folk theory that 
involves water, the folk theory that involves time, which is supposed to be characterized in 
the earlier Callender quote, is based on experience.  This can be exemplified with (Rt)’s 
component of having a shared global now.  There being a shared global now can be 
considered to be a generalization of the apparent
21
 lack of time-lag in our everyday 
interaction with medium-sized dry goods and people.  It seems that the things we experience 
at a particular time are occurring at the same time we perceive them.  For example, it seems 
that the page that you are currently reading is there with you now.  From this, you draw the 
                                                 
21 See Butterfield 1984 for an attempt to explain away this folk feature of time given the pervasiveness of time-
lag. 
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conclusion that you and this page are both occupying the present.  In view of tokens of such 
experience, we draw the generalization that there is a global now shared by all.  So, at least 
this component of (Rt) involves experience since it is based on our interaction with the world; 
the armchair analyst requires empirical information in constructing a folk theory from which 
(Rt) is derived.   
So, for empirical concepts like water and the previously exemplified folk time, our 
intuitions regarding reference rely on experience, and our folk theory is formed through 
experience.  In effect, experience is required to acquire the relevant folk theory and, in effect, 
to specify the water or time role in this theory.  Thus, epistemic reflection provides 
experiential justification for the propositions that serve to specify concepts, e.g., (R), (Rt), 
which are part of a folk theory that incorporates experience.  Given that the a priori must not 
require experiential justification, epistemic reflection cannot establish a priori truths in all 
cases.  Instead, it may establish a posteriori truths.
22
 
Thus, the specification of the watery stuff of our acquaintance that JCA is supposed to 
provide is a posteriori, though it does establish something informative.
23
  Being a posteriori 
is problematic since JCA is supposed to be distinct from empirical means of analysis.  Thus, 
provided that JCA’s first stage only uses justification via epistemic reflection, JCA cannot be 
used to informatively examine concepts whose folk theory involves empirical claims.  JCA’s 
commitment to only concepts known a priori and its first stage’s separation from empirical 
means of enquiry make its range limited to a priori known concepts whose first stage, which 
                                                 
22 Due to the role of experiential justification in epistemic reflection, Henderson and Horgan opt to distinguish 
between high-grade a priori, which does not require experiential justification, and low-grade a priori, which 
does require some sort of experiential justification, e.g., the type that is involved in epistemic reflection.  Since 
Jackson seems to require the a priori to be high-grade in order to maintain the distinction between JCA and 
empirical enquires, I do not explore the low-grade option here. 
23
 While there may be some options for importing the empirical in one’s armchair analysis, e.g., Bonjour’s 1998 
suggestion that after incorporating the empirical features, such as filling lakes, into the concept, statements such 
as (R), which express this incorporation, get promoted to a priori, it is not clear that one can do so in JCA given 
its commitment to conceptual analysis’ a priori domain of enquiry being separated off from that of science’s 
empirical domain.  See Miscevic 2000, 2001 for discussion of these options and their problematic impact on 
JCA’s exclusive a priori analysis. 
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involves the refinement and specification of the concept, does not require reference to 
empirical matters.
24
 
 Regarding temporal concepts, JCA is only applicable to those that are known a priori, 
e.g., perhaps that of Kant
25
, and that do not come from folk theories that involve experience.  
Further, since our target is to provide some means of analysing temporal concepts in 
empirical, physical theories, JCA, as requiring an a priori starting point and analysis, would 
be severely limiting in this domain.  At best, JCA would allow one to refine a priori known 
temporal concepts without reference to the experiential and then to check whether the refined 
a priori concepts would be eliminated in view of, e.g., Barbour’s view. 
 The upshot of JCA’s restrictive focus on the a priori is that an adequate analysis of 
time in physical theories cannot be limited to the a priori and, thus, must incorporate the 
empirical in the refinement of concepts. 
2.2.2 Concepts and Referents 
 As stated above, Jackson assumes that all legitimate concepts must have referents that 
are actual physical properties or objects.  Following Rey’s (2004) use of ‘empty concept’, I 
here use this term to refer to concepts that do not have actual physical properties of objects as 
referents.  Regardless of its origins, this assumption is problematic in an analysis of time.  
Below I provide two cases in which time or its features may not have such a referent.  Then, I 
discuss such cases’ impact on JCA. 
First, suppose that whatever fills the time role is something that serves as a measure, 
is a convention and has equal intervals.  The referent of such time may turn out to be a 
measure based on the duration of some apparently regular motion, e.g., the rotation of the 
                                                 
24 Though one may appeal to different theories of reference, e.g., Pettit’s 2004 causal descriptivism, or to 
different formulations, e.g., a conditional formulation in Chalmers and Jackson 2001, in order to maintain the a 
priori status of JCA’s claims, whether a claims is known a priori is an epistemological matter.  So, such 
strategies only succeed if they can successfully divorce the evidential justification from such claims and are able 
to provide some rationale for doing so.  See Miscevic 2000 for arguments against being able to do so. 
25 See Kant (1996, A30-1/B46-7). 
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Earth on its axis, supplemented with some mathematical correction for irregularities in this 
motion, e.g., taking the mean of such rotation, and divided into some equal intervals by 
convention. 
 Though such time has an empirical basis, namely the rotating of the Earth, its referent 
can be construed as a line segment divided into intervals of equal length.  This purely 
geometrical construal of time is not supposed to have a physical object or property as a 
referent.  As a geometrical object, such a line is, strictly speaking, breadthless and is divided 
into intervals by dimensionless points.  Such objects are uninstantiable and have merely 
physical approximations.
26
  In effect, the concepts that have such geometrical referents are 
not supposed to have physical objects or properties as referents.  A possible reason for having 
this purely geometrical referent for time is that, given that this measure is conventional, there 
is no natural measure to which time refers.  So, if one cannot choose a physical object or 
change as a standard since none exhibit the required features, e.g., they lack equal intervals, 
then such time would lack a physical referent.  However, the lack of such a physical referent 
is not indication that there is no such time.  Instead, this would suggest that the referent is 
mathematical or geometrical.  Thus, time’s features of having equal intervals and being 
conventional may not specify a physical property or object as its referent.   
While I chose the previous example because it more obviously is a folk time, one that 
first year students often provide, the problem of assuming that all temporal concepts have 
physical referents is clearer in a less obviously commonsense case.  Yet, one may dispute that 
JCA is supposed to apply to this second case since the analysis is only explicitly applicable to 
folk concepts.  Nevertheless, I am adding this example here in order to enhance the need for 
an analysis of temporal concepts to include an account of empty concepts. 
The second and less folky example involves time as abstracted from Minkowskian 
spacetime, which, assuming you’re not a substantivalist, can be regarded as mathematically 
abstract in that it serves as a mere convenient calculational aid that says nothing about 
                                                 
26 This line of argument appears, among other places, in Plato, e.g., (Republic VII, 529), who states that physical 
objects can only be imperfect representations of geometrical objects.   
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ontology.
27
  If time has a purely mathematical or geometrical referent, then, unless one 
accepts some extremely strong realism, in which mathematical and geometrical entities are 
physical, this time does not require a physical referent.   
These empty referent cases are problematic for JCA.  JCA clearly works for concepts 
like water that are supposed to have a physical referent; if, upon empirical investigation, the 
concept is not found to have a physical referent, then the concept is to be eliminated.  
However, JCA offers no explicit means of dealing with concepts that are supposed to lack a 
physical referent.  Without an apparatus to deal with such empty concepts, JCA is limited to 
concepts that specify some physical referent.  While it may work for some temporal concepts, 
such as, arguably, for our earlier folk time, that are supposed to have some sort of objective 
referent that is in the world, e.g., a moving now
28
, this limitation is problematic for analyzing 
time generally since it may involve empty features, like those of the previous two examples. 
 Thus, in order to not rule out such empty temporal features and concepts in our 
analysis, we need a means of incorporating and examining empty concepts.  
2.3 JCA and Naïve Metaphysical and Ontological Realism 
If the objections of §2.2.1 and §2.2.2 are correct, then JCA is not applicable, as 
Jackson claims, to even folk concepts.  Rather, its scope is limited to a priori known concepts 
that are supposed to have actual physical referents.   
However, even granting that it is just applicable to cases of a priori-derived folk 
concepts with actual physical referents, JCA suffers from the problem of naïve metaphysical 
and ontological realism
29
, i.e., it just presupposes that the metaphysics and ontology of a 
physical theory are straightforward and, in effect, that one may just read the metaphysics and 
                                                 
27 This example is discussed in Craig (2001, 193). 
28 Dolev (2007, 66) teases out the ontological requirements of the moving now among other temporal features.  
29 This terminology is not without precedence in the domain of physical theories.  See, e.g., Dürr et al. 1996, 
who use ‘naïve realism about operators’ to refer to various ways of taking seriously that operators are 
observable, measurable entities, and Earman 2006, who uses ‘naïve realism’ for the practice of reading our 
ontology and ideology off the standard presentations of a theory.  
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ontology of physical theories directly off the theory.  For short, I refer to this as ‘naïve 
realism’.  In this subsection, I explain the manner in which JCA employs it and, 
subsequently, illustrate why such use is problematic. 
JCA, as an a priori domain of enquiry that is supposed to be separate from empirical 
enquiries, is not applicable to concepts that include experiential justification.  This limitation 
prohibits JCA on its own from offering an analysis of a posteriori known concepts.  Thus, 
JCA alone cannot examine the concepts involved in scientific theories.  So, without some 
supplementary analysis of a posteriori concepts, JCA cannot examine scientific concepts.  
This suggests that, at best, JCA brackets off the questions of how to examine scientific 
concepts and how to determine the properties associated with their referents. 
However, rather than merely bracketing off these questions, Jackson seems to answer 
them by appealing to naïve realism in JCA’s second stage.  JCA’s second stage requires some 
empirically established premise, e.g., (P2), (Pt2).  Jackson claims that such premises are 
assumed as given through ‘empirical investigation’.  For example, we know through 
chemistry that H2O is the watery stuff of our acquaintance.   
How do we establish to what ‘H2O’ refers? Jackson provides an answer to this in 
honing his physicalism: 
[I]t is reasonable to suppose that physical science, despite its known inadequacies, has 
advanced sufficiently for us to be confident of the kinds of properties and relations 
that are needed to give a complete account of non-sentient reality.  They will broadly 
be of a kind with those that appear in current science. (1998, 7) 
In effect, Jackson answers that physical science in its current form can straightforwardly 
provide us with the kinds of physical properties and relations that exist.  So, in the case of 
water, chemistry provides us with the kinds of properties and relations, e.g., being hydrogen, 
being a covalent bond, and these properties are assumed to exist.  In effect, ‘H2O’ refers to 
some chemical compound that exists.  Furthermore, since we just read our ontology of 
elements and their relations off chemical theory, Jackson seems to promote naïve realism.   
However, the use of such naïve realism is problematic for two reasons. 
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First, the sole use of naïve realism risks ignoring other ontological and metaphysical 
options which a particular theory may have.  In the H2O case, alternative and competing 
ontologies and metaphysics have been proposed for chemistry’s kinds of properties and 
relations.  For example, due to the application of quantum theory to chemistry and quantum 
theory’s lack of such bonds, whether covalent bonds exist and whether their explanatorily 
relevant properties can be attributed to other chemical entities has been debated.  While I do 
not elaborate on the details of this debate here,
30
 it is important to note that even in the 
apparently straightforward case of H2O, there are other ontological readings, e.g., ones in 
which covalent bonds are completely eliminated, and metaphysical readings of the theory, 
e.g., ones in which covalent bonds qua fundamental properties are replaced by covalent bonds 
qua emergent relations.   
This first general problem of naïve realism impacts JCA by potentially limiting its 
second stage’s results.  The naïve reading of the theory establishes the second stage’s 
‘empirically established’ premise, e.g., (P2), (Pt2).  If a theory has alternative metaphysics 
and ontologies, then JCA is merely evaluating whether a folk concept can be identified with 
an ontology and metaphysics obtained from a naïve reading.  In effect, the conclusions drawn 
from JCA’s second stage are restricted to an ontology and metaphysics from a naïve reading 
of the theory; JCA, at least given Jackson’s preceding quote, only allows one to draw 
identities between folk concepts and a physical theory’s naïve ontology/metaphysics. 
Second, by creating one’s ontology and metaphysics with whatever can be read off 
the physical theory, naïve realism risks incorporating entities or metaphysics that are 
redundant, irrelevant or inconsistent.
31
  Though one may reply that one could be a slightly 
less naïve realist by, e.g., rejecting certain salient redundancies or resolving select 
inconsistencies, the primary issue that I want to emphasize about such approaches is their 
lack of a systematic analysis.  Without some principled means of assessing the commitments 
of being a naïve realist about a theory, one has little guidance as to exactly which ontological 
and metaphysical tenets one should accept.  Naïve realism offers no such means explicitly.  
                                                 
30 See Hendry 2008 for a detailed discussion of this debate. 
31 Dürr et al. 1996 point out this specific problem in the context of naïve realism about operators. 
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Nevertheless, in order to illustrate how naïve realism’s lack of a clear method can cause an 
inconsistency, I borrow a means of assessment from Saunders and apply it to a quantum 
example.   
Saunders (2006) offers some procedure for the naïve realist.  He claims that we 
should list the allowable predicates and terms that are dictated by grounds internal to the 
theory, e.g., only allow predicates of measurable properties and relations.  From this list, we 
can establish our ontology by admitting only the entities that are required by the distinctions 
that these predicates and terms establish.  For example, suppose when talking about fermions 
and bosons, we use ‘fermion’ and ‘boson’ as subject terms that have predicates, e.g., ‘has 
charge’.  This use indicates that fermions and bosons are objects and charge is a property that 
is attributable to such objects.
32
  Thereby, we can get our ontology from how we refer to our 
theory. 
Further suppose that all objects are individuals.  This supposition can easily be 
imparted to our quantum objects, e.g., their corresponding subject terms normally refer to 
individual objects.  Can we get some metaphysical apparatus that secures such particle’s 
individuality?  Saunders proposes a weak form of discernibility that all fermions can satisfy, 
while elementary bosons cannot.  In effect, assuming that this is the weakest form of 
discernibility available and that discernibility is indicative of individuality, fermions are 
individual objects, while bosons are non-individuals and, thus, are not objects.  I am not 
presenting the details of the case here since this characterization is sufficient to establish that 
such naïve readings’ lack of method can cause, in this case, an inconsistent metaphysics in 
                                                 
32 Saunders 2003, 2006 would likely object to my use of the subjects of sentences to establish the objects of our 
ontology.  His approach in this case is to establish the properties and relations in view of the predicates relevant 
to a theory.  Then, he proceeds to determine whether the set of properties and relations predicated of a particular 
subject term are discernible from other sets of the same properties and relations.  Since he claims that 
individuality, which is indicated by such discernibility, is the mark of objecthood, the discernible fermions are 
objects, while indiscernible bosons are not.  However, this difference between Saunders’ naïve realist approach 
and the naïve realist approach suggested above indicates that metaphysical presuppositions, e.g., taking 
properties, rather than objects, to be fundamental, guide naïve realism and can result in various ontologies.  If 
this is so, the need for some method of assessing the commitments of being a naïve realist about a theory is even 
more pressing. 
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which bosons are and are not objects.
33
  Moreover, it is not clear what one should do at such 
an impasse.  Should one reject the initial ontology and/or metaphysics that was read off the 
theory, the metaphysical supposition that all individuals are objects or the link between 
discernibility and identity? 
Since there does not appear to be a principled way of answering this question or, 
generally, a systemized means conducting a naïve realist reading of a theory, naïve realism in 
its present form does not offer an adequate means of providing a theory’s metaphysics and 
ontology. 
JCA relies on naïve realism, yet it merely assumes that naïve realism offers a 
consistent, non-redundant, relevant ontology and metaphysics.  Since naïve realism does not 
appear to have a principled means of providing such an ontology and metaphysics, naïve 
realism’s ontology, metaphysics and concepts, which may indicate its ontological and 
metaphysical commitments, are themselves in need of analysis.  This suggests that the 
concepts associated with physical theories cannot be taken for granted.  In turn, the second 
problem of naïve realism indicates that the concepts of scientific theories also require a 
conceptual analysis; a conceptual analysis may provide a method to refine the concepts we 
associate with scientific theories in order to avoid the problem of incorporating redundant, 
irrelevant or inconsistent claims about a theory’s metaphysical and ontological commitments. 
In sum, the upshots of JCA’s reliance on naïve realism are as follows.  The first 
problem with naïve realism concerns JCA’s ignorance of non-naïve readings.  It suggests that 
we should be aware of alternative metaphysics and ontologies for, at the very least, properly 
qualifying the conclusions we make relative to the particular set of metaphysics and ontology 
that one associates with the scientific theory.   
                                                 
33 Though this example has been presented rather crudely, note that are a few options in the literature to deal 
with this inconsistency.  French and Krause 2006, for example, claim that such objects are indeed objects yet are 
non-individuals.  Additionally, Saunders’ own view can be read in terms of his Quinean project in which 
variables correspond to objects.   In view of such objects, he formulates a means of individuating them, and 
rejects bosons as objects because they are not individuals given the individuation criterion. 
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Moreover, there is no reason, other than Jackson’s advocacy of naïve realism, for JCA 
to be restricted to using the metaphysics and ontology of naïve realism in its second stage of 
analysis.  It could easily exchange its naïve realist commitments in, e.g., (P2), for those of an 
alternative reading of a scientific theory. 
However, the second problem, which may also apply to non-naïve alternatives that 
have no principled way of maintaining the consistency, non-redundancy and relevancy of 
their metaphysical and ontological commitments, suggests that one cannot take the concepts 
that express such commitments for granted.  So, a conceptual analysis that is applicable to the 
concepts involved in scientific theories offers a way to avoid these problems.   
Unfortunately, JCA, as dealing only with a priori concepts, cannot be extended to the 
empirically justified concepts of science.  Nevertheless, JCA may be supplemented with a 
separate conceptual analysis for experientially justified concepts.  But, some may find the 
resulting two-tiered analysis, which requires two sub-analyses, to be unpalatably 
unparsimonious when compared with a single analysis.  Furthermore, in view of JCA’s 
problems concerning the a priori and empty concepts, substantial revision of JCA is required 
to analyse even folk time.  
3 Towards an Analysis of Scientific Concepts 
 Since JCA neither provides a satisfactory account of folk time nor offers any means of 
analysing the concepts of scientific theories, I approach developing a working conceptual 
analysis for time in Barbour’s view in two stages.   
In the first stage, I construct a conceptual analysis of the network theory variety for 
folk time.  This analysis aims to resolve the problems associated with JCA’s a priori and sole 
focus on non-empty concepts.  Such problems are resolved by using portions of an alternative 
conceptual analysis that is sketched by Miscevic (2005).  As inspired by Miscevic, I denote 
this working folk conceptual analysis as ‘MCA’. 
In the second stage, I attempt to provide some means of analysing the concepts of 
scientific theories.  Since I am here concerned with analysing time in Barbour’s view, I focus 
on developing an account for time in physical theories.  So, I begin by applying MCA to such 
time.  While MCA provides some preliminary method for the analysis of such time, its 
30 
 
application to physical theories is not without problems; in §3.2, I provide the following three 
criticisms of such application.   
First, I present theory theory’s general problem of identifying its concepts.  Rips’ 
discussion of this problem suggests a few solutions in the domain of physical theories; 
however, I argue that these solutions may risk naïve realism. 
Second, I examine the problem of MCA being limited to a single scientific theory.  I 
do so by applying MCA to Esfeld’s discussion of time’s directionality in QT and GR.  Since 
the target of our conceptual analysis is Barbour’s view, which involves both QT and GR, I 
claim that MCA may be problematically limited to a particular scientific theory. 
Third, I develop a suggestion made by Esfeld to the effect that the restriction of one’s 
analysis to the concepts of a scientific theory potentially creates a gap between those 
scientific concepts and our folk concepts.  This objection is made salient through its 
application to time’s feature of directionality.  In view of this gap and the problem it causes in 
the application of MCA to Barbour’s view, which also attempts to explain our everyday 
experience of time, it seems that our conceptual analysis must bridge this gap. 
From these three criticisms, I derive three desiderata for a working conceptual 
analysis that appears applicable to at least Barbour’s view.  These desiderata are outlined 
below in §3.3.  
Finally, I modify MCA in a fashion which allows it to fulfil all the desiderata.  The 
amended and extended version of MCA is referred to below as the Alternative Conceptual 
Analysis, or ‘ACA’. 
3.1 A Working Analysis of Folk Concepts: MCA 
 I develop a working analysis of folk concepts, i.e., one which can address JCA’s 
problems of having a focus on a priori known concepts and of only being applicable to 
concepts that are supposed to be non-empty.  Since the modifications made to address these 
problems are largely drawn from Miscevic (2005), I refer to this modified analysis of folk 
concepts as ‘MCA’.   
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My rationale for developing a folk account is twofold.  First, JCA’s use of naïve 
realism reveals the need for an analysis of scientific concepts.  However, there appears to be 
no systematic analysis available for such concepts.  Yet, such systematic analyses have been 
developed for folk concepts.  So, I am endeavouring to use an analysis of folk concepts, 
which addresses the problems of JCA, as an initial model for the analysis of scientific 
concepts.  Second, Barbour considers our folk time and offers some explanation of it.
34
  So, in 
order to address this component of Barbour’s view, I need a working analysis of folk 
concepts. 
To develop this account, we shall start off by construing MCA as a form of network 
analysis for reasons given in §1.  Thus, a concept is examined in terms of the role it plays in a 
network of principles that constitutes some theory(s).  And, the meanings of terms are 
identical with the roles concepts play in our folk theory. 
The problems with JCA indicate the direction in which we develop MCA.  JCA’s 
focus on a priori known concepts was found to be too restrictive since many temporal 
concepts seem to involve experiential justification.  In effect, MCA must offer some means of 
incorporating concepts that involve experiential justification.
35
  Additionally, JCA was shown 
not to address empty concepts, i.e., concepts that are not supposed to have a physical referent.  
Because such practice excludes empty temporal features, e.g., those that are purely 
mathematical, MCA must apply to such concepts. 
Let’s proceed by using JCA as a rough guide for MCA.  MCA involves two stages.  
In the first stage, one starts by specifying the folk theory from our armchair intuitions about 
possible cases.  As argued in §2.2.1, experiential data may inform one’s intuitions.  So, MCA 
incorporates both experientially and nonexperientially justified intuitions in the formation of 
one’s folk theory.   
                                                 
34 For example, much of his 1999 as well as his work on time capsules addresses our folk time.  This account of 
our temporal experience is presented in Ch5 and discussed in Ch6. 
35 I assume that a naturalistic conceptual analysis is a legitimate form of conceptual analysis.  See, e.g., Miscevic 
2005b for arguments against the traditional link between conceptual analysis and a priority. 
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While this move seems to be an easy means of incorporating concepts that involve 
experiential justification, it comes at a cost.  JCA’s sole use of a priori intuitions allowed it to 
assume that there is a shared set of intuitions, which is revealed by our consensus regarding 
possible cases.  However, when we incorporate experientially supported intuitions, we run 
the risk of adding a wide range of potentially conflicting intuitions into our folk theory.
36
   
Miscevic (2005, 460) exemplifies such conflicts with number.  Additionally, he 
suggests a way of addressing them, which will be incorporated in MCA.  Suppose we have 
formulated our folk theory that involves number by consulting our experientially supported 
intuitions.  From this, we specify the number role as:  
(Rn) Number is the language in which the book of nature is written and lacks a 
referent that can causally influence nature.
37
 
(Rn)’s components seem to clash; the second portion indicates that the referent of number 
cannot affect nature, while the first portion seems to presuppose such interaction
38
.  Thus, we 
need some means of resolving such clashes.  At this juncture, Micsevic (2005, 460) suggests 
that we engage in metaphysics and epistemology to resolve such clashes in our folk concept.  
MCA will follow Miscevic’s lead by suggesting that one engages in metaphysics and 
epistemology in an attempt to resolve the clashes that occur from incorporating experientially 
                                                 
36 For the purpose of simplifying this subsection’s discussion regarding MCA, I focus on conflicts that are 
clashes which arise within the specification of a particular concept’s role.  However, such conflicts may also 
occur between different roles.  Additionally, such conflicts may take the form of clashes, redundancies and 
irrelevancies. 
37 This example is from Miscevic (2005, 460). 
38 However, Miscevic’s example of number being the language in which the book of nature of written seems to 
have number serving merely as a means of representing nature, rather than as something interacting with it.  To 
get this example to work in the fashion Miscevic intends, it seems that we should assume a Pythagorean stance 
on numbers and ratios, e.g., Aristotle’s presentation of Eurytus’s view in which numbers are causes of 
substances by being the points that bind things into certain shapes.  See Huffman 2005 for discussion of 
Aristotle’s presentation of his account. 
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justified intuitions in one’s folk theory.39  However, note that since I will be focusing more on 
the metaphysical issues that arise, I henceforth bracket off discussion of the epistemological 
feature.  Additionally, Miscevic does not state exactly how one should ‘engage in 
metaphysics’ here.  For the purposes of this chapter, MCA, too, is silent as to how one should 
proceed metaphysically.  Nevertheless, the activity of metaphysics will also be incorporated 
in ACA below.  Moreover, this ‘engaging in metaphysics’ will be developed in Ch6 primarily 
in which I apply ACA to Barbour’s view and attempt to resolve clashing components of its 
time via seeking alternative metaphysical options.  Plus, in Ch7 I discuss the ramifications of 
this application for this practice of ‘engaging in metaphysics’. 
 In effect, MCA has a procedure to incorporate folk concepts that involve experiential 
justification.  Using both experientially and nonexperientially justified intuitions about 
possible cases, we can construct a folk theory and, therewith, specify a concept’s role in the 
theory in a fashion similar to that of JCA.  However, as (Rn) illustrates, the components of 
such roles may clash.  In such cases, one must engage in metaphysics in an attempt to resolve 
such clashes. 
 Before we can leave MCA’s first stage, we must address JCA’s problematic focus on 
empty concepts.  Recall that the main purpose of JCA’s first stage is to establish what can 
count as the physical referent of a folk concept.  Since JCA is only to deal with concepts that 
are supposed to have physical referent, this purpose of JCA’s stage seems warranted.  
However, since we want MCA to incorporate concepts that are not supposed to have 
referents, we must make MCA’s purpose more generic, i.e., it seeks to specify a concept’s 
role in a folk theory.  In effect, the role’s specification may or may not refer to physical 
properties or objects. 
This generic purpose of MCA’s first stage raises the question of how one can 
determine whether a concept is supposed to have a physical referent.  In some cases, the 
specification of a concept’s role and its metaphysical refinement may reveal whether the 
                                                 
39 I assume that folk theories that incorporate clashing and even inconsistent claims can still be called ‘theories’.  
In the context of classical electrodynamics, see Frisch 2005 for arguments in support of the claim that there are 
inconsistent theories, and Vickers 2008 for discussion of Frisch. 
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concept is supposed to have a physical referent.  For example, if one assumes the 
metaphysical claim that the ability to causally interact with physical objects is the mark of 
something being a physical object, (Rn)’s second component indicates that number is not 
supposed to have a physical referent.  In effect, MCA’s first stage aims to specify a concept’s 
role in a folk theory, and this role may be indicative of whether the concept has a physical 
referent. 
If we continue to mirror JCA, after we specify the concept, we are to proceed to the 
second stage of JCA.  Recall that this second stage involves determining whether a physical 
theory posits some physical referent that has most of the properties listed in the specification 
of the concept’s role.  As such, JCA’s second stage is not applicable to empty concepts.   
So, I propose that MCA incorporates JCA’s second stage largely as is.  When dealing 
with a concept that is supposed to have a physical referent, one makes recourse to some 
‘empirically established’ claim in order to determine whether a concept refers.  If such a 
concept turns out to have such a physical referent, one may use the physical referent’s 
properties to further specify the concept.  Such influence on the concept and the folk theory 
seems permissible since MCA allows experiential justification to forge its folk theory.  If 
such a concept does not turn out to have a physical referent, then one can either reject the 
concept or, if there is some reason to keep the concept, attempt to modify the specification of 
the concept’s role through metaphysics.  However, when dealing with an empty concept, one 
does not proceed to the second stage in MCA.
40
   
This provides us with a sketch of MCA’s second step.  Discussion of MCA’s second 
stage has been rather schematic here because, as we’ll see in the next section, it, as still 
incorporating some ‘empirically established’ premise, suffers from naïve realism.  In effect, 
there is not much need to develop it here.  Moreover, I have presented this sketch to show in 
                                                 
40 This modification is inspired by two principles which Miscevic (2005, 449, 451) adopts.  These principles are: 
Principle of External Definitions: Where there turns out to be a referent to a concept, we turn to an examination 
of the referent to determine the concept’s constitutive conditions. 
The Principle of Internal Rule: Where there is no referent, all we have is the internal rule for the concept alone. 
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§3.4 that much of MCA’s second stage schema is present in ACA.  So, the preceding sketch 
should be sufficient for present purposes. 
In sum, MCA for folk concepts proceeds in two stages.  In the first stage, one uses 
experientially and nonexperientially justified intuitions about possible cases to construct a 
folk theory.  From this folk theory, one specifies the concept’s role in the theory.  Due to the 
incorporation of experience, the components of the resulting specification of a concept’s role 
may clash.  One should engage in metaphysics to try to resolve such clashes.   
To determine whether one should proceed to MCA’s second stage, one needs to 
ascertain whether the concept is supposed to have a physical referent.  This may be done by 
consulting the specification of the concept’s role and its associated metaphysics.  If the 
concept is supposed to have a physical referent, proceed to MCA’s second stage.  Otherwise, 
one should stop after the first stage.   
Furthermore, due to MCA’s incorporation of the experiential and its use of 
metaphysical enquiry, the results of MCA’s second stage have a few more options, in 
comparison to JCA’s immodest folk eliminativism.  A concept that is found to have a 
physical referent may be informed by the referent’s actual properties.  On the other hand, a 
concept that is found not to have a physical referent may either be rejected or attempted to be 
salvaged via the modification the metaphysics associated with its role’s specification. 
3.2 Applying MCA to Time in Physical Theories 
I use MCA as an initial model for the analysis of concepts in physical theories.  Prima 
facie, since MCA is a form of network analysis that is applied to folk theory, it seems rather 
straightforward to apply at least its first stage to physical theories. 
 However, MCA faces three pressing problems in this domain. 
3.2.1 Theory Theory’s Concept Identification Problem 
 Theory theory faces the problem of not providing an account of how one should 
identify a concept in a theory.  In theory theory, the concept just is the role it plays in a 
theory.  However, this setup provides no means of determining how one should pick out 
exactly which role the concept should be identified with; since such a concept is completely 
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defined in terms of its role in a theory, theory theory concepts lack any essential feature 
which would allow one to identify the concept.   
 As a form of theory theory, MCA suffers from this problem of identifying concepts.  
While this problem raises many concerns for MCA, e.g., how to identify a concept across 
theory change
41
, I am focusing on the issue of being unable to initially
42
 identify a concept in 
MCA.  Since, at this stage, we are attempting develop a conceptual analysis of time, we must 
provide some initial means of identifying time’s role in a physical theory.   
This particular problem of concept identity can be exemplified through the application 
of MCA to time in GR.  MCA’s first stage indicates that we are to use GR’s theory to specify 
spacetime’s role.  However, without further guidance, it is unclear what we should include in 
spacetime’s specification; there seems to be no indication from MCA as to whether one 
should initially include, e.g., only being a metric, or being a metric and being a manifold. 
In the context of general problems associated with theory theory’s means of 
identifying concepts, Rips (1995) discusses a means of resolving this problem.
43
  This means 
consists of identifying a concept via the surface structure of propositions in which the concept 
is involved.  So, one may identify a concept by making recourse to the manner in which it is 
used in propositions.  This suggests two options for MCA’s problems of initially identifying a 
concept.  First, one may initially identify time via how ‘time’ is used in the statements that 
refer to a physical theory.  Second, one may identify time’s role with whatever role the time 
variable plays in a physical theory. 
                                                 
41 See Laurence and Margolis 2000 for discussion of this and other concerns linked to theory theory’s lack of a 
means to identify concepts. 
42 I focus on the initial identification of a concept to highlight the manner in which it can lead to naïve realism.  
However, I do acknowledge that, in a fashion similar to that of ACA, MCA may be able to overcome this 
problem of identification through later metaphysical enquiry. 
43 Another prominent option, which is discussed by Laurence and Margolis 2000, is to add some essential core 
features to theory theory concepts.  While the addition of such a core would allow time to be easily identified, I 
do not consider this option here because it would restrict time to whatever is characterized by a particular core 
feature.  Additionally, one would require some means of determining what this feature is. 
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However, such resolutions may run the risk of naïve realism.  These resolutions, quite 
literally, may read the metaphysics and ontology off a theory or the propositions associated 
with a theory.  Moreover, the first option mirrors Jackson’s own naïve realism.  See §2.3 for 
problems with such practice. 
In view of the MCA’s lack of a means of identifying time initially and the risk of 
naïve realism that may accompany straightforward means of doing so, ACA must offer some 
means of identifying time in a fashion which avoids naïve realism. 
3.2.2 The Possibility of Limiting Resulting Concepts to a Single Scientific Theory 
 This is merely a possible problem because it depends upon the manner by which 
MCA examines concepts across theories.  In this section, I am only considering an obvious 
means of doing so, i.e., by applying MCA to each physical theory separately.  If MCA is 
applied to the time of each physical theory separately, it may result in clashes between 
concepts of time that are not straightforwardly resolvable. 
 To demonstrate this, I use Esfeld’s discussion of directionality in the time of QT and 
SR.  Suppose that we apply MCA to time in SR.  SR gives us the theory, and we’ll assume 
Esfeld’s interpretation.  So, in accord with MCA, we must next determine the role of time in 
this theory.  SR’s laws that describe space-time and its material content are time symmetric in 
the sense that they allow in principle the time-reversal of all processes they describe.  In 
effect, the laws associated with space-time do not allow us to give a physical signification to 
the designation of one part of a light cone of a point in space-time as past of that point and 
another as future of the point.  Thus, in SR, the time role seems to include the lacking of a 
direction. 
 In contrast, an application of MCA to QT indicates that its time role includes the 
having of a direction.  In order to conceive of definite numerical values as the outcomes of 
measurements, Esfeld (2006, 89) advocates an interpretation of QT according to which it 
contains a dynamics that describes processes of state reduction dissolving superpositions and 
entangled states.    He then links this interpretation with temporal asymmetry: If there are 
processes that dissolve quantum entanglement and superpositions, these are time asymmetric 
processes at the fundamental level of nature.  So, it seems that time’s role in QT involves 
having a direction given this interpretation. 
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 Two separate applications of MCA to SR and QT have resulted in what seem to be 
two clashing roles for time, i.e., a role which involves having a direction and a role which 
lacks such a direction.  Further, while the sketch has been brief, it is not obvious how this 
clash should be reconciled, e.g., should one concept be rejected or should some attempt be 
made to incorporate asymmetry into SR’s time?  Without further guidance in how to proceed, 
it seems that this application of MCA has resulted in two different concepts of time that are 
only straightforwardly viable in the context of their respective theories. 
 In effect, the procedure of applying MCA to different theories separately may result in 
two apparently incommensurable temporal concepts.  If such concepts are compared they 
may be found to clash and to be apparently irreconcilable.  Thus, an application of MCA to a 
single theory may result in a temporal concept that clashes with that of another theory.  In 
turn, the concept that results from an application of MCA to a particular theory may be too 
limited to that particular theory. 
 This possible limitation of a concept to a single theory is problematic for the 
application of a conceptual analysis to Barbour’s interpretation.  Barbour’s view incorporates 
two theories, namely GR and QT.  As revealed above, separate applications of MCA to two 
different theories may result in two temporal concepts that clash and that cannot obviously be 
reconciled.  A possible means of resolving this issue is to come up with an analysis that can 
be applied to more than one theory at a time. 
3.2.3 Creation of a Problematic Gap between Folk Concepts and Scientific Concepts 
 Esfeld (2006) argues that if one holds that the ontology and metaphysics that one 
derives from a physical theory offer a complete description of the world, then one creates a 
gap between the physical description of the world and one’s experience of the world.  To 
exemplify the manner in which such a gap can occur, Esfeld considers time in SR.  I here 
present his example in the context of MCA. 
Suppose that one applies MCA to time in Einsteinian SR.  Further suppose that 
whatever ontology and metaphysics that result from this application of MCA offer a complete 
description of the world.  E-SR’s laws, which describe spacetime and its material content, are 
in principle time-symmetric.  Due to such symmetry, it seems that, barring any other means 
by which E-SR’s time may be attributed a direction, having directionality cannot be a feature 
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of E-SR’s time; time does not play a role that involves directionality in E-SR. Given such 
symmetry and our assumption that E-SR offers a complete description of the world, E-SR’s 
laws show that there is no direction of time.  
However, as Esfeld (2006, 89) points out with the example of all forms of life 
involving an apparently irreversible process that stretches from birth to death, our folk time 
does seem to have a direction.  This feature of our folk time clashes with that of our E-SR 
time.  Esfeld regards this clash as indicative of a gap between the scientific view of the world 
and our experience of the world. 
Why is this gap problematic?  After all, we can easily adopt JCA’s immodest folk 
eliminativism and just eliminate such folk concepts that clash with MCA’s resulting physical 
description. However, this gap is problematic for the application of a conceptual analysis to 
Barbour’s time.  Because Barbour attempts to give an explanation of our everyday experience 
of time in view of the physical description of his interpretation, our conceptual analysis must 
offer some means of bridging such gaps between the concepts derived from folk theories and 
those derived from scientific theories.   
3.3 Three Desiderata for an Alternative Conceptual Analysis (ACA) 
 From the preceding three problems, I derive the following three desiderata: 
D1. ACA must have some relatively unproblematic means, i.e., a means that 
avoids naïve metaphysical realism, of identifying time in a scientific theory. 
D2. A single token of ACA must be applicable to more than one scientific theory. 
D3. ACA must include and integrate an analysis of our folk time with an analysis 
of time in scientific theory(s). 
Note that D2 and D3 are partially motivated above by Barbour’s particular interpretation, 
which involves more than one theory
44
, namely GR and QT, and attempts to explain our 
everyday experience of time.  While these desiderata may be wanted for more general 
                                                 
44 Because, as well shall see in Ch5, his GR is not completely and clearly integrated with his QG, some work is 
required to spell out the manner in which QT and GR may be unified. 
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purposes, e.g., combining other theories with apparently clashing concepts, examining the 
compatibility of particular concepts and their features across theories, I do not discuss such 
purposes here.  However, if, apart from giving an analysis of time in Barbour, one does not 
see the need for these desiderata in a conceptual analysis, then one can still find some use for 
ACA, albeit in a truncated form, e.g., application to .  Although I do not further discuss such 
truncation here, I explore this issue in later chapters where I discuss the scope of ACA’s 
applicability. 
Further note that D2 may seem controversial in that there appears be other means of 
incorporating the analyses of different theories together.  For example, apply ACA to the 
theories separately and subsequently apply ACA again to both theories and to the concepts 
that resulted from ACA’s first application.  However, even in this case, there still is a single 
token of ACA being applied to both theories, though it occurs at the second stage of analysis.  
In effect, since this analysis still requires some means of applying conceptual analysis to both 
theories, D2 is still required.
45
   
3.4 ACA 
In view of these desiderata and the merits of MCA relative to JCA, we can formulate 
ACA as follows.  ACA is a form of network analysis.  ACA begins with one obtaining the 
theory(s) that one is considering.  For folk theories, follow MCA’s procedure of using 
experientially and nonexperientially justified intuitions about possible cases.  For scientific 
theories, less work needs to be done at this stage since the theories and their interpretations 
are largely given. 
                                                 
45 Throughout this discussion, I assume that one should apply a single analysis, rather than, say, using one type 
of analysis for a single theory, e.g., MCA, and some other type of analysis across theories, e.g., a non-network 
analysis in which one just compares the concepts that resulted from MCA and, where two theories’ concepts 
clash, eliminate one or both of the concepts in accordance to some criteria specified by the analysis.  I do not 
here explore the possibility of having different sorts of analysis for two reasons.  First, I lack the space to go 
through all the options.  Second, I prefer using a single type of analysis that is applicable to both a particular 
theory and to more than one theory because of parsimony regarding types of sub-analyses involved in one’s 
method of analysis. 
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If one is dealing with more than one theory, the theories are treated as parts of a single 
network.  Further, while such a network may lack many connections among its theories at 
this stage, at least some metaphysical connections will be made apparent and developed over 
the course of the analysis. 
After one has the theory(s), determine what role time plays in the theory(s).  To 
initially identify time, appeal to what seems to be the theory(s)’ temporal role by using the 
surface structure of propositions made in the theory(s) and/or the role of temporal variables.  
However, in order to avoid the problems of naïve realism, one does not stop at this point.  
Instead, one must proceed to determine whether any of the components of the role clash, are 
redundant or are irrelevant with each other and with other concepts of the theory(s) and their 
specified roles.  If there is no such conflict, and if there seems to be some coherent time role, 
then the theory has time.  If not and provided that one wants to salvage time, one must engage 
in metaphysics in an attempt to construct a coherent, relevant and non-redundant time. 
This engaging in metaphysics may involve modifying the metaphysical and 
ontological commitments indicated by time and other relevant concepts associated with the 
theory(s).  Following Jackson’s definition of metaphysics,46 metaphysical enquiry aims to 
create a list of what there is that is coherent, complete and parsimonious.  So, in order to 
maintain such coherency and parsimoniousness, engaging in metaphysics may force one to 
re-examine the metaphysics and ontology of other parts of the theory and, if considering 
more than one theory, the metaphysics of other theories. 
Further, as the metaphysical enquiry may tell us whether certain concepts and their 
features are supposed have ontological referents and because the theories are informed by 
empirical information, MCA’s second stage is absorbed into ACA’s metaphysical enquiry.  
For example, if a folk time requires a referent, then one ascertains whether there is one by 
looking at the scientific theory’s ontological and metaphysical commitments.  Then, if 
nothing seems to correspond to time, one can proceed with attempting to salvage the folk 
concept by examining and modifying the metaphysical and ontological commitments of other 
                                                 
46 This also roughly follows Esfeld’s 2006 view of metaphysics as something that is informed by a physical 
theory and that constrains a theory’s ontology by limiting it to one that is parsimonious and coherent. 
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parts of the network in a parsimonious and coherent fashion.  If this cannot be done, then this 
concept may have to be rejected. 
Now that I have formulated ACA, I show that it can fulfil all of §3.3’s desiderata.  
Through ACA’s initial inclusion of all terms and its subsequent metaphysical enquiry into the 
coherency and parsimony of the relevant metaphysical and ontological commitments of all 
the theories listed, ACA provides a means of being able to apply a token analysis to more 
than one theory.  This allows a token ACA to be applicable to be applicable to more than one 
theory and, thus, allows ACA to fulfil D2.  Additionally, by initially adding a folk theory to 
the network, ACA can include and examine a folk theory in a fashion in which it fulfils D3.   
Finally, ACA fulfils D1.  Though it initially uses means that risk naïve realism to 
identify time, it proceeds to examine the resulting time in a manner that allows one to 
incorporate the alternative temporal features of, e.g., some other theory.  Additionally, the 
ensuing metaphysical enquiry allows one to assess the redundancy, irrelevance and 
inconsistency of time, both among the components of time’s specification and in relation to 
other concepts of the theory(s) involved.  In effect, though ACA does initially employ means 
that might risk naïve realism, its subsequent analysis offers a means around §2.3’s problems 
with naïve realism.  Thus, in accord with D1, ACA can identify time unproblematically. 
Thus, as fulfilling the desiderata and by incorporating the resolutions that MCA offers 
to JCA’s problems, ACA seems to provide a means of analysing time that is applicable to the 
time in Barbour’s view.  In the following chapters, I turn to applying ACA to Barbour’s view.  
When I do so, I focus on ascertaining what plays the time role in Barbour’s view and on 
doing the metaphysical work to try to make this list coherent.  Furthermore, in applying ACA 
to Barbour’s view, I develop and refine the above outline of ACA. 
In accord with ACA, here is the manner in which we proceed to apply it to Barbour’s 
account through Chapters 2-6.   
We start by obtaining theory(s) that one is considering and, if there is more than one 
theory being analysed, treat them as part of a single network.  How can we initially treat a 
number of theories as parts of a single network?  We will see in Ch2 that Barbour’s account 
is based on a number of Machian principles.  So, I suggest that we use these principles to 
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serve as our means of initially pounding his theories into a single network; they effectively 
serve as the overarching principles for his entire timeless view. 
He has four main ‘theories’: a Machian nonrelativistic dynamics, a Machian 
relativistic dynamics, a Machian quantum interpretation and a Machian interpretation of 
quantum gravity.  I am including his nonrelativistic dynamics because it informs us of the 
manner in which he develops his relativistic account.  Along with his principles, his 
nonrelativistic account is provided in Chapter2.  His accounts of GR, QT and QG are 
provided in Chapters 3, 4 and 5, respectively.  Because, other than Barbour (1999) and 
(1994), he has not explicated in detail the manner in which his interpretations of QT and QG 
fit with his GR, we must consider exactly the role(s) that time plays in each of these accounts.  
In each chapter, I either highlight the manner in which it is in accord with his principles or, 
where required, discuss the manner in which it may be able to fulfil the principles.  By taking 
care to note the manner in which his overarching principles do or can dictate the content of 
his ‘theories’, I effectively treat all the theories as parts of a single Machian network.  In 
effect, these accounts are presented with the aims of treating all these theories as part of a 
single Machian network and making the surface role(s) that time plays in them salient.   
ACA requires that once we have the theories and treat them as a single network, we 
then determine what role(s) time plays in the theories initially using the surface structure of 
these accounts.  In Chapter6, these surface roles of time that have appeared in the exposition 
of Barbour’s account are summarized and compared with each other.  In accordance with 
ACA, these roles are then compared and conflicts are identified.  Then, some of the conflicts 
are addressed and attempted to be reconciled by ACA’s practice of ‘engaging in metaphysical 
enquiry’.  With this application of ACA to Barbour’s account, we, thus, have a model of the 
application of ACA to time in physical theories.  The ramifications of this application for 
ACA are discussed in Chapter7. 
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Chapter 2: Barbour’s Machianization Project and Its Application to Nonrelativistic 
Dynamics 
We begin the process of applying ACA to Barbour’s account by presenting his 
overarching Machian principles with which we will draw out in his ‘theories’ and, thus, be 
able to treat his accounts as parts of a single Machian network.  Additionally, here I discuss 
the manner in which he develops his nonrelativistic dynamics.  It is important to include this 
account in the course of his unification of GR and QT for a number of reasons.  First, it 
clearly provides an application of metaphysical principles by which he formulates his 
account.  Second, as we’ll see in Chapters 4 and 5, his account of QT is presented largely in 
terms of this nonrelativistic account.   
In addition to presenting his principle-based nonrelativistic account, this chapter 
serves to provide an overview of Barbour’s project and the manner in which it has developed.  
Because his research project is on-going and due to the fact that his present work does little 
by way of developing his interpretations of QT and QG, I use this overview of his project to 
delineate a specific period of his research that I expound in the chapters below and, thus, to 
serve as a model to which I apply ACA.  
Following the outline of his project, the manner in which he develops a nonrelativistic 
dynamics is presented.  Because it is principle-based, these principles are first presented and 
specified.  Then, we see the manner in which these principles are applied to Newtonian 
dynamics in order to generate an account in which time plays no fundamental role.   
1 Barbour’s General Aims, Method and Rationale 
Barbour’s overarching project is to develop a Machian version of quantum gravity, 
i.e., a version of quantum gravity that only recognizes entities in the universe and their 
relations at the fundamental ontological level.  This project, at least as indicated in his (1989), 
(1992) and (1995), is historically motivated; it is rooted in the role that Machian concepts 
play in Einstein’s development of General Relativity (GR).  So, a brief historical exegesis is a 
necessary prelude to the introduction of the aims that accompany Barbour’s overarching 
project. 
1.1 A Brief Historical Prelude and Barbour’s Approach 
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 Barbour (1989) (1992) is motivated initially to formulate a Machian GR in view of a 
goal that Einstein set for his GR but did not successfully accomplish.  I should note here that 
because my main aim is to present what Barbour claims is the motivation behind his 
approach to a Machian GR as well as the resulting relation between his Machian GR and 
Machian nonrelativistic accounts, the influence of this Machian task on Einstein is largely 
drawn from Barbour’s own readings of Einstein and Mach.47 
 This aim that Einstein tackles, albeit unsuccessfully, is to provide a relational account 
of inertia
48
.  In this project, he is guided by Mach’s criticisms of Newton’s account of inertia.  
However, according to Barbour (1992), Einstein conflates two different concepts of inertia 
that Mach criticizes on separate grounds.  First, Mach criticizes Newton’s account of inertial 
mass
49
, i.e., the quantity of matter that a body possesses arising from its density and bulk 
conjointly, on grounds that this definition is circular.
50
  He points out that it is circular 
because density is itself defined in terms of mass.  In response, he offers an alternative 
definition that is founded on the ratio that results from considering two accelerated bodies, 
e.g., for two bodies that collide, it is the ratio of the change in velocity of each body.
51
  Note 
that, according to Barbour’s reading of Mach, other than the circular means in which it was 
defined, Mach finds this concept relatively unproblematic.  Second, Mach criticizes Newton’s 
account of inertial motion as defined by his first law, i.e., bodies continue in a state of rest or 
uniform motion in a straight line unless accompanied by external forces.  And, it is assumed 
                                                 
47 Though my present purposes do not permit me to evaluate his reading of Einstein in detail, I must note that it 
is controversial, e.g., see Barbour and Pfister 1995 for alternatives. Also, for alternative readings of Einstein’s 
development of GR see Stachel (2002, Ch5), DiSalle 2006. 
48 While defining inertia is a substantial problem, I am not going to engage with the debate here: I just use 
Barbour’s definitions.  But, for further discussion of inertia, see Arthur 2007 regarding its relation to time, 
Gasco 2003 for its relation to Mach and Brown 2005 regarding its role in GR. 
49 See Harman 1982 for an overview of inertia’s role in Newton’s account and DiSalle 2006 for discussion of 
Mach’s criticisms. 
50 This sketch of Mach’s reception of Newton’s notions of inertia is drawn from Barbour 1995, 1989. 
51 Due to Barbour’s addition of mass into his account below, which must only be in terms of the relative 
relations between stuff, I return to Mach’s definition below and offer further explication of it. 
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that this uniform motion or state of rest is with respect to absolute space and time, rather than 
being relative to some physical body.  Mach criticizes Newton’s inertial motion on grounds 
that it should not be defined initially in terms of the motion of an isolated body with respect 
to an absolute space and time.  Instead, one must consider motion in terms of the relative 
relations among observable bodies in the universe.  In effect, Mach has much deeper 
concerns with Newton’s inertial motion arising from him wanting to base motion on the 
relative relations among bodies in the universe.
52
 
With this distinction between two senses of ‘inertia’, we can return to Einstein’s use 
of the term.  Because, by the lights of Barbour’s conflation reading, Einstein set out about the 
task of providing a relational account following what he claims to be a Machian hunch, i.e., 
he aims to show that inertial properties of local matter are determined by the overall matter 
distribution of the universe.  On Barbour’s reading, Einstein is here addressing inertial mass 
in terms of Mach’s proposed relational solution to inertial motion, i.e., in terms of the relative 
relations of the universe’s matter.  While he was initially convinced that GR would give full 
expression of this hunch, Einstein ultimately concludes that he has failed to do so.  One 
reason for his conclusion is because of his assumption of general covariance, i.e., the laws of 
nature are to be invariant under arbitrary coordinate transformations, in the formulation of 
GR.  As Barbour (2001, 202) cites, Einstein was made aware that this assumption is not 
based on the relative positions of stuff.  Rather, it is just an assumed principle.  So though, 
according to his GR, matter in the universe does influence inertia, Einstein is unable to 
demonstrate that inertia can be formulated in terms of relative relations alone. 
Barbour (1989, 6) (1992, 137) untangles Einstein’s task and reformulates it only in 
terms of the sense of inertia that he, following Mach, finds problematic, namely inertial 
                                                 
52 Though Barbour claims the latter problem is due mainly to Mach’s relationist leanings, while the former 
problem is just one of redefining a term, one could argue that Mach has relationist reasons for his responses to 
both issues.  His reasons for wanting to redefine ‘inertial motion’ may be two-fold: it is a circular definition, and 
its definition must be in terms of the relative relations among bodies.  His definition, as at least based upon the 
relative spatial relations that bodies undergo over time, could thereby be regarded as an attempt to redefine it in 
such relational terms.  Although I won’t pursue arguing for this here since this criticism is tangential to my 
present purposes, see Norton 1995 who illustrates an emphasis on re-description in terms of relations among 
bodies in the world is a persistent theme that runs through Mach’s writings. 
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motion.  He deems this task that Einstein fails to complete ‘the Machian problem’, i.e., the 
problem of finding a dynamical explanation of the inertial motion with reference to only 
bodies and their relative positions. 
In approaching this problem, Einstein takes an indirect route, a route which involves 
showing that the laws of nature must have a form which can be expressed in the same fashion 
under all coordinate transformations. This route aims to solve the problem by eliminating the 
need for coordinate systems to play a fundamental role in the formulation of the laws.  If laws 
that refer only to relative positions of stuff in the world are invariant in all coordinate 
systems, then the laws would not depend on a specific coordinate system and, thus, would not 
feature a background structure that is not reducible to relative relations of stuff.  In effect, GR 
would then only fundamentally make reference to its analogues of bodies and their relative 
positions, i.e., fields and their relative intensities.  However, as noted above, Einstein’s 
formation of this route makes use of the assumption of general covariance, and this 
assumption is not derived from or reducible to relative relations among fields.  With such an 
assumption, he has not completed the Machian problem. 
A direct route would be to formulate relativity in terms of only relative distances; 
however, Einstein, claims Barbour, rejects this approach.  According to Einstein (1918) as 
quoted in Barbour (1992, 142): 
One’s initial reaction would be to require that physics should introduce in its laws 
only the quantities of the first kind.  However, it has been found that this approach 
cannot be realized in practice, as the development of nonrelativistic mechanics has 
clearly shown.  One could, for example, think […] of introducing in the laws of 
nonrelativistic mechanics only the distance of material points from each other instead 
of coordinates; a priori one could expect that in this manner the aim of the theory of 
relativity should be most readily achieved.  However, the scientific development has 
not confirmed this conjecture.  It cannot dispense with coordinate systems and must 
therefore make use in the coordinates of quantities that cannot be regarded as the 
results of definable measurements. 
In effect, Einstein asserts that an account of dynamics cannot be cast in terms of relative 
distances because it ‘has not been confirmed’.  Barbour (1989, 6) takes this to mean that 
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Einstein rejects such a route at least partially because he is convinced that it is impractical to 
dispense with coordinate systems in view of their necessity in the history of science.   
In view of his reading of Einstein’s approach to the problem, Barbour (1989, 7) 
questions the impracticability of the direct route:   
Reflection on these matters led to the conclusion that one ought to go right back to 
first principles in the Machian problem and attempt the route which Einstein had said 
was impracticable.  In particular, the problem might not appear so insuperable if, as a 
first approximation, it was attacked in a nonrelativistic approach.  After all, Mach had 
identified and formulated the problem of inertia in the prerelativistic world.  Might it 
not be possible to solve the nonrelativistic Machian problem?  If this could be 
cracked, one would at least have some definite theoretical models on the basis of 
which the full relativistic problem could be attacked. 
Guided by the hunch that the direct approach may work if first formulated for nonrelativistic 
dynamics, Barbour take the direct route by first resolving the Machian problem in a 
nonrelativistic context.  Accordingly, this starting point would offer at least some definite 
theoretical models on the basis of which the Machian problem in a relativistic context could 
be articulated.  Moreover, this highlights the central role of his process of Machianizing a 
nonrelativistic dynamics: as we’ll see, aspects of such a process and results in the 
nonrelativistic context are imported to the relativistic context.  Whether such imports are 
problematic for his overall account will be illustrated through the application of ACA to it in 
Ch6.   
This historical prelude provides some of the rationale for the path Barbour takes in 
developing his view, i.e., he is resolving the Machian problem via a direct route rejected by 
Einstein.  But, to do so, Barbour follows a general method of first Machianizing Newtonian 
mechanics or some other nonrelativistic
53
 theory, i.e., treating only bodies and their relations 
as fundamental and proceeding to expunge any other apparently fundamental entities, e.g., 
                                                 
53 I employ ‘nonrelativistic’ in the sense that Barbour (1989, 7) uses, i.e., to denote a something in which the 
concept of simultaneity is allowed. 
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absolute space, time, and subsequently applying these findings to a relativistic account.  This 
method, as is made clear in §2.2, appears to some degree in all stages of his writings. 
1.2 Overview of Barbour’s Texts and Changing Aims 
In the various stages of his writings, Barbour adopts different aims that result from the 
development of his Machian project.  These stages come in a well-defined temporal 
succession.  Since it is useful to delimit the scope of my application of ACA and organize this 
chapter in terms of these stages, I am introducing them here.  The stages are inventively 
entitled ‘Early’ (1974-1980), ‘Middle’ (1980-2002) and ‘Current’ (2002-present).   
During the early stage, Barbour presents and refines Machian principles, i.e., 
principles required for a theory that is deemed Machian.  I am using 1974 as the lower bound 
because it is this year in which Barbour publishes a paper that first outlines a Machian 
principle, namely that the dynamical law of the universe must be expressed ultimately in 
terms only of the relative distances between the observable entities in the universe (1974, 
328), and constructs a general model that automatically satisfies this principle.  Additionally, 
working in partnership with Bertotti during much of this stage, Barbour (1989, 7) aims to 
develop an alternative theory to general relativity that has these principles.  Their strategy to 
do so, which follows this historically motivated method above, is to first develop the Machian 
nonrelativistic theory and subsequently to incorporate basic tenants of Special Relativity (SR) 
in a Machian manner.  The end goal (1974, 1980) is to develop the resulting theory as a 
Machian alternative to Einstein’s general relativity (GR).   
The second stage is marked by a change of the early stage’s goal of finding a Machian 
alternative theory to Einstein’s GR.  During the first stage, Barbour and Bertotti were 
expecting to create a Machian geometrodynamics
54
 with physical predictions different from 
those of GR (Barbour 1995).  However, Kuchař motivated them to conclude that the Machian 
                                                 
54 Contra Wheeler’s 1962 geometrodynamics as an interpretation of GR, Barbour considers GR to be a special 
case of his Machian geometrodynamics.  For instance, regarding GR’s action and geometrodynamics, Barbour 
1984 holds that GR requires an action which is almost uniquely determined by the requirement that the evolving 
three-geometries can be stacked to make a 4-d Riemannian space.  In effect, GR is a very special theory among 
all possible theories of the dynamical evolution of gij. Ch3 further explicates this relation. 
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principles are already fulfilled by Einstein’s GR (1989, 7, 12).55  Additionally, Barbour and 
Bertotti (1984) show that they can generate GR’s action principle from their Machian 
geometrodynamics; they can recast GR’s action principle, which is usually expressed directly 
in terms of the 4-d metric gμυ, as a theory of the dynamical evolution of their 
geometrodynamics’ Riemannian three-geometries qij (i,j=1,2,3).  So, instead of developing a 
Machian alternative theory to Einstein’s GR, Barbour now discovers that the Machian 
principles of their alternative actually underlie GR, and, in turn, that the basic structure of GR 
is Machian.  Moreover, at least GR’s action can be recast in a Machian fashion.56  
Evidence of this shift first appears explicitly in Barbour 1981, 1982 and especially 
1982 with Bertotti.  He concludes claiming that he has shown Einstein’s GR to be an example 
of Machian dynamics and, in effect, states that this reverses the Barbour and Bertotti 1977 
conclusion, i.e., that Einstein’s GR is non-Machian and that Barbour and Bertotti’s Machian 
dynamics offers a path to a Machian alternative to Einstein’s GR.  Additionally, in 
subsequent works, notably in his 1994a and 1995, Barbour develops the Machian GR in 
terms of his geometrodynamics. 
Thus, the Middle stage is marked by Barbour and Bertotti shifting from developing a 
competing alternative theory to GR to developing a Machian version of GR in terms of 
geometrodynamics.  Additionally, he (1994b, 1999) attempts to make this Machian GR more 
complete by incorporating quantum theory (QT) during this stage.
57
  Regarding the 
development of his GR, his method reflects that of his Early stage:  He begins with a 
Machianization of a nonrelativistic theory and, subsequently, works in some of the key 
changes made in the nonrelativistic theory into an account that includes gravity.  But, from 
the Early strategy he must proceed to quantize his relativistic theory and give an 
interpretation in order to provide an account of QT. 
                                                 
55 Details of Kuchař’s motivation are to be given in Barbour’s unpublished sequel to his 1989.  
56 Ch3 explicates the manner in which the action is Machianized. 
57As further explained in Ch5, Barbour (1994a, 1994b) incorporates QT by taking a route in which GR is 
quantized.  In this account, he appeals to the time-independent Schrödinger equation and explains away the 
appearance of time via time capsules. 
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The third, Current stage is marked by modifications made to his proposed Machian 
theory in response to issues raised by some of his collaborators.  Notably, Anderson (2003) 
(2006) (2007) presents criticisms regarding the import of certain formulae from Machianized 
nonrelativistic theories to relativistic theories and his deficient interpretation of QT.  These 
criticisms cause Barbour to formally revise and reinterpret portions of his quantum 
geometrodynamics.  Such revisions first appear in 2002 and are on-going. Thus, this stage is 
marked by Barbour continuing to import his interpretation of the Machian relativistic theory 
from his Machian nonrelativistic theory, while being in the process of modifying his 
relativistic theory formally by eliminating inapplicable formal imports from Machian 
nonrelativistic theories.
58
  
Despite the developments of his Current stage, I am only going to explicate and 
analyse Middle Barbour.  The reason for this focus is partially due to the fact that while the 
formulae change from the Middle to Current stages, many of the concepts and conclusions 
imported from the Machian nonrelativistic theory to the relativistic theory are not altered or 
developed much.  Additionally, his account of the interpretations of QT and QG have not 
been developed much in the Current stage
59
, and, as we see in Chapters 4 and 5, much of 
what Barbour does say regarding such interpretations during his Middle period is in need of 
much unpacking and development.  Thus, because a most of his interpretive claims are 
                                                 
58 Because I focus on only the Middle stage below, I note here some of the major changes in the Current stage.  
First, he along with Anderson attempt to develop formally the manner in which the wavefunction in his QG may 
be used to pick out time capsules in superspace.  Second, he discovers that despite his Middle conclusions to the 
effect that GR is Machian, he discovers that its use of scale make it ‘not quite Machian’.  In view of this issue, 
he 2003 (and with Anderson, Foster and Murchadha 2002) aims to eliminate such scale by developing shape 
dynamics.  In the process of developing this dynamics, he moves from the superspace of his Middle stage to 
conformal superspace.  Each point of this conformal superspace is an instantaneous shape of the universe.  
Unlike superspace in which, as we see in Ch3, only all diffeomorphisms are quotiented out, this space also 
quotients out general conformal transformations.  Furthermore, with this setup he and Murchadha 2010 claim 
that they can reconstruct GR, eliminate its foliation invariance, which we encounter in Ch3, and replace it with 
conformal invariance.  Consult his 2008 for a nice summary of the developments in this stage.   
59 For example, even regarding his Current GR account, he 2011 admits that he is just beginning to understand 
the significance of swapping foliation invariance for conformal invariance and highlights the need to develop 
the conceptual implications of the recent developments of his account. 
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presented in the Middle period, it thus provides a relatively cohesive model in terms of it 
being supplemented directly with an interpretation, rather than, as done in his Current stage, 
being supplemented with concepts imported from his interpretations that are originally given 
to earlier formulae.  In turn, I focus on presenting and analysing time as it appears in the 
Middle period.   
1.3 The Impact on the Structuring of Chapters 2-5 
This broad survey of Barbour’s work allows me to provide a comprehensive 
exposition of the aspects of his view relevant to my analysis as follows.   
Since I am focusing on the time that appears in Barbour’s Machian 
geometrodynamics, I am ignoring Barbour’s changing views on the relation between it and 
GR, which marks the Early and Middle stages.  Further, because most of the setup and 
developments from Early Barbour relevant to his Machian geometrodynamics project are 
repeated in Middle Barbour, I have not included Early Barbour as a separate section in the 
organization of these chapters.   
Nevertheless, it is important that I provide Barbour’s Machianization of 
nonrelativistic theories, which appears both in Early and Middle Barbour.  The historically 
motivated method of first Machianizing Newtonian mechanics and subsequently 
Machianizing a relativistic theory in light of the Machianized nonrelativistic theory, is used in 
Middle Barbour and, at least interpretively, in Current Barbour.  Because we must track the 
origins and development of temporal concepts that appear in his quantum geometrodynamics, 
I begin my exposition with Barbour’s Machianization of nonrelativistic theories in this 
chapter.  Then, I present his Middle moves from Machianized nonrelativistic theories to a 
Machian GR in the next chapter.  Finally, the means by which Middle Barbour quantizes 
geometrodynamics and timelessly interprets the quantum is provided in Ch4 and Ch5. 
2 Machianizing Newton 
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 To motivate and explain his Machianization of Newton, I present Barbour’s moves in 
the framework of his (1974) and (1982) Machian and Leibnizian principle-driven approach.
60
   
This approach aims explicitly to address the Newtonian challenge for relationists, i.e., 
to formulate a relational version of Newton’s dynamical laws of motion.  Since Barbour 
holds that the aim of dynamics is to characterize the change of variety quantitatively, a 
demonstration that one can construct dynamical schemes in which ‘the change of variety is 
described in terms of the variety itself’ is needed to meet the challenge.   
He (1974), (1982) and Barbour and Bertotti (1982) approach the challenge by first 
identifying a number of philosophical principles.  As will be pointed out, Barbour considers 
some of these principles essential for the relational case, while others contribute towards the 
development of such relational dynamics.  Then, he proceeds to show how these principles 
can be used to construct an alternative relational framework.  
I shall proceed to present Barbour’s account in a fashion parallel to that described in 
the previous paragraph:  First, I provide the principles Barbour mentions.  Then, I illustrate 
the manner in which Barbour uses these principles to construct a relativistic Machian account 
of dynamics.  Furthermore, the account itself, as found in his (1974), (1982) and Barbour and 
Bertotti (1982), will be supplemented with relevant developments that occur in later Middle 
Barbour publications.  Even though these later publications largely drop the principled 
approach, most of the relevant developments have precursors in the earlier works.  
Nevertheless, as we will see in later chapters, these principles play a prominent role in 
motivating all his of accounts. 
2.1 The Principles 
 As we’ve seen, his approach of Machianizing Newtonian mechanics first as a means 
of generating a Machian GR is motivated by his reading of Einstein.  However, the means by 
                                                 
60 In later texts he provides a streamlined presentation of his Machian nonrelativistic dynamics without much 
reference to these principles, and Barbour 1995 provides an alternative manner of motiving his account via two 
‘Machian requirements’.  While these alternative presentations of his account might appear clearer, the 
Leibnizian presentation of his account makes his metaphysical motivations and intended ontological 
implications more apparent, which are important given our task of applying ACA. 
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which he generates this Machian mechanics is principle-based.  As mentioned earlier, 
Barbour uses two types of principles: those that a relational theory must uphold, and those 
that are used, ultimately, to formulate a relational dynamical theory that fulfils the former 
principles.  I call the former type of principle ‘relational principles’, and the latter ‘fulfilling 
principles’.   
Note, moreover, that Barbour (1982, 254) does not regard the fulfilling principles, “as 
necessary truths but only as convenient for characterising the manner in which specific 
theories of motion can be regarded as meeting the relationist ideal.”  In effect, it seems that 
these fulfilling principles are not required for building a relational account.  Instead, they are, 
perhaps, only one among many different sets of principles for building a relationist dynamics.  
Such contingency is important because all of these principles that Barbour uses are drawn 
from those of Leibniz.  This assumed contingency allows for a more liberal reading of 
Leibniz’s fulfilling principles because we are not necessarily restricted to Leibniz’s intended 
meaning and application of his principles; there is not one set of fulfilling principles, e.g., 
exactly those that Leibniz uses, that Barbour must use.     
2.1.1 Relational Principles 
Barbour mentions two general relational principles.  The first that we’ll discuss is one 
that provides the minimum ontological requirements for a relationism.  The second is a 
general Machian principle that Barbour subdivides into two subprinciples. 
To set the stage for the ontological principle for relationism, we best define what he 
means by ‘relationism’.  A relationist is defined (1980, 2) as one who holds that, “only things 
(strictly […] perceived things) exist, but they bear relations to another.  [A relationist] 
dynamics should therefore be concerned with these relations and the manner in which they 
change.”  In view of this quote, it seems that a relationist holds that only perceived things 
exist that can bear relations to each other.  But, this brief definition gives rise to a number of 
questions: In what sense are things ‘perceived’, and how does this bear on the issue as to 
whether a thing is deemed ontologically acceptable for the relationist? What are these 
relations these things bear to each other, e.g., do these include only relative positions?  
To answer these questions, we must consult his 1982 in which he puts this in terms of 
‘perceived variety’:  
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[P]erceived variety is the starting point of all science.  There is however a pronounced 
tendency in science to degrade variety and operate as far as possible in terms of 
homogeneous or uniform substances. […] [V]ariety is the starting point of Leibniz’s 
ontology; moreover, I believe that the whole tendency of Leibniz’s philosophy is to 
present science, not as the explanation of perceived variety in terms of something 
which is as uniform as possible, but rather as the recognition of order and unity within 
the diversity. (1982, 251-2) 
What I suggest is needed is a demonstration that one can construct dynamical 
schemes in which the change of variety is described, not in terms of a uniform 
standard, but in terms of variety itself. (1982, 253) 
Given the final quote, it seems the Barbour is following what he claims to be Leibniz’s lead 
regarding ontology: only perceived variety exists.  And, in effect, he aims to construct a 
dynamics in terms of only this variety and the manner in which it changes.  The variety, 
further, is contrasted with ‘homogeneous or uniform substances’. 
However, his ‘perceived variety’, what it means to ‘be perceived’ and how such 
variety contrasts with things he describes as ‘uniform’ or ‘homogenous’ require some 
unpacking.  As Barbour is drawing his general ontological commitments from what is 
presented in Leibniz, it seems that much of this terminology is borrowed from Leibniz.  So, 
let’s turn to some positions attributed to Leibniz regarding variety, its perception and its 
relation to uniform things.
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61 I realize Leibniz’s overall metaphysics and epistemology is the subject of much historical debate and was 
modified throughout his life, e.g., as documented in Mercer et al. 1995, Mercer 2001 and Rutherford 1995.  
And, I acknowledge that I do not attempt to provide an assessment of the secondary sources I use in order to 
cash out what Barbour may mean by his Leibnizian terminology.  Because his approach to historical texts is to 
read the source material, Barbour’s reading of Leibniz may, ultimately, not reflect either a comprehensive 
reading of Leibniz or one that is in accord with prominent readings of his view in the secondary literature.  So, 
my use of certain secondary sources here is only an attempt of making sense of the terminology and how the 
associated concepts may be related.  Moreover, I have included quoted passages from Leibniz more for the 
purposes of illustrating the similar use of terminology than for providing a comprehensive analysis of the 
passages. 
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 Without going too deep into the details of Leibniz’s account, monads are its 
fundamental entities.  Monads are simple, indivisible substances, and something is a 
substance iff it obeys the Principle of the Complete Notion of a Contingent Thing, which is 
defined on p.62 below.  Each body is made up of an infinite number of monads.  Moreover, 
some of these monads can have perceptions and apperceptions.  In the context of 
distinguishing souls, which are monads in his account, that have both perceptions and 
apperception from those that only have the former,
62
 Leibniz characterizes them as follows: 
It is well to make the distinction between perception, which is the internal state of the 
monad representing external things, and apperception, which is consciousness or the 
reflexive knowledge of this internal state itself. (Principles of Nature and Grace IV) 
In effect, apperception, as the result of a monad reflecting upon its internal state, is contrasted 
with perception, as the result of the monad representing things that are external to it.  So, if 
Barbour is borrowing Leibniz’s terminology here, it seems that ‘perceived variety’ is variety 
that is external to the perceiver.  Crudely, he merely appears to make reference to stuff that 
exists in the world of which we can have sensory experience. 
 But, what exactly counts as ‘perceived variety’ for the relationist?  Does it only 
include the medium-sized dry goods of our daily experience?  If he aims to provide an 
account of Newtonian mechanics, GR and QT, which standardly are considered to have basic 
stuff that is not ‘perceived’ in the same and relatively direct manner as, e.g., tables and chairs, 
it seems that this variety might refer to, e.g., point particles, matter fields, electrons.  In the 
context of physical theories, these entities could still be regarded as perceived in some sense, 
e.g., an electron could be detected by one seeing a streak in a cloud chamber.  This ambiguity 
also arises over the course of Barbour’s discussion, e.g., he (1995, 224) claims that this stuff 
can be mass points, fields or matter fields defined on Riemannian 3-geometries, but he 
elsewhere makes references to relative positions of a pointer on a measuring device that we 
see in the same manner in which we see tables and chairs.  In view of such considerations, it 
appears that Barbour’s use of ‘perceived’ here to be indicative of a certain type of variety is 
ambiguous: the variety to which it refers could be either that which we experience in day-to-
                                                 
62 For discussion, see McRae 1995 and Rutherford (1995, 137). 
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day life or that of which our best scientific theories are indicative.  Further, as he holds that it 
is such variety that a relationist regards as ontologically fundamental, determining in which 
sense he uses this term is essential to his entire project.  Nevertheless, I am going to bracket 
off this issue for now but will return to discussion of it in my Ch6 analysis of his project 
because his employment of this vague ontological principle varies. 
 So, given that perception, as Leibniz characterized it, is of stuff that is external to 
oneself, it seems that we can at least say that such perceived variety is something out in the 
world.  But, what is this variety?  Leibniz’s distinction between variety and uniformity helps 
elucidate to what ‘variety’ may refer.   
As echoed in the quotes above, Leibniz makes a distinction between variety and 
uniformity. 
Things which are uniform, containing no variety, are always mere abstractions, for 
instance, time, space and other entities of pure mathematics.  (New Essays II.1.2)  
[I]n actual bodies there is only discrete quantity […].  But a continuous quantity is 
something ideal which pertains to possibles and to actuals only insofar they are 
possible. (1975, 539) 
Here, time and space are deemed to be uniform and lacking in variety.  As such, they are 
regarded as ‘mere abstractions’.  According to McDonough (2007), Leibniz holds that the 
notion of a fixed, uniform space or time is abstracted from the relative spatial and successive 
relations that bodies bear to each other.  As such, this fixed, uniform space is not 
ontologically basic. Moreover, as these mere abstractions are contrasted with variety, it seems 
that variety must be more ontologically basic.
63
  Actual things are made up of a number of 
discrete quantities corresponding to their infinite monads.  Thus, it seems actual things 
exhibit infinite variety.  In effect, we get a similar distinction to one that Barbour makes.  
                                                 
63 However, as McDonough 2007 notes, Leibniz’s later views as to the basic ontology of the world shifted to an 
arena of monads in which there is not even relative spatial or temporal relations.  So, such relative relations 
would be one step removed from his fundamental ontology while the fixed, uniform space and time are two 
steps removed in this later account. 
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Time and space qua uniform structures are not ontologically basic, while variety in the world 
is. 
 From our previous discussion, we know that this variety includes the existing stuff in 
the world.  But, recall that Barbour claims these things bear relations to each other.  What 
relations can be born to each other on the relationist account?  Leibniz seems to accept that 
there are both relative spatial and temporal relations that hold between things.  In the Leibniz-
Clarke correspondence, Leibniz (1999, 146) states: 
As for my own opinion, I have said more than once, that I hold space to be something 
merely relative, as time is; that I hold it to be an order of coexistences. As time is an 
order of successions.   
As space and time are just ‘orders of coexistences’, things can have spatial and temporal 
relations in the sense of being in relative distances to each other and being related through 
succession to each other.   
If Leibniz’s stance on space and time as sketched above is indicative of the notion of 
relationism
64
 that Barbour has in mind, then it seems that the variety is made up of stuff in the 
external word and this stuff can bear certain relations to each other, namely bearing distances 
to something and being successive.  However, as there is only such stuff, these relations can 
only be borne among this stuff.  In effect, there can only be relative distances and successions 
between the points.  Moreover, time and space qua abstracted uniformities are not 
ontologically basic.  Some examples of such relative relations that Barbour (1995, 224) 
provides are the relative configurations of a field that are defined by field intensities and 
Riemannian 3-geometries.  While an account remains to be developed of the former by 
Barbour in detail
65, explanation of the latter is provided in Ch3’s presentation of his 
geometrodynamics. 
                                                 
64 Although I do not compare Barbour’s relationism with other forms of it, see Earman 1989 for discussion of 
different accounts of relationism and his 2008 for discussion as to whether Leibniz is a relationist. 
65 However, see Pooley 2001 for a manner in which such an account can be developed. 
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 Now that we have unpacked ‘perceived variety’, we can present Barbour’s project as 
well as his relationist ontological principle.  As in the quote above, he claims that stuff and 
their relative spatial and temporal relations is the starting point of all science.  However, he 
notes, there is a tendency in science to operate using the abstracted uniform substances.  
Some examples of such ‘substances’ he (1982, 252) provides are Newtonian mechanics’ 
absolute time and space, SR’s Minkowskian space-time and GR’s use of uniform frames of 
reference.  As these accounts utilize something uniform that is a mere abstraction from the 
relative spatial and temporal relations that are among the stuff of the external world, he aims 
to construct a dynamics in which ‘the change of variety is described in terms of the variety 
itself’.  That is, he wants to describe the change of the universe’s stuff and its relative 
relations in terms of this stuff and relations.  The requirement of such descriptions is specified 
in his Machian principles below, but let’s first cash out his ontological principle. 
Here is Barbour’s (1982, 254) minimal ontological principle of the relationist 
standpoint: 
(ONT0) The existence of things is established through perceived variety and abstract 
uniformity is nothing. 
Given the preceding discussion, this becomes: 
(ONT) Strictly speaking, the ontologically basic things are stuff
66
 in the external 
world and their relative distances and successions to each other, and anything   
abstracted or derived from this stuff does not exist. 
In ONT, note that it is not specified whether the distances and successions are spatial or 
temporal.  I formulated it in this vague manner because, as we shall see below, Barbour 
formulates what we would consider to be temporal successions of spatial configurations in 
terms of differences in relative spatial positions alone.  This partially results from his choice 
of static configurations of all the stuff in the universe to feature in his description of 
                                                 
66 I use ‘stuff’ here to characterize the non-relational entities of Barbour’s perceived variety, which, as discussed 
above, may be medium-sized dry goods or the entities posited by certain scientific theories.  It has been chosen 
because it does not have that much metaphysical baggage associated with it. 
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dynamics, which is in fulfilment of MP2 below.
67
  Such entities are presented as the basic 
ontological elements of his account.  Due to the fact that such a configuration only has 
relative spatial relations, any temporal relations are not ontologically basic.  So, when I 
mention ONT in the context of Barbour’s account, its relative distances and successions are 
assumed to be spatial ones only or are reducible to them. 
 Further note that in Barbour’s 1980 quote, he states that only things exist and they can 
bear relations to each other, but his 1982 is in terms of variety: stuff in the world and their 
relative relations.  Due to the vagueness of both of these formulations it is not clear whether 
the relative relations have the same ontological status as the stuff.  Such relations do depend 
on the stuff to be there for their existence and magnitudes.  So, perhaps they are not as basic 
as the stuff if independence is a requirement of being ontologically basic.  However, we will 
follow Barbour (1982, 255) and gloss over this issue for now, but we return to its 
ramifications for his view in Ch6. 
This brings us to the second relational principle: the general Machian Principle (MP).  
MP requires that the dynamical law of the universe, i.e., a law that characterises the change of 
variety in the universe quantitatively, “be expressed ultimately in terms only of the relative 
distances between observable entities
68
 in the universe” (1974, 328).  Barbour (1982, 260) 
uses two specific versions of MP, and we will follow suit since this division provides a useful 
means of dividing up Barbour’s account as follows with §2.2.2 and §2.2.3.  The two specific 
versions are the First Machian Principle, which applies to space, and the Second Machian 
Principle, which applies to time.  In more detail: 
(MP1) The First Machian Principle: The dynamical law of the universe must be 
expressed ultimately in terms only of the relative distances between stuff in the 
                                                 
67 Additionally, as we’ll see in Ch4 and Ch5’s presentation of his solution to the problem of time in quantum 
geometrodynamics, he aims to eliminate any ontologically basic sense of temporality. 
68 In the context of Machianizing Newtonian mechanics, Barbour follows Newton in assuming that observable 
entities are particles.  However, as will be discussed later in the context of GR, these observable entities may be 
considered to be matter fields; however, Barbour presents his GR in terms of pure geometrodynamics in which 
there are only manifold points and their geometrical relations. 
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universe, and not ultimately in terms of a space that it is anything over and above the 
relative distances of the stuff. 
(MP2) The Second Machian Principle: The dynamical law of the universe must be 
expressed ultimately in terms only of the relative distances between stuff in the 
universe, and not ultimately in terms of a time that is anything over and above the 
relative distances of the stuff. 
These principles are often presented by Barbour in the context of teasing out MP2 from what 
he claims to be Mach’s actual principle, i.e., MP1,69 for the purpose of Machianizing Newton.  
But, as ‘stuff’ is used above, these principles can be used in the Newtonian context to refer to 
point particles as well as in the GR context to refer to the non-gravitational fields.  Moreover, 
MP1 bans Newton absolute space and time as they were formulated independently of the 
bodies’ relative relations.  And, MP2 bans the use of some fixed time parameter that does not 
somehow emerge from stuff’s relative distances. 
In effect, with the above division of the general Machian principle into one that refers 
to space and one that refers to time, it seems to be easy to assess whether such principles are 
fulfilled by accounts, e.g., certain formulations of Newtonian mechanics, in which space and 
time can be separated.  Moreover, to assess whether an account in which space and time are 
combined is Machian, one can consider whether the conjunction of the two principles is 
fulfilled.   
Thus, Barbour posits two relationist principles.  ONT sets requirements on the 
ontology, while MP sets requirements on what terms are permissible in one’s dynamics. 
2.1.2 Fulfilling Principles 
                                                 
69 Rovelli (2004, 76), however, notes that there is no well-defined principle presented by Mach.  Rather, the 
formulation of such a principle(s) is the result of varying discussions of the implication of a suggestion made by 
Mach, which is in the context of Newton’s spinning bucket argument, for GR.  Mach’s suggestion is that the 
inertial reference frame for a spinning bucket is determined by the entire matter content of the universe, rather 
than by absolute space.  From discussions of this suggestion, a number of formulations of a principle based on it 
are presented as Mach’s principle.  See Rovelli (2004, 76) for a list of eight such principles. 
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 There are four fulfilling principles.  All of these are attributed to Leibniz, and all play 
a role in the development of Barbour’s relationist dynamics.  However, unlike Barbour, I 
have augmented the prominence of the second and fourth principles and have changed the 
order in which all the principles appear, which mirrors their later appearances in §3.2, for the 
sake of clarity.  The principles follow and are explained further where necessary. 
 The first principle Barbour uses is:   
(CNP) Principle of the Complete Notion of a Contingent Thing: One must attribute to 
 something, x, a notion so complete that everything that can be attributed to x can be 
 deduced from the notion. (1982, 261) 
Leibniz
70
 makes a distinction between two kinds of concepts: complete and incomplete or 
abstract.  An incomplete concept is not in nature, strictly speaking, and arises partially from 
thought, e.g., the abstracted concepts of space and time rejected by Leibniz above.  On the 
other hand, a complete concept is one that is characterized by CNP: it contains within itself 
all the predicates of the subject of which it is the concept.  In other words, if an entity is 
characterized by such a concept, then all the predicates that are attributed to the entity can be 
deduced from this concept.  Leibniz’s monads are characterized by such a concept.  As we’ll 
see shortly, Barbour applies CNP to static configurations of the entire universe. 
The next fulfilling principle is: 
 (UNP) A Principle of Unity: A principle that tells us why a certain plurality is a true 
 unity and not a mere unity by aggregation. (1982, 266-7)  
For Leibniz there are two kinds of entity: substance and entity by aggregation.  Each of these 
entities has a different kind of unity.  He regards substances, e.g., monads, to have true unity, 
while aggregates, e.g., a body, have a unity that results from the activity of our imagination 
on what we perceive.  Barbour provides some examples of UNPs, and we can make recourse 
to these in order to determine what something requires to be a true unity. 
                                                 
70 This is drawn from McRae (1995, 190, 185). 
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He (2003, 54) gives the ‘modest’ example of a graph that has its points connected.  By 
expressing the points’ relations to the other points, the graph is supposed to have a UNP.  
With this example, it seems that a UNP can be cashed out in terms of a description of the 
relative distances that hold between points at a time. 
Another example Barbour (1982, 266) provides is that of Heisenberg’s matrix.  
Heisenberg discovered similar relations between matrices of numbers, which lead to the 
development of quantum mechanics.  He claims that Heinsenberg considered these matrices 
to represent relations between quantities that are observable in principle.
71
  Thus, Barbour 
(1982, 266) states that such relations “could be said to express the particular [UNP] that 
inheres in the given set of data.”  Additionally, these congruences are further captured in 
equations, e.g., Heisenberg’s equation of motion, which Barbour considers to be the 
mathematical expression of these congruences.  Here, it seems that a UNP is obtained in view 
of only the relative relations between stuff in the world.  Moreover, Barbour assumes that this 
description can be put in the form of an equation.  So, it seems that a UNP for Barbour is a 
description qua equation or mathematical representation of stuff’s relative relations.  Given 
MP, such a description can only refer to relative relations.  Thus, Barbour must hold that a 
UNP must only at base be a description of such relations.  Otherwise, if any entities in 
violation of ONT and any expression in violation of MP are used, i.e., if there are entities or 
expressions involved that are not of stuff’s relative relations or reducible to them, then the 
resulting description is not a UNP. 
Further, note that though Barbour does not make explicit whether equations 
incorporate a type of unity that differs from that expressed in the congruences of sets of 
numbers in, e.g., matrices, he does state that congruences of sets of numbers “are between 
definite things […] which have been derived from observation of variety” (1982, 266).  So, 
for the purposes of fulfilling our Machian requirements and ONT, it seems that the crucial 
feature that Barbour is highlighting regarding UNPs is they must at least start from perceived 
variety, be in terms of the relative instantaneous relations among stuff and not violate ONT or 
MP in the process of their formulation.  
                                                 
71 For an introduction to the role of observation in the construction of matrix mechanics, see Cushing (2003, 
282-6). 
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Does Barbour imply a similar distinction to that of Leibniz between entities that are 
true unities and entities by aggregation?  It seems that he does have a distinction.  As we’ll 
see below, one could say that the instantaneous configurations of all the stuff in the universe 
are the fundamental entities in his account.  In effect, only such a configuration may have true 
unity.  Other accounts of the unity of the world that feature things that are actually abstracted 
from stuff and their relative positions at an instant, e.g., absolute space, local frames of 
reference, may be regarded as referring to an entity by aggregation, e.g., Newton’s universe 
in which there is an absolute space plus stuff and relations.  Moreover, while it is interesting 
to draw such a parallel between Leibniz’s use of the UNP, Barbour does not explicitly make 
use of an analogue of entities by aggregation; he mainly employs the UNP, as we’ll see 
below, in his formulation of a Machian non-relativistic mechanics, rather than as a means of 
drawing a distinction between two kinds of entities. 
Next, here is the third fulfilling principle
72
: 
(PII) Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles: Two things which are completely 
indiscernible with respect to all their qualities are in fact the same thing. (1982, 254) 
Leibniz uses this principle throughout his writings.  As McRae (1995, 179) cites, one manner 
in which he uses it, which is relevant for our purposes, is to serve as a means by which 
substances are distinguished from each other in virtue of their internal qualities.  Though I 
discuss the ramifications of this principle for Barbour’s account in Ch5, we can note here that 
because his instantaneous configurations of the universe play a role in his account that 
somewhat parallel that played by substances, it seems that this principle may be used to limit 
the set of possible configurations of the universe to a set that contains no copies. 
 Moreover, this principle can have different strengths depending to what these 
‘quantities’ refer.  In view of ONT as well as Barbour’s use of this principle, which we’ll see 
                                                 
72 For discussion of the role of PII in QT, see Ladyman and Bigaj 2010. 
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shortly, ‘quantities’ includes the monadic, non-relational properties of external stuff 
themselves as well as their relative spatial relations.
73
  
Finally, the last fulfilling principle is: 
 (PSR) Principle of Sufficient Reason: Nothing can be true or existent for which there 
 is not a sufficient reason or cause why it is so.  
According to Leibniz, PSR is one of two principles on which reasoning is based.
74
  Barbour 
(1982, 254) mentions it and assumes that it is true in the formulation of his account.  
However, it is debatable whether certain truths require such reason or whether PSR is even 
contingently true.
75
  Nevertheless, we’ll just assume it, along with Barbour, for the purposes 
of creating a Machian principle-based dynamics. 
2.2 The Machianization of Nonrelativistic Mechanics via the Principles 
Barbour uses these fulfilling principles in order to construct a nonrelativistic relational 
dynamics, which, in turn, can be used to derive key Newtonian equations.  However, before 
giving the details of the resulting account, I provide an outline of how the fulfilling principles 
generate an account which fulfils the relational principles.   
Barbour starts by using CNP to carve up the universe into instantaneous 
configurations.  Next, he uses UNP to generate the relational arena, i.e., one in which he can 
describe the relative relations of each instantaneous configuration of the universe.  Then, he 
uses the resulting configuration space in order to generate a means of quantifying change of 
variety in terms of variety itself and, thus, provides a start to a dynamics that satisfies MP.  
This dynamics is further developed, aided by PII and PSR, in order to fulfil MP1.  Finally, 
                                                 
73 See Rodriguez-Pereyra 2006 and Black 1952 for general discussion of PII.  For a discussion of it in the 
context of quantum mechanics, see French and Krause 2006.  I do not evaluate PII because my main aim is to 
specify it as it appears in Barbour and evaluate the presence of (or lack thereof) temporal concepts that appear in 
his resulting account. 
74 The other is the Principle of Contradiction: A proposition cannot be true and false at the same time. 
75 For discussion of PSR, see Pruss 2006 and Parkinson 1995. 
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the dynamics is developed to fulfil MP2 via insight from PSR.  Thus, Barbour appears to 
develop a nonrelativistic Machian dynamics, a dynamics that satisfies MP1, MP2 and ONT. 
2.2.1 The Development and Relationalism of Configuration Space 
 Barbour begins by specifying the raw material, i.e., the stuff in universe, with which 
his is going to build his dynamics and satisfy ONT.  He uses the CNP to do so by claiming 
that: 
the position of a body is defined, and moreover completely, by its relation (distance) 
to all the other objects in the universe. (1982, 269-70) 
Recall that CNP states that one must attribute to something, x, a notion so complete that 
everything that can be attributed to x can be deduced from the notion.  Here Barbour claims a 
body is defined completely in terms of its relative relations to all other bodies in the universe 
at an instant
76
.  Such instantaneous configurations of the universe in which each body is 
completely defined by is relative spatial relations to all other bodies satisfies ONT; only stuff 
and their relative spatial relations at an instant are proposed.  Moreover, as was mentioned in 
my presentation of ONT, because such static configurations and their spatial relative relations 
are proposed as the raw material, he eliminates any sort of temporal relative successions from 
ONT.  Instead, his dynamics is, at base, in terms of spatial relations, with any temporal 
succession being derived from instantaneous spatial relative relations.  I must emphasise here 
that this lack of fundamental temporal succession is essential in Barbour’s overarching claim 
to be able to eliminate time from his accounts.  If he can successfully eliminate or reduce 
such relations to relative instantaneous spatial relations, then it seems that temporal relations 
do not play a fundamental role in his account. 
Next, Barbour (1982, 268) claims that a UNP is sufficient to develop an entire theory 
of dynamics.  To illustrate this claim and develop his dynamics’ key element of configuration 
                                                 
76 The use of ‘instant’ is not intended here to refer to some unit of time.  Instead, it refers to a static 
configuration of all the bodies in the universe.  Presumably, you can obtain the same configurations if you, e.g., 
divide a 4-d representation of a universe evolving in accord with Newtonian mechanics by making slices of 
infinitesimal length along the time axis.  The result would be a bunch of 3-d static slices, and it seems to be such 
slices Barbour has in mind when he uses ‘instantaneous configurations’ in this context. 
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space
77
, two assumptions are made.  First paralleling Newtonian theory, assume that the 
universe consists of N bodies in a fixed three-dimensional Euclidean space.  Second, assume 
that our knowledge about these N bodies consists of the sets of numbers corresponding to 
their relative distances at an instant.   
So far, only one particular realization of the universe has been described in the form 
of the sets of numbers.  But, this realization of the universe has an UNP in the sense 
described above; just as with the graph example in which connections of all its points express 
its UNP, the sets of numbers corresponding to the relative distances of the N bodies provide a 
UNP of the universe.   
How do we generalise the UNP?  Barbour claims we can extend it as follows.  Any 
other different relative configuration of the N bodies in Euclidean space would have a 
different set of relative distances, but they would still have a UNP of the same form.  What 
exactly Barbour means by ‘same form’ here is not specified.  However, in view of our 
discussion of UNP above, it must be a function of relative distances.  In this case, it seems to 
be a function of the universe’s N bodies relative distances at an instant, i.e.,         .    
represents all possible sets of numbers that correspond to the N bodies’ possible relative 
positions, with each set representing a distinct possible static configuration of the N bodies.  
Thus, with such a generalised UNP, we are able to consider other possible static 
configurations of the universe. 
It is from all possible static configurations of the N bodies that we obtain a 
configuration space (c-space).  Each point in the c-space corresponds to a set of relative 
relations of the N bodies subject to the UNP.  Moreover, Barbour (1982, 268) claims that 
each point stands in a one-to-one correspondence with the set of all possible distinct 
configurations of the N bodies.  With this requirement and PII, it seems that c-space contains 
                                                 
77 Barbour refers to c-space points as ‘instants’.  However, I will largely avoid this terminology because of its 
temporal connotations. 
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no copies
78
 of configurations; because each point must represent a possible distinct 
configuration, c-space cannot contain two c-space points that correspond to the same 
configuration of the N bodies. 
Before moving on, there are two things to note about Barbour’s c-space.  First, unlike, 
e.g., the points of a coordinate system or the points of a manifold, Barbour’s c-space points 
are, so to speak, loaded.
79
  The points of a manifold are usually
80
 considered to be uniform 
and largely featureless: a manifold is just a collection of points that has topological 
properties, e.g., being smoothly connected and of a certain dimension, but it lacks 
geometrical properties.  Each c-space point, on the other hand, represents all the relative 
distance relations of the universe’s stuff at an instant.  Moreover, in the context of his 
nonrelativistic dynamics, c-space’s structure is unclear: he (1986) characterizes it as a heap of 
all possible instantaneous configurations of the universe, but below we see he refers to a 
possible history as a path in c-space.  Such tracing may imply that c-space has a structure.  
We’ll see that this ambiguity in the presentation of his nonrelativistic dynamics also 
reappears if one compares his relativistic account, in which c-space has a structure, with his 
quantum account, in which c-space is described as a heap.  While I do not resolve this 
ambiguity in his nonrelativistic model, it will be discussed in the contexts of GR and QT in 
Chapters 5-6.  Additionally, the significance of his use of ‘heap’ is discussed in Chapter3 due 
to the large role it plays in his QT. 
Second, the use of such a space does not ab initio violate ONT or MP.  Barbour 
(1982, 267) indicates this when he claims that his use of space merely, “permits an 
economical and perspicuous representation of the salient data.”  In other words, c-space is 
just a means of representing the relative relations that stuff in the universe may have.  If such 
                                                 
78 It is important to highlight the requirement that this possible space lacks copies here.  We return to this issue 
in Ch5 since probability in his QT and QG is supposed to be indicative of the number of actualized copies of c-
space points. 
79 Such c-space point loadedness is also used in Pooley’s 2001 discussion of sophisticated substantivalism. 
80 This is, of course, barring any primitive identity or the like that one may attribute to them in response to the 
hole argument.  See Hoefer 1996 and Stachel 1993 for discussions of such attributing.  In Ch3 we’ll see the 
manner in which this setup supposedly avoids this argument. 
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space is merely playing this representing role, then it seems that the space adds no description 
that is over and above the universe’s relative relations among bodies, which is in accord with 
MP.  And, as a representation of such relations, it does not appear to add any entity that is not 
reducible to objects and their relative relations, which is in accord with ONT.  However, the 
issue of whether his c-space only plays this representing role is questionable given his QG 
and is taken up in Ch5. 
Let’s return to Barbour’s account of dynamics in terms of c-space.  He has some 
revealing claims about motion.  With c-space, he (1982, 268-9) claims that in contrast with 
conventional dynamics in which the motion of a body in considered in the arena of a, e.g., 
Euclidean space, in his view we: 
consider the motion of the universe in its [c-space].  The first main advantage is that 
dynamics is immediately restricted to what is observable.  One uses in fact the entire 
[relative spatial relations of the universe at an instant] and nothing more.  A possible 
history of the universe is then any continuous curve taken by the universe in its [c-
space].  The second main advantage is that Leibniz’s idea of time being merely 
successive order of things finds very simple expression.  Namely, we say simply that 
the passage of time just reflects the fact that the universe is moving along some 
particular curve in [c-space]. 
Notice here that Barbour is writing in terms of the universe itself moving through c-space.  
Recall that each c-space point is supposed to represent a possible static configuration of the 
universe; it is a set of numbers that corresponds to all the relative special distances between 
stuff in the universe in a possible configuration.  But, here Barbour is speaking in terms of the 
actual universe tracing a path through c-space.  With his talk of the universe moving through 
c-space, he is paralleling conventional dynamics’ practice of being in terms of objects 
moving through space.   
Prima facie, this slide from the descriptive arena of c-space to a space in which the 
actual universe traces a path seems to import temporal order and temporal succession in 
violation of ONT.  If the universe actually does trace out such a path, then it seems that we 
have a series of temporally ordered c-space points that originated from the universe’s 
movement through c-space.  Thus, it seems that there exist temporally ordered c-space points 
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that are arrived at through an appeal to the ‘motion’ of the universe through c-space.  ONT is 
in turn violated because there is temporal order and temporal succession that is not reducible 
to relative spatial relations among stuff. 
However, this description-to-ontology slide, at least as presented above, does not 
violate ONT in this manner.  As we shall see, he provides a dynamics in which c-space points 
are stacked in terms of their relative spatial relations only.  Such a stacking of c-space points 
corresponds to what would be termed a ‘history of the universe’  So, the talk of ‘the universe 
tracing paths’ above should be read in terms of the existence of a set of static configurations 
of the universe.  As such histories are constructed only in terms of relative spatial relations, 
ONT is not violated and any associated temporal succession is reducible to relative spatial 
relations.  So, at least ontologically, such slides from description to ontology do not seem 
problematic.  This is because both MP, which dictates that the description must be at base in 
terms of relative spatial relations only, and Barbour’s ONT, according to which he is 
committed to there being stuff and their relative spatial relations only, make recourse to 
relative relations of the spatial kind only.  But, recall that ONT, unlike MP, also involves 
stuff, which can have monadic properties.  So, as long as the stuff’s monadic properties are 
not required in MP’s description, then such description-ontology slides are acceptable, and I 
follow Barbour in making such slides.  However, later we will discuss whether monadic 
properties are imported via these slides as a means of getting the resulting description to 
work. 
So, to put the content of the above passage in justifiably less temporally-loaded terms: 
Through this c-space Barbour provides a means to express time in terms of paths through c-
space, but such expression, he claims, does not commit him to some abstract generalization 
that violates ONT.  Rather, time merely corresponds to the ordering of c-space points via 
their relative spatial relations.  A possible history corresponds to any continuous curve 
through c-space.  Thus, Barbour claims that c-space paths can reflect what we would term 
‘the passage of time’; the passage of time merely reflects the fact there exist a certain set of c-
space points that is ordered via their relative spatial relations.  Moreover, PSR demands that 
we find reason for why there exists a set of c-space points corresponding to a certain path in 
c-space.  Thus, to find reasons as to why a particular path manifests, we must turn to 
Barbour’s dynamics.  
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2.2.2 The Development of Intrinsic Dynamics I: Fulfilment of MP1 
 Barbour initially develops a dynamics that fulfils MP1 by using c-space and CNP.  By 
c-space and CNP, he obtains a means to quantify change of variety in terms of variety itself 
and, thereby, establishes the foundation for a dynamics that seems to satisfy ONT.  In other 
words, he seeks to quantify how much the relative relations of the universe’s stuff changes 
when the universe ‘passes’ from one configuration to another.  This dynamics is then further 
developed in view of PII and PSR in order to fulfil MP1. 
 To “introduce a bit more variety into the scheme” (1982, 269), Barbour asks us to 
assume that we are able to associate a positive mass with the N bodies constituting the 
universe. 
Presumably in order to maintain MP, this additional variety must be expressed in 
terms of the bodies’ relative spatial relations.  Barbour’s (1989, 676 ff.) historical discussions 
of Mach’s analysis of inertial mass, which was mentioned earlier, illustrates a manner in 
which this can be done.
81
 
Recall that Newton defined inertial mass as the quantity measured by a function of a 
body’s volume and density.82  Newton’s discovery of the universal law of gravitation 
provides some motivation for introducing such a mass concept as distinct from weight.  
Partially because this concept of mass mutated into something in matter that measures inertia 
after Newton
83
, Barbour (1989, 684) characterizes Mach as aiming to clear this and other 
“metaphysical cobwebs out of the kitchen of physics.” 
                                                 
81 Plus, Barbour (1982, 269) supports the unproblematic nature of this addition by stating that astronomers can 
succeed in assigning a positive value to certain bodies.  This can indeed be calculated from the rotation of, e.g., 
a planet around a star, and the distance from the observer to the star.  See Zeilik 2002 for the manner in which 
such mass is calculable. 
82 Barbour (1989, 682-3) suggests Newton has a different notion of density, i.e., one which varies according to 
how close the pieces of matter, which are all identical, are packed together, that is inherited from the Cartesian 
plenum. 
83 See Harman (1982, 13-7) for an overview of the development of Newton’s inertial mass, which Newton 
eventually formulated in terms of an inherent force in a body. 
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Guided by the notion that a successfully functioning scientific theory must rest on 
experimentally observable phenomena, Mach proceeds to build up the concepts of dynamics 
by starting with the fundamental geometrical ones; in the context of classifying mass and 
force, he starts by presuming distance measurement, the existence of clocks as chosen from 
some convenient standard, e.g., the intervals in which the Earth turns through equal angles, 
and a frame of reference, which is defined by distant stars, with respect to which all motions 
are to be defined.  Next, Mach begins to stratify this setup for dynamics with an 
“observational fact” (1989, 685), namely, the law of inertia, i.e., “In the frame of reference 
defined for practical purposes by the stars, the bodies are usually observed to travel in straight 
lines with uniform speed.” 
From this layer, acceleration must be addressed starting, of course, with observed 
accelerations.  The observational facts concerning acceleration are:  Normally bodies travel 
on straight lines relative to the stars, but, under certain conditions, at least two bodies can 
mutually accelerate each other.  One example of such mutual acceleration is collisions.   
Consider the collision of body1 and body2 in a straight line.  Each body is observed to 
undergo a change in velocity, i.e.,        , as a result of the collision.  It results that if the 
pre-collision velocities are varied, then the bodies’ change in velocity varies as well.  
However, the ratio between each set of velocities, e.g.,         , is always equal to the same 
number -C12.   
Further, suppose that there is a third body.  Collision experiments are performed 
between body1 and body3, and body2 and body3.  The constants that are found, i.e., C13 and 
C23, have this relationship: 
C12C23 = C13 
It is the existence of such relationships, Mach claims, that makes the introduction of the mass 
concept possible via associating with each body i a mass mi such that Cij=  mi/mj.   
Supposing that Mach can successfully determine mass by using bodies’ relations 
alone, it seems that mass can at least be described in terms of relative relations alone.   As 
such, MP would not be violated.  Does this violate ONT?  One could plausibly argue that, 
due to ontologically parsimony, we can eliminate any sort of mass property because it can be 
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cashed out in terms of relative relations to which we are already committed.  In effect, any 
monadic mass property should be eliminated.  Thus, the fulfilment of ONT can be argued for.  
However, if such a reduction is in the offing, the introduction of mass as variety by 
Barbour above is odd; it seems more accurate to state that mass is reducible to the objects’ 
relative relations, rather than to introduce mass as an additional type of variety.  More 
importantly, I will later question whether Barbour’s initial use of mass here offers a means of 
identifying bodies across c-space points that cannot be later reduced to objects’ relations.  So, 
let’s assume for now that ‘the variety’ refers, strictly speaking, to objects and their relative 
relations alone and that mass is reducible to this variety.  In effect, he aims to solve the 
problem of quantifying the change in the relations of the N bodies from one configuration to 
another and fulfilling UNP only in terms of these N bodies’ relations, but can legitimately use 
mass because it is derivable from the N bodies’ relations. 
 With such mass, Barbour (1982, 270) proceeds to give an account of ‘change of 
position’.  Since by CNP the position of a body is defined in terms of its instantaneous 
relations to all other bodies, it seems that change of position ought to also be in terms of its 
relations to all other bodies.  So, CNP and ONT motivate Barbour to give an account of 
‘change of position’ via configurations of all the bodies in the universe.  In subsequent works 
(e.g., 1994a, 1995, 2001), he terms this account the ‘best-matching procedure’ (BMP).   
Before going into the details of BMP, which start in the next paragraph, here is a 
characterization of BMP in general terms.  In BMP, broadly speaking, one considers two 
points in c-space that only slightly differ in terms of their N bodies’ configurations.  One 
aims to move one of these c-space points relative to the other to the position in which the 
action is a minimum.  When the action is a minimum, the two c-space points ‘best-match’, 
and the corresponding displacements are the ones that the particles have actually made in 
passing from the first configuration to the second.  Plus, it’s important to note for PII later, 
these displacements cannot be transformed away by coordinate transformations (1982, 270). 
 BMP is formally derived as follows.  Represent a particular configuration    of the N 
bodies in the universe by way of a Cartesian coordinate system.  In this coordinate system, 
each particle   has three coordinates:         .  So,            . 
 Consider an arbitrary infinitesimal change   
  of   : 
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Here,     is the change between    and   
 .  This change, claims Barbour, must be ‘genuine’, 
i.e., it must be change in terms of one or more of the relative distances between the N bodies, 
rather than a mere shift of the coordinate system.  Barbour uses PII in order to support the 
claim that the change produced by a change of the coordinate frame is not genuine change.  
Assuming we’re dealing with point particles, if all the relative distances among the bodies in 
two configurations of the universe are the same, then there is no means to discern them.  
Thus, by PII, these configurations are one and the same.  Compare this with the case of 
shifting the coordinate frame. Suppose we have a certain configuration of the universe with 
the origin of the coordinate frame at some particle at the centre of the configuration, and we 
shift its coordinate frame so that its origin is on some particle that is not in the centre of the 
configuration.  As this coordinate transformation makes no difference as to the lengths of 
relative distances in the configuration except for re-labelling them, PII dictates that the 
configuration that results from such a transformation is identical to the initial configuration.
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84 Barbour only addresses this issue in terms of the passive transformation, i.e., change of coordinate system on 
a single configuration.  If a configuration of point particles underwent an active transformation, i.e., one in 
which the particles are effectively pushed around to the positions of other particles in the original configuration, 
then it seems Barbour’s response is not straightforward.  By his application of CNP, a particle in a configuration 
is completely defined by the relative distances it has to everything else in the universe.  Further, because of MP, 
dynamics cannot be described in terms of anything that is over and above relative relations.  In effect, dynamics 
cannot refer to some sort of primitive identity that a particle may have.  So, the particle can only be identified in 
terms of its relative relations.  If the configuration exhibits certain symmetry, e.g., the configuration has only 
two particles, and an active transformation is performed, then the particles retain the same relative distances.  
PII would thereby entail that the configurations are the same.  If a configuration does not exhibit this sort of 
symmetry, then the active transformation would result in there being the same set of relative relations but 
holding among different particles.  However, since there is no way of identifying these point particles other than 
in terms of their relative relations, both configurations are one and the same by PII.  Moreover, if the particles 
had different masses, then there would be a way of identifying them in an active transformation provided that 
the configuration does not exhibit symmetry.  In such a case, the configurations would not be identical.  And, in 
effect, this counts as genuine change too.  However, Barbour likely did not make reference to active 
transformations above because he is concerned with the role of coordinate systems, and active transformation 
does not require such a system. 
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 However, Barbour notes that   
 could be represented in a different coordinate system, 
and that this would result in a different    .  If he formulated this change by choosing one 
coordinate system, then he would be reliant on a particular chosen background structure that 
is not derived from relative relations.  Thus, he would not be able to fulfil MP.  In order to 
not be dependent on a particular coordinate system, the genuine change must be measured in 
a manner that is coordinate-system-free.  To do so, we must compare all the different sets of 
    obtained by comparing the first configuration, which is represented in some fixed 
coordinate system, with the second configuration, which is represented in all possible 
coordinate systems  .  Doing so results in the sets     
 
 . 
 Here is the difference between the two coordinate systems     when the second 
configuration is represented in coordinate system  : 
     ∑       
 
    
             (E2.1) 
Mass is included as a weighting factor because the particles are not assumed to be of identical 
mass. Except for exceptional degenerate cases, which Barbour (1982, 270) ignores, there is 
among the coordinate systems   a single placing of the second configuration relative to the 
first in which the value of     a minimum.  This is what he calls the position of best-match.  
For this case,        is the coordinate-free change between the two configurations.  Thus, 
Barbour claims to have a way of quantifying change of variety in terms of the variety itself.  
Indeed, ONT seems to be intact.  Through the effective comparison of the relative distances 
between two configurations, it only uses relative spatial relations among the bodies and mass, 
which, as indicated above, may be reducible to bodies’ relative relations. 
 With this setup, we can implement MP1 by constructing an analogue of standard 
nonrelativistic dynamics’ principle of least action.  This is the equation that minimizes the 
action, which is a quantity associated with each of the possible paths a system can take 
between two points.  In nonrelativistic dynamics, the least action is calculated by considering 
any two configurations with a finite difference, e.g., a particle with a certain position at t1 and 
the particle with a different position at a later time t2.  These positions are with respect to 
absolute space or, qua mathematic representation of such space, some fixed coordinate 
system.  Then, one considers all the possible continuous paths that the particle can take 
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between these two positions.  For each path, the action is calculated, and the path with the 
minimum action is deemed the path that is realized by the particle.   
While the details of these calculations are not required for our purposes here
85
, notice 
that such calculations rely on there being some fixed time parameter as well as the ability to 
make reference to the positions of bodies with respect to a fixed coordinate system.  To fulfil 
MP, Barbour must modify the action principle so as to either eliminate the fixed time 
parameter and coordinate systems or make them reducible to relative relations of the bodies. 
He claims that there is no reason to choose one fixed coordinate system over another. 
PSR dictates that there is no reason for the least action to be calculated using a certain fixed 
coordinate system.  Instead, such differences among configurations should be measured 
without reference to a particular coordinate system.  E2.1 above allows him to do this.  E2.1 
determines the change between two configurations, allows one to consider the difference 
between two c-space points measured from all possible coordinate systems, and the minimum 
value of E2.1 for all possible coordinate systems is deemed the change between the two 
configurations.  As noted above, E2.1 does not make reference to anything over and above 
the relative relations of the configurations.  Thus, it seems to offer a means of describing 
something similar to the least action without reference to a fixed coordinate system.  In turn, 
if the principle of least action can be constructed in terms of such a minimum, then MP1 is 
satisfied.  We’ll see how Barbour incorporates this best-matching in his version of the least 
                                                 
85 For reference, I present them here.  The equation to calculate the action   of a path, which is a function      
for t1<t< t2, between the particle’s initial position at t1and its later position at t2 is: 
        ∫        ̇   
  
  
 
Here,   is position,  ̇       , and the Lagrangian L=T-V, where T is the kinetic energy (a function of  ̇) and 
V is the potential energy (a function of  ). 
The principle of least action is calculated by determining the points where the derivative of   vanishes for all 
t1<t< t2: 
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action principle, which is provided in the next section as it requires that we also get rid of 
nonrelativistic mechanics’ presupposed fixed time parameter. 
 Thus, in view of considerations from PII and PSR, Barbour has some means of 
describing dynamics in a manner that does not refer to some presupposed fixed coordinate 
system or absolute space.  MP1 can be satisfied in a coordinate-free fashion that only makes 
recourse to the relative distances of the universe’s bodies through determining the best-
matching position of one configuration relative to that of another. 
2.2.3 The Development of Intrinsic Dynamics II: Fulfilment of MP2 
The dynamics of the preceding subsection is further developed to fulfil MP2 using 
PSR.  As stated in the previous section, the standard principle of least action involves using a 
fixed time parameter.  Barbour (1982, 271) and Barbour and Bertotti (1982, 296) point out 
that this time parameter, however, is not based on the relative relations of stuff in the 
universe.  Rather, one could consider it to be a clock that is exterior to the system.  This use 
of such a clock is problematic when the relative change of the entire universe is considered.  
Suppose that through best-matching, a sequence of c-space points is generated.  Now 
consider two copies of the sequence, i.e., both have the same sequence of c-space points.  If 
there is an external clock, then one sequence can be sped-up: the sequence occurs but the 
external clock reads that a smaller amount of time has passed.  Because this speeding up does 
not change the relative relations in the c-space points, it does not result in a discernible 
difference in the two sequences.  So, they conclude that nonrelativistic dynamics has no 
reason to claim that sequences that are otherwise identical occur at different rates.  In effect, 
their presupposition of there being a time parameter that is external to the system violates 
PSR. 
To overcome this alleged problem, Barbour proposes to eliminate the use of an 
external arbitrary time parameter.  To do so and fulfil MP2, he develops his version of the 
principle of least action such that it does not make use of such a time parameter and is at base 
a description only in terms of relative distances between stuff in the universe. 
Barbour (1994a) (2001) (1982) bases his action on the Jacobi principle.  In the Jacobi 
principle, time   is treated as a variable rather than as a pre-established background 
parameter.  It is defined in terms of having a value that increases along any path in a space.  
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Jacobi’s principle is used to calculate a curve in the space.  Here is a standard formulation of 
the principle      : 
       ∫  √       (E2.2) 
Here,   is any monotonically increasing parameter along the curve.    , a conformal factor, is 
equivalent to E-V, where E is the system’s constant total energy and V, a function of position, 
is the potential energy of the system.  T is the flat kinetic metric, which is equivalent to 
 
 
∑   
   
  
 
   
   
, where    is a position vector of particle i. 
 To use this principle as a means of calculating curves in c-space, Barbour needs to 
replace the part of T which is dependent on positions relative to a fixed coordinate system.  
He also eliminates  .  Because it just serves as a means to arbitrarily label a c-space path, it is 
not required in the Machian version.  In effect, 
   
  
 
   
  
 is replaced by the displacement in the 
best-matching position       from above.  To present the equation in a more streamlined 
fashion, denote this quantity as:    .  Now, we can present the Machian version of E2.2, 
where V= Σi mi mj / rij: 
                         ∫√      ∑ (
  
 
)                    (E2.3) 
This is what Barbour terms his best-matching procedure (BMP).  BMP allows us to define 
paths in c-space, i.e., sequences of c-space points.  Moreover, it is only in terms of relative 
relations of stuff in the universe.  As it makes no reference to a time parameter or space that 
is not built from the stuff’s relative relations, E2.3 satisfies both MP1 and MP2. 
 How does the BMP affect ONT?  To approach this question, I introduce Barbour’s 
horizontal and vertical stacking, which also appear in his relativistic Machian theory as we’ll 
see in the next chapter. 
In the context of using BMP to recover trajectories that are usually set against a 
Newtonian absolute space, he (2001, 206) (1986, 239) proposes a procedure: the ‘horizontal 
stacking’ of best-matching c-space points.  Here he uses this term to refer to the placing c-
space points together such that they are laid out in a space, which is meant to contrast with 
vertical stacks, i.e., stacks in a time dimension.  To horizontally stack, first suppose that you 
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found a sequence of c-space points by means of BMP.  He (1986) refers to the c-space points 
picked out as a solution to E2.3 as a heap.   
As we see in the next chapter, his use of ‘heaps’ appears to be a means of indicating 
that such a solution doesn’t come in, e.g., an ordered 4-d block.  For now, just note that use of 
‘heap’ is to emphasize the fact that the order of the sequence is derivative from the relations 
with in a c-space point, rather than a relation that is given with a solution to the equations.  It 
is presumably due to the lack of such structure that we must stack the points of heaps.  Yet, 
Barbour assumes that the BMP will generate a continuity of changes among the set of c-space 
points it picks out.  This seems reasonable given that the best-matching position is one that 
minimizes that difference between two c-space points.  In effect, BMP picks out a series of 
points, each of which is slightly different from the one that follows it in the series.  These 
points can thus be uniquely ordered in a horizontal stack.  To stack them horizontally, start 
with one of the extremal c-space points of the series.  Take the next c-space point and place it 
on top of the first such that the difference between them is minimized.  This process is 
repeated for each subsequent point.  Thus, we can obtain a horizontal stacking of c-space 
points.
86
   
 Before moving onto vertical stacking, note that horizontal stacking seems to be in 
accord with ONT.  Such stacks have an order, but this order is the product of a comparison of 
their relative spatial relations only.  Thus, the succession of the c-space points does not seem 
to violate ONT.   
 Vertical stacking further highlights the fact that he only uses relative spatial relations 
to build temporal successions of configurations.  To do so, you start with the horizontal stack 
as constructed above.  Then, you reintroduce the Jacobi’s   as follows: 
                 √      ∑ (
  
 
)                             (E2.4) 
                                                 
86 In the context of using this stacking procedure, Barbour goes further and recovers Newtonian laws in the same 
form via BMP by placing the stack is placed in absolute space.  This allows him to associate each stack with a 
position relative to absolute space.  However, as I am concerned with procedure itself and the implications it has 
for its use in the context of his relativistic account, rather than with the extent to which he can recover Newton’s 
laws, I do not present such arguments.  See Barbour and Bertotti 1982 for details. 
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Here,   is an arbitrary parameter that serves to label the stacked configurations with a value 
that is monotonically increasing up the stack.  In this sense, the configurations have a vertical 
stacking.  Barbour (1986) supports the choice of a single monotonically increasing parameter 
here because in the Newtonian context, the simplest forms of the equations of motion can be 
obtained with a single parameter that is applied to the entire stack.  Does such a parameter 
violate ONT?  The labelling seems to add nothing over and above the relative relations by 
which the horizontal stacks are constructed.  Instead, it merely associates some number with 
each instantaneous configuration of the universe in the stack.  The order of the numbers, 
moreover, comes from the ordering of the horizontal stack: the horizontal stack is constructed 
first, and its order comes from comparing relative relations among the c-space points.  Then, 
the horizontal stack is associated with a certain series of numbers.  The order of the 
configurations that the series of numbers labels thus results from the relative relations among 
c-space points.  In effect, apparent temporal sequences are constructed from relative spatial 
relations among stuff, which is in accord with ONT. 
 
Thus, Barbour formulates a Machian account of nonrelativistic dynamics.   This 
account, as emphasized above, is principle-based.  These principles are used in order to 
construct a dynamics that is in terms of the relative instantaneous spatial relations among all 
the stuff in the universe.  To sum up his account, it is useful first to contrast it briefly with 
Newtonian dynamics.  In Newtonian dynamics, each particle moves with respect to absolute 
time and space primarily.  Barbour’s Machian nonrelativistic dynamics, on the other hand, 
claims that only sets of relative instantaneous configurations of all the particles in the 
universe exist; a solution to his timeless BMP provides a sequence of c-space points that can 
be stacked to construct a space and operational sense of time from relative spatial relations 
among bodies alone. 
The fundamental components of this account are his c-space points.  These are in 
accord with ONT as each being made up of only all the stuff in the universe and their relative 
spatial relations at an instant.  Moreover, with these as his fundamental building blocks, 
temporal relations are excluded from ONT.  In this nonrelativistic account, c-space contains a 
single copy of each possible c-space point, but whether Barbour regards this space as being a 
heap or having structure is unclear.  Because this space is presented as a mere means of 
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representing the relative relations that stuff in a universe may have, it does not seem to 
violate ONT or MP.  Paths through this space represent best-matching sets of c-space points.  
Moreover, his BMP does not violate ONT or MP: it is not dependent on a particular 
coordinate system, includes mass that may be reducible to relative relations, lacks a time 
parameter and, thus, only involves a comparison of the relative instantaneous relations of c-
space points.  Thus, the order of best-matching c-space points is a product of a comparison of 
their relative spatial relations alone.  Furthermore, such c-space points can be stacked 
horizontally in virtue of the relations.  An arbitrary time parameter can be applied to a 
horizontal stack and serve as a mere label of the stacked c-space points.  Thus, time, qua 
arbitrary monotonically increasing parameter associated with a horizontal stack, can be 
introduced in a manner that does not violate ONT or MP. 
Recall that his motivation to generate such a Machian nonrelativistic dynamics is to 
provide a model on which he will develop a version of GR that is clearly Machian.  In the 
next chapter, we turn the manner in which he makes inferences from the above Machian 
nonrelativistic dynamics to generate his Machian account of relativity as well as expand upon 
the manner in which it is consistent with the principles. 
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Chapter 3: Machianizing Relativistic Dynamics 
 From the model of a Machian nonrelativistic dynamics that he generated such that it 
fulfilled his relational principles, Barbour proceeds to develop a Machian relativistic 
dynamics.  To do so, he redefines the c-space points such that they do not require a fixed 
geometry, namely he chooses the Riemannian 3-geometries of geometrodynamics to serve as 
his c-space points.  Then, he constructs analogues of his Machian nonrelativistic BMP, which 
provides him the means by which to create a 4-d space through horizontal and vertical 
stacking.  Finally, by comparing the extremely similar structures of the version of the 
Machian relativistic BMP that involves a time parameter with the Baierlein-Sharp-Wheeler 
formulation of GR’s action, he claims that GR is just a special case of his Machian relativistic 
dynamics. 
 Compared with his accounts of quantum theory and quantum gravity, which are 
unpacked in the next two chapters, his account of GR is relativity well-rehearsed.  In effect, 
the first two sections of this chapter are expository and highlight parallels with his 
nonrelativistic account given in the previous chapter as well as the manner in which MP and 
ONT are fulfilled.  Additionally, §3 explores that status of relations among c-space points 
given his principles. 
One reason Barbour (1992, 142) provides for believing that standard GR is not 
Machian is its use of distinguished inertial frames, i.e., local frames in which stuff is moving 
at a uniform velocity.  While GR does not rely on some global fixed coordinate system as 
Newtonian mechanics does with its absolute space and time, it does make use of these frames 
of reference locally.  Each point of spacetime is assigned a local inertial frame in accordance 
with the value of the metric field tensor.  These local inertial frames are assigned a 
Minkowski vector bundle, i.e., a bundle of 4-vectors that are assigned on the tangent at a 
point of spacetime to curves in the manifold that pass through the point.
87
  Unless these 
frames emerge from the relative relations among stuff, Barbour rejects such local spacetimes 
as being anti-Machian; though local, these spacetimes are regarded as nonphysical and 
defined on points, rather than being clearly derivative from relative relations.  Nevertheless, 
                                                 
87 See Plebański and Krasiński 2006 and Hall 2004 for details about tangent spaces. 
83 
 
despite the presence of these frames, he claims that GR is Machian; it only appears not to be 
so because these frames have not been explicitly reduced to the stuff and relations of a 
universe.  In turn, he seeks to illustrate that these frames in fact are reducible to such stuff 
with his Machian rendition of GR.  After providing his choice of c-space points in §1 and his 
Machian relativistic dynamics in §2, we return to the manner in which such local spacetimes 
are recoverable from stuff and their relations alone. 
1 Relativistic C-Space Points 
 Barbour chooses c-space points for his relativistic dynamics such that they reflect the 
fact that GR’s geometry is variable.  The manner in which GR’s spacetime is standardly 
formulated aims to incorporate as few assumptions as possible about the geometry of each 
representation of a physically possible universe in order to be generally covariant, i.e., uphold 
the posit that the laws of nature are invariant under arbitrary coordinate transformations.  
Accordingly, such a representation is <M, g, T>.  M, which represents spacetime
88
, is a 4-d 
continuously differentiable point manifold, i.e., a collection of points that has topological 
properties, e.g., having points that are smoothly connected and being 4-d, but has no 
geometrical properties, e.g., having a defined notion of length or angle.  g is a metric field 
tensor
89
 that is defined everywhere on the manifold and represents the gravitational field.  
This tensor structures the points by defining their metric and geometrical relations, e.g., it 
defines distance between two points and co-linearity.  Finally, T is a stress-energy tensor that 
is defined everywhere on the manifold and represents matter and non-gravitational energy 
existing in the manifold.  With this setup, the geometry across a spacetime varies in 
accordance with the value of g. 
                                                 
88 This depiction of spacetime is in accord with manifold substantivalism, i.e., the view in which spacetime is 
identified with only the manifold.  Contrast this with the view held by those, e.g., Hoefer 1996, who represent 
spacetime with M and g in response to the hole argument.  While such options will not be assessed here, the hole 
argument and Barbour’s means of replying are presented below.  
89 Generally, a tensor field on a manifold is a mapping that assigns a tensor to every point of the manifold.  A 
tensor can be regarded as similar to a vector except that it has more indices that transform under a change of 
coordinates.  See Friedman 1983 for details. 
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 In his Machian nonrelativistic dynamics, a c-space point is characterized in terms of 
relations among all particles of the universe in an instant.  However, the geometry of all the 
nonrelativistic c-space points is the same: spatial Euclidean geometry is assumed.  Given that 
a specific geometry is not fixed in GR, the relativistic c-space points must not be in terms of a 
single particular geometry.
90
  So, he replaces his nonrelativistic c-space point, which is a 
possible set of all the relations among the universe’s particles in an instant, with his 
relativistic c-space point, which is a set of all the distance relations that hold among points in 
a possible closed 3-d Riemannian space and instanced by one of its 3-metrics    .  In view of 
the manner in which these Riemannian 3-geometries are used in the geometrodynamics 
formulation of GR, Barbour adopts the basic components of this view and uses them to 
construct a Machian relativistic dynamics in a fashion that mirrors his nonrelativistic 
dynamics.   
To provide some information about what these 3-metrics     are, some information 
about geometrodynamics’ setup is required.  Geometrodynamics is a way of formulating GR 
in terms of the spatial dynamics of geometry.  In standard geometrodynamics, the 4-d 
spacetime manifold M is given topology    , where   is a spatially compact 3-manifold 
and   is the set of real numbers representing a global time direction.  This submanifold is 
foliated by a family of spacelike 3-d hypersurfaces   , indexed by the time parameter t.  A 
coordinate system {x
a
} is defined on   .  In effect, 4-d spacetime is decomposed into 
instantaneous 3-d hypersurfaces, or spacelike slices, plus t.  Each 3-d hyperslice is put in 
terms of geometric variables that correspond to a Riemannian 3-metric
91
     describing the 
3-d hyperspace’s intrinsic geometry.92   
                                                 
90 See Friedman (1983, 185) for details. 
91 A Riemannian metric is a metric having an inner product on the tangent space at each point, i.e., a vector 
space containing all possible ‘directions’ in which on can tangentially pass through the point, which varies 
smoothly from point to point, giving local notions of angle, length of curves, surface area and volume.  To 
define this further as well as ‘pseudo-Riemannian geometries’, to which Barbour later refers, I contrast them 
here. Pseudo-Riemannian geometries are generalizations of Riemannian geometries in the sense that their metric 
tensors need not be positive-definite, while those of Riemannian geometries must be positive-definite.  To 
explain ‘positive-definiteness’ without getting into the details of bilinear forms that are associated with each 
tangent space on a metric, it suffices to say that this has to do with the signatures of the manifolds.  Both the 
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It is the Riemannian 3-geometry content of geometrodynamics’ hyperslices that serve 
as Barbour’s relativistic c-space points.  These 3-geometries have their intrinsic relations 
cashed out in terms of 3-metrics     that are defined on a 3-manifold.  However, for any 3-
geometry there is a number of 3-metrics
93
; a geometry is an equivalence class of metrics with 
elements related by a diffeomorphism.
94
   To see why this is so, consider a 3-metric defined 
on a 3-manifold.  Shuffling the points of the manifold around results in the same relations 
holding, but the points are re-labelled or moved.  The shuffled manifold, though having the 
same 3-geometry, has a different metric because the metric defines relations among specific 
points of the manifold; if the points are shuffled, then a new metric results.  But, because a 3-
geometry effectively captures the geometrical relations among the points without referring to 
the labels of the points, the 3-geometry remains the same.  Thus, because the points of the 3-
manifold can be shuffled around by diffeomorphisms, there are a number of different metrics 
                                                                                                                                                        
Riemannian and pseudo-Riemannian geometries are associated with a bilinear form with a fixed signature (p, q), 
where p is the number of positive eigenvalues of the form, and q is the number of negative eigenvalues.  As 
positive-definite, the signatures of a Riemannian manifold must be (n, 0).  Partially because pseudo-Riemannian 
geometries are not necessarily positive-definite, the signature of the manifold associated with such a geometry is 
just the signature of its metric, e.g., the signature of a type of pseudo-Riemannian manifold, namely the 
Lorentzian manifold, is (p, 1) or (1, q), depending on sign conventions.  For an introduction to Riemannian 
geometries, see Boothby 1986. 
92 Note that we are using the common convention in GR of using Greek indices, e.g.,    , as spacetime indices, 
which take the values (0,1,2,3), and Roman indices, e.g.,     as spatial indices, which take the values (1,2,3).  
Plus, these indices are shorthand for certain matrices, where the element’s row is indicated by the first subscript 
and the column by the second, and     is the inverse of    . 
93 Also, see Rickles (2008). 
94 A diffeomorphism is a coordinate transformation which is a one-to-one smooth differentiable mapping that 
takes the points of the 3-manifold to other points of it.  In geometrodynamics, a 3-geometry is an equivalence set 
of such metrics because of its diffeomorphism constraint.  This constraint ensures the theory is invariant under 
spatial diffeomorphisms, which makes the resulting dynamics only dependent on variables that are unaffected 
by such arbitrary coordinate transformations.  And, note that in this context, this is meant to include all 
diffeomorphisms, i.e., diffeomorphisms interpreted both in the passive sense, i.e., as a change in coordinate 
system, and in the active sense, i.e., as a change in the relations among coordinates.  In §3, we discuss the 
impact of local active diffeomorphisms on 3-geometries. 
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that can be associated with a single geometry.  Moreover, in view of this exposition of the 
nature of 3-geometries, the manner in which the 3-geometries parallel the nonrelativistic c-
space points is elucidated.  Just as a nonrelativistic c-space point is all the relative spatial 
relations that hold among particles in an instant, a relativistic c-space point is a 3-geometry, 
i.e., all the relative spatial geometrical relations that hold among points in a 3-d hyperslice.   
Additionally, these 3-hyperslices mirror the instantaneous nature of his nonrelativistic 
c-space points in that they capture a single instantaneous 3-geometry.  We will see shortly 
that Barbour plugs these components into a modified best-matching procedure in order to 
construct spacetime by stacking the resulting 3-geometries.  In effect, he creates a Machian 
geometrodynamics.  The manner in which his project differs from the project of standard 
geometrodynamics is that the latter, at least in view of Wheeler’s motivations, aims to use 
GR as a model for constructing a dynamics in terms of 3-geometries
95
, while the former has 
the initial aim of creating a Machian relativistic dynamics in which its timelessness is 
emphasized.  In Barbour’s project, the action for Machian relativistic dynamics turns out to 
be able to be cast in very similar form to an action of GR that was formulated in standard 
geometrodynamics.  So, while a similar expression of GR may be derived in both approaches, 
as we’ll see in §3 below, Barbour’s approach differs in that it aims to emphasize the Machian 
nature of relativistic dynamics. 
Furthermore, note that he restricts his Machian account to pure geometrodynamics, 
i.e., one without matter fields.  However, he (1995, 225) speculates that matter fields can be 
added by supplementing the 3-geometries with more degrees of freedom.
96
  Because I am 
more concerned with the role played by time in the general form of his Machian account than 
whether such fields can be added and because such fields may at least in principle be cashed 
out in terms of the relative spatial relations among the fields in accordance with MP, I do not 
consider the implications of adding such matter fields for his Machian geometrodynamics. 
                                                 
95 See Stachel 1972 for details concerning Wheeler’s development of geometrodynamics.  His development of 
this account is intertwined with the project of unifying GR with quantum mechanics.   Moreover, in Ch4 we will 
see the manner in which his geometrodynamics is quantized. 
96 Also, see Pooley 2001 for discussion of how fields may be incorporated in Barbour’s account. 
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 Moreover, Barbour’s c-space points in this context are ‘loaded’ in a similar fashion to 
those of his nonrelativistic dynamics.  Just as his non-relativistic c-space points are loaded in 
comparison with the standard points in a coordinate system, these 3-geometry points are 
loaded in comparison with the points of GR’s manifold.  Rather than being a largely 
featureless point that only has topological relations with other points constituting GR’s 
manifold, a c-space point is all the relative relations of a possible 3-geometry.  We will see 
below the manner in which this setup provides Barbour with a reply to a standard issue in 
GR, namely the hole argument. 
 Now that we have our relativistic c-space points, we turn to its corresponding c-space.  
Just as the points of nonrelativistic c-space are all possible instantaneous configurations of 
the bodies of the universe, the points of c-space are all the possible 3-geometries.  However, 
unlike the heap constituting his nonrelativistic c-space, relativistic c-space is given structure 
in the context of his relativistic dynamics.  He (1994a, 2853) (1995, 225) identifies c-space 
with the DeWitt superspace, which is the space of all possible Riemannian 3-geometries of 
the universe of a fixed compact 3-manifold M.  This space is obtained by quotienting out the 
group of diffeomorphisms of M from the space of smooth Riemannian 3-metrics on M.  
Recall our definition of ‘geometries’: a geometry is an equivalence class of metrics with 
elements related by a diffeomorphism.  In this context, a diffeomorphism is interpreted as 
generating a spatial coordinate transformation on M.  Quotienting out the diffeomorphisms 
effectively removes the labelled coordinate grid of the metric and leaves the 3-geometries, 
i.e., all the relative spatial geometrical relations that hold among points.  This procedure has a 
similar effect to our suggested reduction of mass in the nonrelativistic dynamics.  By 
reducing mass to relative relations, we are able to describe dynamics only using relative 
relations at base and, thus, are able to fulfil MP.  Similarly, by eliminating any import of 
manifold points, we are able to describe dynamics in terms of the relative relations of the 3-
geometries alone and, thus, have a setup that allows us to fulfil MP.   
 Moreover, Giulini (2009) notes that this particular quotienting out procedure results in 
a space with more than one manifold, i.e., it has a collection of manifolds each of which has a 
different dimension.  This manifold can then be structured such that some of these manifolds 
serve as strata.  While Barbour accepts that c-space does have stratified structure in the 
context of his relativistic account and, as we’ll see in Ch5, in the context of his quantum 
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gravity account, he does not make explicit how exactly it is in accord with ONT and MP.  
Furthermore, though he does indicate how c-space is stratified in the context of quantum 
gravity, this structure does not do much work in his relativistic dynamics.
97
  So, the 
presentation of his stratified c-space is not given until Ch5, and its implications for ONT and 
MP are discussed there. 
 In sum, by defining a c-space point as a possible 3-geometry, Barbour has a means of 
describing dynamics in terms of relative spatial relations alone.  Moreover, as such 3-
geometries are instantaneous and only involve the relative relations among unspecified 
points, these c-space points fulfil ONT.  For now, we consider the c-space just to be the set of 
all possible c-space points.  With these Machian relativistic c-space points and c-space in 
place, we can move to the manner in which Barbour provides an analogue of his 
nonrelativistic BMP. 
2 The Formulation of the Machian Relativistic BMP 
 To formulate his Machian relativistic BMP, he follows a method analogous to the one 
used for formulating his nonrelativistic BMP with some modifications. 
2.1 Initial Parallels with Nonrelativistic Best-Matching 
 Recall that in nonrelativistic case, we begin by considering two c-space points that 
differ only slightly in terms of the configurations of their N particles.  Likewise, in the 
relativistic case, we start by considering two c-space points that differ only slightly in terms 
                                                 
97 While Barbour does make references to c-space in the formulation of his relativistic account, e.g., stating that 
a sequence of best-matching 3-geometries is a geodesic in c-space, it is the relativistic BMP informs us exactly 
how to ‘draw’ the geodesic through c-space.  His stratified c-space, as we’ll see in Ch5, is organized in terms of 
the relative symmetry and congruence of all possible c-space points.  While a c-space structure in terms of such 
properties may narrow down the set of possible best-matching c-space points given a particular configuration, it 
does not dictate precisely in which direction a geodesic should be drawn.  Because, as noted in Ch5, c-space is 
multi-dimensional, there are a substantial number of directions in which a geodesic can be drawn.  In effect, it 
seems that the relativistic BMP, like the nonrelativistic BMP, is doing most of the work in establishing a 
sequence of c-space points that form a specific geodesic in c-space.  For this reason, my exposition below 
focuses on the role of the relativistic BMP in generating sequences of c-space points and makes little reference 
to c-space. 
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of 3-geometries among the points of their 3-manifolds.  However, in the nonrelativistic case, 
the relationships of Euclidean geometry are assumed; the geometry of such c-space points is 
restricted to a single specific geometry.  In this case, we are able to start by trial matching by 
using rigid body transformations and rotations, i.e., we can simply shift around the two c-
space points, such that the particles and relations of the respective points largely match up.  
Because the geometry of the relativistic c-space points is not similarly restricted to a single 
geometry, we cannot use such transformations in order to perform the initial trial matching of 
these points.   
Instead, Barbour (2001, 209) suggests that we consider one 3-geometry    and lay out 
coordinates on it in some arbitrary manner, which gives it the metric    
 .  Then, consider a 
second 3-geometry    that differs from the first slightly.  Coordinates are put on the second 
3-geometry arbitrarily except that the resulting metric    
  at the same coordinate values 
differs slightly from those of    
 , i.e., 
   
     
       
where the value of their difference      is very small. 
Next we consider the ‘equilocal’ points in these two c-space points.  The points of the 
two 3-geometries are equilocal if each point of the first is paired with a point of the second.  
In our trial matching, we establish this pairing by definition: the coordinate points on the 
respective 3-geometries that have the same values are, by definition, equilocal.  This gives us 
a trial equilocality relation among the 3-geometries such that      measures the change of the 
metric at paired equilocal points.  The measure of change at each point can then be integrated 
over the entire c-space points in order to get a trial value of the global difference between the 
c-space points. 
 So far, we have used a couple of arbitrarily chosen coordinate systems, each of which 
resulted in a single metric for each of our two 3-geometries, and a mapping between the 
points established by a definition.  The arbitrariness resembles that arising from the 
nonrelativistic approach’s initial use of a pair of arbitrarily chosen coordinate systems 
capturing the relations among bodies in two c-space points.   In that case, the coordinate 
system of the second c-space point had to be varied in order to calculate that difference 
between the two c-spaces that does not rely on the choice of certain coordinate systems.  
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Similarly, imposed coordinates, defined mapping between the coordinates and resulting 
metrics must be varied in order to find the difference between the two 3-geometries such that 
is does not rely on the choice of a particular coordinate system, mapping between the 3-
geometries’ points or metric tensor. 
Mirroring the manner in which he varied the coordinate systems of the second 
nonrelativistic c-space point while holding the first fixed in order to achieve the above 
minimum value, Barbour (1994a, 2865) (2001, 210) advocates changing the coordinates on 
the second 3-geometry while holding those of the first fixed to find the extremum.
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  Doing 
so results in a different metric describing the second 3-geometry.  However, note that because 
the new metric is generated via a coordinate transformation, it is a diffeomorphism of the 
second 3-geometry’s initial metric.  Moreover, given that the coordinate system is changed, a 
different set of equilocality pairings results because we defined such pairings in terms of 
matching coordinate values. 
How does this process remove an arbitrary choice of a coordinate system and metric?  
Recall that a 3-geometry corresponds to a set of metrics that have their elements related by a 
diffeomorphism.  So, if we work through all the possible coordinate mappings on the second 
3-geometry and compare the resulting differences between them, then we can find one in 
which the global difference between the two geometries is extremalized.  The two 3-
geometries with such a value are deemed to be best-matched, and this value is not dependent 
on a particular choice of metric or corresponding coordinate system. 
2.2 The Addition of a Time Parameter to Relativistic Best-Matching 
Unlike the nonrelativistic BMP E2.3 that lacks  , Jacobi’s    must be introduced 
before he can formulate the relativistic BMP.  According to Barbour (1986, 241),   must be 
introduced at this stage of his relativistic account because in the nonrelativistic setting: 
                                                 
98 While we were dealing with fixed notion of length in the Newtonian context and could refer to smallest length 
without ambiguity via ‘minimum’, the term ‘extremum’ is used in this context because length is dependent upon 
the geometry. 
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absolute simultaneity still has meaning.  In [the Machian nonrelativistic dynamics] 
this amounts to the assumption that the simplest form of the equations of motion can 
be obtained with a single time parameter, this time parameter being the same across 
the entire universe.  In a post-relativistic approach, such a view cannot be maintained; 
one must consider the possibility that the separation in ‘time’ between the snapshots is 
not only unknown but also position dependent in general. 
In effect, in nonrelativistic dynamics, we can formulate its BMP E2.3 without reference to  .  
This is because, as Barbour implies above, time is usually defined in that context as a 
background parameter that is monotonically increasing independent of one’s position.  
However, time in the relativistic setting is defined locally and is position dependent.   
To elucidate the contrast Barbour is making here, it is helpful to make recourse to 
different temporal concepts in Newtonian mechanics and GR that Rovelli (2004, 82-8) 
proposes as well as the manner in which the temporal distance between 3-geometries is 
formulated in standard geometrodynamics. 
Rovelli briefly presents a number of different temporal concepts that appear in various 
theories.  A contrast that he makes between Newtonian mechanics and GR in terms of the 
uniqueness and global nature of time is most relevant to our present purposes.  The 
Newtonian concept of time exhibits both uniqueness and general globalness.  It is unique in 
the sense that it requires a unique, constant time interval between any two events, and it is 
global in the sense that every solution of the equations of motion ‘passes’ through every 
value of it once and only once.   
To exemplify these characteristics, consider Barbour’s nonrelativistic dynamics.  
There the uniqueness of Newtonian time indicated that his time parameter should be chosen 
such that its values are not repeated.  In effect, it was formulated as monotonically increasing, 
allowing for each c-space point of the horizontal stack to be assigned a unique value.  Thus, 
the arbitrary time parameter was chosen to reflect the uniqueness of Newtonian time.  
Additionally, it is global.  The horizontally stacked c-space points that result from a solution 
to the action BMP amount to a stack of instantaneous configurations of the universe, and a 
single time parameter is assigned to the entire stack such that each configuration of the 
universe gets a single value.  With this arrangement, the time parameter is global in that each 
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of the instantaneous configurations of the universe is assigned a single value.  It is to these 
temporal concepts that Barbour in the passage above seems to be referring.  With his claim 
regarding the assumption that ‘the equations of motion can be obtained with a single time 
parameter that is the same across the universe’, he appears to be referring to Rovelli’s 
globalness.  This global aspect allows him to plot a single parameter along the horizontal 
stack.  And, Barbour’s quote implies that the separation between time intervals in 
nonrelativistic theories can be known.  This seems to be a reference to the fact that 
Newtonian time is assumed to have unique, constant intervals, which effectively allows him 
to choose a monotonically increasing parameter by which to characterize his operational time 
parameter. 
Let’s contrast these temporal concepts with those Rovelli associates with GR’s proper 
time in order to further elucidate the quote.
99
  Proper time in GR is defined generally in terms 
of the amount of time measured by an observer with a clock.  The observer has a worldline, 
which corresponds to a continuous 1-d curve in spacetime, and the amount of time measured 
by a clock he carries is the proper time along the world line.  Because geometry is no longer 
fixed in GR and instead is determined by the metric, the length of such paths and, thus, the 
time one measures locally with a clock depend on the metric.  A solution to Einstein’s field 
equations assigns a metric structure to every worldline.  Since proper time is determined by 
the metric field tensor, there is, as Rovelli points out, a different proper time for each world 
line or, infinitesimally, for every speed at every point. 
Regarding the feature of globalness, it is helpful to recall its general characterization: 
time is global if every solution of the equations of motion ‘passes’ through every value of it 
once and only once.  Because each worldline is assigned a metric from a solution to 
Einstein’s field equations, Rovelli claims that along a worldline proper time is ‘temporally 
global’, i.e., the events in this worldline ‘go through’ every value of the time variable once 
and only once.  In effect, it seems that we can apply a single time parameter to a particular 
worldline.  However, Rovelli also states that proper time is not ‘spatially global’, i.e., it is not 
                                                 
99 I do not here discuss GR’s coordinate time, i.e., the dimension of GR’s manifold that is associated with time.  
Because this notion of time is simply treated like another spatial dimension, it does not pose a substantial 
problem for Barbour.  We’ll see shortly that he can recover such time by stacking his c-space points. 
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possible to define the same time variable in all space points.  Here it seems that Rovelli is 
referring to the fact that a time parameter can only be applied to each worldline, rather than 
across all of spacetime.  Because a solution to the equations assigns a different metric 
structure to different worldlines, we cannot apply a single parameter across all points of 
spacetime.  Since the metric assigned to each worldline differs from the others, each requires 
a different parameter associated with their proper time.   
How does GR’s proper time fare with regard to uniqueness?  Rovelli does not specify 
the role of uniqueness in the context of GR.  So, let’s examine the manner in which the 
proper time of a worldline may be unique by considering parts of a single worldline.  Recall 
that in the context of Newtonian mechanics, its time is considered unique due to the 
assumption that there is a unique, constant interval between any two events.  Along a 
worldline in GR, a clock is supposed to provide the measurement of the length along the 
worldline.  In effect, it provides a monotonically increasing parameter by which we measure 
this length.  But, such length is determined by the metric; because the distance between any 
two points on a worldine depends on the metric, the length between the points is dictated by 
the metric and, thus, varies.  So, the interval measured by clock along a worldline from one 
point to another varies in accordance with the length between the points.  Thus, though a 
proper time provides a series of unique intervals along a worldline, it is not assumed that all 
the intervals are of the same length.  Compare this with the uniqueness of Newtonian time: 
there it is assumed that each temporal interval is unique and constant in the sense that they 
are of equal length.  In GR, however, the intervals along a worldline, though measured by a 
monotonically increasing parameter that provides a series that is unique in the sense that it 
has a nonrepeating order, are not assumed to be constant. 
In view of this characterization of GR’s proper time, we can unpack the rest of 
Barbour’s quote above.  Recall that he claims that in a relativistic setting, “the separation in 
‘time’ between snapshots is not only unknown but also position dependent in general.”  By 
‘snapshots’ we assume he is referring to c-space points because he usually uses this term to 
refer to instantaneous configurations of the universe.  In GR, it seems that Barbour’s 
description of the separation in ‘time’ between c-space points as ‘unknown’ refers to GR’s 
lack of constant intervals.  To construct nonrelativistic dynamics, we assumed that there was 
a unique constant interval between c-space points.  Because such intervals are dependent 
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upon the metric in GR, we cannot assume, as we did for nonrelativistic dynamics, that there 
is a unique, constant interval between the points of any two 3-geometries.  Thus, it seems that 
Barbour is referring to the variable length of the intervals between GR’s points on a 
worldline; we cannot know the length between two points of two different 3-geometries or, 
more generally, the overall distance between two c-space points.   In effect, his description of 
them as ‘unknown’ contrasts with the assumed unique, constant ‘distance’ between each of 
his nonrelativistic c-space points. 
Moreover, his reference to his relativistic c-space points’ separation in ‘time’ as being 
position dependent can be cashed out in terms of GR’s temporal but non-spatial global 
aspect.  Nonrelativistic dynamics’ general global nature allowed us to add a single time 
parameter to a horizontal stack.  However, we cannot just tack on a single time parameter to a 
stack of relativistic 3-geometries due to GR’s lack of a spatial global aspect; there is not a 
single time parameter that we can assign to the whole of spacetime that corresponds to all the 
proper times along its worldlines.  Yet, proper time is temporally global, i.e., events in a 
particular worldline go through every value of the time variable once and only once.  So, 
though we cannot assign a time parameter to spacetime as a whole such that it reflects proper 
time, we can assign a time parameter to each worldline.  Furthermore, in this case, the length 
of a particular worldline and its corresponding proper time depend upon its place in the 
metric.  In this sense, the proper time of a particular worldline in GR is position dependent.   
In Barbour’s account, such position-dependency is, as we’ll see in more detail below, 
expressed in terms of relative spatial relations.  By his account, an example of a worldline is a 
path from a point in one 3-geometry to its corresponding equilocal point in its best-matching 
3-geometry.  Recall that the position of a point in a 3-geometry is a function of all the relative 
spatial relations that the points has with all the other points in that 3-geometry.  So, the proper 
time assigned to such a worldline is dependent upon the points’ positions in the 3-geometries.  
Moreover, in view of the role of proper time in GR, Barbour cannot, as for nonrelativistic 
dynamics, apply a best-matching procedure that does not initially make use of a time 
parameter and subsequently apply a time parameter on the stack as a whole.  Instead, as we’ll 
see, he must introduce the time parameter into his relativistic best-matching procedure in 
order to incorporate the variable ‘time’ separation between two best-matching 3-geometries.  
However, this parameter, as I explain below, does not violate MP or ONT. 
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Before moving onto his best-matching procedure, it is informative to see the manner 
in which GR’s proper time is cashed out in geometrodynamics.  Echoing Wheeler, Barbour 
(1999b, 105) provides a useful characterization of the manner in which geometrodynamics 
stacks hyperslices.  The normals of the hyperslice’s points can be envisioned as struts that 
join together the hyperslices.  The struts have a certain ‘length’ that provides the time-like 
separation between the points and effectively provides the proper time difference between the 
points.  In effect, Barbour must provide a means by which to join certain points together and 
provide the strut length with reference to the hyperslices’ 3-geometries alone in order to fulfil 
ONT.  In other words, because this strut length, or ‘lapse’, specifies the time-like separation 
between the hyperslices, Barbour requires a means of specifying this value from the 3-
geometries alone.  Doing so will allow him to define the local time along a world-line 
without violating ONT. 
In less metaphorical terms, standard geometrodynamics puts the distance between two 
hyperslices in terms of the lapse function, which gives what Kiefer (2007, 88) calls, “the 
purely temporal distance between the hypersurfaces.”  Recall from the brief exposition of 
geometrodynamics above that GR’s 4-d spacetime is decomposed into instantaneous 3-d 
hypersurfaces plus t, and a coordinate system {x
a
} is defined on the hypersurfaces   .   
After decomposing GR’s spacetime in this fashion, a spacetime is recovered as a 
stack, i.e., a one-parameter family, of its hyperslices, with    serving as a time parameter.  To 
recover spacetime, an extrinsic curvature tensor    , which provides information on the 
manner in which   is embedded in the 4-d spacetime, in obtained.
100
  Additionally, the lapse 
function   and the shift vector   are chosen.  Each point in the hyperslice’s 3-metric has a 
3-vector field.  The vector that is perpendicular to the hypersurface at a point is termed the 
normal.  The lapse function specifies the amount of normal separation between the 
hyperslices.  The shift vector provides the value of the amount by which a point is shifted on 
a hypersurface relative to its equilocal point on the successive hypersurface.  To have a 
clearer picture of the relations between these components, suppose that there is a point that 
                                                 
100 For a non-technical introduction to extrinsic vs. intrinsic curvature in this context, see Kuchar 1999.  And, 
see Colosi 2004 for detail on how     is obtained. 
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has one of its vectors, which is not a normal, pointing towards a point with the same 
coordinates on a neighbouring hypersurface.  If we shift our point across its hyperplane using 
the shift vector, it will be directly under its equilocal point.  If we construct a normal at the 
shifted point, i.e., a vector that is perpendicular to the surface at the point, then the length of 
this normal is equivalent to the lapse.  Furthermore, these components allow us to reconstruct 
the 4-metric from the 3-metric; the spacetime interval between        and          
     is: 
                 
                  
We’ll see below that Barbour uses normals of equilocal points as the means of joining 
together the hypersurfaces.  Moreover, he already has a means of incorporating 
geometrodynamics’ shift function; his equilocality trials above allow him to determine the 
best-match between the spatial coordinates of two 3-geometries.  However, he needs a means 
of deriving what is specified by the lapse in standard geometrodynamics, i.e., the orthogonal 
distance from one 3-geometry to its best-matching 3-geometry.   
 In effect, he (1994a, 2866) defines his Machian relativistic BMP as follows in a form 
that resembles Jacobi’s principle E2.2: 
       ∫  ∫  √      [
    
  
       ] [
    
  
       ]         (E3.1) 
Here, F is a conformal factor.        is the supermetric.101      and     are the metrics of two 
different 3-geometries.  And,    is an arbitrary 3-vector field
102
 that Barbour terms 
‘equilocality shuffler’ because it effectively generates coordinate transformations and new 
                                                 
101 A supermetric is generally a metric of metrics.  In this case, it is a generalization of a Riemannian metric    , 
which is used to calculate distances between points of a given manifold, to the case of distances between metrics 
on this manifold.  Additionally, here it is a functional of    ,.  Barbour notes that the value of the supermetric 
here is not given.  However, as we’ll see in the next section, the GR instance of this equation does specify the 
supermetric. 
102 Generally, a vector field on a manifold is a smooth function that assigns vectors to every point on the 
manifold. 
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trial equilocality pairings between the two 3-geometries.
103
  
    
  
 is the derivative of     with 
respect to an arbitrary time parameter, i.e., it is just some monotonically increasing 
parameter.  This specifies the direction of, e.g., a vector of a point on     pointing towards its 
equilocal point on the neighbouring    .  In effect, the two bracketed functions allow him to 
determine the manner in which two 3-geometries are matched up in terms of both the 
equilocality connection between 3-geometries’ coordinates and the orthogonal distance 
between the 3-geometries via the directionality specified by 
    
  
.  We’ll see the role this plays 
via exposition of his horizontal and vertical stacking.  
Before moving on to the stacking, it is necessary to discuss the appearance of   in 
E3.1.  This use of 
    
  
 is required here, rather than a mere function of spatial distance like     
of E2.3, because of the proper time’s lack of a spatial global aspect and varying intervals.  As 
mentioned above, Barbour cannot apply a single parameter to a horizontal stack of relativistic 
c-space points such that it captures the different lengths between neighbouring c-space points.  
Instead, he needs some means of specifying the lapse between each best-matching pair of c-
space points.  This time derivative allows him to do so because it specifies the direction in 
which the vectors of a 3-geometry’s points point.   However, the appearance of   here does 
not violate ONT because it is used to provide the infinitesimal ‘velocity’ at a point and 
thereby provide the direction in which one of its vectors is pointing towards a neighbouring 
hyperslice.  So, though Barbour incorporates this as a function of time, he has done so with 
an arbitrary parameter.  And, because this amount is infinitesimal, it parallels the 
instantaneous nature of his nonrelativistic c-space points.  But, unlike the nonrelativistic c-
space points, the varying geometry of his relativistic c-space points encodes information 
about the distance from it to the best-matching c-space point.  So, though   enters into his 
action and because the 3-geometries have an infinitesimal temporal length, it merely serves as 
a means of indicating the direction of certain vectors in the c-space points.  Thus, MP2 is not 
violated because   adds no quantitative value to    .  Rather, its role in 
    
  
  is merely to 
                                                 
103 The parentheses of        denote symmetrisation, i.e., the fact that the sign of the metric does not change if its 
indices are interchanged, and the semicolon denotes the covariant derivative, i.e., it is a partial derivative plus a 
correction that is linear in the original metric.  See Friedman 1983 for details. 
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indicate the directionality already encoded in    .  Moreover, because we are still only 
dealing with instantaneous 3-geometries, ONT is not violated.  
2.3 Stacking with the Relativistic BMP 
 We can use this equation to stack 3-geometries horizontally in a similar fashion to the 
manner in which we used BMP to stack nonrelativistic c-space points.  To stack horizontally 
and obtain successive 3-geometries, one starts with a given 3-geometry and attempts to 
calculate the action along a trial sequence of 3-geometries via E3.1.  This would provide us 
with a solution to E3.1, giving us a sequence of 3-geometries.  However, doing so involves 
solving the thin-sandwich problem in order to find the variational principle for the 
equilocality shuffler.  Generally, the thin-sandwich problem for geometrodynamics
104
 is put 
in terms of the problem of solving for a 3-vector field given any given 3-metric associated 
with a 3-geometry and its tangent vector obtained from its time derivative 
    
  
.  Once a 
solution is obtained, it can be used to find the lapse and shift.  Since the shuffler of E3.1 is an 
arbitrary 3-vector field, finding the shuffler’s variation principle in order to generate a 
sequence of best-matching 3-geometries effectively amounts to finding a solution to the thin-
sandwich problem.  But, as Barbour notes, it is problematic to find this value because of the 
difficulty in solving the resulting differential equations.
105
 Nevertheless, assuming that it can 
be solved, it can then be used to specify the separation between equilocal points of successive 
3-geometries; it can be used to find the local lapse and shift from a single 3-geometry alone 
and thereby calculate its series of best-matching 3-geometries.  This would enable us to 
horizontally stack these 3-geometries and define an operational local time on the local lapse 
distances.   
                                                 
104 This problem arises from the difficultly in solving the equations involved in attempts to fulfil the thick and 
thin sandwich conjectures.  According to the thick sandwich conjecture, two 3-geometries determine the lapse 
and shift between them.   Both conjectures were originally proposed by Baierlein, Sharp and Wheeler 1962 and 
are discussed by Wheeler 1964 when questioning whether two 3-geometries alone can be used to reconstruct 
Einstein’s spacetime.  See Bartnic and Fodor 1993 for criticism of the sandwich conjectures. 
105 However, it has been solved locally for certain situations.  See Kiefer (2007, 115) for details. 
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 Assuming these sequences of 3-geometries can be obtained by a solution to the thin-
sandwich problem, Barbour (1994a, 2867) (1986) illustrates that these 3-geometries can be 
stacked horizontally to create a 4-d space.  Such a solution provides, so to speak, information 
about the struts connecting 3-geometries’ points and their length.  To stack, consider two 
successive 3-geometries.  Make them into hypersurfaces that are embedded into a 4-d metric 
space.  Stack them such that the normal orthogonal to the point in one of them pierces 
through the other 3-geometry’s corresponding equilocal point. In effect, we get a bunch of 
successive 3-geometries and stack them by their orthogonal norms at equilocal points.   
Now that we have a horizontal stack, we can vertically stack.  Like in the 
nonrelativistic case, we assume that we have already obtained our horizontal stack prior to 
vertically stacking them.  Doing so ensures that the definition of time is derivative from the 
spatial geometrical relations because such vertical stacks effectively are built out of 
horizontal stacks.  Recall that in his nonrelativistic dynamics, c-space points are stacked 
horizontally in virtue of their order obtained from a solution to the BMP.  Vertical stacking in 
the nonrelativistic context amounts to adding a time parameter to such stacking that merely 
serves to label successive c-space points.  Similarly, Barbour (1986) vertically stacks in the 
relativistic context by defining a local time via the affixing of an arbitrary label 
corresponding to the local lapses between the equilocal points.   
The above horizontal stacking here does not seem to violate ONT or MP2.  Though 
the 3-geometries are stacked horizontally in virtue of their orthogonal normal, such relations 
among equilocal points are given by the solution to the thin-sandwich problem, which only 
uses a single 3-geometry and its time derivate as input.  In effect, given our discussion above 
concerning the appearance of   in       , this stacking is specified by a 3-geometry.  
 Moreover, MP1 is fulfilled because spatial distances in this constructed 4-d space are 
those in a hypersurface that are expressed by a 3-geometry.  Additionally, this setup allows 
him to create a vertical stack in the sense of allowing him to define a local time for the 
distance between each equilocal set of points in an operationalist manner.  Given that a 
solution to the thin-sandwich problem involved in        provides the distance between 
such points and because this distance is derived only from instantaneous 3-geometries, an 
arbitrary time parameter can be affixed to the distance between equilocal points in a similar 
fashion to which such a parameter was assigned to a horizontally stacked nonrelativistic c-
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space points.   Local time here corresponds to the assignment of an arbitrary parameter of 
increasing value to distances in the orthogonal direction between equilocal points of the 3-
geometries. Because the distance itself arises only from the relations in a 3-geometry, MP2 is 
satisfied.   
3 GR as a Case of Machian Relativistic Dynamics 
 Barbour (1994a, 2868) claims that GR is indeed Machian because it is one of the 4-d 
spaces that he can build from       .  GR exhibits foliation invariance, i.e., there is no 
preferred foliation of space-like hypersurfaces.
106
  In effect, there is no single way to slice up 
spacetime into a certain best-matching sequence of 3-geometries.  Barbour conjectures that 
he can build a 4-space that exhibits this property.  Build a 4-d space via horizontal and 
vertical stacking as described in the preceding section.  So that the 3-geometries out of which 
it is built are not deemed the preferred foliation, allow the space to be foliated such that any 
foliation results in another sequence of 3-geometries.
107
   
In §3.2 below, we’ll return to this means of accounting for foliation invariance and 
address the issue of the extent to which the Machian spacetime must be foliated so that 3-
geometries, rather than spacetime, retain their ontologically fundamental status.  Further, it is 
important to note that because, as we’ll see in Ch5, Barbour discusses the prospect of 
quantizing GR, rather than his general Machian dynamics, it seems that at least in the context 
of quantum gravity he accepts that a Machian GR exhibits this foliation invariance.
108
  But, 
for the time being, let’s return to Barbour’s evidence for the Machian nature of GR. 
                                                 
106 This issue is linked with that of the relativity of simultaneity.  Because whether one regards two events as 
being simultaneous is relative to one’s worldline, there’s no single notion of simultaneity that indicates that 
spacetime should be foliated in a certain manner.  For discussion, see Jammer 2006 and Craig and Smith 2008. 
107 While I am focusing on Middle Barbour throughout, note that Current Barbour, e.g., Barbour, Foster, 
Murchadha 2000, argues that a unique curve can be drawn in conformal superspace such that it corresponds to a 
single GR spacetime.  If his arguments here maintain the Machian nature of his relativistic account, then it 
seems that there is a single preferred foliation picked out for a GR spacetime and, thus, he is not obviously 
committed to a proliferation of sets of best-matching c-space points in order to capture GR’s spacetime. 
108 However, there have been some proposals regarding the prospect of determining a preferred foliation.  See 
Monton 2005 on preferred foliations in quantum gravity and their impact on presentism. 
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In addition to having some means of accounting for foliation invariance, he illustrates 
the Machian nature of GR by noting the similar structures of his        and of a certain 
version of GR’s action, namely the Baierlein-Sharp-Wheeler form of GR’s action (BSW).  
Baierlein, Sharp and Wheeler (1962) take up the task of specifying a geometry of curved 
empty space that evolves in accordance with Einstein’s field equations if one is given only 
the 3-geometries of two hypersurfaces.
109
  Using Barbour’s formulation in order to mirror his 
       above, the action they find is: 
      ∫  ∫  √      [
    
  
        ] [
    
  
        ]  (E3.2) 
E3.2 is only in terms of 3-geometries and a shift vector   .  The lapse has been eliminated.  R 
here is the 3-d scalar curvature of    .  And, the DeWitt supermetric  
     has the ultralocal 
form
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                       , where q is the determinate of    . 
 In comparing E3.2 with E3.1, Barbour (1994a, 2868-9) identifies the shift vector    
with his equilocality shuffler: they both serve the same function in the equation.  Moreover,   
is operating in the same fashion as that of his E3.1 and no lapse is used.  However, a few 
components in E3.2 are specified more than their analogues in E3.1: his conformal factor F is 
specified here by R, and the ultralocal supermetric is used.  In effect, he concludes that E3.2 
is a specific version of his Machian       . 
3.1 The Recovery of Local Minkowski Vector Bundles 
 In the introduction of this chapter, we encountered a reason why GR does not seem to 
be Machian, i.e., it assigns a Minkowski vector bundle at a point tangent to a curve passing 
through a point.  Furthermore, it was stated that Barbour claimed his Machian 
geometrodynamics could be used to show how such a tangent space could be emergent from 
stuff and their relations alone.  Barbour has not specified exactly the manner in which his 
                                                 
109 For criticism of this approach, see Bartnic and Fodor 1993. 
110 The supermetric is ultralocal if it contains no spatial derivatives of the metric.  It effectively specifies the 
unique distances among the points of the metrics. 
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Machian geometrodynamics does so.  However, we can sketch out how this may work given 
the preceding account. 
 Once GR’s spacetime is constructed via a horizontal stack that is foliation invariant, 
i.e., any subsequent foliation of the space results in another sequence of best-matching 3-
geometries, suppose that there is a curve through it.  Foliate the space such that the curve 
passes through a series of equilocal points of a sequence of best-matching 3-geometries.  
Consider one of these equilocal points.  The point is on a 3-geometry with a 3-metric.  The 
metric tensor associated with this point by the 3-metric can correspond to the spatial vectors 
of a Minkowski vector bundle.  The local lapse associated with the point corresponds to the 
temporal vector of a Minkowski vector bundle.  Thus, Machian geometrodynamics can show 
that such tangent spaces emerge from the relative relations of 3-geometries alone.
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3.2 Machian GR, the Hole Argument and the Status of Relations Among C-Space Points  
 Though the hole argument, at least as formulated by Earman and Norton (1987), is 
targeted at substantivalism about the manifold in the context of GR
112
, it is important to 
present the hole argument here and discuss its implications for Barbour’s Machian GR.  This 
is due to the fact that it highlights the role that relations play among c-space points.  
                                                 
111 Further, briefly note the difference, one that is discussed in Ch6, between his nonrelativistic constructed 
space-time and his relativistic constructed spacetime.  In his Machian GR, there are many sets of best-matching 
c-space points with no preferred set.  As c-point set is relative to one’s worldline in a similar fashion to the 
manner in which simultaneity is relative to one’s worldline.  Yet, in his nonrelativistic dynamics, there is a 
single set of c-space points with only one means of foliating them.  This latter dynamics is assumed in his 
depiction of QT.  So, even though time is cashed out in spatial terms, there are still conflicting notions of 
spatialized time between the theories.  Because he generally puts discussion of his QT in terms of his Machian 
nonrelativistic dynamics, I discuss in Ch6 whether he has effectively created a timeless version of the problem 
of time in his quantum gravity through his juxtapositions of these spatialized times. 
112 Because I am focused on determining what role time plays in Barbour’s dynamics given his explicit 
definition of ‘relationism’, rather than on how to classify his account in terms of the standard 
substantivalist/relationist distinction, I bracket off the issue of how ‘substantivalism’ and ‘relationism’ ought to 
be defined in GR.  See Dorato 2000 for discussion.  Furthermore, this is a very live problem in current GR 
debates; for discussion of Earman and Norton’s formulation of the hole problem, see Hoefer 1996, Rynasiewicz 
1994,1996. 
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Additionally, it makes salient the ontological commitments one is saddled with in cashing out 
foliation invariance via many best-matching sets of c-space points such that GR’s spacetime 
does not play a fundamental role.  So, while I do not argue for the claim that Barbour’s view 
is impervious to some version of the hole argument, I here raise it as a means of illustrating 
the role of spacetime in his account as well as the sorts of relations and ontology to which he 
is committed; I focus here on teasing out the role of time in Barbour’s account so that ACA 
may be applied to it, rather than on whether his account can generally overcome the hole 
argument.
113
  Additionally, in accord with ACA, I explore the ramifications of his principles 
for his ontological and metaphysical commitments in GR in order to treat his GR as part of 
the Machian network that we proceed to analyse in Ch6.   
In effect, I provide a sketch of Earman and Norton’s version of the argument against 
manifold substantivalism, and I put the objection in terms of a problematic generation of 
ontological proliferation by manifold substantivalism.  Then, I question whether Barbour’s 
Machian GR faces a similar problem by considering the effects of transformations on 
relations in a c-space point, on a c-space point in a best-matching stack and on a c-space point 
in the context of a horizontally stacked space with multiple foliations.  It will be shown that 
while Barbour’s account must and can reduce relations among c-space points to each c-space 
point’s internal relative relations, his account of foliation invariance requires there to be an 
enormous number of horizontal stacks. 
 With their version of the hole argument, Earman and Norton target manifold 
substantivalism.
114
  Generally, spacetime substantivalism is the view according to which 
spacetime is a substance, i.e., something that exists independently of objects or processes 
occurring in spacetime.  Accordingly, manifold substantivalism treats GR’s manifold as a 
substance with the identity of the points of the manifold grounded independently of the fields 
                                                 
113 For formulations of the hole argument for covariant theories, see Iftime and Stachel 2005. 
114 They (1987, 518-20) target manifold substantivalism because they argue that it is the most viable form of 
substantivalism for GR, e.g., they claim that because the metric carries energy and momentum, it should be 
treated on par with other fields considered to be the contents of spacetime, rather than spacetime itself.  For 
criticism of this argument and discussion of other forms of substantivalism in this context, e.g., versions of 
manifold plus metric substantivalism, see Hoefer 1996. 
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defined over the manifold.  Earman and Norton attack this form of substantivalism with their 
version of the hole argument.
115
  Their argument is presented as follows. 
 Suppose there are two mathematical models of standard GR spacetimes with each 
represented by a manifold and a metric field tensor.  These models are related by a certain 
diffeomorphism such that it is the identity map for all manifold points outside of a given 
region, ‘the hole’, but smoothly comes to differ from the identity map inside the hole.  
Diffeomorphisms can be interpreted in two ways: passively, i.e., the coordinate system has 
changed but the same structures are described, or actively, i.e., the coordinate labelling does 
not change but the metric gets dragged across the manifold and effectively moves the points 
with certain labels around on the manifold.  Earman and Norton make use of this latter 
interpretation of diffeomorphism in the hole.  Using this transformation, the particular points 
inside the hole of the second model are remapped.  Einstein’s equations are generally 
covariant, e.g., if a certain metric is solution to the equations, then any other metric obtained 
from the first by any diffeomorphism also satisfies the equations.  So, if one of the metrics is 
a solution, then so is the other.  If, however, the manifold substantivalist holds that the 
manifold points have their identity built in, i.e., have their identity independently of physical 
fields in spacetime, then the substantivalist must claim that the metrics related by a hole 
transformation are physically distinct. 
                                                 
115 As is well known, a form of the hole argument was originally proposed by Einstein.  See Norton 2005 for 
historical discussion. 
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 This illustrates the untenable nature of manifold substantivalism because it leads to 
ontological proliferation.
116
  Due to assumptions about manifold point individuation
117
, it 
seems that the substantivalist must assert that each model represents a distinct spacetime.  
However, the two distributions are observationally identical. 
 With this sketch of the hole argument, it is clear the identity of manifold points plays 
a central role in making a hole transformation problematic for the manifold substantivalist.  
Do the points of Barbour’s manifolds have any problematic identity?  Recall that in his 
relativistic account, a c-space point is a 3-geometry, which is a set of equivalence class of 
metrics with elements related by a diffeomorphism.  Do the manifold points of a metric that 
characterizes a 3-geometry have any sort of primitive individuality? 
3.2.1 Relations Among the Points of a 3-Geometry 
 We saw in Ch2 that through Barbour’s application of CNP to c-space points, a body 
in a c-space point must be defined in terms of all the relations that it has with everything else 
in the universe at an instant.  In the context of Machian relativistic dynamics, a manifold 
point plays the role of the nonrelativistic body in a c-space point.  So, it seems that a manifold 
point must be defined in terms of all the geometrical relations it has with all the other 
manifold points in a particular c-space point. 
 Do these manifold points have some sort of primitive identity?  While the inclusion of 
haecceities in Barbour’s account would not violate ONT, e.g., it may be considered a 
monadic property of each manifold point, haecceities, as being independent of relative 
                                                 
116 Rather than originally referencing the problem of ontological proliferation that arises for the substantivalist, 
Earman and Norton claim that the hole argument illustrates that manifold substantivalism leads to 
indeterminism on grounds that the laws cannot pick between the two developments of the field in the hole.  But, 
as it is contentious whether this indeterminism is only an issue for manifold substantivalism in the context of 
GR, I do not present this issue for manifold substantivalism here: see Melia 1999 for discussion.  And, see Belot 
1995 for discussion of the relation between ontology and indeterminism. 
117 See Stachel 2005 who makes this assumption explicit in terms of each of the points having a primitive 
thisness or haecceity, and see Parsons and McGivern 2001 for discussion of other means of individuating 
manifold points in order to avoid this conclusion. 
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relations cannot enter into MP’s descriptions.  But, it is contentious whether the lack of 
haecceities in such a description is indicative of whether one lacks an ontological 
commitment to them.  Nevertheless, because haecceities are independent of relative relations 
and since CNP is only defined in terms of the instantaneous relative relations of a thing, a 
haecceity cannot be part of a manifold point’s CNP.  It follows that because a CNP is 
supposed to provide a complete description of a thing, a manifold point cannot have a 
haecceity.  Thus, though it is not ruled out by ONT, Barbour’s use of CNP dictates that the 
manifold points do not have some sort of primitive identity built into them.  Instead, a 
manifold point can only be identified, or at least distinguished from a point in a manifold that 
has a different set of instantaneous relations, in virtue of the instantaneous relative relations it 
has in a certain 3-metric. 
 Further, this result is in accord with Barbour’s use of 3-geometries.  In effect, if we 
perform a diffeomorphism on the entire metric of a c-space point, then we get another metric.  
This metric just is one in the set of a particular 3-geometry’s set of equivalence class of 
metrics with elements related by a diffeomorphism.  Because manifold points have no built-in 
individuality, there is no means of identifying particular points across such transformations.  
Thus, we are not committed to there being an individual manifold for each equivalent metric.   
 To sum up thus far, even though ONT seems compatible with stuff having primitive 
identity, Barbour’s use of CNP provides a means of denying that manifold points have some 
sort of relation-independent identity.  Doing so allows him to use 3-geometries without any 
ontological proliferation; 3-geometries are still the fundamental feature of his account each of 
which can be represented in terms of a set of an equivalent class of metrics. 
3.2.2 Relations Between Best-Matching C-Space Points 
 Let’s move on to considering the relation between two best-matching c-space points.  
But, first we must determine the nature of the relation that holds between them.  ONT and 
CNP are cast in terms of the relative relations among stuff within a c-space point.  What is the 
nature of relations, e.g., best-matching, that hold between two c-space points?  By addressing 
this question, we can, as we will see at the end of this section, determine the manner in which 
Barbour must respond to a diffeomorphism being performed on a 3-geometry in a best-
matching stack. 
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In the context of his account of quantum theory, which is presented in Ch4, he makes 
more use of heaps of c-space points, which we briefly encountered in his nonrelativistic 
account presented in Ch2.  We will see in his quantum account that, rather than using, at least 
initially, some sort of ordered c-space composed of all possible c-space points, he makes use 
of a heap of possibilities.  In this context, he makes a contrast between heaps of c-space 
points and ‘points on an ordinary manifold’ that may reflect the manner in which considers a 
c-space point to be related to other c-space points.   
In his (1994c) outline of his quantum account, heaps are just c-space points that make 
up a c-space.  One would suppose that Barbour uses the term ‘heap’ in order to emphasize the 
lack of fundamental relations among the points in c-space.  In view of the following quotes, 
he implicitly seems to do so by presupposing CNP: 
I use the word heap because individual objects in a heap are entities in their own 
right.  They can be picked up and examined and have an intrinsic structure which 
exists independently of the fact that they belong to the heap. (1994c, 409) 
[…] I use the word heap to emphasize that its points are very different from points of 
an ordinary manifold on which, say, a metric has been defined.  For the points of such 
a manifold have no individuality of their own.  They can only be individuated by the 
metric relationships which hold around them.  If one were to remove such a point 
from the manifold, to ‘pick it up’, so to speak, it would lose all its individuality.  In 
contrast, any relative configuration takes with it all its defining attributes.  Each thing 
in a heap is a self-contained unity, can be picked up, examined in its own right, and 
inferences drawn from the structures found within it. (1994b, 2881) 
The first quote makes clear that the c-space points in a heap have their internal structure and 
existence independently of whether they belong to the heap.  And, as described as a ‘self-
contained unity’, a c-space point seems to be capable of complete independence from other c-
space points.  From this we can infer that heaps of c-space points do not impose any 
fundamental relations or structure onto the c-space points.  Moreover, this ‘self-contained 
unity’ of a c-space point and the claims that it ‘takes with it all its defining characteristics’ 
and that ‘inferences can be drawn by the structures found within’ the point indicate a c-space 
point version of CNP, i.e., a notion attributed to a c-space point that is so complete that 
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everything that can be attributed to the point can be deduced from the notion.  In effect, the 
CNP of a point seems completely reliant on the contents of the c-space point and, thus, its 
membership in a heap has no bearing on the c-space point’s CNP.  In effect, a c-space point 
in a heap bears no fundamental relations to other points.  The second quote indicates that the 
internal structure of such a point, however, allows us to make ‘inferences’.  I return to these 
‘inferences’ following a discussion of whether a weaker reading of this passage is possible 
such that there is room for Barbour to posit fundamental relations among c-space points. 
There indeed appears to be an alternative reading of the above quotes.  One may claim 
that, rather than assuming something as strong as CNP, Barbour is only committed to a 
weaker, less complete analogue of CNP.  He is not necessarily committed to something as 
strong as a CNP that is defined via the point alone because he does not state that everything 
that can be attributed to the point can be deduced from its internally-defined notion.  Rather, 
he is just explicitly committed to the point’s defining attributes being deducible from its 
internally-defined notion.   
From this reading of the quotes, two objections to the initial reading arise.  First, the 
quotes do not presuppose CNP.  Rather, they at most assume what I term a strong internal-
CNP, i.e., a notion attributed to a c-space point that is so complete that everything that can be 
attributed to the point when the point is considered separately from all other c-space points 
can be deduced from the notion.  Second, when a point is considered alone, we can only 
ascertain its defining attributes, rather than, as CNP states, ascertaining everything that can be 
attributed to the point.  For example, even though something is a ‘self-contained unity’ in the 
sense that it has all of its constituent stuff and their relations, it could still have relations with 
other self-contained unities.  Such relations, though not defining attributes, may still exist 
among the self-contained unities.  These two objections are interlinked as follows.  The latter 
specifies the type of attributes, i.e., defining attributes, that one may ascertain when the point 
is considered alone.  So, in turn, the former’s inter-CNP can be reformulated as: a notion 
attributed to a c-space point that is so complete that all of its defining attributes can be 
deduced from the notion.   
This reading gives us some room to add relations among c-space points that are not 
restricted to those within a c-space point.  But, can Barbour maintain that there are such 
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relations?  Following a discussion of this alternative reading, it seems that he cannot: all such 
relations ultimately must be reducible to the stuff and relations in a c-space point. 
To facilitate discussion of the alternative reading, namely that Barbour assumes the 
weaker inter-CNP rather than CNP, ‘defining attributes’ will be specified.  This specification 
will then be used to reply via discussing the second objection’s example in the context of 
Barbour’s ontological commitments.   
In order for a distinction between inter-CNP and CNP, which is posited by the above 
objection, to be maintained, the defining attributes must be a subset of the totality of a c-
space point’s possible attributes.  This is required because CNP, which takes into account 
everything that can be attributed to a c-space point, is distinguished from the supposedly 
restricted inter-CNP, which only includes what may be attributed to a c-space point when the 
point is considered separately from all other c-space points.  Because the alternative 
interpretation claims that Barbour is committed to inter-CNP, rather than CNP, it is the 
limited domain of attributes included in inter-CNP to which ‘defining attributes’ refers.  
Thus, one who holds the inter-CNP interpretation must provide some account in which the 
defining attributes are a subset of the totality of a c-space point’s possible attributes in order 
to maintain the distinction between inter-CNP and CNP.   
Does the inter-CNP interpretation have such an account in which defining attributes 
are a subset of all possible attributes?  Given his choice of the term ‘defining’, it seems 
natural to assume that Barbour’s distinction between defining attributes and all other 
attributes may be equivalent to a distinction between essential properties and accidental 
properties.  I’ll define ‘essential properties’ in the standard modal fashion118, i.e., a property 
which an object necessarily has.  Such properties are contrasted with accidental properties, 
i.e., a property, which the object could possibly lack, that the object just happens to have.  
Thus, it seems at least prima facie that the inter-CNP interpretation has an account that 
prohibits a deflationary reading of inter-CNP and CNP.  Let’s attempt to develop this account 
further in view of the passage in order to ascertain whether it is coherent. 
                                                 
118 Because the proper characterization of the essential/accidental distinction is not my primary concern here, I 
do not argue for this manner of making the distinction: see Fine 1994 for criticism. 
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An examination of the contrast made in the second quote between the points of a 
metric and the points of c-space implies that essential properties are monadic properties and, 
assuming that relations among objects are ontologically on par with the objects themselves, 
intra-point relations, i.e., relations among the stuff in a c-space point.   It also seems that the 
accidental properties are inter-point relations, i.e., relations among c-space points.   
As in the second quote above, a contrast is made between a point from a standard GR 
manifold on which a metric has been defined and a c-space point.   
If the standard manifold point is considered apart from the rest of the manifold, then 
the point, as lacking metric relationships, cannot be individuated.  The manifold itself, as just 
a smooth, continuous group of points, is made of points with no properties that serve to 
individuate one point from another.  Contra manifold substantivalism, Barbour assumes in the 
quote that standard manifold points have no primitive identity.  Metric relationships are 
defined on the manifold as a whole, hold among points and, thus, can be classified as inter-
point relations.   In considering such a point by itself, Barbour claims that it lacks a means of 
individuation since, as taken out of the manifold in which the inter-point relations apply, it 
would ‘lose all its individuality’. Thus, in the case of standard manifold points, inter-point 
relations seem to be accidental; the points may have metric inter-point relations, yet it is 
possible that these points do not have them.   
In contrast, if the c-space point is considered apart from the other points in c-space, 
then the c-space point is described as still possessing all of its defining attributes.  This is 
because, it seems, the c-space point is a ‘self-contained unity’ and ‘inferences can be drawn 
from the structures within it’.  Unlike a manifold point, a c-space point contains certain 
structures that are independent of its ‘location’ in c-space.  In view of ONT, these structures 
are, at base, the stuff and the stuff’s relations, which make up a c-space point.  In effect, the 
monadic properties of the stuff in a c-space point and its intra-relations are the defining 
attributes of a c-space point, i.e., the c-space point’s essential properties, as illustrated in this 
exercise of considering the point removed from c-space.  Exactly what ‘inferences that can be 
drawn’ from such structures can be surmised in view of ONT.  Since c-space intra-relations 
and their stuff are supposed to be ontologically basic, all things, including those that feature 
in such inferences, must be reducible to or emerge from the stuff and their intra-relations of 
c-space points.  Thus, due to ONT, even inter-relations, e.g., similarity among c-space points, 
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must be strictly speaking reducible to stuff in c-space points and intra-relations among the 
stuff in the c-space point.  In turn, the inferences that can be drawn from c-space structure are 
supposed to include ones concerning c-space points’ inter-relations.  In sum, unlike the thin 
concept of manifold points from which no manifold inter-relations can be drawn, a c-space 
point itself is supposedly robust enough to allow one to infer even the inter-relations among 
c-space points.
119
  An example of such ‘inferences’ is the sequence given by the relativistic 
best-matching procedure: only a specification of a 3-geometry’s metric and its time derivate 
are required to specify the corresponding best-matching sequence of 3-metrics. 
In view of this discussion, it seems clear that, strictly speaking, all inter-relations must 
be reducible to the monadic properties and intra-relations within c-space points.
120
  How does 
this affect our overarching question concerning the plausibility of the inter-CNP reading: Can 
a non-deflationary distinction be maintained between essential and accidental properties on 
Barbour’s view?  If the set of accidental properties is completely comprised of inter-relations, 
then the distinction cannot be maintained since these inter-relations are reducible to the set of 
essential properties, i.e., monadic properties and intra-relations.  If this is correct and such a 
distinction cannot be maintained, then the inter-CNP reading, which requires this distinction 
in order demarcate inter-CNP from CNP, is not the right reading of the passage. 
However, one may consider it contentious to claim that the set of accidental properties 
is composed of only inter-relations; surely many of the monadic and intra-relations of a c-
space point may be considered accidental.  For example, the distance between two objects in 
a c-space point is 10m.  It seems possible that the objects may lack this specific intra-relation, 
e.g., they could be a distance of 10.5m apart, yet still be the same objects.  Thus, it seems 
incorrect to claim that all intra-relations, at least, are essential properties. 
                                                 
119 In Ch6 I discuss whether this conception of a c-space point is robust enough to make such inferences 
without, e.g., some irreducible relations among c-space points indicated by certain equations chosen. 
120 A similar deflation is also attributed to Leibniz: he arguably held maximal essentialism, i.e., the view 
according to which all properties of a thing are essential.  Given his notion of a self-contained substance, the 
concept of an individual substance contains in itself all the predicates that the substance has, has had and will 
have. 
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I reply that given Barbour’s notion of a c-space point, all of a c-space point’s monadic 
properties and intra-relations must be essential properties.  Recall that a c-space point is 
comprised fundamentally of stuff and their intra-relations.  If the monadic properties or intra-
relations are changed even slightly, then the particular c-space point is regarded as a different 
c-space point.  In effect, the monadic properties and intra-relations of a c-space point must be 
regarded as essential c-space point properties.   
Thus, in view of the above discussion, I conclude that the CNP reading, rather than 
the inter-CNP reading, is the correct reading of the above passage.  In effect, Barbour seems 
to be presupposing that CNP can be applied to c-space points.  From this presupposition he 
infers that such CNP-governed points do not gain any additional essential properties when 
grouped together.  Such claims appear to be in line with ONT and require that the accidental 
inter-relations be reducible to the essential monadic properties and intra-relations.  Moreover, 
this exploration of Barbour’s intended relation between c-space points and c-space further 
elaborates his rationale for using ‘heap’ to describe a collection of c-space points.  Just as the 
things in a heap do not, arguably, acquire different monadic properties and intra-relations in 
virtue of being in the heap, c-space points do not acquire different essential properties in 
virtue of being in a heap of c-space points. 
In view of this discussion, we can draw some conclusions concerning the relation of 
best-matching that holds among certain c-space points.  The best-matching relation cannot be 
some fundamental and irreducible relation that holds among c-space points.  Instead, it must 
be derived from the relations within a specific 3-geometry.  Barbour’s best-matching 
procedure indicates the manner in which this may be done.  A 3-geometry can be described in 
a number of different metrics.  And, for each metric, one can use the best-matching procedure 
to determine the series of 3-geometries to be associated with that description.  In effect, the 
relation of best-matching among a certain set of metrics is itself specifiable by the relative 
relations within a single 3-geometry alone.  Thus, the relation of best-matching among 3-
geometries is reducible to ‘inferences’ one can draw from the structure of a single c-space 
point.
121
 
                                                 
121 Here again we have a parallel with Leibniz: the properties associated with monads are treated in a similar 
fashion.  See Rutherford 1995. 
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Finally, to return to the issue of whether we can perform a transformation on a best-
matching sequence and generate some sort of displeasing ontological proliferation, consider 
performing a diffeomorphism on one of the c-space points in a best-matching sequence.  
Suppose a diffeomorphism is carried out on the metric of one 3-geometry’s metric that is in a 
horizontally stacked set of best-matching 3-geometries.  Denote the initial best-matching 
stack as ‘stack A’ and the stack resulting from the diffeomorphism ‘stack B’.  Because a 
diffeomorphism is performed on a 3-geometry’s particular metric, the 3-geometries in both 
stacks are the same except one is described by a different 3-metric.  So, stacks A and B have 
the same series of 3-geometries, but it seems like stack B is a different stack because of the 
different metric involved.  Moreover, due to this difference, Stack B is no longer a best-
matching stack.  Thus, it seems that the metrics, rather than the 3-geometries, are doing the 
work in specifying whether two 3-geometries are related by best-matching; because the 3-
geometries remain the same, it is particular metrics that must be specifying the inter-relations 
among 3-geometries.  Due to this reliance on 3-metrics, one may claim that the inter-relations 
are not completely reducible to the relations within a 3-geometry. 
Though the presence of such irreducible relations would certainly be ontologically 
displeasing given the previous discussion, Barbour can argue that they are in fact reducible to 
a 3-geometry.  It is the 3-geometry that encodes the information about which best-matching 
sequence is associated with each of its metrics: perform the relativistic best-matching 
procedure on any of them, and the sequence of best-matching metrics associated with it is 
determined.  Stack B is indeed not a best-matching stack.  However, the reason for this is that 
such a stack is not encoded in a particular 3-geometry’s intra-relations.  In effect, it is 
particular 3-geometries, rather than their associated metrics, that are ultimately indicating 
whether a stack is best-matching or not.  So, contra the above argument, the relation of best-
matching is ultimately reducible to a 3-geometry. 
 In sum, Barbour must hold that relations among c-space points are ultimately 
reducible to the relative relations among the stuff in such a point alone.  Through his use of 3-
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geometries and best-matching procedure, it seems that the relations among c-space points can 
indeed be reducible to the relations within individual c-space points.
122
 
 This implies that the presence of a 3-geometry with a certain metric in a horizontal 
stack must be accompanied by a certain series of best-matching 3-geometries if there is a 
geometry with a certain metric.  In the context of a single foliation of a stack, this doesn’t 
provide much ontological commitment: one is committed to there being a single stack of 3-
geometries.  However, in a foliation invariant stack, one is committed to a large number of 
these stacks.  Let’s now turn to the implications of Barbour’s means of cashing out GR’s 
foliation invariance.  
3.2.3 Relations Among Foliations 
 Recall that Barbour attempts to cash out GR’s foliation invariance by first building a 
4-space via horizontal and vertical stacking and then allows the space to be foliated such that 
any foliation results in another sequence of best-matching 3-geometries.  Presumably we can 
then vertically stack each of these foliations by defining a local lapse between each of the 
equilocal points on horizontal stacks resulting from such foliations. 
 With Barbour’s claim that any foliation of spacetime must correspond to another best-
matching horizontal stack, it seems that Machian GR spacetime requires that there exist all 
possible foliations of that stack.  Because a stack is made up of a series of 3-geometries and 
since these 3-geometries are taken to be ontologically basic, it seems that this setup commits 
us to a huge number of stacks and, thus, the existence of an enormous number of c-space 
points.  Is there any way to choose between possible foliations in order to cut down on the 
magnitude of our Machian GR ontology? 
                                                 
122 Furthermore, a means of distinguishing a single c-space point from others can also be obtained in virtue of a 
single c-space’s relations.  Any possible change of the relations in a single c-space point is indicative of a 
different possible c-space point. The degree to which such a change differs from the c-space point’s actual 
relations can indicate the degree to which such a point differs from a different possible configuration.  This 
process of using only the relations in a single c-space point as a means of distinguishing it from other possible c-
space points was also used by Barbour in Ch2 in order to generate best-matching initially. 
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  Pooley (2001) answers this question negatively.  Unless Barbour has a metric-
independent manner of specifying the time derivative associated with a 3-geometry and, thus, 
has some means of selectively foliating, he must hold that all possible resulting foliations of 
the original horizontal stack exist.  In the context of illustrating the manner in which 
Barbour’s setup generates a ‘thoroughly pernicious indeterminism’123, Pooley argues that 
GR’s spacetime formulation is more fundamental than an account using geometrodynamics.   
In standard GR, an initial point and direction in superspace are all that is required to 
determine a unique spacetime geometry.  In Machian GR, however, a foliation of spacetime 
is supposed to be regarded as a set of 3-geometries.  Unlike standard GR in which a local 
lapse is effectively specified by one of the vectors at a point, on Barbour’s account the lapse 
is derived from the relations between equilocal points of the best-matching metrics.  In effect, 
between any two hypersurfaces, there is an uncountable number of possible foliations.  All of 
these foliations can be cashed out via the best-matching procedure as follows.  Consider one 
of these hypersurfaces.  On Barbour’s account, it is a 3-geometry.  But, this 3-geometry has a 
number of different metrics, and with each metric there may be a different time derivative 
associated with it.  In effect, it seems that there can be a number of different best-matching 
sequences from a specified hypersurface to another.  However, it appears that there is no way 
to choose which sequence there should be between the hypersurfaces without specifying a 
particular metric and associated time derivative.  On the assumption that not all best-
matching foliations by a constructed GR spacetime exist, Pooley claims that this illustrates 
that such a Machian GR is indeterministic.  Because there are a number of different paths that 
can be generated between the two surfaces, it seems that one is unable to determine exactly 
which sequence should be generated between the points.  Due to such indeterminism facing a 
selective geometrodynamical account of foliations, Pooley claims that GR’s spacetime might 
be regarded as more fundamental than a reconstruction of spacetime with geometrodynamics. 
                                                 
123 See Pooley 2001 for discussion of the manners in which Barbour’s account can be regarded as 
indeterministic.  Though such indeterminism is a very pressing issue in Middle Barbour’s GR, I bracket off this 
issue because I am concerned with highlighting the ontological implications and the role of time in his account 
so that I can apply ACA to it.  However, Pooley’s claims about the indeterminism of such an account are 
generated by assuming that not all possible foliations are actualized, and Middle Barbour does not make this 
assumption. 
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Nevertheless, he does note that there is a means of constructing spacetime from 3-
geometries such that it does not require the specification of its metric and associated time 
derivative in order to, e.g., provide a single sequence of 3-geometries between two 
hypersurfaces.  This alternative, which mirrors Barbour’s suggestion, is to regard GR’s 
spacetime as constructed from all possible compatible sequences of 3-geometries.  Thus, 
given a particular 3-geometry that appear in a foliation of GR’s spacetime, it seems that 
without some means of specifying its metric(s) and time derivative(s) that can appear in the 
spacetime, we must hold that the sequences associated with all possible foliations of our 
initial stack exist. 
 So, by claiming that all possible foliations exist, we have an ontological commitment 
that is immense in terms of the number of 3-geometries that exist.  However, because we do 
not make recourse to primitive temporal relations, the number of our basic ontological 
building blocks is still low, i.e., there is only stuff and their relative instantaneous spatial 
relations fundamentally, and it is in accord with ONT.  Thus, it seems that GR’s spacetime 
can be reconstructed in terms of instantaneous 3-geometries alone. 
 
 In sum, Barbour provides a relativistic dynamics by mirroring the development of his 
nonrelativistic dynamics.  C-space points again feature as the primary components of his 
account; however, rather than involving the relations among particles, each c-space point is 
the relations at an instant among manifold points as given by a 3-geometry.  This choice of c-
space points seems to be in accord with ONT: only instantaneous relative relations among 
manifold points are involved.  Additionally, the set of all possible c-space points is structured 
by a stratified manifold, but, again, this seems to serve the function of representing best-
matching series of c-space points, rather than determining the exact series of best-matching 
points.  It is his relativistic BMP that indicates the manner in which to match up a 3-geometry 
given a metric of the 3-geometry and its associated time derivative.  Although a time 
parameter appears in this BMP, it merely serves to indicate the direction of tangent vectors at 
the manifold points and, thus, does not violate MP or ONT.  In effect, the BMP provides a 
Machian means of determining a series of best-matching 3-geometries given the metric of a 
single 3-geometry; local lapses and shifts can be obtained from this information alone.  These 
3-geometries can then be stacked by lining up their equilocal points to create a 4-d space.  
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Additionally, proper time can be reconstructed from this setup in a manner that is in accord 
with MP by affixing a monotonically increasing parameter to the path constructed along 
equilocal points. 
 With this set up, he can provide a Machian interpretation of BSW and GR such that 
its assignment of a nonphysical Minkowski vector bundle to a point used to represent a local 
inertial frame and its foliation invariance emerge from best-matching 3-geometries alone.  
The former feature is obtainable from the vectors associated with equilocal points, while the 
latter feature is the result of allowing all the possible foliations of a stack to be a best-
matching series of c-space points.   
Finally, given our discussion of the various relations in and among c-space points that 
were made salient by considering the implications of the hole argument for Barbour’s 
Machian GR, it seems that due to his application of CNP to c-space points, their manifold 
points cannot have a primitive individuality.  Moreover, he must hold that all the relations 
among c-space points must be reducible to the relative relations among the stuff within the c-
space point alone.  And, in order to avoid using the time of GR’s spacetime as a means of 
specifying particular paths and foliations through his constructed spacetime, he must hold 
that all possible foliations of a constructed spacetime exist.  So, it seems that given his 
overarching Machian principles, his GR is saddled with these additional ontological and 
metaphysical commitments. 
 Because, as we’ll see in the next chapter, he proposes quantizing the Machian BSW 
and Machian account of GR, rather than his general Machian relativistic BMP, henceforth we 
will focus on his Machian GR.  Let us next turn to his quantization project and aims. 
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Chapter 4: Barbour’s Quantum Theory and Setup for his Quantum Gravity 
 Over the course of the next two chapters, Barbour’s quantum theory (QT), proposed 
method of merging QT with GR and resultant account of quantum gravity are provided.  
Because of the large role that his QT and its interpretation play in his quantum gravity (QG), 
I am devoting much of this chapter to the explication of his QT.  Additionally, this chapter 
provides general background and his methodological setup for merging QT and GR.  Thus, 
the subsequent chapter can utilize components of this chapter and focus on the explication of 
his QG. 
 Moreover, due to the relatively few places in which he presents his quantum account 
and the rather condensed manner in which it is provided, much work is done here in order to 
unpack his QT and make the role of time salient in a manner that is in accord with his 
overarching Machian principles.  Thus, the work done here and in Ch5 will allow us further 
treat his QT and QG as parts of a single Machian network such as to apply ACA in Ch6 to the 
surface reading of time’s roles obtained here. 
1 Timeless Quantum Theory 
 Before elucidating the details of Barbour’s treatment of the quantum, I provide here a 
brief introduction to the manner in which he tackles QT as well as the manner in which it 
affects his QG, all of which will be explained in depth in this and the following chapter. 
 Barbour’s account of QT is formulated generally in terms of his Machian project of 
eliminating time’s fundamental role in the theory.  In addition to being motivated by his 
principles, his QT is also formulated with an eye to solving the problem of time in canonical 
QG.  As is explained below, this particular problem arises from the ‘frozen’ formalism when 
the geometrodynamical Hamiltonian is quantized, i.e., such quantization results in an 
equation that is supposed to describe temporal evolution but lacks an explicit time parameter.   
In turn, this chapter is organized as follows.  First, I provide an overview of his 
approach to QT and QG as it appears in his Middle stage.  Then, due to Barbour’s method of 
formulating QT such that it can be interpreted in a timeless manner, unified with a timeless 
GR and, thus, provide a solution to the problem of time, I present this problem.  Next, I spell 
out his proposed method of resolving it which involves a method of identifying the 
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fundamental features of QT and GR.  By finding such features, he conjectures that we can 
formulate QT in a timeless fashion and, in effect, make the lack of a time parameter in the 
quantized Hamiltonian unproblematic.  Because ONT and MP must be upheld, he proposes 
an interpretation of QT along the lines of the many worlds Everettian interpretation in which 
the worlds are replaced with c-space points. 
2 Middle Barbour’s QT Texts and Approach to QG 
 Before beginning the exegesis of Middle Barbour on QT, it is necessary make a few 
notes about the relevant texts.  There are three texts from the Middle period in which Barbour 
substantially developed his QT account: 1994b, 1994c and 1999.  1994b is a relatively 
technical paper in a peer reviewed journal, and 1994c, from an edited collection on time 
asymmetry, provides a generalised outline of the content of 1994b.  The 1999, however, is 
written as a work of popular science that is, “self-contained and accessible to any reader 
fascinated by time” (1999, 5); however, it is the only text during Barbour’s Middle period in 
which he makes certain explicit links among the various portions of his account of QT and 
QG as well as particular contrasts between his account and more standard interpretations.  So, 
though much of what follows focuses on his 1994b and 1994c, I also incorporate the 1999 in 
order to supplement some of Barbour’s 1994 reasoning, provide his explicit contrasting of his 
theory with other interpretations and use some examples presented there as a pedagogical aid 
to illustrate his theory.  Additionally, I am careful to qualify and develop the crucial but 
potentially pop-sci claims presented in his 1999. 
As Barbour believes that DeWitt has solved the problem of quantizing GR to some 
extent, Barbour uses the Wheeler-DeWitt equation (WDE) as a starting point and proceeds to 
provide an interpretation of QT and the WDE.  This interpretation is to be such that QT is 
reconcilable with GR and that the WDE has a coherent, timeless story.  These issues are 
presented in the next chapter.  This chapter focuses on the manner in which Barbour prepares 
QT for merging with his GR.  But, he goes about such preparation assuming a certain 
approach to QG as well as a certain method of ascertaining of the fundamental components of 
his QG.  So, before going into the details about Barbour’s account, it is necessary to provide 
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some background information about his assumed canonical approach to quantum gravity, its 
relation to the WDE and his method for merging QT and GR.
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The main, general project that characterizes quantum gravity is the integration
125
 of 
GR with QT simpliciter, rather than with our most successful QT.
126
  To provide some 
background for the difficultly with such integration as well as to give some rationale for the 
three main approaches, I first present two general difficulties with the merging of GR at QT.  
Then, I present the three main QG approaches briefly and state how each of them attempts to 
resolve these difficulties.  Next, I go into more detail with a presentation of Barbour’s 
preferred programme, which we encountered in the previous chapter, namely a type of the 
canonical approach called ‘quantum geometrodynamics’.  Finally, I state how the problem(s) 
of time arises for this programme and tease out exactly which problems of time Barbour 
attempts to resolve.   
Following the presentation of the problem of time, we turn to Barbour’s method of 
reconciling QT and GR in a timeless fashion.  According to this method, we determine what 
the most fundamental shared elements of QT and GR are.  Unsurprisingly, Barbour identifies 
the instantaneous relative relations of c-space points as the fundamental shared elements and 
rejects any fundamental role for time.  In the final subsection, we see how he proposes to 
formulate QT such that it is in accord with ONT and MP. 
2.1 Difficulties Arising in QG’s Integration and Approaches to QG 
                                                 
124 This overview is admittedly brief as its main purpose is to better delineate Barbour’s starting point via 
providing some contrast with standard views and more orthodox approaches.  For overviews of QG, see Isham 
1993, Kuchar 1992, Rovelli 2008. 
125 As Rickles (2008, note 9) points out, the meaning of such ‘integration’, ‘unification’ or ‘merging’ is not 
entirely clear and varies depending on the QG programme adopted.  If Rickles’ claim is correct, it provides 
motivation for my entire project of developing and examining means of merging physical theories: it is precisely 
Barbour’s means of integration that I wish to critique and replace with ACA.   
126 This follows Rickles’ (2008, §2.3) definition and is similar to that of Isham (1993, 1-2).  For a discussion of 
other uses of ‘quantum gravity’, see Rickles (2008, 2.1-2). 
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Amongst many other issues
127, there are two central difficulties that arise in QG’s 
general project of integrating GR and QT.   
First, there is the need to reconcile GR’s classical treatment of certain physical 
quantities, i.e., physical quantities such as those having values given by real numbers that 
represent field strength, particle position and momentum, with QT’s quantum treatment of 
physical quantities, i.e., quantum in the sense that physical quantities can only take a certain 
set of discrete values.  To obtain specific values for physical parameters in QT, the 
wavefunction is operated on with the operator associated with that parameter.  Solutions for 
the parameter can only take certain values of the parameter, i.e., eigenvalues.  The issue 
arises because: GR is formulated in terms of Riemannian geometry, which assumes that the 
metric is a smooth dynamical field, while QT requires that any dynamical field be quantized, 
i.e., at small scales the dynamical field manifests itself in discrete quanta.
128
 So, GR’s 
physical quantities are of continuous values, while QT’s physical quantities are of certain 
discrete values.   
 Second, there is the issue of background independence.  GR is background 
independent in the sense that it does not involve a fixed
129
 spacetime geometry with values 
given a priori.
130
  Such values are not given a priori
131
 because one obtains its spacetime 
                                                 
127 See Isham (1993, §2), Butterfield and Isham (1999, 128-9) and Rickles (2008, §3) for other such issues. 
128 This explication of this issue is largely from Rovelli (2004, 3).  Also, see Hughes (1989, Ch2) regarding QT 
and Rovelli (2004, 47) regarding GR. 
129 Butterfield and Isham (1999, 134-7, 147) provide three meanings of ‘fixed’ for its use in at least QG: (a) 
indicates that a structure present in a classical theory is not quantized; (b) indicates that a structure is not subject 
to dynamical evolution, e.g., the spacetime metric is fixed in Newtonian physics but not in GR; (c) indicates that 
a structure is completely given in the formulation of the theory and is often said to be part of the fixed 
background.  Regarding these definitions, I am here using ‘fixed’ in sense (b).  Additionally, the a priori aspect 
of background independence defined above seems to correspond with meaning (c), and the first difficulty above 
seems to highlight issues raised by (a). Though I do not have time to map completely and discuss Butterfield 
and Isham’s framing of these issues and ensuing discussion with that given above, there seems to be at least 
some prima facie parallels between the accounts. 
130 This follows Rickles’ (2008, §2.6.1) exposition of background independence. 
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geometry by solving GR’s field equations.  Such spacetime geometry is not necessarily fixed 
because GR’s spacetime geometry is dynamical.  The basic dynamical variable in GR is the 
metric.  The metric determines the geometry of spacetime and acts as a potential for the 
gravitational field.  The curvature of the metric, which determines the spatial lengths and 
times elapsed along curves in GR’s continuous spacetime manifold, is postulated to describe 
the gravitational field: its value at any point is dependent on the state of matter at that point.  
Thus, since a dynamical variable is responsible for GR’s spacetime geometry, the spacetime 
geometry is itself dynamical.  In effect, GR is not dependant on a fixed spacetime geometry.  
On the other hand, QT appears to be background dependent necessarily; standard QT is 
constructed against the backdrop of a fixed spacetime geometry of either Newtonian 
spacetime or the flat metric of SR.  In this context, time is used as a background parameter t 
in the time-dependent Schrödinger equation, which marks the evolution of the system in the 
same manner as in standard classical mechanics in the following sense: configurations of 
particles in standard QT change at rates given with respect to absolute time.  Further, these 
configurations are configurations with respect to absolute space; quantum states are defined 
on spacelike hypersurfaces and evolve unitarily onto other hypersurfaces.  In effect, GR is 
background independent, while standard QT is background dependent.
132
  A viable QG must 
somehow reconcile QT and GR regarding these disparate spacetime geometries.   
There are three main approaches to the general task of QG that merge together QT 
and GR such that the above two incongruencies are resolved: the covariant approach, the 
canonical approach and the sum over histories approach.
133
  In hopes of making clear what 
distinguishes the canonical approach, on which we, following Barbour, will focus, I provide 
general sketches of the other two approaches.  
                                                                                                                                                        
131 For detail regarding the a priori nature of spacetime in these theories, see Dieks (2001, 221-3). 
132 This exposition comes largely from Rickles (2008, 17-8, 81), Isham (1992, 10-2) and Weinstein (2001, 69). 
133 This division follows that in Rovelli (2008 and 2004, 393), which is based on the historical roots of the most 
developed approaches to quantum gravity, and the brief exposition of each approach largely follows that in 
Rickles (2008, §6).  See Isham 1993 for an explicitly pedagogical presentation of quantum gravity, which is 
divided into four routes, see Callender and Huggett (2001a, 13-14) as well as Butterfied and Isham (1999, 130) 
for a division of QG approaches into two camps: superstring and canonical. 
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In the covariant approach, one attempts to construct QG as a theory of the fluctuations 
of the metric field over a flat, non-dynamical spacetime.  To do so, the metric is split into a 
background part, which is a flat, fixed Minkowski spacetime usually, and a part consisting of 
a dynamical field that is the deviation of the physical metric from the background part.  It is 
this latter dynamical part that is treated as the gravitational field and quantized.  And, the 
dynamical part is quantized with respect to a fixed spacetime, which parallels the method of 
quantization in standard quantum field theory.
134
  The result of such quantization is a theory 
of gravitons, i.e., massless 2-spin particles that are the quanta of the gravitational field.  A 
well-developed example
135
 of this approach is string theory.
136
 
In the canonical approach, one attempts to construct QG as a theory of the 
fluctuations of the metric as a whole.  This is accomplished by first formulating GR with the 
Hamiltonian formalism.  In such formalism, GR is rendered as a dynamical theory of the 
basic configuration variable chosen to represent space, e.g., spatial geometry, spatial 
connection, certain Wilson loops
137
.  Then, this formulation of GR is quantized by the 
                                                 
134 Because my overarching project is to evaluate Barbour’s view and his version of the canonical approach, I do 
not list or evaluate the (dis)advantages of the non-canonical approaches.  But, see Isham (1993, 16ff) for a list of 
difficulties with the covariant approach and a comparison with the merits of the canonical approach, and see 
Butterfield and Isham (2001, 55-8, 65-9) for discussions of problems with both approaches.  See Rickles (2008, 
§6.5) regarding the sum over histories approach. 
135 String theory is classified at least historically as a covariant approach.  However, it could be claimed that 
string theory is a successor to GR, rather than a quantization of GR, due to its radical modification of GR.  
Though I am not concerned here with such classification of these theories, see Rickles (2008, §6.3) for 
discussion.  Similarly, see Perez 2008 for some considerations as to whether a certain sum over histories 
approaches, i.e., spin foam theory, is legitimately a third approach or, perhaps, some synthesis of the canonical 
and covariant approaches. 
136 See Weingard 2001 for an introduction to string theory.  Also, see Butterfield and Isham (1999, §3) for an 
introduction to the superstring route of the covariant approach and to the canonical approach. 
137 A Wilson loop is the matrix of parallel transport along a closed curve that represents gravitational 
connection.  For further discussion, see Rovelli 2004. 
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application of an adapted standard quantization technique.
138
  This results in the quantization 
of the full metric.  And, no fixed metric is involved, but the 4-d spacetime is decomposed into 
a 3-d space plus time.  Some examples of this approach are: the loop dynamics
139
, connection 
dynamics
140
 and quantum geometrodynamics.  Because this final approach is favoured by 
Barbour, I provide it in the next section and further explain its resulting Wheeler-Dewitt 
equation and interpretation in the next chapter.  Please consult this information for a detailed 
and relevant example of the canonical approach. 
In the sum over histories approach, one attempts to construct QG as a theory 
involving the application of some version of Feynman’s path integral quantization to GR’s 
metrics.  The idea motivating this approach is to quantize GR in a fashion analogous to the 
manner in which Feynman obtained a formulation of QT in which a system’s single trajectory 
is replaced with a sum, a path integral, over all possible trajectories in order to compute a 
quantum amplitude.  Effectively, this technique is used in QT to compute the probability for a 
particle to go between two states by summing over all possible trajectories that could connect 
the states.  To go towards obtaining a QG using this technique, apply it to GR’s gravitational 
field: supposing that one wants to calculate the motion of some object from a 3-d hyperslice 
at an initial time to another 3-d hyperslice at a later time, one sums over all possible paths 
connecting these slices.  The space of these paths, which roughly amount to being evolutions 
of the metric, contains 4-metrics that have convergent 3-metrics on the initial and final 
                                                 
138 There are two ways to quantize constrained Hamiltonian spaces: quantize and then solve the quantum 
constraints, or solve the quantum constraints and then quantize.  The former, termed as ‘constrained 
quantization’ or ‘Dirac’s canonical quantization programme for constrained systems’, is what is used in 
quantum geometrodynamics and is given in the next section.  The latter is mathematically difficult in that one 
must solve a collection of non-linear, coupled partial differential equations.  For a more detailed comparison 
between the two types of quantization, see Butterfield and Isham (1999, 148-51). 
139 For recent a proponent of this version of the canonical approach, see Rovelli 2004. 
140 For in depth comparison and contrast between the connection dynamics and geometrodynamics, see Kuchar 
1993.  For detailed discussion of the relation between connection dynamics and loop dynamics, see Ashtekar 
and Rovelli 1992. 
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hyperslices.
141
  One relatively well-developed example of this approach is the spin foam 
formulation.
142
  In this formulation, one considers a sum over spin foams, which are foam-
like configurations that represent a possible history of the gravitational field.  
To compare and contrast these three approaches, I now provide and compare the 
means by which they respond to the two aforementioned difficulties of quantized quantities 
and background independence. 
All three of these programmes, as well as most of the highly developed QG accounts, 
resolve the first difficulty by quantizing GR.
143
  As Isham (1993, 2) states, such quantization 
amounts to the aim of paralleling the manner in which the classical theory of an atom 
bounded by the Coulomb potential is quantized via the replacement of some of its classical 
observables with operators on Hilbert spaces.  Though all of these approaches start with 
classical GR and apply some quantization algorithm
144
 to it, they differ on the issues of what 
type of quantization technique is applied and to what exactly the technique should be applied.  
In the covariant approach, only the dynamical part of the spacetime metric is quantized with a 
method that is based upon a classical action, which involves applying the Euler-Lagrange 
equations to a classical algebra of all functionals over configuration space.  The canonical 
approach usually applies Dirac’s canonical quantization procedure to the full metric, which 
has a manifold decomposed into a 3-d space plus time, after GR is put into Hamiltonian form.  
                                                 
141 For more details on this general approach, see Rickles (2008, §6.5) 
142 For a nice introduction to the spin foam approach, see Perez 2008. 
143 However, as Isham (1993, 16ff) catalogues them, there are three other approaches to this issue: general-
relativize quantum theory, get GR to emerge only in some low-energy limit of standard QT, get both GR and 
QT to emerge in the context of a new theory.  See Butterfield and Isham (2001, 40-3) for more elaboration on 
these issues.  As I am only providing the above strategies, which use quantization, to contrast with Barbour’s 
favoured canonical approach, I do not enter into the debate of whether a legitimate theory of QG requires such 
quantization.  See Mattingly 2009, Wüthrich 2005 and Callender and Huggett 2001a, 2001b, for objections to 
arguments that claim that the gravitational field must be quantized in QG.  And, see Rickles (2008, §6.1.1) for 
the presentation of some such arguments. 
144 For an example of such an algorithm and its application to GR, see the five step canonical quantization 
procedure below. 
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The sum over histories approach applies some version of Feynman’s path integral 
quantization to GR’s metric that results in a quantization with a focus on entire histories of 
metrics and manifolds.  So, though all approaches use different quantization techniques, the 
canonical approach differs from the other two in that the quantization technique is applied to 
a 3-metric, rather than to a spacetime metric. 
There are two general means of addressing the second issue of background 
independence: preserve background independence in QG, or consider background 
independence to be expendable.  The covariant approach uses the latter means: it eliminates 
GR’s background independence.  By splitting the metric into a quantized gravity field and a 
fixed spacetime geometry, the covariant approach has a fixed background structure given 
with the latter component.
145
  On the other hand, the canonical approach adopts the former 
means by retaining background independence regarding the metric: the full metric is 
quantized in this approach.  However, as Butterfield and Isham (1999, 67) point out, the basic 
configuration variable with which it chooses to represent 3-d space serves as a 3-manifold 
background structure.  So, while it has no background spatial or spacetime metrics, its 3-
manifold is a fixed background structure.  The sum over histories approach also seems to be 
background independent: the histories summed over are not each in time.  Rather, they each 
have a manifold and metric.  So, at least at this global level, the sum over histories approach 
is background independent.  
Now that we’ve highlighted the distinctive features of the canonical approach, namely 
its application of a quantization technique to 3-metrics and its elimination of background 
dependence, let’s turn to the details of Barbour’s favoured version of canonical approach to 
QG as it is standardly formulated and the problem of time that arises for it.  Further, note that 
other than some suggestions in 1994a and 1986 as to the manner in which his own Machian 
geometrodynamics and the BSW can be quantized, Barbour does not present such an account 
in detail.  Instead, as we’ll see below, he focuses on reinterpreting QT such that it is timeless 
in order to overcome the problem of time that arises for standard quantum 
geometrodynamics. 
                                                 
145 See Rickles (2008, §6.2) for further explanation of how this approach addresses the graviton’s apparent 
movement through a curved spacetime. 
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2.2 The Problem(s) of Time 
To provide some necessary setup for the problem of time as it appears in Barbour’s 
favoured version of the canonical approach, i.e., quantum geometrodynamics, I here present 
geometrodynamics in more detail.   
2.2.1 Geometrodynamical Formalities 
In quantum geometrodynamics, Dirac’s canonical quantization procedure (CQP) is 
adapted and applied to GR.  CQP consists of five steps.  Though skimming over much detail, 
I now present each step, putting relevant technical explication in footnotes, and show how 
each step is applied to GR in quantum geometrodynamics.
146
 
(CQP1) Put the classical theory in canonical form, and identify the conjugate 
canonical variables
147
 that satisfy a Poisson algebra
148
.  
ADM formalism is used to put GR in canonical form as was presented in Ch3.  Recall that 
the 4-d spacetime manifold M is given topology    , where   is a spatially compact 3-
manifold and   is the set of real numbers representing a global time direction.  This 
                                                 
146 These steps are largely drawn from Pullin (2002, 3) and Colosi (2004, 21ff).  The entire exposition is a 
conglomeration of Rickles 2006 and 2008, Isham (1992, 21ff), Colosi 2004 and Pullin (2002, 3-4). 
147 Canonically conjugate variables always occur in complementary pairs, e.g., position and momentum, energy 
and time.  They are defined as any coordinate whose Poisson brackets give a Kronecker delta or Dirac delta.  
The Kronecker delta function is: 
     {
         
         
 
And, the Dirac delta      for an integral with arbitrary function      is evaluated as follows:  
∫             
  
  
 {
              
                 
 
148 A Poisson algebra is a vector space over a field K with two bilinear products:   and {,}, where the product    
forms an associative K-algebra, and the product {,}, which is termed ‘the Poisson bracket’, forms a Lie algebra 
and acts as a derivation of the associative product ‘-’ such that for any three elements, x, y, z, in the algebra: 
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submanifold is foliated by a family of spacelike 3-d hypersurfaces   , indexed by the time 
parameter t.  A coordinate system {x
a
} is defined on   .  In effect, 4-d spacetime is 
decomposed into instantaneous 3-d hypersurfaces, or spacelike slices, plus t.  Each 3-d 
hyperslice is put in terms of geometric variables that correspond to a Riemannian 3-metric
149
 
    describing the 3-d hyperspace’s intrinsic geometry.  Spacetime is recovered as a stack, 
i.e., a one-parameter family, of these slices, with    serving as a time parameter.  To recover 
spacetime, an extrinsic curvature tensor    , which provides information on the manner in 
which   is embedded in the 4-d spacetime, in obtained.  Additionally, the lapse function   
and the shift vector   are chosen.  These components allow us to reconstruct the 4-metric 
from the 3-metric. 
    is the fundamental canonical variable in this formulation of GR.  CQP1 requires 
us to identify the conjugate of    , namely momentum  
  : 
    
  
   
√            
 Finally, to fulfil the Poisson algebra component of CQP1, here is the Poisson bracket 
satisfied by the canonical variables of the 3-metric     and momentum150: 
           
          
 
 
(  
   
    
   
 )              (E4.1) 
Now that CQP1 has been applied, we can move onto the next step. 
 
                                                 
149 Recall from Ch3 that a Riemannian metric is a metric having an inner product on the tangent space at each 
point, i.e., a vector space containing all possible ‘directions’ in which on can tangentially pass through the point, 
which varies smoothly from point to point, giving local notions of angle, length of curves, surface area and 
volume.  Pseudo-Riemannian geometries are generalizations of Riemannian geometries in the sense that their 
metric tensors need not be positive-definite, while those of Riemannian geometries must be positive-definite.  
See Ch3 note91 for information regarding positive-definiteness. 
150   and    are also identified as conjugate to   and must be dealt with according to the procedure.  However, I 
omit such non-dynamical details here.  See Colosi 2004 for such details. 
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(CQP2) Represent these quantities as operators
151
 acting on a space of wavefunctions, 
and promote the Poisson bracket
152
 to the status of commutators
153
. 
To represent GR’s classical quantities of momentum and the 3-metric as operators, let the 
operators  ̂ and  ̂ act on a functional space Ƒ of quantum states.  Where       represents 
the wavefunctionals of the 3-metric, these operators are defined as:  
 ̂         =                                     (E4.2) 
 
 ̂         = 
 
 
 
    
                             (E4.3) 
This second step also requires that the Poisson brackets of E4.1 become commutators: 
          ̂         ̂
            
 
 
(  
   
    
   
 )             (E4.4) 
 
(CQP3) If the theory has constraints
154
, i.e., quantities that vanish classically at the 
classical level, write the constraints as quantum operators, and identify the physical 
states of the QT with those states annihilated by the action of the constraint operators. 
                                                 
151 An operator, very generally, is a rule that tells you to do something with whatever follows it.  With every 
physical observable in QT, there is an associated mathematical operator that is used in conjunction with the 
wavefunction, e.g., operator  ̂ extracts the observable value qn by operating upon the wavefunction that 
represents the particular state of the system.  For further details regarding operators in QT, see Albert (1994, 
25ff), which is more philosophical, and Hughes (1989, 14ff), which is more technical. 
152 See note148 for the corresponding definition. 
153 In QT, the commutative law, e.g.,  ̂  ̂   ̂  ̂ , does not generally hold for operators.  So, ‘commutator’ is 
defined as follows.  The commutator of operators  ̂ and  ̂ is the third operator [ ̂   ̂ ]. The commutator 
  ̂   ̂   is defined as: [ ̂   ̂ ]   ̂  ̂   ̂  ̂ .  If the commutator equals zero, then   ̂  and ̂  are said to 
commute.  But, if the commutator does not equal zero, then   ̂ and  ̂ are non-commuting operators. 
154 Rickles (2008, note 98 in §6.4) provides a very nice means of visualizing the general role of constraints.  
Roughly, constraints are equations that relate some variables to others, some of which are extra in the sense that 
130 
 
In the above form, GR has a total of four constraints: one Hamiltonian constraint  and three 
momentum, or diffeomorphism, constraints.    Here, I only provide the Hamiltonian , one 
momentum constraint   and the full Hamiltonian   that results from the sum of all four 
constraints, where   is the determinate of 3-metric    :
155
 
          
   
  √ 
(    
   
 
 
  )  
  
   
√               (E4.5) 
 
                   
                                    (E4.6) 
 
                                           ∫           
   
  
                      (E4.7) 
Now, as per CQP3, these constraints must be written as quantum operators.  In the metric 
representation, i.e., where  becomes a functional of the metric components     and the 
momentum becomes a certain functional of differential operators, they are: 
            ̂  (            
  
        
 √
 
    
 )           (E4.8) 
 
   ̂           
 
 
  
    
                               (E4.9) 
E4.9, where  represents the covariant differentiation on   , renders the quantum states 
independent of the choice of coordinates on  .  E4.8, where       is the DeWitt 
supermetric
156
, is the Wheeler-DeWitt equation.  This equation provides the full quantum 
                                                                                                                                                        
the formalism has more variables than there are physical degrees of freedom.  ‘Solving the constraints’ is the 
term for using the constraints to eliminate such variables with the aim of obtaining an unconstrained theory. 
155 I have omitted the other two momentum constraints because they only involve  ,    and the Einstein 
Lagrangian. 
156      is defined by:  | |
 
 
                   . 
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dynamics of gravity.  The interpretation of this equation will be a subject in the next chapter.  
But, for the purposes of this section, note that it lacks an explicit time parameter. 
 
(CQP4) Define an inner product
157
 in the space of the physical states, and then 
complete to obtain the physical Hilbert space
158
 of the QT. 
(CQP5) Define a set of observables as those quantities that have vanishing Poisson 
brackets with the constraints, and provide predictions in order to give a physical 
interpretation to the states’ Hilbert space. 
I group these last two steps together because they are problematic to apply to GR in the above 
formalism.  CQP4 requires that an inner product be defined on the space of physical states in 
order to obtain a Hilbert space of physical normalized state vectors.  However, the measure 
required in superspace to do so cannot be rigorously defined.  It is also difficult to carry out 
CQP5 in this context.  This final step implies that observables are invariants under the 
symmetries of theory and, qua quantum expressions, entails that solutions to the constraints 
in which they appear are also physical states.  However, such an observable is problematic: 
no such quantities are known for GR generically, and it is difficult to obtain for GR in 
Hamiltonian form.
159 160
 
                                                 
157 The inner product (or ‘dot product’, or ‘scalar product’) of two vectors, u, v, for example, is denoted as: <u, 
v>.  It enables one to provide the numerical expression of geometrical ideas, e.g., the length of a vector, the 
orthogonally of vectors.  For more details, consult Hughes (1989, 26). 
158 Albert (1994, 21) defines a Hilbert space as: a collection of vectors such that the sum of any two vectors in 
the collection is also a vector in the collection, and such that any vector in the collection times any real number 
is also a vector in the collection.  In slightly more technical jargon, a Hilbert space is a vector space on which an 
inner product has been defined and which is complete, i.e., any converging sequences of vectors in the space 
converge to a vector in the space.  The dimension of this space is equal to the number of mutually perpendicular 
directions in which vectors in that space can point.  For further details, see Hughes (1989, 55-6).  
159 See Pullin (2002, 3-4) for further details regarding the problematic implementation of CQP5 in 
geometrodynamics, and see Matschull (1996, 21ff) for general difficulties with the implementation of this step. 
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2.2.2 Quantum Geometrodynamics’ Problem(s) of Time 
The timelessness of the Wheeler-DeWitt equation (WDE) is often regarded as a 
problem in quantum geometrodynamics since quantum mechanics is governed standardly by 
the time-dependant Schrödinger equation.  In quantum geometrodynamics, the WDE, rather 
than the Schrödinger equation, describes a system’s dynamics.  Plus, the Hamiltonian is 
responsible for describing temporal evolution in classical theory, and the WDE is a quantized 
Hamiltonian.  So, one would expect that, like the Schrödinger equation and the classical 
Hamiltonian, the WDE, as describing a system’s dynamics, would also describe its temporal 
evolution and, thus, involve a time parameter.  However, the WDE is regarded as timeless 
because it has no time explicit parameter.  Such timelessness seems to indicate that the 
physical states of the system do not evolve at all.  Thus, the issue arises: How can the WDE 
describe a system’s dynamics without a time parameter?  It is this issue that is referred161 to 
as ‘the problem of time’.162 
It is this conflict which is the problem of time that Barbour is attempting to resolve.
163
  
Certain discussions of the problem of time catalogue the issues surrounding it in more detail:  
Isham (1993) provides lists of the disparate roles that time plays in standard QT and GR and 
                                                                                                                                                        
160 It was due to these and other technical difficulties that geometrodynamics was largely abandoned.  For 
historical details, see Stachel’s 1972 aptly titled article, “The Rise and Fall of Geometrodynamics.” 
161 Though, note that some authors, e.g., Butterfield and Isham 1999, 2001, Isham 1993, Anderson 2011, present 
‘the problem of time’ as either a cluster of or something that arises from incongruencies between the roles time 
plays in GR and those in QT.  The sense of ‘the problem of time’ used above is particular to the canonical 
approach, and I refer to any other problems of time without the ‘the’.  Further note that these disparate, 
implicitly context-dependent, i.e., dependent on usage in the contexts of discussing QG generally or only 
canonical approaches, uses of ‘the problem of time’ occur within single articles, e.g., Rickles 2008, Butterfield 
and Isham 2001. 
162 For a good technical review of the problem of time as it arises in the context of the canonical approach, see 
Kuchar 1992, and see Rickles 2006 for a philosophical discussion of the problem. 
163 However, although this is regarded as a substantial problem with time in geometrodynamics, it is not the only 
problem of time that arises in quantum gravity; see Kuchar 1992 for a list of several temporal problems in 
various approaches to quantum gravity. 
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claims that the problem arises from such differences, while Kuchař (1992) names and 
discusses several problems involving time that arise in the process of deriving and quantizing 
GR’s Hamiltonian.  As Barbour initially develops a Machian GR and then proceeds to fit this 
theory with a timeless account of QT, his programme is far removed from the standard 
versions of QT and GR and, thus, from many of the issues discussed by Isham and Kuchař.  
In effect, Barbour does not spend much time explicitly addressing particular problems of time 
or issues from standard QT and GR that give rise to the problem of time.  Instead, he (1999, 
15, 167), (1994c, 410), (1994a), largely focuses on providing a resolution to the problem of 
time, though some of the relevant issues Isham and Kuchař raise, e.g., key roles of time in 
QT’s measurements and the construction of Hilbert space, are addressed in the process and 
will be explained the following sections. 
How exactly does Barbour propose to resolve the problem of time?  In much detail, 
Isham (1992) catalogues various resolutions to the problem of time under three main 
categories: those in which time is identified before quantizing; those in which time is 
identified after quantizing; and those in which time plays no fundamental role.  In line with 
his timeless, Machian approach to GR, Barbour’s approach to the problem of time in 
geometrodynamics falls under the third category; he accepts the timelessness of the WDE and 
attempts to provide an alternative interpretation of dynamics and explain away the 
appearance of time.  The remainder of this chapter and the next chapter explicate the details 
of this resolution to the problem of time. 
2.3 Barbour’s Approach to his Problem(s) of Time 
 His specific approach to the problem, as detailed in his (1994b) and (1999), is as 
follows.  He begins with considerations raised by DeWitt (1967), the WDE and the 
assumption that we should seek a timeless foundation that is also free of external inertial 
reference frames.  With these elements in mind, Barbour proposes a method that provides a 
basis for the interpretation of a timeless QT.  Next, he elaborates this interpretation and 
explains away our experience of time via time capsules. Lastly, making use of Mott’s 
explanation of the behaviour of an alpha particle in a Wilson cloud chamber, he shows how 
time capsules may be implemented and developed in QT.  I now turn to presenting this 
outline in more detail.  In this chapter, I develop his timeless QT.  Time capsules and his use 
of Mott are discussed in the next chapter. 
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2.3.1 DeWitt and Timelessness 
 Citing his apparent success at developing a Machian GR that has no “external 
framework” (1994b, 2876), which likely refers to the Barbourian GR’s lack of time and 
frames of reference as fundamental features that are independent of stuff and their 
instantaneous relative relations, Barbour seeks to quantize GR.  Thus, he provides some 
reason to go the canonical route; given his overarching project of creating a Machian physics 
and due to the Barbourian GR exhibiting Machian features, the straightforward way of 
creating a Machian quantum gravity theory would be to quantize his GR.  Moreover, note 
that Barbour (1994a) suggests that we should quantize the BSW version of GR rather than his 
general Machian dynamics.  So, when we compare the roles of time that appear in his 
account, we will focus on his Machian GR. 
 Additionally, Barbour approves of DeWitt’s (1967) approach to quantizing GR; he 
claims that, “the problem of quantizing GR already may have been solved in its essentials by 
DeWitt” (1994b, 2877).  DeWitt’s resulting quantum theory has a static wavefunction of the 
universe, the WDE, which is defined on possible relative configurations of the universe.  
Because Barbouric GR lacks fundamental time and frames of reference, Barbour reasons that 
DeWitt’s static wavefunction on relative c-space is a perfect fit with his GR. 
 Nevertheless, as Barbour points out, DeWitt’s quantization is not regarded as 
complete by some, e.g., Kuchař (1991), because it does not include the Hilbert spaces and 
unitary transformations characteristic of QT.
164
  He initially responds to this accusation of 
incompleteness by stating that we should not expect that everything ‘belonging’ to QT and 
GR should be brought through when unifying the two theories into a theory of quantum 
gravity.  Then, he develops this response by addressing the question of which elements of GR 
and QT must be kept even following their merger. 
2.3.2 Barbour’s Method for Unifying QT and GR 
                                                 
164 As we’ll see below, Barbour rejects Hilbert space and attempts to replace it with heaps of c-space points.  For 
discussion of the spaces used in QT, see, e.g., Albert 1996, Ney 2010, North (forthcoming). 
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 Barbour proposes an apparently simple method, applies it to GR and QT in turn and 
uses the results to provide a substantial reply to the above incompleteness worry. 
 With the method, he aims to determine “essential structure” shared by GR and QT 
given that “time is truly non-existent in the kinematics of both theories” (1994b, 2875-6).  So, 
apparently we must expunge any fundamental, independent notion of time that appears in 
both theories.  But, what else can go, and how do we determine what constitutes the shared 
‘essential structure’, whatever that is?  Barbour states: 
Let us first seek the deepest layers of each theory.  If we can find them, we shall 
certainly want them in quantum gravity, especially if they are common to both 
theories; for then we shall have a non-trivial intersection of the two, on which we can 
attempt out construction.  We may be able to jettison the other features and recover 
them in certain limits. (1994b, 2877) 
In view of this quote, we must turn to GR and QT separately and determine what their 
‘deepest layers’ are.  Ordinarily, one might believe that the ‘deepest layers’ of GR and QT are 
those aspects of the theories that are the most well confirmed.  However, Barbour’s approach 
indicates that, rather than appealing to experimental confirmation, the deepest layers of these 
theories are those that are in accord with his Machian project and/or are not ‘arbitrary’.  In his 
application of this method to GR and QT, which I will go through shortly, Barbour rejects 
‘arbitrary’ features of the theories.  In view of this practice and the overarching Machian 
project, it seems that these deepest layers are meant to include a theory’s fundamental, 
essential yet non-arbitrary features and exclude automatically an independent time, space or 
frames of reference.  After determining such features for each theory, we can then compare 
the theories’ sets of features.  We keep the common ones, which serve as the foundation on 
which we build our interpretation of quantum gravity.  In effect, rather than being 
confirmation-based, his methodology here is principle-based. 
2.4 The Application of Barbour’s Method to GR  
Barbour (1994b, 2877-8) argues that classical GR’s 4-dimensionality with its time 
dimension is less fundamental than his timeless GR that is built out of c-space points.  He 
makes his attack on the fundamental status of GR’s 4-dimensionality on two fronts.   
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First, he attacks standard GR’s time dimension on grounds that it is arbitrary. Time is 
usually regarded as a dimension and is identified with the sign opposite to that of the spatial 
displacements in the signature of standard GR, (+ - - -) or (- + + +).  However, Barbour 
claims that these signatures are arbitrary.
165
  He supports this claim by citing the fact that the 
Einstein field equations are silent as to the proper signatures and by making recourse to 
geometrodynamics in an apparent attempt to address worries of whether GR would 
breakdown with such an arbitrary foliation.  Though the latter means of support is rather 
quick, it does provide a route to support the above claim: supposing that one takes any 4-d 
metric space of any signature that satisfies Einstein’s and foliates arbitrarily, e.g., such that 
signature (- - + +) results, the basic equations of geometrodynamics would still hold, claims 
Barbour, as long as superspace includes pseudo-Riemannian geometries in addition to 
Riemannian geometries.  The former geometries would allow for play in possible metric 
signatures in that it is not, like Riemannian geometries, restricted to all positive signatures.  
Thus, if Barbour’s arguments here are correct, such time signatures seem arbitrary and, 
according to Barbour’s method, are not fundamental in GR.   
Second, he shows that there need not and should not be a fourth dimension with 
which coordinate time is identified.  He argues that there need not be such a dimension since 
a 4-d space can be constructed from a 3-geometry.  This is done by using his relativistic BMP 
to construct a horizontal stack.  In effect, rather than being a fourth dimension, coordinate 
time could be recast as must the measurement of the interval orthogonal to the hypersurfaces 
of the foliation.  Further, he argues that there should not be such a fourth dimension because 
Barbour’s 3-d version of GR is more economical by having fewer basic variables.  To support 
this, Barbour cites the characteristics of his Machian GR that we encountered in the previous 
chapter: 3-geometries feature as its fundamental components, time plays no fundamental role 
in that the BMP has no lapse, its shift is just an auxiliary equilocality shuffler, frames of 
reference are emergent from the 3-geometries, 4-d space is constructed from the 3-geometries 
and GR’s foliation invariance can be cashed out as derivate from 3-geometries in terms of 
there being a best-matching sequence for all possible foliations. 
                                                 
165 For discussion of this conventionality of GR’s signature and its implications for time, see Callender 2008, 
Norton 2003. 
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In effect, he claims that the fundamental component of Machian GR is c-space points 
that are 3-geometries, and he stresses that time should play no fundamental role.  
2.5 The Application of Barbour’s Method to QT  
 Barbour (1994b, 2878-80) applies the method to QT to determine its fundamental 
elements.  But, since his goal here is to try to merge GR and QT, he mainly here determines 
whether QT can have GR’s fundamental elements; he determines whether there may be a 
plausible QT account that is timeless and that features c-space points as fundamental.  Note 
that the sketch of QT made here will be developed in detail below.  This method serves to 
ascertain the fundamental elements shared by QT and GR, rather than to develop a detailed, 
coherent account of how exactly these elements function in the theories. 
 To motivate his aim of generating a timeless QT, he claims that if one removes time, 
then one removes the incompatibility of GR and QT that is generated from the different roles 
of time in these theories.
166
 In turn, the question arises as to whether it is possible to remove 
time from QT.  To address this question, Barbour examines three features of standard QT that 
involve time: its background dependence
167
, use of Hilbert space and role of measurement. 
 Regarding background dependence, he states that the Schrödinger wavefunction of 
any system is defined on its possible configurations.  But, recall that this involves the 
backdrop of a fixed spacetime.  According to the manner in which Weinstein (2001) 
describes the roles of space and time in standard QT, a state ψ(x) is a function that assigns a 
complex-valued amplitude to each configuration x.  Such configurations are configurations 
with respect to absolute space, and the evolution of the state is given with respect to absolute 
                                                 
166 See Isham 1992, 1993, for a catalogue of such problems.  This key claim and the related issue of whether 
Barbour has removed time to this effect are examined in Ch6 once his theory is spelled out in this and the next 
chapter. 
167 Though he does not address this issue by name, I have taken the liberty of reframing his arguments to the 
effect that QT can be cast in terms of c-space points, frameless and timeless, rather than dependent on the 
configuration space of QT that includes a fixed spacetime geometry, in terms of an argument claiming that QT 
can be background independent yet dependent on configurations of stuff. 
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time.
168
 However, Barbour claims that such dependence on a fixed spacetime can be 
circumvented by restricting the definition of the wavefunction of the universe to only its 
relative configurations.  So, in accord with his Machian project as well as with the canonical 
approach’s strategy for addressing the background independence issue, he claims that QT’s 
dependence on time may be expunged by eliminating its fixed spacetime background while 
retaining a dependence on c-space points.  How exactly he proposes to do so is the subject of 
§3 of this chapter. 
 Barbour addresses Hilbert space, i.e., a vector space
169
 that one uses to represent and 
calculate
170
 quantum states in standard QT, on a few fronts.  First, to map the vectors onto the 
Hilbert space, one must presuppose that there is an absolute space and time or Minkowski 
spacetime.  To elaborate, Isham (1992, 10) cites an aspect of Hilbert space in which such 
time plays a key role: a central requirement of Hilbert space is the selection of a complete set 
of observables that are required to commute at a fixed time.
171
  In effect, such selection 
requires a time parameter corresponding to that of a flat, fixed spacetime.  However, Barbour 
argues that because GR does not have such background structures, it is unlikely that a Hilbert 
space may be constructed in QG.  Second, Barbour cites that an important role played by 
Hilbert space in standard QT is to describe time evolution by unitary transformations.  Such 
transformations involve operators that arise from the time-dependent Schrödinger equation.  
Yet, assuming that QT is a timeless theory, QT would not have such a temporal evolution.  In 
                                                 
168 For more details, see §3.4.2.2 below where the standard presentation of the time-dependent Schrödinger 
equation is given. 
169 The Hilbert space is a certain type of vector space, which is also detailed in note158 above.  Consult Albert 
1994 for a nice introduction to the formalism of QT. 
170 Though they are the subject of much debate, the ontological statuses of the wavefunction and Hilbert space 
are not relevant for our present expository purposes.  But, see Monton 2006 for arguments against the existence 
of the wavefunction, Lewis 2004 who defends its existence and Wallace and Timpson 2009 for an alternative in 
which states are fundamental. 
171 A Hilbert space is constructed by representing a state of a system at a fixed time t by a state vector.  This 
state vector contains all accessible physical information about the system at t.  The same state at a different time 
t’ is denoted by a different state vector.  In Hilbert space, operators, e.g., the Hamiltonian, the time evolution 
operator, serve to map one state vector onto another.   
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effect, Barbour rejects the need of Hilbert space
172
 on grounds that a timeless theory would 
not have the need for a description of its temporal evolution and, thus, would not have such a 
role to fulfil.   
 Intertwined with his rejection of Hilbert space is also a comment on measurement.  In 
standard QT, an observable is something having a value that can be measured at a fixed time.  
So, the ability of referring to a constant time parameter is a key feature of measurement.  
Barbour counters this need of a time-dependent notion of measurement by making recourse 
to a universal wavefunction.  In a timeless QT in which there is no fixed spacetime or 
external references frames by which we could legitimately divide the universe into 
subsystems, Barbour reasons that the entire universe must be treated as a quantum system.  
Barring a deity outside of the universe performing measurements on the system, there are not 
any measurements being performed on this system.  In effect, standard QT’s time-dependent 
notion of measurement seems possibly eliminable.  Note that this may also be a product of 
his application of CNP to c-space points.  Because such a point is completely defined in 
terms of all of its relative relations, it does not seem that there is a means of dividing a c-
space point that is not arbitrary. 
Thus, time, Hilbert space and a time-dependent notion of quantum measurement may 
not be fundamental to QT and can be eliminated, provided that he can construct a plausible 
alternative interpretation of QT that is based on c-space points, background independent and 
applicable to the entire universe as a single quantum system.  The manner in which Barbour 
replaces Hilbert space is explicated in detail below. 
2.6 The Results of Barbour’s Method 
With Barbour’s method for merging GR with QT, we have established the basic 
elements that he claims are common to both GR and QT.  In GR, c-space points that are 3-
geometries are its fundamental components.  In QT, given his rejection of its background 
dependence, Hilbert space and reference frames, instantaneous configurations of stuff in the 
universe can be its fundamental components as well.  With these fundamental elements in 
mind, he proceeds to provide a timeless interpretation of QT in terms of c-space points such 
                                                 
172 Though this rejection of QT’s Hilbert space is radical, it is not unprecedented: see Albert 1996.  
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that it can be merged with his Machian GR.  The remainder of this chapter presents and 
attempts to clarify his interpretation of QT.  In the next chapter, we see how this QT 
combines with his GR as development and interpretation of quantum geometrodynamics such 
that the problem of time is resolved. 
3 Developing the Interpretation of Barbour’s QT 
Barbour proceeds to develop his account of QT by drawing on the many worlds 
Everettian interpretation.  He puts this interpretation in terms of his c-space points by using 
them to replace the Everettian branching worlds.  The Everettian approach, however, is 
problematic on a number of grounds, and this chapter addresses its preferred basis problem in 
Machian terms.  After presenting the Everettian setup, we examine the roles that the c-space 
points and wavefunction have in Barbour’s Machian account.  The heaps discussed in Ch3, 
rather than a structured c-space, are shown to play a prominent role in his QT.  With the roles 
of his c-space points and wavefunction delineated, we finally turn to Barbour’s reading of the 
time-independent Schrödinger equation and the manner in which he claims it is related to the 
time-dependent Schrödinger equation.  With this QT account, we can turn to the manner in 
which he proposes to unify his ‘timeless’ GR and QT as a means of resolving the problem of 
time. 
It is important to note here that most of what follows does not directly provide an 
account of our day-to-day experience.  Barbour does not provide much by way of an 
interpretation of such experience for his QT directly, though, as is presented in the next 
chapter, he does go to some length to provide such an interpretation for his QG.  So, although 
his QG account of personal experience may be at least partially attributed to his QT, I do not 
do so here because I am primarily concerned with analysing his QG. 
3.1 Everettian Starting Point: An ‘Internal’ Approach 
 Barbour models his interpretation on that of Everett (1957).  He wishes to utilize 
Everett’s ‘internal’ “interpretative scheme,” i.e., “deduce the measurement from the bare 
structure of the theory.”  Presumably, the ‘bare structure of the theory’ refers, at least 
partially, to the ‘fundamental layers of theory’, which were determined above (1994b, 2880).  
However, as Barbour does not go into detail about the meaning of ‘internal’, other than the 
preceding quote, this requires some unpacking.   
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Everett (1957) uses ‘external’ to refer to the observers in the von Neumann-Dirac 
collapse formulation of QT: 
We take the conventional or “external observation” formulation of quantum 
mechanics to be essentially the following: A physical system is completely described 
by a state function ψ, which is an element of a Hilbert space, and which furthermore 
gives information only to the extent of specifying the probabilities of the results of 
various observations which can be made on the system by external observers. (1957, 
454) 
Everett proceeds to elaborate on how this conventional formulation relies on external 
observers.  Following von Neumann (1952, ChV,ChVI), he does so by stating two basic 
manners in which the state function can change according to this formulation.  The first, 
termed ‘Process 1’, is the discontinuous change that is brought about by the observation of a 
quantity in which the state function will be changed to a particular eigenstate with a 
probability that is a function of the initial state function and the final, post-observation 
eigenstate.  The second, termed ‘Process 2’, is the continuous, deterministic change of an 
isolated system with time according to a wave equation, e.g., that of Schrödinger.  Clearly, 
Process 1 relies on observers in order to change the state function into an eigenstate.  
 One of the problematic implications of the von Neumann-Dirac collapse interpretation 
that Everett (1957, 455) notes is that it is unclear how this formulation is to be applied to a 
closed universe.  Because there is no place to stand outside this system in order to observe it, 
Process 1 cannot be used to provide transitions from one state to another, and it is this process 
that determines the probabilities of the various possible outcomes of observation.  In turn, 
Everett seeks to provide an interpretation that is applicable to a system that is not subject to 
an external observation, an interpretation that is internal to an isolated system.  To do so, he 
posits that the pure wave mechanics of Process 2 is a complete theory.  In effect, he can treat 
any system that has an external observer as part as a larger isolated system.   
It is this sense of ‘internal’ that Barbour wishes to adopt from Everett, i.e., as an 
interpretation that does not rely on external observers.  In view of Everett’s specific problem 
regarding the standard formulation’s inapplicability to a closed universe, Barbour’s 
motivation for choosing this route is relatively clear: Barbour considers his c-space points as 
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fundamental.  A c-space point is a configuration of all the stuff in the universe.  Due to this 
focus on the universe as a whole, rather than focusing on parts of it, there is no place for an 
external observer.  Thus, Barbour’s approach requires a route that does not rely on external 
observers. 
A final part of the Everettian setup that must be presented here is his proposed 
solution to the measurement problem. Though it is controversial exactly what the 
measurement problem is
173
, Barbour does not present or address it in much detail.  So, a brief 
sketch of it is sufficient for my expository purposes here.  Assuming that the state of a system 
always evolves in accordance with the Schrödinger equation, a system’s state should evolve 
continuously according to this equation; it should always be in Process 2.  However, at least 
in the Copenhagen interpretation, Process 1 occurs as well: the wavefunction of a system 
with superposed states collapses into one of its eigenstates upon measurement.  Thus, given 
that the system is supposed to evolve continuously in accordance with the Schrödinger 
equation, it is puzzling that the system’s wavefunction collapses discontinuously into an 
eigenstate upon measurement.  It is this incongruity that will serve as the measurement 
problem for the purposes of explicating Barbour’s point later.174   
Everett resolves the problem by rejecting Process 1: he denies that the wavefunction 
collapses upon measurement.  Rather, at least according to Barbour’s reading of Everett, such 
measurement, “tells us where we are, i.e., in which branch of the post-measurement 
wavefunction we are actualized” (1994b, 2880).  Here, Barbour clearly seems to be adopting 
DeWitt and Graham’s (1973) many-worlds version of the Everett interpretation; this version 
                                                 
173 See Bachtold 2008 for the classification and discussion of several formulations of the measurement problem 
in the literature. 
174 Von Neumann (1952, Ch.VI) attempted to resolve this problem by accepting that the Schrödinger equation, 
though right in cases in which no measurement is made, does not describe what happens when a measurement is 
performed.  In effect, he claimed that there are two types of dynamical evolution corresponding to the above two 
processes: When there is a measurement made on a system, its states evolve in accordance with Process 1 and 
not in accordance with the Schrödinger equation; and when there is no measurement being made on a system, its 
states evolve in accordance with the Schrödinger equation.  See Albert (1994, Ch.5) for discussion. 
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is characterized by there existing, in addition to our own world, many other worlds.
175
  To 
characterize these worlds, DeWitt (1970, 163) states that, “[a]ll are equally real, and yet each 
is unaware of the others. […] Each branch corresponds to a possible universe-as-we-actually-
see-it.”  In this interpretation, there is a wavefunction for the entire universe, and the universe 
splits into branches after each quantum measurement made.  For example, suppose a system 
containing an electron is in the superposed state of having spin-up and having spin-down.  In 
the course of a measurement made on this system, the world with this system branches into 
two other worlds: one in which the electron is spin-up, and another in which the electron is 
spin-down.  So, this version denies that the wavefunction collapses upon measurement and, 
instead, claims that such a measurement branches this world into two other worlds
176
 as well 
as indicates that we, e.g., are in the world in which a particular electron is spin-up and not in 
the world in which the electron is spin-down. 
 However, this resolution of the measurement problem faces a number of problems, 
e.g., the preferred basis problem
177
, the problem of recovering probabilities
178
 and the 
problem of personal identity
179
.  The latter two problems, which respectively and roughly are 
the problem of making sense of the probability of states in an arena where all of these states 
exist following a measurement and the problem of accounting for personal identity over time 
due the fact that the branching of a world entails that everything in the world, including 
                                                 
175 This is distinguished from readings of Everett in which only a single world is involved, e.g., that of Zurek 
2010 in which ‘relative state’ is defined in terms of decoherence of the environment.  See Saunders (2010, 8-11) 
for a historically-oriented introduction to different interpretations of Everett.  Following Barbour, I assume the 
many worlds interpretation of Everett because my concern here is the role of time in his account, rather than 
whether, perhaps, another version of the Everettian interpretation would work better for Barbour. 
176 How exactly these branches and worlds should be characterized is the subject of much debate.  Vaidman 
(2010, 588) discusses a few definitions of ‘world’ and attempts to refine the concept of world given above by 
offering an alternative to the relatively standard view of branching that starts from a single world, splits at each 
quantum measurement and, effectively, evolves forward with time as a tree of worlds. 
177 For discussions of this problem, see Saunders 2010, in particular Wallace 2010. 
178 See Saunders and Wallace 2003 for discussion of this problem. 
179 See Saunders and Wallace 2008 for discussion of this problem. 
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agents, branches, are intertwined with one’s experience.  Due to this role of experience, these 
two problems are presented in detail and discussed following the exposition of Barbour’s 
account of experience in §2.1.1 of the next chapter.  But, as the preferred basis problem 
hinges less on the details of one’s experience, I present this problem here and discuss its 
implications for Barbour in §3.2 of this chapter.   
As Albert (1994, 113-4) presents it, the preferred basis problem arises because what 
worlds there are is dependent upon what separate terms there are in the universal 
wavefunction.  But, what terms are in this wavefunction is dependent on what basis we 
choose to write the wavefunction down in.  Because the quantum formalism itself does not 
pick out such a basis, some sort of principle has to be added to the formalism in order for 
there to be an objective matter of fact about which worlds there are at any given instant.  But, 
it’s not clear what this principle is.180 
3.1.1 Methodological Similarities 
Before moving on to key differences that Barbour highlights between his approach 
and that of Everett, I should elaborate on the manner in which Barbour’s brief elucidation of 
his internal approach is likely related to the proceeding exposition of Everett.  As stated 
above, Barbour goes towards explaining his internal approach by stating that it must “deduce 
the measurement from the bare structure of the theory” (1994b, 2880).  Process 1 describes 
how a system changes when it is measured, while Process 2 describes how a system evolves 
when it is not being measured.  Everett rejects Process 1 and proposes to regard the pure 
wave mechanics as a complete theory.  He then describes his general approach to formulating 
an interpretation: 
The wave function is taken as the basic physical entity with no a priori interpretation.  
Interpretation only comes after an investigation of the logical structure of the theory.  
Here as always the theory itself sets the framework for its interpretation.  For any 
interpretation it is necessary to put the mathematical model of the theory in 
correspondence with experience.  For this purpose it is necessary to formulate abstract 
                                                 
180 One popular solution to this problem is decoherence, which is outlined in §3.2 below and rejected by 
Barbour. 
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models for observers that can be treated within the theory itself as physical systems, 
to consider isolated systems containing such model observers in interaction with other 
subsystems, to deduce changes that occur in an observer as a consequence of 
interaction with the surrounding subsystems, and to interpret the changes in the 
familiar language of experience. (1957, 455) 
Accordingly, this approach starts with the wavefunction, rather than, e.g., measurement.  As a 
means to gain an interpretation, abstract models for observers are considered given in ‘the 
logical structure of theory’, i.e., the Schrödinger equation and the role of the wavefunction in 
it.  And, finally, the results of such enquiry are used to formulate an interpretation in terms of 
our experience.  This formula-driven method may be seen as potentially motivated by 
Everett’s internal approach, i.e., his rejection of Process 1 and acceptance of Process 2 only.  
The standard formulation’s problematic amalgamation of experience in Process 1 with 
Process 2’s wavefunction may be regarded as resulting from its treatment of experience, i.e., 
measurements, as on par with its treatment of the wavefunction.  Because Everett finds that 
this pair has problematic implications, he endeavours to treat the wavefunction as more basic 
than observation, which is indicated in his methodology of starting with the wavefunction, 
assuming that the Schrödinger equation, qua providing a complete account of dynamics, is 
the basic mathematical structure of the theory and subsequently deriving an experiential 
interpretation from the Schrödinger equation and its wavefunction.  In effect, within the 
context of Everett (1957), it seems that the ‘bare structure of the theory’ in Barbour’s quote 
refers to the wavefunction and Schrödinger equation prior to interpretation and that 
‘measurement’ refers to part of the experiential interpretation derived using Everett’s 
methodology.  Thus, Barbour’s quote above and its connection to Everett’s internal approach 
seem to indicate that he wishes to utilize Everett’s internal route of rejecting Process 1 and 
accept the general methodology that results from his internal stance.  
3.2 Machian Modifications to Everett 
 Despite wanting to adopt a parallel ‘interpretive scheme’, Barbour points out that 
Everett defined his universal wavefunction in terms of external time and internal frames.  To 
adapt Everett’s approach to fit his own approach, which lacks a fundamental external time 
and internal frames, Barbour proposes to make two changes. 
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 First, Barbour must reject Everett’s practice of considering many quantum systems 
coexisting in a single framework, i.e., the subsystems of a system (see §4 of 1957), with each 
subsystem having its own Hilbert space.  Everett uses the interactions between the 
subsystems to construct a product Hilbert space that describes the larger system composed of 
a union of two subsystems.  Barbour attacks this practice on two of its anti-Machian fronts.  
First, according to Barbour’s Machian framework, position, for example, is defined relative 
to all of the other stuff of the universe.  In effect, the Machian position cannot be defined, as 
Everett does, through the initial use of subsystems.  Second, Barbour denies the existence of 
subsystems.  He claims that though localized regions of some of the universe “look like 
instruments used to make quantum measurements” (1994b, 2880), these apparent subsystems 
are not really systems.  This is supported by his recourse to CNP; he claims that splitting the 
universe, which is the only system, “does violence to the unity of the world” (1994b, 2880).  
Given that all the relative relations of the universe at an instant give the complete notion of 
the universe, it seems that we cannot legitimately divide the universe into subsystems.  
Because everything in a c-space point is defined in terms of its relations to everything else in 
that c-space point, we must consider the entire universe at an instant as a single system.  
Thus, because his Machian approach is incompatible with Everett’s primary use of 
subsystems, the subsystem basis of Everett’s interpretive scheme must be replaced with a 
basis on a single system. 
 Second, Barbour seeks to modify Everett’s approach to the measurement problem. He 
accepts Everett’s solution to the measurement problem to the effect that he denies that the 
wavefunction collapses with measurement and accepts that such measurements tell us ‘where 
we are’ in some sense.  But, as Barbour’s primary entities are c-space points, rather than 
Everettian branches, he rejects the Everettian claim that measurements tell us in which branch 
we are.  Naturally, Barbour replaces these branches with c-space points: measurements tell us 
in which c-space point we are.  This modification is further elucidated in the next section.   
Moreover, as he adopts Everett’s general solution to the measurement problem, he 
attempts to resolve its ensuing preferred basis problem.  He tries to address the preferred 
basis problem by giving Machian reasons to reject the widespread solution to this problem, 
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i.e., decoherence
181
, and then gives some reason to believe that his c-space-point-based 
account dissolves the problem.  Decoherence involves dividing systems into two subsystems 
with one being the environment.  Schlosshauer and Fine (2004) present decoherence theory 
and the manner in which it resolves the problem as follows.  Decoherence involves two steps.  
First, there is an interaction of a system with its environment and the resulting entanglement.  
Then, a formal restriction is imposed, namely a restriction to the observations of the system 
only, by which one ignores the unobserved part of the system.  This setup is then used to 
resolve the preferred basis problem as follows.  Consider a system entangled with its 
environment.  A system and its observer or measuring apparatus cannot be fully separated 
from their surrounding environment.  In turn, there are interactions between the surrounding 
environment and observer resulting in certain correlations such that initial correlations 
between the system and observer are disturbed.  Such disturbances alter or destroy the 
measurement record.  Such interaction with the environment is used to define the preferred 
basis: the basis that contains a reliable record of the system’s state.  In effect, the interactions 
between the system and environment depend on the small number of quantities with 
determinate values, e.g., position of medium-sized dry goods, that physical systems are 
observed to have. 
However, Barbour (1994b, 2880) rejects this solution on the grounds of its 
presupposition of subsystems: decoherence presupposes that a system can be divided into two 
subsystems.  Such division, to echo Barbour’s rejection of Everett’s subsystems, goes against 
his Machian approach in which the universe’s system cannot be legitimately divided.  
Instead, he (1994b, 2880-1, 2882) (1999, 301) stipulates that the preferred basis problem may 
be solved by using his c-space points as the preferred basis.  While he doesn’t provide much 
by way of argument as to why or how exactly this would work, one could justify why c-space 
points are chosen via the results of his method for determining the fundamental components 
of QT given in §2.5 above.  Recall that this resulted in c-space points as being the basic 
entities of QT given his Machian agenda of formulating a timeless, frameless theory.  So, 
                                                 
181 Zurek 2010 is a major proponent of this solution, and the above exposition leans on his version of 
decoherence.  For different types of decoherence and discussion of it regarding time, see Saunders (1995, §3).   
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perhaps if such a Machian agenda is coherently incorporated with the quantum formalism, we 
at least have some reason for choosing c-space points as the basis.    
Formally, however, it is not clear exactly how such a basis would work, e.g., how 
would standard quantum properties like spin be emergent from c-space?  In passing, Barbour 
(1994b, 2880-1) suggests that particles with spin and internal degrees of freedom may be 
represented as the excitation of multicomponent fields.  Yet, he has not developed this 
suggestion. And, as my purpose here is primarily to provide a metaphysical analysis of time 
as it appears in his view, rather than attempt to extend his formalism, I do not develop this 
suggestion here.   
Nevertheless, he (1994b, 2882) does give some reason for believing that the reduction 
of such properties to position is possible in principle.  He does so by making a quick 
reference to Bell.  Bell (1988, 10, 34) makes the claim that many measurements reduce to 
measurements of position.  He exemplifies this claim with spin: to measure the spin of a 
particle, the particle passes through a Stern-Gerlach magnet.  One determines its spin by 
seeing whether the particle is deflected up or down.  In effect, it seems as though spin in this 
context can be formulated in terms of position.  So, if we can reduce such non-positional 
observables to relative positions between, e.g., lab equipment and particles, then it seems 
that, at least in principle, we can reduce such properties to the relative positions of stuff in a 
c-space point.  And, if this reduction is possible for all non-positional observables, then 
there’s some reason to believe that c-space points are a viable preferred basis.182 
Thus, as the first step in developing his interpretation, Barbour advocates a many 
worlds Everettian setup with two modifications, namely a shift to a holistic perspective on the 
universe via regarding it as a single system, rather than regarding it as a composite made up 
of subsystems, and the emphasis on fundamental role of c-space points via their use to solve 
the preferred basis problem.   
From this step, Barbour proceeds to develop his interpretation.  In this interpretation 
of a timeless QT, Barbour does not provide much by way of an overarching, coherent account 
of our experience, though he does attempt do so for his QG as explicated in the next chapter.  
                                                 
182 Additionally, see Esfeld 2004 for a treatment of QT in terms of relations, e.g., having the same spin as. 
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So, the remainder of this chapter mostly involves him extracting the temporal elements of QT 
with something of an Everettian framework in mind.  In effect, his QT is approached mostly 
from an external perspective, i.e., one that considers c-space as a whole, rather than from an 
internal perspective, i.e., one that deals with our experience within c-space points.  To 
develop this interpretation, he starts by explicating c-space points and the wavefunction.  
Though their roles seem interlinked, Barbour claims to distinguish these roles cleanly.   
3.3 The Role of C-Space Points in Barbour’s QT 
Barbour delineates the role of his c-space points as follows. As quoted above in §3.1, 
he considers the measurements made in the Everettian picture to ‘tell us where we are’, i.e., 
in which world we are in.  So, just as Everett regards measurements as telling us where we
183
 
are, Barbour regards observations as telling us where we are.  However, rather than making 
recourse to branching worlds and given the fundamental status of c-space points assumed 
earlier, he posits that observations tell us in what c-space point we are.  He (1994b, 2881) 
qualifies this by stating that these observations inform us “(in principle and imperfectly) in 
what” (1994b, 2881) c-space point we are in.  Though this qualification in parentheses is 
made in passing, it is useful to elucidate it here as well as the likely reason for Barbour’s 
replacement of ‘measurements’ with ‘observations’.   
Though Barbour does not provide much by way of explanation as to his slide from 
Everettian measurements to ‘observations’, this replacement is rather important for keeping 
the timelessness of his theory intact.  A typical lab measurement process, as a process, takes 
place over time and is temporally ordered, e.g., an experiment is setup, started and results are 
then obtained.  If this is applied to his c-space, then time may be smuggled in, e.g., c-space 
point(s) with the experimental setup could serve as the past to c-space point(s) in which the 
experiment is started, and c-space points with the experiments possible results could be 
                                                 
183 Due the problem of personal identity for the Everettian interpretation, it is controversial who exactly this 
‘we’ is, i.e., it is unclear how personal identity is to be account for in which a person branches into a number of 
subsequent individuals when a measurement is performed.  I discuss this issue and its analogue for Barbour’s 
QT in §2.1.1 in the next chapter as it hinges on his account of experience.  Since I am here focusing largely on 
the external perspective of c-space, rather than the internal one, I, following Barbour, use ‘we’ without posing 
such issues of personal identity here. 
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deemed possible future c-space points.
184
  In effect, Barbour needs to redefine ‘measurement’ 
in a timeless fashion or eliminate the possibility of measurements strictly speaking.  In a 
discussion about time capsules, he (1994b, 2883) seems to opt for the latter: we do not 
measure, we experience, and what we experience is an indivisible whole.  As the context of 
this comment deals more with the internal perspective of c-space, rather than the external one 
on which we are focusing on here, I return to this comment, unpack it and explore its 
ramifications for measurement in §2.2.1 of the next chapter.  But, hopefully it provides some 
insight to the timeless reason that may back this slide from ‘measurement’ to ‘observation’. 
Regarding the imperfect qualification, this may refer to aspects of the external and 
internal perspectives of c-space points. 
From the internal perspective, one might think that Barbour is referring to our, qua 
observers, limited domain of observations: our observations imperfectly inform us of our c-
space point because our observations are limited to the properties in a very small part of the 
universe, e.g., the spin of a particular electron at a particular time.  Such observations are 
potentially compatible with many other configurations of other stuff in the universe that we 
are not presently measuring.  Thus, such a measurement, while ruling out that we are in some 
c-space points, e.g., those in which the electron is spin-down, is potentially compatible with 
several other c-space points.  For this reason, one might conclude that such a measurement 
given the wavefunction imperfectly determines the c-space point we are occupying.   
From the external perspective, the imperfect qualification may refer to the possibility 
of a c-space containing identical c-space points, i.e., points that have the same configuration 
of stuff.  As we’ll see below, Barbour holds that given certain solutions to the wavefunction 
of the universe, c-space can contain multiple copies of the same c-space point.  So, even if we 
                                                 
184 In view of Barbour’s use of BMP in his classical dynamics, one may question whether it is possible for him 
to explain away this appearance of temporal succession by referring to a horizontally stacked c-space points.  
However, he cannot appeal to such dynamics at this stage because he is here attempting to explain away time as 
it appears in QT’s dynamical principles alone.  There is no reason to think that the two dynamics should be 
indicative of, e.g., sequences of configurations in QT.  Instead there is only a frozen mist over the heap of 
possible c-space points.     
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observe all of the configurations of the universe at an instant from an external perspective, 
this may pick out a set of c-space points, rather than a specific point.  
 Making sense of the ‘in principle’ qualification in the context defining the roles of c-
space points is a bit of a stretch.  But, from the discussion of the imperfect qualification, it 
can be understood as follows.  Either suppose that an external, God’s eye view of the whole 
of the universe is possible, or that CNP holds for a c-space point in the sense that by 
observing part of it, you are observing all the configurations in the universe at an instant.  
Barring the possibility of there being identical c-space points, one would then be able to tell 
exactly in which c-space point one is in by what one is observing.  So, either by taking an 
external perspective of the universe at an instant or by using the internal perspective with 
CNP, it is in principle possible to know which c-space point one is in. 
Thus, in this fashion c-space points play a role similar to that of Everettian worlds, 
i.e., a c-space point is one of many configurations that we may occupy and observations (in 
principle and imperfectly) indicate in which c-space point we are.   
3.4 The Role of the Wavefunction in Barbour’s QT 
The wavefunction’s “sole role, as in Born’s probability theory, is to say how likely the 
experiencing, or actualizing, of a given configuration is” (1994b, 2881).  As in Everettian 
interpretations and due to Barbour’s treatment of the universe as a single system, this 
wavefunction is the wavefunction of the universe.
185
  By referencing the Born rule, according 
to which the probability of each outcome of a measurement is the squared amplitude of the 
outcome’s corresponding term in the quantum state, Barbour is indicating that the 
wavefunction provides the probability that a certain configuration is ‘experienced, or 
actualized’.  While Barbour does not elaborate here as to what exactly the relation is between 
‘experiencing’ and ‘actualizing’ or why he lists them separately here, it’s useful to explicate 
this as a means of foreshadowing the rest of this chapter as well as to emphasis the timeless 
concept of experiencing he may have in mind. 
                                                 
185 The use of a wavefunction that is applicable to the universe as a whole is pragmatically problematic, as 
Smolin 2001 points out, because a solution to the wavefunction of the universe would be extremely complicated 
and difficult to obtain. 
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 As we’ll see in the next section, Barbour distinguishes between the heap of actualities 
and the heap of possibilities, which are bunches of c-space points.  Actualized heaps are those 
that actually exist, while the heap of possibilities includes the actualized heaps and c-space 
points that do not exist.  Whether a c-space point is in the heap of actualities depends upon a 
solution to the universal wavefunction: if a certain configuration of the universe has a non-
zero probability, then there are a number of copies of this configuration’s c-space point that 
corresponds to the probability, i.e., the higher the probability of a certain c-space point, the 
higher number of actualized copies of that c-space point.  So, it seems that Barbour is 
referring to such membership in the heap of actualized heaps with ‘actualizing’ above. 
 Regarding ‘experienced’, a natural reading of this term here is to indicate c-space 
points that you personally experience, as opposed to ones that, e.g., your doppelganger 
experiences.  Barbour, however, could not accept this reading as it presupposes that you can 
be identified over time.  Since there is fundamentally no time, you cannot be identified over 
time as a specific person, e.g., in point1 as an infant, in point378 as an adult, across c-space 
points.
186
  Instead, ‘experiencing’ here must refer to some sort of experience that is limited to 
an instant.  Barbour’s notion of a time capsule, which is given below, will show to what his 
notion of instantaneous experience amounts.  But, here I just want to emphasize that it does 
not necessarily import time into his account. 
 With this discussion, we can return to the quote.  Where the sole role of the 
wavefunction is to provide the probability that a certain configuration is actualized, the 
                                                 
186 A notion of personal identity that may work well with Barbour’s timelessness is that of Hume according to 
which we are just bundles of perceptions: we are “are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, 
which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement” (Hume 
1978, I.IV.VI).  (See Campbell 2006 for a recent defence of a similar theory of personal identity.)  Though 
Hume’s account is supported by the changing of perceptions over time, it might be adapted to timeless c-space: 
at each c-space point, one is nothing but a configuration that corresponds to an instantaneous experience.  
Because one does not ‘move’ from one c-space point to the next, there is no temporal contiguity at all, just as 
there is no contiguity of perceptions, senses, faculties or soul according to Hume, that connects one’s current 
experience with one’s apparent past and future experiences.  So, unlike Hume’s temporally extended bundles, 
Barbour’s bundles are confined to a single instant.  Barbour’s stance on personal identity is discussed further in 
Ch5 §2.1.1 below. 
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wavefunction serves to indicate the number of c-space points of that configuration that exist.  
Because it would seem that not all possible points are experienced, the experienced c-space 
points are likely a subset of the possible points.  So, if a solution to the universal 
wavefunction only gives a non-zero probability to some configurations in which there is an 
experiencer(s), then the heap of actualized points would be the heap of experienced points.  If 
not, then the experienced points would be a ‘sub-heap’ of the actualized points or would be 
merely in the heap of possibilities.  Thus, the role of the wavefunction is to establish the 
probability of a configuration and, in effect, the number of actualized c-space points with that 
configuration.  Whether the resulting heap of actualized points is identical to the heap of 
experienced points depends upon the solution to the universal wavefunction. 
3.4.1 The Wavefunction and Heaps 
He (1994c) spells out this role of the wavefunction more with his heap hypothesis.  
Before explicating this hypothesis, it is beneficial to explore Barbour’s rationale for using 
‘heap’.  Heaps are just c-space points that make up a c-space.  One would suppose that 
Barbour uses this term in order to emphasize the lack of fundamental order among the points 
in c-space.  Recall the upshot of the heap discussion in Ch3.  Just as the things in a heap do 
not acquire different monadic properties and intra-relations in virtue of being in the heap, c-
space points do not acquire different essential properties in virtue of being in a heap of c-
space points.   
In view of this implication of Barbour’s use of ‘heap’ in describing c-space, let’s turn 
to the task at hand, i.e., presenting the heap hypothesis and, ultimately, explicating the role of 
the wavefunction in more detail.  The heap hypothesis (1994c, 409) states that physical 
theories simply provide rules to establish which configurations from the heap of possibilities 
go into the heap of actualities.  The heap of possibilities is defined generally (1994c) as the 
heap of all possible configurations and, specifically for QG (1994b, 2881), as the heap of “all 
possible configurations of the universe which for closed-universe quantum gravity will be 
compact 3-geometries with matter fields defined on them.”  In other words, the heap of 
possibilities is the bunch of points resulting from considering all the different amounts and 
types of stuff in a universe and all the different configurations this stuff could be in.  The 
heap of actualities is the heap of realized configurations, i.e., the c-space points that actually 
exist as specified by a solution to the universal wavefunction. 
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3.4.2 The Wavefuction and Heaps of the Schrödinger Equations 
Barbour (1994b, 2881ff) (1994c, 409ff) (1999, 254ff) further delineates the role of the 
wavefunction via these heaps as follows.  As the time-independent version of the Schrödinger 
equation ( ̂   ) is timeless, Barbour uses this as the wavefunction of the universe in his 
QT.  This equation determines the type and number of c-space point in the heap of actualities.  
Thus, it is necessary to provide some relevant background on the Schrödinger equation and 
Barbour’s interpretation of it.  To do so, I first present the formalism of these equations.  
Then, I provide what Barbour takes the status of these two equations to be in his version of 
QT as well as contrast Schrödinger’s reading of them with that of Barbour.   
3.4.2.1 The Formalism of the Time-Dependent and Time-Independent Schrödinger 
Equations  
Before presenting Barbour’s readings of these equations, some technical background 
is required to make clear the role of time and the wavefunction in these equations’ formalism. 
The time-dependent Schrödinger equation for a general quantum system, which 
describes the evolution over time of , is as follows:   
  
 
  
   ̂  
In this equation,  represents the wavefunction, which represents a state of a particle or 
system of particles.  It is a function from a space that maps the possible states of the system 
into complex numbers.
187
 The squared value of , i.e., | | , corresponds to the probability 
distribution.  For example, in cases in which  is a function of position and time, its square is 
equivalent to the chance of finding the subject at a specific time and position.   
  
 
  
 is the energy operator, which corresponds to the full energy of the system. The 
components of this term are as follows.    is an imaginary unit that allows the real number 
                                                 
187 A complex number is a number consisting of real and imaginary parts.  To visualize this mapping, picture a 
Cartesian coordinate system in which the x-axis represents the real numbers, while the y-axis referents the 
imaginary numbers.  Now, pick a real number and an imaginary number.  These serve as the coordinates for a 
complex number.   
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system to be extended to the complex number system.    is the reduced Planck constant, or 
the Dirac constant, which is equivalent to 
 
  
.    is the Planck constant, which is measured in 
cycles per second, as opposed  ’s unit of radians per second, and takes the value of the 
proportion between the energy and the quantum wavelength of a photon.  
 
  
 is a first 
derivative of time, which, in this context, is the rate of change of the wavefunction.   
Finally,  ̂ is the Hamiltonian operator.  This operator corresponds to the total energy 
of the system and is usually expressed as the sum of operators that correspond to the kinetic 
and potential energies of the system, i.e.,  ̂     , where   
 ̂ 
  
 , in which   represents 
momentum, and  is usually a time-independent function of position  , i.e.,     .    The 
momentum operator  ̂ in this context is taken to be equivalent to:     , where   is a gradient 
operator.  The gradient operator of a function is defined as a vector that points in the direction 
in which the function changes most rapidly and has a magnitude equal to the rate of change 
of the function in that direction.  The substitution of this specific momentum operator gives 
us:  ̂   
    
  
     .     is the Laplace operator  that, for three dimensions, is shorthand 
for 
  
   
 
  
   
 
  
   
 and gives the divergence of the gradient of a function on Euclidean space.  
So, the Hamiltonian here involves a space derivative.  In sum, the term on the left-side of the 
time-dependent Schrödinger equation provides the total energy of the system, which involves 
a time derivative multiplied by the wavefunction, while the term on the right-side provides 
the sum of the kinetic and potential energy of the system multiplied by the wavefunction. 
 The time-independent Schrödinger equation (TISE) is: 
 ̂    
Given that, as stated above,  ̂   
    
  
     , then TISE for a single particle with potential 
energy V is: 
[ 
    
  
     ]   .   
This equation is clearly lacks any formal dependence on a time variable and, thus, provides a 
static probability distribution that is dependent upon spatial positions. 
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How does this relate to configuration space?  As is well known
188
, Schrödinger adopts 
a wave version of this equation, as opposed to de Broglie’s version in which each particle is 
accompanied by a wave.
189
  Usually, solutions to these are equations are represented in 
Hilbert space or phase space.  However, as argued above, such spaces incorporate time.  In 
effect, Barbour does not discuss these representations much in the development of his reading 
of the equations.  So, I do not provide details of such representation here.
190
  Instead, as we 
see in the next section, he makes recourse to Schrödinger’s (1926) original formulation of his 
view in terms of a configuration space.
191
 
3.4.2.2 Barbour’s Reading of the Schrödinger Equations 
According to the standard view of the relation between these equations, the time-
dependent Schrödinger equation is fundamental, while TISE is derivative as a special case of 
the time-dependent version.  Barbour (1999, 230-2), however, suggests that these equations 
are actually related in a different manner.  He claims that TISE is actually fundamental, while 
the time-dependent version is merely an ‘approximation’ of TISE.  While he does not provide 
a formal derivation of the time-dependent version from TISE
192
, his claim is based explicitly 
on the reasoning that if one is working with some sort of time-dependent framework in mind, 
e.g., that of Newtonian mechanics, then a quantization will result in a QT in which time is a 
fundamental component.  It is at least partially because of such temporal assumptions that the 
time-dependent Schrödinger equation is considered fundamental.  On the other hand, if one 
                                                 
188 See Moore 1992. 
189 See Jung 2009 for further discussion of de Broglie’s view. 
190 See Amrein 2009 for details. 
191 Allori et al. (2011, 3) cite that he originally regarded his theory as describing a continuous distribution of 
matter spread out in physical space in accord with the wavefunction on a configuration space.  For example, he 
(1926, 1050) treated a mass moving is a conservative field of forced by, “picturing the motion of a wholly 
arbitrary conservative system in its ‘configuration-space’ (q-space, not pq-space).” See Allori et al. 2011 for a 
recent attempt at taking Schrödinger’s use of configuration space seriously. 
192 Interestingly, Schrödinger 1926 derived the time-dependent version from TISE.  See Torretti (1999, 328) for 
further details and discussion. 
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starts with a Machian mechanics and proceeds to perform a quantization, then timelessness is 
crucial.  In effect, Barbour’s Machianism motivates his claim that TISE is fundamental, with 
the time-dependent version being a mere approximation of it.  
 To assist one in visualizing the difference between these two equations, Barbour 
(1999, 261) provides an analogy between mist over standard configuration space and the 
values of the wavefunction squared as well as the complex numbers involved in the time-
dependent equation.  However, before providing this pedagogical device, Schrödinger’s 
configuration space involved requires some elaboration and comparison with Barbour’s c-
space. 
 Barbour (1999, 208ff) provides the following example of Schrödinger’s assumed 
space in which he represents the time-dependent equation.  Suppose there are only three 
particles in the universe.  Consider each possible relative arrangement of the three particles; 
each arrangement can be expressed by the vertices of a triangle.  Each of these possible 
arrangements corresponds to a single point in Barbour’s c-space.  In the absolute space 
presupposed by Schrödinger’s configuration space, the configuration space has the three 
dimensions corresponding to the relative arrangements of the particles of Barbour’s c-space, 
i.e., the lengths of each triangle’s sides, as well as six additional dimensions.  Three of these 
additional dimensions come from the location of the triangle’s centre of mass in the absolute 
space.  The remaining three are used to give the triangle’s orientation relative to absolute 
space.  In effect, Schrödinger’s reading of his equation in this case utilizes a nine-dimensional 
configuration space in which each point of this space corresponds to a triangle’s location in 
absolute space.  And, generally, this space is generated by adding six dimensions, i.e., those 
corresponding to the system’s centre of mass and orientation in absolute space, to the 
dimensions of any c-space.  Following Barbour’s (1999) term ‘Q space’, let’s refer to all such 
configuration spaces, which contain both relative and absolute elements, as ‘q-spaces’.  
 Schrödinger’s wave mechanics is formulated on a suitable q-space and time, with the 
wavefunction defined on the q-space.  The wavefunction provides, in principle, the 
maximally informative description of a quantum system at any instant t, i.e., the 
wavefunction provides predictions that can be made about the system.  In principle, the 
wavefunction may have a different value at each point of q-space.  As t changes, the 
wavefunction changes. 
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 For example, consider the position of our three particles.  The square of the relevant 
wavefunction of the system provides the probability of finding the system to be in the 
configuration specified by a certain q-space point at t, i.e., of finding the three particles in a 
particular configuration at t, after an appropriate measurement is made.  In effect, Barbour’s 
task here is to eliminate the time and absolute parts of the q-space in order to fulfil ONT. 
 Barbour (1999) introduces a means of visualizing the relation between q-space and 
the probability of the wavefunction as dictated by the versions of the Schrödinger equation.  
Though I do not intend to belabour Barbour’s point by presenting such visualization, I find 
that it provides a pedagogical aid in presenting this relation as well as the manner in which 
Barbour claims to have eliminated time in the quantum context.  
Barbour (1999, 230) likens the probability distribution of the wavefunction to a mist 
over static q-space.  The intensity of the mist corresponds to how probable a q-space point is 
given that a certain measurement is made on the system; the more probable a q-space point is, 
the more intense the mist over this point is.  The time-dependent equation, then, as providing 
the evolution of the wavefunction over time, is represented as a dynamic mist over a static q-
space.  As time passes, only the intensities across this mist change in accordance with the 
time-dependent Schrödinger equation.  To see the manner in which q-space is time-
dependent, contrast this visualization with that of the q-space of standard Newtonian 
mechanics.  As time passes in the Newtonian framework, a single q-space point is picked out 
and actualized.  Barbour (1999, 229) likens this case to one in which a single bright spot, 
which picks out a single q-space point at each instant, moves across q-space over time.  So, 
while the Newtonian schema picks out a single q-space point for each instant of time that 
passes, the time-dependent equation provides the probability of whether certain q-space 
points are actualized given a certain measurement and dictates how this probability 
distribution changes for each instant of time that passes.  In effect, both of these 
visualizations involve a static q-space on which a single spot or mist changes over time.  
However, unlike the Newtonian picture in which the light picks out a single series of q-space 
points with a temporal order, there is just a changing mist of varying intensities that is 
indicative of a c-space point’s probability given a certain measurement is performed at t in 
time-dependent equation picture.   
Let’s extract the non-metaphorical upshot of these visualizations.   
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In the Newtonian case, there’s a metaphorical moving light.  Similarly, in the time-
dependent Schrödinger case, there’s a metaphorical changing mist.  In the Newtonian case, 
the light is indicative of the temporal evolution of a system as dictated by certain equations; 
just as the light highlights a series of q-space points, such equations pick out a temporally 
ordered series of actualized q-space points.  Additionally, there being a single light of one 
intensity may be indicative of the fact that if you plug the initial conditions into the relevant 
Newtonian equation, you can predict exactly which temporal sequence of q-space points 
would be actualized.   
In the time-dependent Schrödinger equation case, the mist is also indicative of the 
temporal evolution of a system dictated by equations; the set of q-space points covered by the 
mist at t1 and at t2 pick out a temporally ordered set of c-space points that maybe actualized.  
Additionally, there being a widespread mist, which may cover several points at a time, of 
varying intensity at a time, indicates that the equation predicts that there is a set of q-space 
points with varying probabilistic values reflecting their likelihood to be actualized after a 
certain measurement.   
There are two major differences between the metaphors.  First, the light covers one q-
space point at a t, while the mist potentially
193
 has some value over the entire q-space at a t.  
Second, the light stays at the same intensity over time, while the mist may potentially have 
changes in intensity over time. So, though the time-dependent Schrödinger equation may be 
interpreted on a static q-space while not picking out a single series of instants, it involves a 
temporally evolving probability distribution that indicates the temporal evolution of the 
system and, thus, indicates the probability that the system may evolve at each t. 
Barbour attempts to eliminate any such temporal evolution by adopting TISE.  In 
contrast with the time-dependent Schrödinger equation’s changing mist, TISE is associated 
with a static, ‘frozen’ mist over q-space; though the mist has different intensities over 
different q-space points, these intensities do not change over time. 
                                                 
193 I use ‘potentially’ here to allow there to be cases in which the probability of a certain c-space point being 
actualized given a measurement at t is zero. 
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However, TISE, as presented above, has q-space, which presupposes an absolute 
space.  In effect, Barbour must extract its components that rely on absolute space from its c-
space in order to be in accord with ONT.  To see in what fashion he must extract the absolute 
space components of q-space, it is necessary to identify what role this space plays in TISE. 
Recall that TISE is:  ̂   , where  ̂     ,   
 ̂ 
  
 , and  ̂ =     .  By 
substitution:        [ 
    
  
  ]   .  The second term in the brackets, i.e., potential 
energy  ,does not seem dependent on time or absolute space.  As Barbour (1999, 234) cites, 
any configuration of stuff has a potential energy associated with it as a function of the relative 
configurations of the bodies and their masses.  Because this value is independent of a fixed 
background space as well as time, Barbour claims that he can assimilate it directly into his 
Machian QT.    
The LaPlace operator involved in the first bracketed term, however, requires some 
modification.  Standardly, the    of the first term requires a fixed coordinate space on which 
to map its vectors.  If this is put in terms of the q-space,    must be a function of the 
dimensions dealing with absolute space: it represents changes with respect to distance in 
absolute space.  Barbour (1999, 237) advocates replacing the means of calculating kinetic 
energy T using the operator with the best-matching procedure.  Though he does not spell out 
the details of the replacement, he does give a sketch of how it would work.  To calculate T, 
first measure gradients or ‘curvatures’ with respect to Machian distances created in c-space 
by the nonrelativistic BMP.  Then add measured curvatures in as many mutually 
perpendicular directions as there are dimensions.  This sum is T.  As a metaphysical analysis 
is my primary concern, I do not attempt to further develop Barbour’s formalism.  Instead, I 
present this sketch qua sketch here to illustrate the manner in which he believes reference to a 
fixed background space may be eliminated.   
But, I do need to address the appearance of BMP in this context.  Given his 
interpretation of the equation as providing a static probability distribution in c-space, which, 
in this context, is the heap of possibilities, it is not clear that he can impose such connections 
between points by adding a BMP here without incorporating its sequential connections into 
his interpretation.  Plus, because c-space is the heap of possibilities in this context, rather than 
a structured c-space like that of his GR, it seems that this use of BMP either requires an 
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additional structured c-space, in addition to his heap of possibilities, or the heap of 
possibilities must be structured.  Note, though, that we will encounter a similar issue 
regarding the nature of his heap of possibilities in the next chapter because in QG he assumes 
that the set of possible c-space points has a structure that serves to ‘funnel’ the wavefunction 
onto it.  Nevertheless, because he mainly imports the above interpretation of the Schrödinger 
equation to the WDE, the details concerning the manner in which he can cash out the 
equation without reference to an absolute space do not impact his interpretation of QG.  So, I 
set these issues aside and use his explicit interpretation. 
Thus, Barbour claims to be able to extract the absolute space elements of 
Schrödinger’s c-space from the q-space version of TISE.  And, because this equation is time-
independent, Barbour’s QT, which features this equation as fundamental, lacks time.  So, if 
the above arguments succeed in removing time and the use of a fixed background space and 
if they feature c-space points as fundamental, he has created at least a Machian QT 
formalism. 
 
 To sum up his Machian QT, Barbour’s account aims to resolve the problem of time by 
eliminating temporal elements in QT.  With an eye towards such a solution, he attempts to 
formulate a Machian QT that, in accord with ONT and MP, uses only stuff and their 
instantaneous relative relations.  Mirroring his classical accounts, c-space points are his QT’s 
fundamental components.  In this context, however, this stuff seems to be that which we 
observe at the medium-sized dry goods level, e.g., the pointer on a measuring apparatus.  
And, again, he regards each c-space point as being all relative relations among all of the stuff 
in the universe at an instant.  He initially develops his account along the lines of an Everettian 
many worlds interpretation in which the worlds are replaced by c-space points.  Accordingly, 
the wavefunction does not collapse upon measurement.  But, such measurements, claims 
Barbour, tell us in which c-space point ‘we’ are, and this c-space point is only one among 
many that ‘we’ may occupy.   
He accepts TISE as Machian QT’s fundamental equation.  It clearly lacks a 
fundamental time parameter and, thus, is in accord with MP2.  He regards the squared value 
of its wavefunction to be indicative of a static probability distribution over the heap of 
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possibilities.  The heap of possibilities is the set of all possible c-space points.  The higher the 
probability for a specific c-space point in this heap indicates the number of copies of this c-
space point that there are in the heap of actualities. 
In this interpretation, there seems to be no apparent sequential relation, spatial or 
temporal, among the c-space points.  Rather, there are just more copies of certain c-space 
points than others given a solution to TISE.  This complete lack of sequential connection 
among c-space points is clearly in accord with ONT and MP.  However, unlike in Machian 
GR in which sequences could be built out of c-space points and effectively create histories, 
Barbour’s QT offers no such histories.  In effect, he, as we’ll see in the next chapter, takes up 
the issue of our apparent experience of time.  Because such experience indicates that there are 
such histories, he seeks to explain away such apparent connections among points.  So, in 
view of the moves he makes to generate a timeless QT and its resulting complete lack of 
successive relations among c-space points, it seems that his task of eliminating time 
fundamentally has become more radical. 
 Let’s now turn to the manner in which he integrates this Machian QT in his 
interpretation of the Wheeler-DeWitt equation such as to solve the problem of time.  
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Chapter 5:  Piecing Together Barbour’s Quantum Gravity 
 Now that we have seen Barbour’s Machian rendition of QT’s TISE and elucidated the 
manners in which it eliminates certain temporal features of the orthodox reading of the 
equation, we can proceed to explicate the manner in which Barbour puts together his 
Machian QT with his Machian GR in his favoured version of quantum gravity, while, in line 
with his (1994b, 2877) goals, keeping QT’s and GR’s ‘deepest layers’ intact and building a 
consistent interpretation of the resultant theory.  Moreover, Barbour’s preceding 
characterization of TISE will become important in his account of QG; as will be explained 
shortly, this characterization is used as motivation for his timeless approach to interpreting 
QG, i.e., it illustrates that a timeless QT is plausible and serves as a means of importing some 
features of his timeless interpretation of QT to QG. 
To incorporate quantum mechanics, Barbour begins by adopting the Wheeler-DeWitt 
equation of canonical quantum gravity, which standardly, as stated in the previous chapter, is 
interpreted as being time-independent.  Then, he puts it in terms of what he finds to be the 
fundamental feature of both GR and QT, namely c-space points.  Additionally, as time is 
claimed to be a non-fundamental component of the two theories, he aims to provide an 
interpretation of the equation such that time plays no fundamental role.   
As part of this interpretational endeavour, he seeks to explain away our association of 
the present with a temporal past, i.e., as the product of an ordered sequence of c-space points.  
For this purpose he introduces the notion of ‘time capsules’, notably in his (1994b) and 
(1999).  These time capsules will be explained below.   
 Thus, this chapter is organized as follows.  §1 explicates the manner in which Barbour 
eliminates time from QG from an external perspective: he constructs his Machian 
interpretation of quantum geometrodynamics in terms of a c-space version of the naïve 
Schrödinger interpretation of the WDE.  Then in §2, time in QG is dealt with from an internal 
perspective: his account of the appearance of time in our day-to-day experience is provided, 
which follows this three step process that is provided in his (1994b).  First, he introduces time 
capsules as a means of accounting for our experience of time because we are in a set of static 
c-space points that do not necessarily form a temporally ordered series.  Second, in order to 
give some reason for thinking that there is some correspondence between the more probable 
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c-space points as dictated by a solution to WDE and the c-space points that have time 
capsules, he provides Mott’s explanation of alpha-particle behaviour.  This is an example in 
which the heap of more likely c-space points is identified with the c-space points that contain 
time capsules.  Third, he attempts to answer the question of whether the solutions to WDE are 
‘generically’ concentrated on c-space points with time capsules.  §3 summarizes the resulting 
Middle Barbour account of QG. 
1 The Wheeler-DeWitt Equation, Barbour’s Interpretation and Their Relation with the 
Time-Independent Schrödinger Equation 
As stated in the previous chapter, Barbour’s favoured QG is canonical quantum 
gravity, quantum geometrodynamics in particular.  Recall that this view requires that GR be 
put in Hamiltonian form and that this Hamiltonian be quantized.  The equation that results 
from this process is the Wheeler-DeWitt equation (WDE)
 194
.  Here it is again for reference: 
       ̂  (            
  
        
 √
 
    
 )       (E4.8)  
 To present his interpretation of the WDE, we first state what Barbour claims to be the 
relation between Machian geometrodynamics and the WDE.  Then, some general information 
is provided as to Barbour’s preferred interpretation of the WDE, namely the naïve 
Schrödinger interpretation.  Finally, we present his version of the interpretation, which, as we 
will see, incorporates his reading of QT’s Schrödinger equations in terms of c-space points. 
1.1 Machian Geometrodynamics and the WDE 
Though Barbour (1994a, 2861) does suggest a way of quantizing his nonrelativistic 
dynamics, he merely points out that the result resembles TISE and highlights the fact that it is 
timeless.  Moreover, he offers no formal quantization of his relativistic dynamics in its 
                                                 
194
 See Rovelli (2008, 10) for the historical origin of the equation in brief. 
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entirety.
195
  Instead, he states that we should consider the implications of a possible 
quantization of the BSW
196
, which, in view of his (1994b) focus on providing an 
interpretation of the WDE and claim that we should expect such quantization to at least have 
the form of the WDE, is presupposed to be this equation throughout his attempt of providing 
an interpretation of QG.  Additionally, even in his current work, e.g., (2011), he assumes that 
quantum gravity features the WDE.  Thus, it seems that Barbour is attempting to unify GR, 
when in terms of his Machian BSW account, with his Machian QT such that they can provide 
a coherent interpretation of the apparently timeless WDE. 
What interpretation does Barbour adopt for the Wheeler-Dewitt equation?  In order to 
avoid violating ONT and effectively solve of the problem of time by taking a timeless 
approach, he begins with a timeless interpretation of WDE, namely the naïve Schrödinger 
interpretation, which is presented below.  He puts this interpretation in terms of c-space 
points and, as explained in §2.2-2.3, supplements it with considerations from Mott.
197
   
1.2 The Naïve Schrödinger Interpretation 
                                                 
195 However, in some works, e.g., Barbour and Murchadha 1999, he does offer a means of remedying certain 
formal problems that arise in the quantization of the Hamiltonian.  However, because we are here concerned 
with his interpretation of geometrodynamics and since his interpretation is directly in terms of the WDE itself, 
rather than in terms of the formal details of its quantization, such details are not presented or discussed here. 
196 See Wang for discussion of the quantization of the BSW. 
197 Unlike Kuchar 1992 and Isham 1992, 1993, Anderson (2011, 10-11) adds further options to the category of 
timeless interpretations of QG.  So, rather than classifying him as an advocate of the naïve Schrödinger 
interpretation, Anderson classifies him under the option of  ‘Records Theory Scheme’, i.e., those schemes in 
which records (i.e., some sort of instantaneous configuration) are considered as primary and where one seeks to 
construct a semblance of dynamics or history from the correlations between these records.  This scheme is 
further subdivided into two types: (A) those in which the correlations are obtained by considering the fact that 
present events contain past memories, and (B) those in which the correlations are obtained by reinterpreting 
Mott’s calculation of the manner in which alpha-particle tracks form in a cloud chamber.  Barbour’s approach is 
classified under the latter type.  The classificatory issue of whether Barbour’s approach falls under a 
development of the naïve Schrödinger interpretation or as a completely different solution of the third type does 
not impact my exposition above. 
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Barbour explicitly (1994c, 410) adopts the naïve Schrödinger interpretation of WDE 
as it is discussed in Kuchař (1992, 66-9).198  This interpretation approaches the WDE by 
treating the wavefunction of the WDE in the same way as it is treated in standard QT.  Recall 
that in standard QT, the square of the modulus of the wavefunction , i.e., | | , corresponds 
to the probability distribution.  For example, in cases in which  is a function of position and 
time, i.e.,      , its modulus squared is equivalent to the chance of finding the subject at a 
specific time and position.  According to this interpretation, the square of the WDE’s 
wavefunction is to be treated in the same fashion.  Suppose we have a solution       of the 
WDE.  Its square |      |
  is the probability density for finding a hypersurface with 
intrinsic geometry    . 
Unruh and Wald (1989), Kuchař (1992) and Isham (1992), raise some difficulties with 
this interpretation.  However, many of them arise due to the roles of time in the standard 
interpretation of QT.  For example, Unruh and Wald (1989, 40) state that the wavefunction 
on this interpretation provides the probability amplitude that an observer making a 
measurement at a certain parameter time t will find certain values.  Yet, they object, such an 
interpretation must be rejected because the WDE’s wavefunction is independent of time. 
With this objection, it seems that Unruh and Wald are assuming a standard reading in 
which the time-dependent Schrödinger equation is fundamental and that QT requires a 
background time parameter.  As Barbour’s Machian QT seems to involve no such time 
parameter and regards TISE as basic, it seems that he can develop the naïve Schrödinger 
                                                 
198 Though, as Kuchar notes, this interpretation was adopted by Hawking 1983, 1984 and originally termed the 
‘naive Schrödinger interpretation’ by Unruh and Wald 1989.  Unruh and Wald criticize it among other 
interpretations in order to elicit reasons for the lack of a satisfactory interpretation of the universe in canonical 
quantum gravity.  It is interesting to note that Unruh and Wald (1989, 2598) state in their introduction that they 
are assuming that the term ‘interpretation’ refers to, “a description, in ordinary language, of what an observer 
would see or experience when the mathematical quantities used by the theory to describe the state of the system 
take on any of their allowed values.”  They further note that this implies that the Copenhagen and Everett 
interpretations of QT are equivalent because they both “give the same rules for what an observer ‘sees’.” 
For more discussion of this interpretation, see Isham (1992, 90), Anderson (2011, 9ff).  For less technical 
discussion, see Butterfield and Isham (1999, 153) and Kuchar (1999, 187). 
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equation in a fashion that bypasses at least this worry.  However, as my purpose is to evaluate 
the role that time plays in Barbour’s theory, I do not evaluate whether the problems raised by 
these authors apply to Barbour’s resulting interpretation here.  Rather, I mention these issues 
to emphasize the importance of Barbour’s Machian QT, notably his timeless, frameless 
rendering of the Schrödinger equation, in generating his QG.  Now, let’s see how he uses the 
naïve Schrödinger interpretation with his Machian reading of the Schrödinger equation in 
order to provide a c-space-point-based account of QG. 
1.3 Barbour’s Rendition of the Naïve Schrödinger Interpretation 
In Barbour’s c-space rendition of this interpretation, the Wheeler-DeWitt equation 
puts a probability density on each configuration in the heap of possibilities.  Generally 
speaking, this probability density indicates that some c-space points have more copies in the 
heap of actualities than others.  
In accord with the naïve Schrödinger interpretation’s strategy of imposing the 
treatment of Schrödinger equation’s wavefunction with that of the WDE, Barbour makes use 
of the frozen mists over the c-space of the Schrödinger equation.  He (1999, 247, 260) 
characterizes WDE’s wavefunction in terms of mist: the square of it corresponds to a static 
mist across superspace, i.e., the space of all possible Riemannian 3-geometries (Barbour 
FXQi, 4),
199
  that has a density in proportion to the probability of the c-space points.  Recall 
from Ch3 that in the context of his relativistic dynamics, Barbour refers to the points of 
superspace as ‘c-space points’.  There, superspace just is a c-space: it is a metric of 
Riemannian 3-geometries that is obtained by quotienting out the diffeomorphisms of the 
space of the Riemannian 3-geometries.
200
  In effect, the static mist is denser over c-space 
                                                 
199 Note that Current Barbour replaces superspace with conformal superspace, i.e., a space in which each point 
has a conformal geometry and is represented by the equivalence class of metrics related by position-dependent 
scale transformations.  This plays a large role in Current Barbour’s attempt to relativize shape.  But, as we are 
using only Middle Barbour as a model to which to apply ACA, we do not discuss this alternative here. 
200 As we’ll see in Barbour’s speculations regarding the implications of Mott’s problem, he claims that this 
space has a stratified manifold, which is a collection of manifolds of different dimensions that is structured by 
these dimensions.  Barbour’s choice of stratified manifold and proposed uses of it are explained in detail below.  
Since such a manifold is not integrated in Barbour’s discussions of his QG until after this problem and because 
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points that are more probable, and this density is given by the value of the wavefunction 
resulting from a solution to WDE.      
Additionally, just as in his reading of the Schrödinger equation in which the higher 
probability of a c-space point in the heap of possibilities indicates that there is more copies of 
such a c-space point in the heap of actualities, the more probable a 3-geometry of superspace 
is, the more copies of that c-space point is in the heap of actualities.  This is supported by the 
following quote: 
A solution to [WDE] puts a value of Ψ and, with it, the Schrödinger density Ψ*Ψ on 
each configuration in the heap of possibilities.  Let us then suppose that whoever or 
whatever creates the world puts a corresponding number of identical copies of the 
configuration into the heap of actualities. (1994c, 410) 
In effect, if a c-space point is assigned a positive value by | | , then it is in the heap 
of actualities.  Moreover, the WDE dictates the numbers of copies of a particular c-space 
point that appear in the heap of actualities.  A solution to WDE makes certain c-space points 
probable than others.  The probability of a c-space point is to be understood as indicative of 
how many copies of the point is in the heap of actualities: the more probability a certain c-
space point is assigned, the higher the number of copies of that c-space point in the heap of 
actualities. 
It is important to note here that a heap of actualities is not clearly stackable for two 
reasons.  First, given the manner in which Barbour interprets the WDE thus far, it seems that 
there is no reason for the probable c-space points to correspond to a set of best-matching c-
space points.  However, we’ll see at the end of this chapter that he may be able to make 
                                                                                                                                                        
it is not clearly consistent with ONT and his pre-Mott discussions, I do not present it until §2.3 below and 
analyse its consistency with his overall project in Ch6.  Moreover, as Anderson (2004, 10) notes, the quotienting 
out the diffeomorphisms makes superspace much more complicated than Barbour’s three-point illustration of c-
space because superspace requires much more strata than his simple three-particle illustration, which is 
reflective of a Machian Newtonian c-space.  Nevertheless, Anderson claims that it is a useful model by which to 
consider c-space.  And, what really matters for my analysis is that Barbour proposes any such manifold with 
strata, rather than specific types of strata.  So, we only focus on the model stratified c-space as presented by 
Barbour and bracket off such technicalities regarding the additional strata of superspace.   
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recourse to the interaction of the wavefunction with the stratified c-space.  But, this 
suggestion is highly speculative.  Second, even supposing that these probable c-space points 
are best-matching, such a stack likely contains copies of certain c-space points.  How can we 
determine which particular copy of a c-space point belongs in a certain stack?  Given PSR, 
there appears to be no reason to include one copy rather than another in a certain stack.  And, 
given ONT, any relation between such points must be reducible to the stuff and relative 
relations of the c-space points.  Other than a best-matching relation, which, as presented in 
his classical dynamics, presupposes that a given best-matching set has no copies, it does not 
seem that Barbour has any other means of generating a succession of c-space points.  So, the 
heap of actualities must indeed be a heap.  Thus, given his characterization of the WDE and 
his principles, the c-space points in the heap of actualities are disconnected from others even 
in terms of spatial relations; each instantaneous configuration of the universe that exists has 
no successive relation to the others. 
In order to attempt to illustrate in more detail the possible outcomes of using this 
interpretation as well as sketching out some possible formalism involved, he (1994b, 2881) 
assumes that we have a solution Ψ of the Wheeler-DeWitt equation and further assumes that 
Ψ is for a quantum system that has a finite number of degrees of freedom in order to bracket 
off the issue of renormalization that arises in systems of infinitely many dimensions and 
indefinite kinetic energy.
201
  With only such finite quantities in play, Barbour supposes that it 
is possible to divide superspace into infinitesimal hypercubes of equal side length by using 
the kinetic metric.  The value of Ψ is then taken in each hypercube, and | |  is calculated for 
each cube.  Finally, for each hypercube, a number of identical copies of a representative 
configuration of the hypercube is put into the heap of actualities. This number is to be 
proportional to | | of the hypercube. 
Barbour does not give much else by detailed explanation here or elsewhere that 
explicates exactly how this is connected to WDE, e.g., ‘kinetic metric’ may correspond to its 
                                                 
201 Though Barbour’s (1994b, 2881) motivations for such bracketing here, i.e., “trying to understand the 
appearance of time from timelessness,” are understandable, he does not address this issue directly elsewhere.  
Additionally, Smolin 2001 criticizes precisely the impracticality of implementing his view in a universe like 
ours in which such infinite quantities are likely to come into play. 
170 
 
extrinsic curvature analogue in WDE, or precisely how this setup works, e.g., how exactly the 
hypercubes of superspace correspond to a point in c-space.  But, presumably, he is using the 
hypercubes as a means of mathematically splitting up superspace in order to specify the 
probability assigned to each c-space point.   
Thus far I have made the difference between the heap of possibilities and the heap of 
actualities in terms of existence.  Yet in Barbour’s account, it is not made explicit whether the 
number of heaps is merely representative of the probability of us being in a certain c-space 
point or, rather than being only metaphorical, the heap of actualities, which contains multiple 
copies of certain points, actually exists.  For example, in the 1994c quote above, Barbour 
indicates that the heap of actualities comes into existence when the universe is created.  
Though this prima facie seems to indicate that such c-space points exist by being created in 
the initial creation of the universe, it may also indicate that each possible configuration of the 
universe was assigned a certain probability at the moment of the universe’s creation.  As this 
issue is closely related to the Everettian interpretation’s problem of probabilities and because, 
as we shall see, this issue is intertwined with one’s experience, I need to present Barbour’s 
account of experience before addressing it.  So, I discuss and resolve the issue in §2.1.1 
below following Barbour’s account of experience. 
2 Explaining Away the Appearance of Time  
Given that Barbour aims to eliminate or reduce any temporal connections between c-
space points, he is obligated to provide an account of our temporal experiences.  His 1994b 
proposes a three step process for explaining away such apparent temporal relations.  Thus, 
this section is organized into three main subsections.  First, his notion of time capsules is 
presented and clarified.  It is with these special configurations that he aims to explain away 
our apparent memories and perception of motion.  After discussing these time capsules, I 
return to the Everettian problems of probability, measurement and personal identity, and 
address them along Barbouric lines.  Second, the Mott problem is presented.  Barbour regards 
Mott’s solution to this problem as motivation for the claim that the probability distribution of 
the WDE is higher on c-space points with time capsules.  Third, we look at the manner in 
which Barbour proposes that Mott’s solution can be generalised to his Machian QG. 
2.1 Time Capsules 
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 Because the static c-space points are ontologically basic in Barbour’s picture, he 
needs some account in which our experience of time is merely ostensible.  The first stage in 
this account is the introduction of time capsules.  As these time capsules play a central role in 
the manner in which Barbour attempts to explain away our experience of time, this stage is 
key in indicating to which temporal concepts Barbour’s use of ‘experience of time’ refers.  
Thus, it is also key to our later application of ACA to his theory.  Note that the content of this 
section does not make much reference to the existent literature on the experience of time 
because my main aim here is to tease out the temporal concepts as they appear in Barbour’s 
own narrative.  However, the analysis of these concepts in Ch6 puts Barbour’s concepts 
dealing with temporal experience in the context of such literature. 
Barbour (1994b, 2884) provides the following “general”(2883) definition of ‘time 
capsule’. 
By a time capsule I mean a static configuration of part or all the universe containing 
structures which suggest they are mutually consistent records of processes that took 
place in a past in accordance with certain laws. 
Intuitively, this notion of a time capsule seems to be exemplified by the artefacts we 
encounter daily.  For example, a series of footprints in freshly fallen snow ‘suggest that they 
are mutually consistent records of processes that took place in a past in accordance with 
certain laws’.202  The footprints suggest that they are a set of mutually consistent records 
because each footprint, e.g., is a footprint of the same size, roughly 6in away from another 
footprint and alternates with an opposite footprint.  So, each footprint seems to be a record of 
some event, and these records seem to be consistent given their relative locations.  Further, 
these records seem to be records of processes that took place in a past, i.e., as individual 
processes they each seem to be a record of a shoe making an imprint at a particular location 
in an apparent past, and as a set of processes they seem to be records of someone walking in 
the snow in an apparent past.  Thus, ‘processes’ above refers to a temporally ordered 
                                                 
202 Barbour (1994b, 2885-6) provides a few other examples of time capsules: the apparent evidence of our 
evolutionary history as found in rocks, plants and animals; the apparent rotation of planets inferred from their 
oblateness. 
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sequence of events.  Finally, these records are indicative of a process that took place in 
accordance with certain laws
203
: the apparently past process of someone walking appears to 
have taken place in accordance with laws governing gravity and human physiology, e.g., 
there is no five foot gap in the series of footprints that suggests the person levitated and the 
size and distance between the footprints are consistent with them being from a human of a 
certain height walking at a certain speed rather than a yeti.   
It is with these time capsules that Barbour attempts to explain away any sense of 
temporal extension associated with experienced configurations in a c-space point that appears 
to be the result of a temporally ordered sequence of events.  Thus, with artefacts that appear 
to be the result of a past process, such as the set of footprints above, Barbour claims that only 
the present c-space point in which these configurations appear actually exists and that one did 
not necessarily experience any of the configurations in the apparent past process.  Rather, it is 
due to the presence of these time capsules, which suggest that there was a past temporally 
ordered sequence of events, e.g., someone who walked through the snow, that we erroneously 
come to believe that there was a past ordered set of c-space points the led to the presently 
experienced c-space point.  Thus, one is just interpreting the present configuration as being 
the result of a past process due to the presence of a time capsule, but no such sequence of c-
space points led up to the c-space point that one is experiencing. 
 Thus far, we have been considering a case in which we see a static configuration and 
interpret it as being the result of a past process.  How are these time capsules supposed to 
work for experiences of apparently dynamical configurations, e.g., seeing motion?  How do 
they even work for the apparent process of seeing something and making inferences about it, 
e.g., even in the footprint case it seems that there is a process involved by which one sees the 
object in which photons are reflected from the imprints, arrive at one’s eye, are interpreted by 
                                                 
203 Barbour does not indicate here exactly what he means by ‘laws’ here, but some options are in the offing: the 
laws of nature; possible sets of laws of nature; or laws associated with some sort of folk theory that arises from 
one experiencing certain events being followed by certain other events often.  While I am non-committal here as 
to which option is more plausible given Barbour’s account, these options will be elaborated upon and evaluated 
later as to their consistency with his methodology for arriving at the laws of nature. 
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the brain, and one seems to make an inference from this data to the conclusion that someone 
recently walked by.   
Recall that experiencing on Barbour’s account is confined to that of a single c-space 
point.  And, given ONT, he can only appeal to objects and their relations in a single c-space 
point in order to explain away temporally extended experience.  So, to answer these 
questions, he (1994b, 2883) appeals to a specific type of a time capsule: brain configurations.  
This passage is presented in the context of distinguishing his stance from that in which 
“direct experience,” i.e., present sensory experience, I presume, is ‘correlated’/‘coded’ with 
the positions and motions of atoms in our brain. 
An alternative is that our direct experience, including that of seeing motion, is 
correlated with only configuration in our brains: the correlate of the conscious instant 
is part of a point of configuration space, not phase space.  Our seeing motion at some 
instant is correlated with a single configuration of our brain that contains, so to speak, 
several stills of a movie that we are aware of at once and interpret as motion.  Such a 
brain configuration is a time capsule. 
Our experience of the process of motion, e.g., our experience of a temporally ordered 
sequence of events that we interpret as motion, is explained by there being neural time 
capsules.  A neural time capsule is a configuration of one’s brain in a particular instant, i.e., it 
is part of the configuration making up a particular c-space point, that somehow ‘encodes’ an 
apparent experience of a temporally ordered sequence of events.  Barbour suggests that these 
neural time capsules do so by ‘containing’ “several stills of a movie that we are aware of at 
once and interpret as motion,” i.e., one’s brain configuration in a particular c-space 
corresponds, in some way
204
, with a set of configurations of which we are aware concurrently 
and that are interpreted as the process of motion.
205
  However, he (1999, 267) notes that there 
                                                 
204 As I discuss shortly, Barbour takes his claim that the brain at an instant contains several stills that are 
interpreted as temporally ordered to be a primitive that, perhaps, arises from CNP, or some sort of well-known 
fact. 
205 The viability of his use of time capsules to explain away our usual temporal experience, which seems to be 
extended well beyond what is encodable in the configurations of a single c-space point, is discussed in Ch6. 
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are also c-space points that do not contain such neural time capsules, e.g., some of the stills 
are missing, some of the stills “are jumbled up in the wrong order.” 
This jumble quote may strike one as odd because the second long quotation implies 
that we, somehow, interpret these stills as having a certain order.  In effect, it’s our 
interpretation of the stills that imposes temporal order on them, rather than the stills 
themselves being presented in some sort of order.  The jumble quote, on the other hand, 
suggests that these stills are given to us in a certain order, i.e., a temporal sequence.  In effect, 
on this reading Barbour may be accused of sneaking in temporal order via such neural time 
capsules that contain sequences of temporally ordered stills.   
However, at least prima facie, this threat of sneaking in temporal order via neural time 
capsules is benign; Barbour can make recourse to the following two-fold reply.   
First, the stills ‘encoded’ in neural time capsules are indeed given in an order.  
However, this is a fundamentally spatial order, which may be something akin to best-
matching, rather than a fundamentally temporal order.  Moreover, this reply can be used as a 
means of identifying where we get our concept of temporal order: it is from these given 
spatially ordered stills that we create our empty notion of temporal order.
206
   
Second, shortly we will see how Barbour uses the WDE to make c-space points with 
time capsules more probable.  But for our present purposes, it merely needs to be noted that 
Barbour wants his theory to make such c-space points much more probable so that our 
apparent experience of temporally ordered events can be explained by his account.  In turn, 
the higher likelihood of c-space points containing such neural time capsules, rather than 
sneaking in temporal order, is used to explain where we get our concept of temporal order.  
Because we are much more likely to experience c-space points in which we have neural time 
capsules and since such neural time capsules are interpreted by us as temporally ordered 
sequences with duration, we seem to experience temporally ordered sequences of events.  At 
                                                 
206 This will be developed and discussed further in Ch6 via some models of the structure of the specious present.  
There, I argue that the retentionist model, rather than the cinematic and extensional models, fits best with 
Barbour claims about our experience of time.  And, I also spell out another and more radical option that involves 
a mental/physical property dualism. 
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the god’s eye view of c-space, however, one does not necessarily experience c-space points in 
the order implied by the stills encoded in neural time capsules.  Rather, Barbour (1999, 300; 
1994b, 2883) seems to accept that, at least barring some sort of spatial ordering, that one may 
‘jump around’ wildly from one c-space point to the next.207  So, while at the experiential level 
there is apparent temporal order, the series of c-space points that one actually experiences 
does not necessarily follow the order of stills given by a particular neural time capsule: one 
does not necessarily experience the c-space point with the configuration of the apparently 
previous still ‘prior’ to experiencing the c-space point in which one’s neural time capsule 
‘encodes’ this still.   
Further, while Barbour does seem to realize this in discussion about the role and 
ontological status of histories, which I provide below, and elsewhere
208
 that given that his 
account is fundamentally timeless and that this account, at least at this stage, deals with heaps 
of c-space points, we cannot legitimately speak of our experience of c-space points as 
potentially ‘jumping around’ or even ask the question of what is the actual temporal order of 
c-space points that we experience.  Strictly speaking, there is no such order to or succession 
with our experience of c-space points.  So, this talk of ‘jumping around’ is just to emphasise 
that there is no fundamental link among c-space points that directly corresponds to a temporal 
sequence.  However, we can legitimately speak of some spatial order of c-space points, e.g., 
that imposed by best-matching, assuming that such spatial order is not derived from our 
temporal experience.  This interplay between spatial and temporal order plus whether 
Barbour must use the latter to generate his laws and best-matching will be discussed in Ch6.  
But, for the purposes of this portion of the exposition, the upshot of this discussion is: at least 
in the context of his exposition of time capsules and their function in his interpretation of QG, 
                                                 
207 He seems to accept this in the context of using Bell’s 1981 discussion of Everett’s many worlds 
interpretation.  This discussion is used to setup Barbour’s (1999, 302ff) development of his Many-Instants 
picture. 
208 In (1994b, 2883), he states, “However, we can never step out of the present instant, we can never know if any 
other instant is actually experienced […].  For we shall never know whether other possible instants, including 
what we take to be our own past, are actual or whether the present instant is unique.” 
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the temporal order that neural time capsules impose does not entail that there is temporal 
order at a fundamental level. 
Now that the timeless nature of these time capsules has been clarified, a more 
concrete rendition of the neural time capsule example is in order.  Suppose that an apple 
appears to have, say, rolled off a table apparently in accordance with certain laws.  Imagine 
seeing the apple in the c-space point in which the apple just appears to be going off the end of 
the table.  At that instant one would say that the apple, prior to this particular c-space point, 
had a certain continuous trajectory and speed before reaching the end of the table.  This 
apparently past trajectory is the process encoded by the time capsule; it is some sort of law-
abiding temporally ordered series of configurations that, Barbour claims, is somehow 
encoded in one’s instantaneous brain configuration.  Furthermore, as Barbour explains and as 
my apparent overuse of ‘apparent’ above indicates, such temporal evolution does not actually 
occur.  Rather, certain c-space points are or contain time capsules, which are those 
configurations that somehow encode the appearance of a past set of temporally ordered 
configurations.  Thus, our experience of time is merely the result of us interpreting such time 
capsules in terms of a temporally ordered set of configurations. 
At c-space points that one usually experiences, why does one usually seem to have a 
brain configuration that corresponds to a certain set of configurations, i.e., is a time capsule, 
and how does one, while at a particular c-space point, interpret these configurations such that 
they seem indicative of a temporally ordered past?  His answer to the former question is 
provided shortly in the following two sections.  To foreshadow the following sections, note 
that he answers the first question by claiming that the wavefunction, as governed by the 
WDE, makes those c-space points containing brain configurations with time capsules much 
more probable than those c-space points that lack such brain configurations. He (1999, 255, 
266) answers the second question by claiming that such interpretation is primitive or is some 
sort of “well known fact.”209   
                                                 
209 In Ch6 I develop a few options for such interpretation of our perception of time that fit with Barbour’s claims 
and accounts.  These are the retentionist model, in which one is presented with a number of simultaneous 
retentions in an instant though one interprets them as having a duration, and a psycho-physical dualism, in 
which certain epiphenomenal mental properties supervene on one’s brain configuration at an instant. 
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Barbour’s general Machian project makes clear his rationale for positing such time 
capsules on two related fronts.  First, c-space points are basic in his ontology, with motion 
being derivative from such static configurations.  Thus, he must provide an account 
fundamentally in terms of c-space points only, rather than in terms of a combination of 
objects’ relative positions and their motion. 
 Second, each c-space point is supposed to be a static snapshot of all the objects in the 
universe.  As such, these c-spaces points have no temporal extension.  Additionally, they 
have no emergent sequential order due to the fact that the heap of actualities can contain more 
than one copy of a given c-space point.  So, he must explain away the appearance of a 
temporally extended present as well as the appearance of a particular past. 
 In effect, Barbour claims that any apparent motion, memories, the past and presently 
perceived objects that are indicative of a past, are encoded in a single instantaneous 
configuration.  Whether this account of experience, the consequence from his principles that 
his heap of actualities is not stackable and our day-to-day temporal experience are 
reconcilable is discussed in Ch6.   
Let’s now turn to addressing issues associated with his Everettian-based account. 
2.1.1 Formulating and Addressing Problems of the Everettian Interpretation in the 
Time Capsule Context 
With this account of our experience of time in place, we are now in a position to 
present responses on behalf of Barbour to the other main problems of the many-worlds 
version of the Everettian interpretation mentioned in the preceding chapter, i.e., the problem 
of probability and the problem of personal identity.  Plus, we can address the issue of 
measurement raised in §3.3 of the previous chapter. 
2.1.1.1 The Problem of Probability 
 In the many-worlds version of the Everettian interpretation, a problem of making 
sense of probability arises.  This is due to all possible outcomes of a quantum measurement 
existing following the measurement.  For example, suppose someone sets up an experiment 
that can result in a measurement of spin-up or spin-down.   According to this Everettian 
interpretation, upon measurement this world branches into a world in which spin-up is 
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measured and a world in which spin-down is measured.  In effect, it seems that the 
probability of each outcome is 1.  According to the Schrödinger equation, however, the 
probability of each state is 1/2.  Saunders (1998, 374) diagnoses this result in terms of the 
apparent inapplicability of the concept of probability in this context.  He claims that the 
concept of probability seems only applicable to cases in which a single possibility out of a 
range of possibilities is realized so as to exclude all the other possibilities.  Because all of 
such possibilities are realized for quantum measurements, this concept seems inapplicable to 
the Everettian account.  So, the general question arises: How are we to make sense of 
quantum probability in this Everettian interpretation? 
 Although Barbour bases his account partially on that of the Everettian, it seems as 
though this problem runs much deeper for Barbour.  Given ONT, all he has are the stuff and 
relations of each c-space point.  Unlike an Everettian view in which branches come into 
existence when a measurement is made, Barbour cannot have a single c-space point or a 
certain range of them coming into existence at a time as this requires at least some 
background time parameter.  This parameter would be in violation of ONT.  Nor can he, 
unlike a static block version of the Everettian picture
210
, have a static but temporally ordered 
series of c-space points.  In this case, a temporal concept, i.e., temporal order, appears in 
violation of ONT.  So, there must exist either a single set comprised of each possible c-space 
point, i.e., those in the heap of possibilities, or all the points in the heap of actualities, which 
includes copies of certain c-space points corresponding to the probability distribution 
calculated from a solution to the WDE.  Above the problem is claimed to arise on the 
Everettian picture due to all possible outcomes of a quantum measurement existing following 
measurement.  In Barbour’s picture, we have neither a set range of possible outcomes 
existing following a quantum measurement nor the temporal order implied by the term 
‘following’.  Rather, we just have either the entire heap of possibilities or the entire heap of 
actualities existing, with certain types of c-space points allegedly more probable than others.  
This view effectively is very far removed from being able to employ Saunders’ concept of 
probability, which is only applicable to cases in which a single possibility out of a range of 
                                                 
210 See Saunders 1995, 1998 for a discussion of framing the Everettian interpretation in this way that focuses on 
modifying the time-flow laden tenses often used to speak about branching and the like. 
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possibilities is realized so as to exclude all the other possibilities, because all possibilities 
exist and there is no sense of being realized at a time.  So, how can sense be made of 
Barbour’s use of ‘probability’? 211 
Since c-space points are supposed to be the basic thing in his QG, let’s try to make 
sense of his use of ‘probability’ in some manner using c-space points.  We’ll proceed by 
ascertaining whether some of the standard accounts of probability can be used in this context.  
As we’ll see below, standard interpretations of probability on the metaphysical market 
attempt to explain something along the lines of Saunders’ time-dependent concept of 
probability.  However, because Barbour’s use of this term must be removed from the usual 
                                                 
211 Because the problem of probability that Barbour faces is so removed from the problem as it appears in the 
Everettian interpretation as well as the time-laden concept of probability presupposed, it does not seem that the 
main Everettian resolutions to this problem can be used by Barbour.  For example, a prominent line of response 
to this problem is the Deutsch-Wallace decision-theoretic approach.  According to this approach, one can 
generate quantum probability distributions through a combination of a non-probabilistic theory and some 
axioms of classical decision theory, e.g., the axiom of additivity according to which an agent is indifferent 
between receiving two separate payoffs and receiving a single payoff of an amount equivalent to the sum of the 
separate payoffs.  However, Wallace (2003, 437) argues that such decision theory seems only “reasonable for 
small-scale betting”.  In effect, this seems only a reasonable account for determining the quantum probability for 
a single branching.  It is not clear how such decision theory may be applied to the entire heap of possibilities.  
Plus, because this decision theory is usually cast in temporal terms, e.g., one puts values on receiving a specific 
range of future payoffs or, more generally, is concerned about future consequences, it would have to be recast 
non-temporally to be employed by Barbour.  For discussion of this approach, see Albert 2010. 
Another main line response is to claim that probabilities are to be cast entirely in terms the observer’s 
uncertainty about something, e.g., Vaidman’s 1998 immediate post-branching location, and, in effect, are 
merely epistemic.  It seems that Barbour can appeal to time capsules in order to recover such uncertainty.  
Moreover, such epistemic uncertainty seems to presuppose that there exists a temporal sequence of c-space 
points, e.g., the uncertainty of which c-space point we will experience next.  However, there are no c-space 
points in a temporal sequence, whether an ordered sequence or a sequence that is not ordered and jumps around.  
So, unless one’s experiences correspond to an existing sequence of c-space points, which violates ONT by 
appealing to some basic temporal relation among points, it does not seem that this appeal to uncertainty can be 
employed to make sense of Barbour’s use of ‘probability’ that refers to the number of copies of a c-space point 
in the heap of actualities corresponding with the wavefunction’s squared modulus given a solution to the WDE. 
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time-laden concept of probability, these interpretations must be modified.  I attempt to do so 
below with the frequency and propensity interpretations of probability. 
One route is to have the heap of actualities exist.  Recall that the degree of probability 
of a configuration corresponds to the number of c-space points in the heap of actualities.  
Let’s try to read this claim in terms of a frequency interpretation of probability212, i.e., the 
frequentist probability of some event of type x occurring is the number of occurrences of x in 
a set divided by the total of set members.  As this frequentist probability is time-laden due to 
it being in terms of the occurrence of an event, let’s eliminate this component: the probability 
of some event of type x is the number of occurrences of x in a set divided by the total of set 
members.  This just amounts to statistical probability, but it seems to be assimilated into the 
Barbour picture easily: the probability of a configuration of the universe c is the number of 
occurrences of c in the heap of actualities divided by the total number c-space points in this 
heap.  Thus, using this form of probability in conjunction with the existence of the heap of 
actualities, Barbour can account for probability without temporal concepts by correlating the 
higher probability of a c-space point with a higher number of existent copies of the c-space 
point: the more copies of a certain c-space point there is, the more probable that type of c-
space point.   
Furthermore, when cast in this fashion, ‘probability’ just seems here to be a static 
ratio of the number of a certain type of c-space points in a heap to the total number of c-space 
points.  Because the ‘probability’ merely gives this ratio and doesn’t provide any information 
about, e.g., the tendency of something to occur, it lacks the modal aspect that usually 
characterizes probability. 
The other route is to suppose that only the heap of possibilities exits.  If only the heap 
of possibilities exists, then how are we to understand probability without violating ONT?  We 
cannot make recourse to statistical probability as above because the heap of possibilities 
contains only one copy of each possible c-space point.  Because only one copy of each c-
space point is there to be counted, each c-space point would have the same probability.   
                                                 
212 See Papineau 2010 for a discussion of frequentism as well as propensity theory in the context of the 
Everettian interpretation.  Also, for general discussion of frequentism, see Salmon 1977. 
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One option is to equate the higher probability of a c-space point with us experiencing 
the c-space point more often.  By referencing our experience, it seems that we have to have 
some way of counting the number of times a c-space point is experienced.  In a timeless c-
space of possibilities, it is not clear how this would be done: given ONT, all the c-space 
points are simply given as being experienced where the c-space point has an experiencer.   
An alternative option is to drop the experiencer and equate the higher probability of a 
c-space point with the fact that it occurs more often.  However, this ‘occurring more often’ 
seems to presuppose that there are a number of times in which the universe is in a certain 
configuration.  This, again, is in violation of ONT.  To make sense of this, we have to assume 
that the universe adopts the configurations of certain c-space points, with some c-space points 
being adopted more often than others.  However, this picture seems to presuppose some 
temporal concepts: it seems to assume that the universe traces some path through c-space to 
effectively create a set of ‘realized’ c-space points that may be deemed its temporal history. If 
only the heap of possibilities exist and the universe, in accord with ONT, does not trace some 
path through c-space to effectively create a set of ‘realized’ c-space points that may be 
deemed its temporal history, then there exists only the c-space points of the heap of 
possibilities to be counted.  As there is only one copy of each c-space point, each corresponds 
to the same probability.   
However, this second option might be modified by recourse to propensity theory
213
 
which would allow for a timeless account of probability that does not require, e.g., the 
universe to trace out paths in the heap of actualities.  Usually in propensity theory, a 
probability is understood as a propensity, i.e., a physical property or disposition, of a certain 
physical situation to yield an outcome of a certain kind.  As the yielding of a certain outcome 
seems to assume that there is a temporal sequence of events, we have to choose something 
thing that may be ‘yielded’ non-temporally.  So, let’s take ‘certain physical situation’ to refer 
to the heap of possibilities and replace ‘to yield an outcome of a certain kind’ with ‘to be 
indicative of which possible c-space points and the number of copies of these c-space points 
are in the heap of actualities’.  As we are assuming that only the heap of possibilities exists, 
the heap of actualities may be thought of as a mathematical tool or metaphor here.  So, the 
                                                 
213 For discussions of propensity theory generally, see Benlap 2007.  See Eagle 2004 for criticism. 
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propensity account in this context claims that the probability of a c-space point is the 
propensity of the heap of possibilities to be indicative of the number of copies of that c-space 
point in the heap of actualities.  To visualize how this may work, let’s make recourse to the 
mist analogy: like the frozen mist of different intensities across the heap of possibilities, the 
heap of possibilities has a propensity field that assigns certain c-space points a propensity 
with some propensities being of a higher weight than others.   
Suppose that we can make sense of propensity fields and that this account is not 
circular, i.e., the probability of a c-space point is the propensity of the heap of possibilities to 
be indicative of the number of copies of that c-space point in the heap of actualities and this 
number correlates to the probability of a c-space point that arises from a solution to the 
WDE.  This setup, however, does not offer much of an explanation of probability.  Rather it 
is precisely this issue, i.e., what does it mean to say that there are more copies of a certain 
configuration in the heap of actualities, that needs to be analysed.
214
  Additionally, even if 
there is a more explanatorily viable propensity formulation of his account, Barbour will still 
have difficulty assimilating these propensities qua physical properties or dispositions.  Given 
ONT, propensities must be reducible to stuff and their relations.  It seems that Barbour may 
be able to derive the values for the weights of such propensities from his c-space points and 
the WDE.  However, the existence of propensities simpliciter seems to be part of accepting 
the propensity theory.  As, by definition, such propensities exist, Barbour cannot accept this 
account without violating ONT. 
So, as it is difficult to make sense of probability in Barbour’s account using an 
existent heap of possibilities alone such that ONT is satisfied, it seems that statistical 
probability combined with an existing heap of actualities is the only viable option of those 
considered above.   
Moreover, in view of this discussion, we can return to the question raised at the end of 
§1.3: Are the number of heaps merely representative of the probability of us being in a 
certain c-space point or, rather than being only metaphorical, does the heap of actualities, 
                                                 
214 See Hitchcock 2002 for general objections to propensity theory along this line that propensities do not really 
offer an explanation of probability. 
183 
 
which contains multiple copies of certain points, actually exist?  Because it does not seem 
possible for Barbour to hold that only the heap of possibilities exists without importing 
temporal concepts and irreducible properties into his account of probability and, thus, violate 
ONT, it appears that he must claim that the heap of actualities exists and that the WDE’s 
‘probability’ is just a ratio indicating the number of existing copies of a particular c-space 
point.   
2.1.1.2 The Problem of Personal Identity 
 A specific problem of personal identity arises in the many-worlds Everettian 
interpretation.  At each branching, a world splits into a number of different worlds.  This 
implies that an observer at a branching world can have a successor in each of the branched 
worlds.  Because each successor can claim spatiotemporal contiguity with the observer, how 
can it be determined which successor is the same person as the observer?
215
 
 This problem cuts even deeper for Barbour.  He has no basic spatiotemporal 
contiguity connecting c-space points.  There is no time linking them or an order of the c-
space points.  Instead, the heap of actualities just exists statically.  So, as there’s no time, it 
does not seem as though Barbour could accept a notion of personal identity that, as usually 
conceived, is across time.  Could we have a spatial link by appealing to some sort of best-
matching among the points, e.g., the c-space point in which you seem to be in now is best-
matched with the c-space point in which you are reading the next sentence?  Such a spatial 
link does not seem possible.  Because there can be multiple copies of a single configuration 
of the universe, both the configurations involved in the best-matching procedure may each 
correspond to a number of distinct c-space points.  In effect, even with best-matching, no 
specific c-space point may be picked out as the spatially next point.  And, no specific point 
may be picked out as the spatially prior point.  In effect, one only seems able, by Barbour’s 
                                                 
215 This can be considered a case of fission, and such cases are widely discussed generally in philosophical 
personal identity literature, e.g., Parfit’s 1971 example of an organism that literally undergoes fission, cases in 
which one’s brain is removed, divided and successfully transplanted into two different bodies.  See Saunders 
and Wallace 2008 for a good discussion of Parfit’s fission case generally as well as evaluation within the 
Everettian context.   
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account
216
, to identify the point one is experiencing.
217
  Assuming that there are multiple 
copies of such points in the heap of actualities, there are no unique spatial links between the 
point one is experiencing and another c-space point.  So, it seems as though Barbour has to 
deny that there is some trans-c-space point notion of personal identity that relies on unique 
spatial or temporal contiguity.
218
 
2.1.1.3 The Issue of Measurement 
 In §3.3 of the previous chapter, the issue was raised as to how Barbour deals with 
measurement.  As was mentioned there, because typical lab measurements are processes and, 
thus, usually involve a temporally ordered succession of events, Barbour needs to either 
create a timeless concept of measurement or eliminate this concept strictly speaking.  I made 
reference to a quote that suggests Barbour opts for the latter with the promise that I would 
provide a fuller discussion of it here.  Here is the quote in context: 
I merely wish to connect the ‘internal’ and ‘external’ interpretations of a timeless 
universal wavefunction.  In the latter, we suppose a divine mathematician who 
actualizes (by random selection) one configuration of the universe and can then 
examine it in its entirety.  In the former, it is as if we are inside part of that [c-space 
point] and have direct awareness of that part as an experienced instant [or c-space 
point?].  The [c-space point] is actualized for us; we are powerless to bring it into 
being.  However, experiencing it, we are effectively in the same position as the divine 
mathematician except that we can only see part of the configuration.  The nature of 
                                                 
216 He (1994b, 2883) also seems to make this claim directly: By analogy with Descartes’s Cogito ergo sum, we 
know that the present instant is actualized.  However, because we can never step out of the present instant, we 
can never know if any other instant is actually experienced. 
217 However, in view of  (what appears to be) our day-to-day experience, which seems to be extended far beyond 
the present instant, it seems that we are capable of experiencing much more than a single c-space point.  I return 
to and discuss this issue in Ch6. 
218 There is some precedence for such an account.  Lockwood 1996 develops a many minds version of the 
Everttian interpretation in which there is no transtemporal identity of minds.  See Loewer 1996 and Papineau 
1996 for criticism. 
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what we see must be of the same kind, for otherwise experience would never give any 
reliable information about the conjectured external world.  Incidentally, I believe that 
the division of quantum mechanics is alleged to make between the measurer and the 
measured, or the observer and the observed is non-existent.  When the moment of 
truth is there (in each and every actualized [c-space point]), we do not measure, we 
experience, and what we experience is an indivisible whole. (1994b, 2883) 
Before moving to a discussion of this passage and measurement, I want to note that I have 
replaced ‘instant’ above with ‘c-space point’.  Though he equates the two, it is not entirely 
clear whether the second occurrence of ‘instant’ above should be equated to ‘c-space point’ 
as it could be in reference to our experience in what we perceive to be an instant, i.e., it might 
refer to some version of the specious present.  However, as my aim in this chapter is just to 
explicate his account, I am going to bracket off this possible equivocation here.  But, I will 
return to this issue in the next chapter. 
 With his claims that ‘we do not measure, we experience, and what we experience is 
an indivisible whole’, it seems that, strictly speaking, measurement is not possible.  Instead, 
he claims, we experience an indivisible whole.  Preceding these claims, he compares a divine 
mathematician who is examining externally a single c-space point with our experience of part 
of the c-space point internally.  Unlike the mathematician, we are ‘powerless to bring this c-
space point into being’.  However, he claims that what we see must be the same as what the 
divine mathematician sees in some sense. 
 There seems to be two senses in which these experiences are the same in view of the 
above passage.  First, with the claim, “The nature of what we see must be of the same kind, 
for otherwise experience would never give any reliable information about the conjectured 
external world,” it seems that Barbour is making a correlation between what we experience 
and what stuff and relations are actually in the world.  What we experience in an instant must 
be in at least indicative of what the divine mathematician sees, which presumably is the c-
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space point’s stuff and arrangement.  So, both we and the mathematician must ‘see’ at least 
some of the configurations of stuff in the c-space point that is being experienced.
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 Second, both we and the mathematician experience ‘an indivisible whole’.  
Unpacking this experience of ‘an indivisible whole’ shed some light on his position on 
measurement.  Though it may be made in the context of standard QT, where a distinction is 
drawn between the measurer and measured due to the collapse of the wavefunction when a 
system is measured, it implies much broader claims about the general stance Barbour must 
take on all measurement.  It is these broader claims that I am interested in here since he has 
already rejected collapse for other reasons. 
 A time capsule in a particular instant suggests that we do make measurements.  For 
example, we read the pointer of a device and we seem to remember putting an experiment 
involving that device into action.  But, such time capsules are really just part of a c-space 
point, e.g., the neural time capsule corresponding to stills of our memories of starting an 
experiment.  So, we do not actually make such measurements.  Instead, we are just 
experiencing a single c-space point’s configurations, e.g., the position of a device’s pointer, 
the memories corresponding to configurations of our neurons.  In effect, there is no 
distinction between a measurer and measuree: both are just stuff in a c-space point in a 
relation R.  As long as R is nothing over and above the relative relations of stuff in a 
particular c-space point, then a measurement process and any substantial division between a 
measurer and measuree are reducible to the stuff and relations.  Assuming that we cannot 
divide c-space points into, e.g., subsystems, via stuff and their relations alone and because a 
possible measurer/measure division is reducible to stuff and relations, this supposed division 
                                                 
219
 This point warrants a brief note on Barbour’s realism, i.e., realism (roughly, a view that holds that there is an 
external world that causes our perceptions) in the literature on perception that serves as the foil for idealism 
(roughly, a view according to which ideas are the direct objects of perception and denies that there are mind-
independent material objects), is required for clarification.  In this quote as well as throughout his writings on 
time capsules, Barbour seems to presuppose that the configurations to which our brain states correspond 
somehow with actual world.  While he does not specify his opinions on various types of realism, he (1999, 255), 
in giving one of the aims of his cosmological account, does state that his theory is realist in the sense that it is 
non-solipsistic, claims that other sentient beings exist and uses the structures of “external, objectively existing 
real” things to explain the structure of experience in a “perceptual instant.”   
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gives us no means to divide c-space points.  In effect, rather than a measurer/measuree 
division implying that there are subdivisions in a c-space point, we must, strictly speaking, 
experience a c-space point as ‘an indivisible whole’. 
  With the above example, we have seen how a process involved in a generic lab 
experiment can be made reducible the stuff and relations of a single c-space point.  Such a 
measurement involves a process and, in effect, is a temporally extended activity.  How can 
Barbour deal with a measurement that does not involve such a process?  Consider the case in 
which this you experience this configuration in a c-space point: the edge of a ruler is placed 
on a piece of wood, and the piece of wood extends from the end of the ruler to the mark that 
reads ‘1cm’.  It seems that if this case is presented to you, you are measuring that the piece of 
wood is 1cm wide.  Any background knowledge needed, e.g., how to read a ruler, could be 
part of your neural configuration in this c-space point.  In effect, this measurement also seems 
to be reducible to the stuff in a c-space point and their relations.  Thus, even in the case of 
measurement that does not involve much of a process, Barbour can claim that, strictly, there 
is no measurement; there are only stuff and relations.   
So, in line with ONT and given his account of time capsules, it seems that Barbour 
can deny that there is measurement qua result of a process and qua simple reading of a 
measuring apparatus.  
Now that we have addressed those Everettian problems dealing with experience, let’s 
return to the second stage in Barbour’s three-stage means of explaining away the appearance 
of time.   
2.2 The Mott Problem: Motivation for the Probability Density Being Higher on C-Space 
Points with Time Capsules 
In the process of answering our previous question, i.e., Why does one usually seem to 
have a brain configuration that is a time capsule?, and in order to provide some account of 
histories, Barbour makes recourse to Mott’s (1929) and Heisenberg’s (1930) explanation of 
why alpha particles form straight lines in cloud chambers.  This brings us to the second stage 
of Barbour’s account of our experience of time.  In this stage he provides the above case as 
an example that shows that wavefunctions satisfying timeless equations can be concentrated 
on time capsules and that the appearance of a classical history can result from such a setup.  
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In the final stage, he returns to the WDE and provides some rationale for the generic 
concentration of its solutions on time capsules.  Further, note that Barbour (1999, 307) claims 
that much of the inferences he makes below are speculative.  So, though the following may 
not have the same rigor as the preceding, it does provide a means of explaining away time 
that has some sort of precedent. 
The phenomenon that Mott and Heisenberg attempted to explain is as follows.  To 
observe alpha particles, one can use a Wilson cloud chamber.  Alpha particles are observable 
there via their interactions with atoms: such particles dislodge atoms’ electrons and, thereby 
ionize the neutral atoms rendering them positively charged.  This excess positive charge 
causes vapour condensation around them and, thus, makes alpha particle tracks visible. 
Suppose one uses a radium (Ra) atom as a source of alpha particles in the cloud 
chamber.  According to Gamow’s 1928 theory of alpha decay, one would expect an alpha 
particle that is emitted from the Ra atom to have a spherical wavefunction and, thus, cause 
random atoms throughout the cloud chamber to be ionized.  However, this effect does not 
occur.  Instead, a linear track from the Ra atom is observed. 
Mott offers an explanation of this behaviour by appealing to a configuration space and 
a TISE.  He (1929, 80) does so by first assuming that the nuclei of the atoms in the cloud 
chamber are effectively at rest during the formation of a track.  Nuclei are treated as 
effectively at rest, while alpha particles are governed by TISE.  A configuration in which 
there is a nucleus without neighbouring electrons is interpreted as an excited nucleus.  The 
conclusion that Mott attempts to come to is that the probability distribution of a solution to 
TISE is concentrated on configuration space points in which there are nuclei without 
electrons aligned. 
He reaches this conclusion by, as Barbour (1999, 310) describes it, “a kind of book 
keeping record about how the process would unfold in time.”  He starts by making some 
assumptions: there are outgoing spherical waves that radiate from the Ra atom, and only 
outgoing waves from the Ra atom can be used.  He (1929, 80) makes this latter assumption 
“[t]o obtain a consistent theory of the straight tracks.” After stating these assumptions, he 
considers a case in which there are only two hydrogen atoms, which are in line along a 
mathematical radii from the Ra atom, in the chamber.  He (1929, 81) formulates a TISE to 
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describe this system, and proceeds to solve it by making only configurations in which there 
are linear paths of excited alphas particles probable via focusing the probability distribution 
on these two cases and generalizing them.  In the first case, the atom nearest the Ra atom is 
excited, and the scattered waved of the alpha particle is concentrated in a narrow beam 
pointing away from the Ra atom.  In the second case, both atoms are excited, and the 
scattered wave is concentrated in a narrow beam that is emanating from the outermost atom 
and pointing away from the Ra atom.  Thus, Mott performs ‘bookkeeping’ in order to solve 
the problem: he reaches the desired solution by, so to speak, tallying up the probabilities of 
those tracks that correspond with the observed tracks and making the probabilities associated 
with all other configurations null. 
As a result of this procedure, the probability distribution that Mott obtained is 
concentrated on configuration space points that contain electronless nuclei.  As these static 
points seem to indicate that there was a prior history leading up to the configuration, e.g., a 
series of alpha particles was emitted from the Ra atom and ionized atoms in a certain linear 
track, Barbour claims that such points are examples of time capsules.  Further, because the 
resulting solution to TISE, which, like the WDE, involves no time parameter, has a 
probability distribution that is concentrated on configurations with time capsules, he 
speculates that the same might be true for a solution to the WDE.   
He admits that this speculation is based on rather shaky foundations, e.g., Mott’s 
solution is not actually derived given the ‘bookkeeping’ approach, it is semiclassical as 
interaction between the alpha particle and nuclei are omitted from the calculation and, as 
Barbour claims, Mott made an assumption about the direction of time, which is presented in 
the next section, in order to get his results to match the experienced linear paths.  
Nevertheless, he proceeds to make some further speculations as to how some of the 
assumptions used in Mott’s solution could be applied to c-space and the WDE.  Such 
speculations form the next and final stage of Barbour’s attempt to explain our temporal 
experience. 
2.3 The Relation between Solutions to the WDE and Time Capsules 
 There are two assumptions made by Mott for which Barbour (1994b, 2891ff) attempts 
to find analogues in his QG.   
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First, the Ra atom is assumed to play a distinguished role and has a definite position.  
The Ra atom functions as an origin from which the outgoing waves are emitted.  Because it is 
from this setup that Mott generates his TISE that favours time capsules, Barbour attempts to 
put his c-space in a form in which there’s an analogue of the distinguished Ra atom.  He 
claims that his c-space has a stratified manifold. Such a manifold is a collection of manifolds, 
where each manifold has a different dimension; roughly speaking, an n-dimensional stratified 
manifold is built by decomposing an n-dimensional manifold into disjoint smooth manifolds.  
Each of these decomposed manifolds are of h dimensions, where h is a real number and 
     .220 
Anderson (2004, 6) provides this very clear illustration of the stratified manifold that 
Barbour associates with a case in which there are only three point particles in the universe 
that are in Euclidean space.  I have modified this figure, removing some details not relevant 
here. 
 
                                                 
220 For further details on stratified manifolds in the context of geometrodynamics, see Fischer 1986 and Giulini 
2009. 
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This space has an origin labelled by point 6, and it extends to the left to infinity.  To 
distinguish the particles in configurations, they are labelled with ‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘C’.  The 
volume inside the boundary represents all possible 3-d configurations of the particles, e.g., 
those configurations that correspond to points 1, 2 and 3.  Points on the triangular faces, e.g., 
point 4 representing a configuration with three particles on a straight line, are 2-d, and points 
on the vertexes, e.g., 5 representing a configuration where two particles coincide, are 1-d.  
The origin at point 6 is the point where all three particles coincide and is 0-d.  Though he 
admits that this picture would be much more complicated for cases in which a higher number 
of dimensions are required, Barbour (1994b, 2892) claims that it shows the most 
characteristic features of stratified c-space.
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He (1994b, 2893) speculates that the origin of this manifold can function somehow 
like Mott’s distinguished Ra atom.  With the above stratification, c-space is asymmetrical 
and, in effect, features the origin as a distinguished point.   
Note that in order to avoid a violation of ONT, this asymmetry must arise due to the 
c-space points.  This claim can be supported by the manner in which the stratified manifold is 
built.  It is the dimensions associated with the configurations of particular c-space points that 
determine how the manifold is decomposed.  Plus, the space is organized in terms of 
congruence and symmetry of the c-space points.  If you draw a ray from the origin to the left 
within the boundaries, the series of c-space points on that line is related in terms of being 
congruent to the other points on that ray.  Additionally, if you take a slice of it, the point in 
the centre of the slice represents the most symmetric configuration, i.e., is an equilateral 
triangle, and the symmetry of configurations represented by the points decreases as one 
moves out from the centre.
222
  Because these relations of congruence and symmetry can be 
cashed out in terms of the relative spatial relations of the c-space points, this structure does 
                                                 
221 See note200 above for other complications with the stratified superspace needed in his QG.  However, this 
model will be sufficient for our discussion and analysis of its role in Barbour’s account as, he quite rightly 
states, it highlights the features characteristic of a stratified c-space. 
222 See Fischer 1969 for an introduction to stratified superspace. 
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not violate ONT.  So, it seems that it is the particular 3-geometries of the c-space points that 
give rise to this structure; this structure may be constructed from the relative relations in the 
c-space points.  Thus, Barbour’s claim that the c-space points give rise to the asymmetry 
seems vindicated.  Moreover, as based on the stuff and relations of c-space points, it seems 
prima facie that ONT is satisfied.  However, note that we examine in more detail whether 
such a structure actually does violate ONT in the next chapter.  But, for the present 
expository purposes, let’s assume that ONT is upheld in this case. 
Second, it is assumed that outgoing waves are to be used consistently in obtaining 
Mott’s result.  If Mott had, e.g., chosen an incoming wave at any stage, a linear path would 
not result.  So, Barbour (1994b, 2894) claims that this assumption is required in order for 
there to be the “sharply focused time capsules” that are created in the Mott solution.  In 
effect, the sole use of outgoing waves was to obtain the resulting focus on configurations 
containing time capsules.  This suggests that Mott imposed an arrow of time onto the case, 
and he did so regularly: he only applied outgoing waves in order to get the favoured c-space 
points to contain the apparent histories that are usually experienced. 
Barbour suggests that we believe there to be an arrow of time because it is encoded in 
time capsules, e.g., one only seems to experience an arrow of time because the configuration 
of one’s neurons indicates that one experienced some previous c-space points but has no 
experience of c-space points that would follow it.  In turn, he attempts to mirror Mott’s 
imposition of an arrow of time by proposing a manner in which the stratified c-space may 
concentrate the probability distribution on c-space points with arrow-suggesting time 
capsules.  He reasons as follows.  Stratified c-space is asymmetrical.  It is due to this 
asymmetry that “the wavefunction is ‘funnelled’ onto time capsules” (1999, 308).  Though 
how exactly this funnelling occurs in static c-space is not developed, he notes that, despite the 
lack of such development, the analogues of Mott’s assumptions in a stratified c-space at least 
indicate the manner in which a higher probability distribution on time capsules requires 
neither time nor a special initial condition.  If these speculations can be developed, then a 
stratified c-space is all that is required. 
Furthermore, he (1994b, 2894) tries to mimic the regularity of Mott’s choice by 
suggesting that the origin “sitting as it does at the centre of a hierarchical system of frontiers, 
is likely to impose strong regularity conditions on Ψ.”  He hopes that the structure of the 
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stratified manifold forces perturbations outward and away from the origin in a regular fashion 
such that the resulting probability distribution is regularly on points with arrow-suggestive 
time capsules.  But, other than this hope, this is the extent to which he develops a means of 
accounting for the regularity of our experiencing an arrow of time. 
Though this final stage has been very speculative and remains largely undeveloped by 
Middle Barbour
223
, I present them here in order to illustrate the fashion in which Barbour 
envisions the topological structure of all possible c-space points to function.  As is discussed 
in the next chapter, it is unclear whether a structured heap of possibilities can play these roles 
without violating ONT or conflicting with other components of his theory. 
  
 To sum up, his Machian QG aims to solve the problem of time in a manner that is in 
accord with ONT and MP: he provides an interpretation in which there are no fundamental 
temporal features.  Thus, the apparent lack of a time parameter in the WDE, which is 
supposed to describe evolution, is not a problem at all because it is not the case that it 
describes an evolving system.  Instead, on his interpretation it seems that the WDE indicates 
which c-space points make up the heap of actualities, which just exists statically in its 
entirety.  
                                                 
223 Anderson 2009, though, suggests some means of developing this account by, e.g., combining Barbour’s QG 
with a semiclassical approach.  Additionally, Barbour’s 2011 website states that he and Anderson are in the 
process of developing such an account; however, he does not offer details about it.  Moreover, Halliwell 2000 
offers a formal development of Barbour’s suggestion of using Mott’s solution in this context.  However, 
Halliwell’s development largely mirrors that of Mott’s bookkeeping approach.  As such, it does not make use of 
the topography of Barbour’s possible c-space but, instead, assumes that there are histories and that the 
probability distribution is concentrated only on such histories.   So, Halliwell’s approach starts by assuming that 
there are such histories, rather than providing some means of deriving them from the possible c-space’s 
topology; it does not offer much insight into the manner in which such histories may emerge of possible c-space.  
Nevertheless, given that Barbour speculates that the structure of this space does the work in ‘funnelling’ 
probability distributions and does not have an explicit account of exactly how histories may emerge from this 
structure, our discussion in Ch6 will explore the general question of whether possible c-space can be used as a 
means of determining emergent histories by examining whether such use is compatible with Barbour’s other 
ontological and metaphysics commitments. 
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In turn, he provides an interpretation of the WDE that mirrors his interpretation of 
TISE.  Again, c-space points are the fundamental components of his interpretation.  However, 
here, instead of being in terms of only medium-sized dry goods and their relative relations, c-
space points are supposed to be 3-geometries.  Moreover, he makes recourse to GR’s 
structured c-space consisting of the set of all possible 3-geometries, rather than QT’s heap of 
possibilities, and a heap of actualities such that the square of a solution to the WDE is the 
probability density for finding certain 3-geometries.  This density is likened to a mist that has 
different intensities over the structured possible c-space.  Like that of TISE, this density 
indicates the number of copies of a particular c-space point that there is in the heap of 
actualities.  In order to fulfil ONT, it was argued that the heap of actualities must exist and 
that the distribution given merely amounts to a static ratio that reflects that number of copies 
of a particular 3-geometry in the heap of actualities.   
Moreover, the heap of actualities does not have any particular successive relations 
among the 3-geometries in it.  Instead, the heap of actualized 3-geometries just statically 
exists with no sequential connections.  Due to the lack of such connections, Barbour attempts 
to explain our apparent experience of duration and motion as well as the fact that our 
apparent memories and present experience of artefacts, e.g., footprints in the snow, are 
indicative of there being a certain past series of c-space points.  To accomplish this, he uses 
time capsules, which are certain configurations of a c-space point that indicate an apparent 
past process occurred in accordance with certain laws.  These time capsules can be in the 
form of perceived artefacts as well as neural configurations.  Such instantaneous neural 
configurations, Barbour claims, encode ‘six or seven’ static stills that are given in an order.  
In accord with ONT, this order, rather than being indicative of a fundamental temporal 
succession, can be regarded as an ordering in terms of relative spatial relations along the lines 
of that involved in best-matching.  It is from our interpretation of these stills that we seem to 
experience a duration, rather than an instantaneous c-space point, and motion.  Additionally, 
he claims that such interpretation is also the origin of our concepts of temporal order and the 
arrow of time.  However, this setup and lack of connection among c-space points appears to 
entail a very restricted account of personal identity: there seems to be no trans-c-space-point 
notion of personal identity in the offing. 
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Nevertheless, given that ‘we’ ‘usually’ experience time capsules, Barbour feels 
obliged to provide some explanation in terms of indicating why the WDE’s probability 
density may be higher on c-space points with time capsules.  Making parallels with Mott’s 
solution, he speculatively reasons that the wavefunction is somehow ‘funnelled’ onto c-space 
points with time capsules because of the asymmetrical structured set of all possible c-space 
points.  However, though the construction of this space seems to be in accord with MP, the 
use of this supposedly representational space for this purpose may be in violation of ONT. 
 
 Now that we have all the components of Barbour’s account and have attempted to 
present them as parts of a single Machian network by highlighting and drawing out the 
primacy of his relationist principles in his GR, QT and QG in Chapters 2-5, let’s turn to 
applying the remaining stages of ACA to this network. 
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Chapter 6: The Application of ACA to Barbour’s Account 
 With Barbour’s accounts of GR, QT and QG at hand, we have completed ACA’s 
initial requirement of spelling out the theories involved.  Additionally, in the process we 
treated them as parts of a single Machian network by highlighting the manner in which his 
Machian principles are or can be fulfilled in each of the accounts.  Thus, we have treated 
them as part of a single network in accord with ACA.  However, as noted in Ch1’s 
presentation of ACA, even though we have treated the accounts as components of a single 
network, such components may initially lack connections among each other.  Yet, at least 
metaphysical connections may be developed over the course of subsequent analysis of the 
network.  Let’s turn to such analysis and, thus, the application of ACA’s other steps.   
Because this chapter is organized in terms of the steps of ACA proposed in Ch1, it is 
worthwhile summarizing all of its steps here and relating them to the content of this and 
previous chapters. 
According to ACA, we first obtain the theories that we are considering.  For folk 
theories, this is accomplished by using experiential and nonexperiential, i.e., a priori, 
intuitions about possible cases to construct a folk theory by means of armchair analysis.  For 
scientific theories, this is accomplished by reference to the theory’s interpretation, which is 
often largely given.  
Further, if more than one theory is being analysed, ACA dictates that they are to be 
treated as a single network.  The previous chapters have served to treat Barbour’s GR, QT 
and QG as parts of a single Machian network by utilizing his principles as the overarching 
criteria for their development.  Furthermore, over the course of presenting and discussing 
Barbour’s treatment of our experience of time in Ch5, a partial Machian folk theory of time 
emerged.  I describe it as ‘partial’ because our, following Barbour’s, focus in Ch5 was on 
reconciling some features of our temporal experience with his Machian QG interpretation, 
rather than on giving a comprehensive account of our experience of time.  In turn, I develop 
his folk QG account in the next section so that we may better explore the role of time in it and 
its compatibility with time in other parts of the network.  Additionally, it does not seem to be 
evident that Barbour is aware of the impact of his QG and ONT on personal identity.  In 
effect, the resulting features of his Machian folk time need to be integrated.  We turn to such 
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integration in this chapter by applying the remaining stages of ACA to time in his entire 
Machian network that resulted from the discussion in Chapters 2-5.  So, in this chapter we 
begin with the following stage of ACA. 
The next stage in ACA is the determination of what role time plays in the network.  
To do so, first initially identify time by appealing to what appears to be the temporal roles in 
the network.  In this preliminary identification of time, use the structure of the propositions 
made in the theories and/or the role that temporal variables play. 
In order to avoid the problem of naïve realism, we proceed to determine whether 
components of the role clash, are redundant or are irrelevant, with each other as well as with 
other concepts in the theory.  If the role exhibits no such conflicts, incoherency or 
redundancy, then we accept this role and identify it with time.  On the other hand, if the role 
exhibits such conflicts, incoherency or redundancy, then we must ‘engage in metaphysics’.  
Recall from Ch1 that Jackson characterized such metaphysics’ aim as the creation of a list of 
what there is that is coherent, complete and parsimonious. If the concept is completely 
redundant, then one can eliminate it from such a list relatively easily.  However, barring this 
result, ‘engaging in metaphysics’ involves either the construction of a coherent, relevant and 
non-redundant time or the reduction of its role to those played by other elements in the 
network.  Further note that in Ch1, other than stating that it may possibly involve re-
examining metaphysical assumptions and roles of other concepts in the theory, the exact 
nature of this engaging in metaphysics was left rather vague.  But, it is intended that such 
engagement can at least be exemplified in the application of these latter steps of ACA to 
Barbour’s network in this chapter.  
With our Machian network at hand, let’s proceed to apply the remaining steps of 
ACA.  First, we must determine what role time plays in this network.  To do so, we first 
initially identify it by appealing to its apparent role in propositions made in the network and 
the role of temporal variables.  This is accomplished in §1.  In §2, four main clashes are 
identified among the roles that time plays in the parts of the network.  Then in §3, I ‘engage 
in metaphysics’ in order to resolve two of these clashes.  These particular two clashes are 
selected due to their central role in Barbour’s account of QG and, thus, that feature in his 
solution of the problem of time.  Additionally, in the next chapter’s general discussion 
concerning ACA, I address the possible schematization of ‘engaging in metaphysics’ as well 
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as its scope in view of my attempt of resolving the two clashes.  Finally, in §4 I sum up the 
ramifications of our application of ACA to Barbour’s accounts and present the most 
promising ways of resolving these issues.  While this chapter focuses largely on the 
application of ACA to Barbour’s accounts, I discuss the applicability and extension of ACA 
to non-Barbouric accounts in the final chapter. 
1 The Initial Identification of Time in Barbour’s Network 
 Recall in Ch1 that I assumed that a concept can be complex.  A complex concept is 
composed of sets of features, and these features are themselves concepts.  Upon the 
examination of the Machian network, time in this network is such a complex concept: it can 
be broken down into four main subconcepts.  In effect, I have identified four main temporal 
roles that time plays in this network: the infinitesimal instant role, the static existence role, 
the arbitrary parameter role of the time variable and the derivate temporally ordered 
succession role.  Before explaining what these roles are, I, following Jackson’s above 
suggestion to create a list, present a table that specifies what plays each of these temporal 
roles in all parts of the Machian network.  In addition to illustrating the manner in which each 
part of the network exhibits these roles, this table serves the purpose of making salient 
conflicts, incoherencies and redundancies, of these roles across the network. 
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 Nonrelativistic 
Machian 
Dynamics 
Machian GR Machian QT Machian QG Machian Folk 
Theory 
(assuming QG) 
Infinitesimal 
Instant Role 
C-space points: 
instantaneous 
configurations of 
particles in the 
universe. 
C-space points: 
instantaneous 3-
geometries of 
the universe. 
C-space points: 
instantaneous 
configurations 
of all medium-
sized dry goods 
of the universe. 
C-space points: 
instantaneous 3-
geometries of 
the universe. 
Time capsules: 
instantaneous 
configurations 
that are 
indicative of 
there being past 
processes. 
Static 
Existence 
Role 
Best-matching c-
space points that 
are a solution to 
the BMP. 
Best-matching 
c-space points 
from a solution 
to the BSW and 
the best-
matching c-
space points of 
all foliations of 
the constructed 
space. 
The points in 
the heap of 
actualities, 
which are 
indicated by a 
squared solution 
to TISE. 
The points in 
the heap of 
actualities, 
which are 
indicated by a 
squared solution 
to the WDE. 
You at a c-space 
point, despite 
the appearance 
of motion, 
duration and a 
specious present 
with length. 
Arbitrary 
Parameter 
Role of the 
Time 
Variable 
A single 
monotonically 
increasing 
parameter that is 
applied to 
horizontally 
stacked best-
matching c-space 
points such that 
each c-space point 
is assigned a 
single value. 
In BSW: 
indicates 
instantaneous 
‘velocity’ of a 
3-geometry. 
In proper time: 
monotonically 
increasing 
parameter that is 
assigned to each 
set of equilocal 
points; each one 
does not 
necessarily 
register the 
same value. 
None. None. N/A 
Derivate 
Temporally 
Ordered 
Succession 
Role 
The values of the 
time parameter 
associated with 
the c-space points 
of a horizontal 
stack, which is 
ordered and 
successive in 
virtue of relative 
spatial relations. 
The values of a 
local time 
parameter 
associated with 
the equilocal 
points of a 
horizontal stack, 
which is ordered 
and successive 
in virtue of 
relative 
relations. 
No such role is 
recovered: there 
are no ordering 
or successive 
relations among 
c-space points 
generated by a 
solution to 
TISE.  
No such role is 
recovered: there 
are no ordering 
or successive 
relations among 
c-space points 
generated by a 
solution to the 
WDE. 
 
There is no such 
role: experience 
indicative of the 
role is only 
apparent via six 
neurally 
encoded ordered 
‘stills’. Plus, 
‘identity over 
time’ is 
restricted to one 
c-space pt. 
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 In order to explain the table, I explain each general role and make comments where 
necessary about the manner in which GR, QT and QG play the role.  Discussion of the 
manner in which the thing that plays a role in one column conflicts with that of another is 
provided in §2.  In contrast, §1.1 only serves to present the table and, thus, identify the 
surface roles of time across the network.   
However, in order to provide a fuller exposition of the folk column, it is also required 
that I spell out this section a bit more in §1.2.  Because I was more concerned in earlier 
chapters with presenting Barbour’s physical theories and pounding them into a single 
network that fulfils ONT and MP, I did not there develop Barbour’s folk account much.  So, 
before pointing out conflicts in the table in the next section, I develop his folk account by 
providing a few options for his account of our experience of time that are drawn from some 
categories presented by Dainton.  Note, however, in the remainder of §1 I only discuss 
options for Barbour’s account of our experience of motion at a single instant.  In §2 and §3, 
in which I point out a conflict that arises due to his QG’s lack of histories and our apparent 
experience, which seems to have a temporal extension much longer than that corresponding 
to 6-7 stills encoded in our instantaneous brain configuration at a single c-space point, I 
examine the plausibility of extending these options to the case in which our apparent 
lifetimes’ worth of experiences are limited to a single instant.   
So, in the remainder of §1, I first turn to commenting on each row of the table with 
respect to the non-folk columns.  Then, I present some options for specific claims in the folk 
column. 
1.1 The Roles and GR, QT and QG 
 The first role presented on the table is the infinitesimal instant role.  This role arises 
from Barbour’s characterization of c-space points as instantaneous ‘snap shots’ or ‘instants’ 
of the universe.  It seems that such snap shots must have only infinitesimal temporal length in 
the sense that they are presented as, e.g., hyperslices.
224
  Furthermore, because these c-space 
                                                 
224 However, one may argue that at least in QG, these ‘instants’ must be of Planck length because the canonical 
quantization procedure involves quantizing the 3-metric.  In effect, these ‘instantaneous’ 3-metrics actually have 
a length of around 10-43 seconds.  But, because Barbour does not make this suggestion and since this length is 
much too small to have an impact on our day-to-day experience, I follow Barbour in regarding these instants as 
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points play an ontologically basic role in his account, it seems that he accepts that time can 
refer to the temporal extension, even though infinitesimal, of these c-space points.  
Additionally, given his commitment to c-space points as only having such infinitesimal 
temporal extension, it appears that a time capsule must also only have infinitesimal temporal 
extension.  We’ll return to discussing whether this depiction of time capsules is problematic 
for Barbour’s folk theory in the next main section. 
 The second role is that of static existence.  If something plays the role of static 
existence, then all of it co-exists and it does not undergo temporal becoming.  To elucidate 
this role, consider a comparison with B-theory and A-theory.  According to A-theory, there is 
an objective temporal becoming.  B-theory, on the other hand, involves a denial of this claim.  
In effect, an example of a B-theory model is a 4-d block universe that exists in its entirety 
without involving temporal becoming.  Because it does not undergo temporal becoming and 
all co-exists, the B-theorist’s block universe provides an example of something that may play 
the role of static existence.  So, static existence amounts to all of something or some group of 
things co-existing without there being any objective temporal becoming or passage.  
However, I must highlight that the block universe is merely an example of something that 
may play this role.  The A-theory/B-theory debate usually presupposes that there is an 
ordered sequence at some level, e.g., the events of a statically existing block are sequentially 
ordered within the block.  Since it seems that Barbour’s heaps of actualities exist in a static 
fashion, i.e., the points in the heap co-exist and do not undergo temporal becoming, yet they 
lack a sequential order, I have formulated the static existence role such that it clearly does not 
entail or presuppose that the parts of a thing playing that role are in an ordered sequence.
225
  
                                                                                                                                                        
infinitesimal; whether they have a Planck length does not impact my discussion regarding our experience of 
time. 
225 There are some explicit definitions very similar to the content of the static existence role made in the context 
of the presentism debate, e.g., Hestevold and Carter’s 2002 ‘static time’, Zimmerman’s 1996 ontological 
characterization of this debate.  However, I have not made use of these definitions above because they, in 
addition to presupposing that there is a temporal sequence of events, involve claims about the manner in which 
objects exist over time as well as claims about the ‘realness’ of objects that do not presently exist, i.e., 
presentism can be formulated as holding claim that only present objects exist and are real and all non-present 
objects are unreal in some sense.  Thus, I am using the above definition rather than similar definitions that 
appear in the presentism literature because I do not want to build these further presuppositions into the role or 
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In addition to the block universe’s sequential order not being entailed by the static existence 
role, a feature of the manner in which the block universe’s slices co-exist is also not entailed 
by the static existence role.  It is usually presupposed by block universe advocates that such 
slices co-exist such that they do not overlap, i.e., there are not multiple time-slices 
superimposed at a particular slice of the block.  However, as I delineate the static existence 
role, the role does not prohibit the overlapping of the components of something playing the 
role; the static existence role is silent as to whether there can be such relations among these 
components.  The upshot of this discussion for something that plays the static existence role 
is that any components of such a thing must all exist statically, i.e., there is no objective 
temporal becoming, its components do not necessarily come in a sequential order and its 
components are not precluded from overlapping in some sense.  Thus, the essential feature of 
the static existence role is its static nature, rather than it involving any sort of ordering or 
exclusivity relations. 
Additionally, note that I have included ‘you at a particular c-space point’ as 
something that plays the static existence role under the Folk Theory column.  Because, as was 
discussed in the previous chapter, it seems that personal identity for Barbour does not extend 
beyond a single c-space point, the you at a particular point must completely exist within that 
point.  Moreover, because a c-space point itself is static and instantaneous, it does not seem 
that there can be any fundamental temporal becoming that occurs in a point.  Thus, the you in 
a point statically exists: all of you co-exists in a c-space point and cannot undergo temporal 
becoming.  However, note that this classification of ‘you at a particular c-space point’ as 
something with static existence relies on the claims that no history(s) is recoverable in QG 
and that personal identity is restricted to a single c-space point.  In §3 below I discuss 
whether such claims are modifiable in QG and, thus, whether this classification is required.   
 The third role on the table is the arbitrary parameter role of the time variable.  This 
comes from our surface reading of the equations.  In order to be thorough, I have included the 
time parameter that appears in the relativistic BSW as well as the arbitrary time parameters 
that Barbour creates in the process of vertical stacking: the global monotonically increasing 
                                                                                                                                                        
make some sort of contrast with the contentious sense of ‘unreal’ that enters into the debate.  See Dorato 2006a 
and 2006b for recent discussion of possible senses for ‘real’ as well as the role of ‘existence’ in this debate.  
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time parameter assigned to a nonrelativistic horizontal stack as well as the local time 
parameter assigned to local lapses in GR have been included.  Moreover, TISE and WDE do 
not have an explicit time parameter and since Barbour does not attempt to recover one, they 
are listed as having nothing that plays this role. 
 The final role listed is that of the derivative temporally ordered succession.  Because 
Barbour must fulfil ONT, all ordered successions must be, at base, in terms of stuff and their 
relative instantaneous spatial relations.  However, in the cases of nonrelativistic dynamics and 
GR, Barbour offers what can be considered a means of recovering a temporally ordered 
succession from the spatially ordered successions generated by best-matching.  In these cases, 
an ordered sequence in virtue of spatial relations is obtained via a horizontal stacking of the 
c-space points.  Then, an arbitrary time parameter is assigned to all, i.e., to each c-space point 
in the nonrelativistic stack, or part, i.e., to each path among equilocal manifold points, of the 
stack.  In effect, we can recover something that looks like a temporally ordered succession.  
However, time in this sense is only derivative from the spatially ordered sequences created by 
best-matching.  Thus, there is this derivative temporally ordered succession role in his 
nonrelativistic dynamics and GR that is played by an arbitrary parameter assigned to 
horizontal stacks. 
 In QT and QG as presented in Chapters 4-5, however, there is nothing that plays this 
role.
226
  Their respective equations only indicate that there exist a certain number of copies of 
a particular c-space point.  As discussed in the previous chapter, it, in effect, does not seem as 
though TISE allows us to stack the heaps in an ordered succession in virtue of instantaneous 
relative spatial relations alone; such heaps have copies and, given PSR, we cannot choose 
which copy of a c-space point to put in a particular stack because there is no reason to choose 
including that copy rather than another.  Without such a stack, it does not seem that we can 
obtain a derivative temporally ordered succession that is in accord with ONT.  In effect, this 
                                                 
226 Though I’ve largely argued that this claim seems to follow from his principles and interpretation of the 
WDE, for evidence of Barbour’s explicit support of this claim, see, e.g., his (1999, 302) in which he sums up his 
view, though using metaphors, and thus asserts that there is no ‘thread’ connecting points of possible c-space.  
Moreover, whether a history or histories are recoverable at some level in QG given ONT is discussed in §3 
below. 
204 
 
subconcept cannot have a referent in QT and QG: only heaps of c-space points exist, and 
there are no relations among the c-space points.  Compare this lack of referent with the 
manner in which this role is played in GR.  In GR, one can regard this subconcept as having a 
referent, namely the successive order that is generated by best-matching.  Though, note that 
such a referent does not violate ONT.  Here the derivative temporally ordered succession just 
refers to an ordered succession that is generated from stuff and their relative relations alone. 
 We can further stipulate that there is not intended to be a referent for derivative 
temporally ordered succession in the context of QG.  This is due to the fact that Barbour feels 
the need to provide a means of explaining the origin of this concept.  Recall that he does so 
via speculating that the asymmetrical structure of the space of the set of possible c-space 
points ‘funnels’ the wavefunction onto points that contain time capsules.  In effect, he is 
using this asymmetry to explain the appearance of derivative temporally ordered succession, 
rather than attempting to reduce it to spatially derived relations among c-space points. 
 However, one may object to this depiction of this concept in QG.  One may claim that 
Barbour does in fact have a referent for derivative temporally ordered succession: the relative 
configurations within a c-space that are time capsules.  In a time capsule, there are certain 
static relative relations among stuff such that there seems to be a temporally ordered 
succession.  For example, recall Barbour’s explanation of our apparent motion.  In that case, 
a configuration in our brain corresponds to six or seven ordered stills such that there appears 
to be a temporally ordered succession.  However, this succession can be said to be derivative 
from the instantaneous configuration of our brain.  In effect and contra the table’s Folk 
Theory diagnosis of this role, time capsules can be regarded as the referent for derivative 
temporally ordered succession. 
 I reply to this objection on the grounds that it conflates derivative temporally ordered 
succession with the appearance of derivative temporally ordered succession.  In GR, there is 
a set of stackable c-space points from which there is a spatial ordered succession.  In this 
context time can refer to this spatial ordered succession.  Yet, in a c-space point there is only 
a bunch of stuff and their instantaneous relative relations.  I accept that time capsules are part 
of this set of instantaneous relative relations, but such time capsules merely give rise to the 
appearance of a temporally ordered succession.  This apparent temporally ordered succession, 
e.g., a set of footprints indicative a person walking there in the past, the movement of an 
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apple rolling off a table, does not correspond to there actually being a certain set of past 
events or to a series of events that seems to be contained in a specious present.  Instead, in 
terms of the example, there is only the apple near the edge of the table and a perceiver with a 
certain brain configuration in the c-space point.  In effect, the apparent derivative temporally 
ordered succession of the trajectory of the apple does not have a series of spatial ordered 
successive c-space points that serves as its reference.  Rather, the time capsule serves as a 
means of eliminating a reference, i.e., there being a certain spatially ordered succession, that 
would correspond to such an apparent derivative temporally ordered succession.   
 Thus, there is not intended to be a referent for derivative temporally ordered 
succession in the context of QG.  In the next section, we’ll discuss the manner in which QG’s 
lack of such a referent conflicts with the referent that QT has for this concept.   
1.2 Options for QG’s Folk Theory 
In Ch5, Barbour gave an account of our experience such that he was able to explain 
away the appearance of motion and of there being a prior sequence of events given certain 
configurations in a single c-space point.  Recall that to do so, he claimed that there are 
instantaneous configurations that contain certain structures that appear to indicate that there 
was a past, e.g., footprints in the snow, as well as instantaneous neural structures that 
‘encode’ one’s apparent experience of certain processes with a temporal duration, e.g., the 
motion of a bird in flight.  Such configurations were termed ‘time capsules’.  Regarding the 
case of motion, Barbour claims that our seeing a bird in flight can be explained in terms of 
six or seven static stills that are encoded in our neural configuration at an instant.  In effect, 
he offers some means of explaining the appearance of a specious present, i.e., the experiential 
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or phenomenological present which seems to span a temporal interval
227
, given that we are 
limited to a single brain configuration at a single c-space point.  However, he offers no 
account of why we seem to experience a single and apparently linear sequence of events that 
extends well beyond what is contained in six or seven stills.  As I point out in the next 
section, because histories do not seem to be recoverable, it seems that he must offer some 
explanation of our linear and temporal experience that appears to extend beyond a single 
specious present.  Though I discuss some means by which Barbour may offer such an 
explanation in §3, I here focus only on presenting options by which his account of the 
specious present may be cashed out.  In effect, I here elaborate on some options for 
developing a folk theory that incorporates Barbour’s explicit claims about our experience of 
time, which is summarized by the first role on the table and the first statement of the fourth 
role under the folk column. 
Barbour’s account of our experience of the specious present requires that there only 
exist the stuff and relations in a single instantaneous c-space point.  And, given ONT, no 
fundamental temporal relations can be introduced.  There are two views in the literature that 
may meet these requirements.  The first of these, retentionism, seems to be in line with ONT 
and the use of an instantaneous configuration from which one may generate the appearance of 
time without introducing fundamental temporal relations.  The second option, a psycho-
physical dualism, however, involves a dualism between physical and mental properties.  If 
the stuff of ONT does not preclude mental properties, then Barbour can make recourse to it.  
We’ll assume for the sake of discussion that ONT alone does not rule out the existence of 
such properties, though note that this may be contentious given Barbour’s claim that such 
                                                 
227 It may be helpful to follow Dainton’s 2010 echoing of William James and contrast the specious present, 
which seems to have a brief duration such as to accommodate the change and persistence apparent in our 
immediate experience, e.g., the motion of an apple plummeting off the edge of a table, with what he terms ‘the 
strict or mathematical present’, which can be exemplified by one of Barbour’s instantaneous c-space points.  As 
is well known, James develops this notion of the specious present, but it is contentious as to how exactly it 
should be interpreted: for discussion see Grush 2008, Le Poidevin 2007, 2009, Dainton 2011.  Nevertheless, the 
above characterization of it should be sufficient for our purposes of developing and examining Barbour’s 
account of it. 
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stuff is ‘perceived variety’.  I next present each of these views and highlight the manner in 
which they lack fundamental temporal relations. 
1.2.1 Option 1: The Retentional Model 
The retentional model
228
 of the specious present seems to fit with Barbour’s account 
of our experience at a c-space point.  In the retentional model, a specious present is not 
actually extended over time.  Instead, it involves some momentary states of consciousness 
that only appear to be spread over time.  In terms of Barbour’s suggestion, these ‘momentary 
states of consciousness’ may be put in terms of, e.g., the six or seven snapshots or stills that 
are encoded in our instantaneous brain configuration.  In effect, the Barbouric retentional 
model posits that the motion that one seems to see in a particular c-space point is merely 
apparent and is a product of six or seven snapshots encoded in one’s brain.  These snapshots 
occur simultaneously at that c-space point and, thus, only seem to be successive.
229
  Given 
this characterization, the retentional model seems to be in line with ONT.  No fundamental 
temporal relations have been introduced: the encoded snapshots all exist simultaneously and, 
in effect, do not require there to be a temporal interval corresponding to the apparent duration 
of the specious present.  Moreover, the model is only fundamentally in terms of the stuff and 
instantaneous relative relations: it provides an account of the specious present given the 
configurations in a single c-space point using Barbour’s suggestion that one’s experience 
motion of in a c-space point corresponds to six or seven stills encoded by an instantaneous 
neural configuration.  
Contrast this model with the two other main models of the specious present
230
: the 
cinematic model
231
 and the extensional model
232
. According to the cinematic model, the 
                                                 
228 For support of the retentional model see Broad 1938, Grush 2005, and for criticism see Dainton 2000, 2003. 
229 However, as Dainton (2011, 395) points out, the retentionist must provide some means of addressing this 
issue of how such a set of simultaneously occurring states is experienced as successive rather than as 
simultaneous.  I consider such a mechanism at the end of this subsection and examine whether it may be used in 
the Machian QG context. 
230 These categories and the manner in which I have defined them above are delineated by Dainton 2010, 2011. 
231 For discussion of the cinematic model, see Le Poidevin 2007. 
208 
 
momentary experienced contents are momentary and static, e.g., one’s immediate experience 
of an apple ¾ off the edge of a table in a c-space point consists of only the single snapshot of 
the apple in this position.  In effect, one’s momentary experience contains no perceived 
motion.  In contrast, the retentionist model claims that the content of one’s momentary 
experience does have a perceived temporal extension and, in effect, there can be apparent 
motion.  This contrast highlights the relation of apparent motion with a single instant in the 
retentional model as well as the content that is included in one’s experience in an instant, i.e., 
one experiences a number of stills, rather than only one.  Now, consider the extensional 
model.  According to the extensional model, the specious present is actually temporally 
extended.  So, unlike the retentional model in which the contents of a specious present all 
occur simultaneously, the extensional model posits that the contents of a specious present 
actually occur over time. 
In view of these key characteristic differences among these models, neither of these 
latter two models can be used on Barbour’s account due to the lack of there being a derivative 
temporally ordered succession in QG and his ensuing characterization of one’s experience of 
motion at a c-space point in terms of one experiencing six or seven stills encoded in one’s 
instantaneous neural configuration.  Barbour, in effect, requires a view in which, unlike the 
cinematic model, there is apparent motion at a moment that can be put in terms of there being 
six or seven snapshots experienced at the instant, and, unlike the extensional model, does not 
presuppose that there is a temporal, ordered sequence of events.   
Because the cinematic model presumes that one experiences a single, static, punctuate 
event at each moment, it rules out the possibility of having an experience of, e.g., motion via 
one experiencing a number of snapshots, if one can only experience a single snapshot.  Thus, 
Barbour cannot make use of this model in order to explain our apparent experience of motion 
at a single c-space point: Barbour requires that we experience a series of snapshots at an 
instant, while the cinematic model claims that one only experience a single snapshot.
233
   
                                                                                                                                                        
232 For advocates of the extensional model see Dainton 2000, 2003, and for criticism see Gallagher 2003. 
233 However, it may be possible to use some form of the cinematic model even in the case in which there is no 
linear sequence of c-space points, provided that we ignore Barbour’s claim that we seem to experience motion 
due to six or seven stills that are neurally encoded at a single c-space point.  For example, Koch 2004 argues that 
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Moreover, the extensional model’s extensional specious present, which has actual 
temporal extension, is usually depicted as being extended over many actual instants.  
Barbour, however, must explain our apparent experience of motion at a single c-space point 
using only the configurations in that point because there are not necessarily linear sequential 
histories in QG: ‘you’- assuming, as Barbour does, that there can be some sort of personal 
identity over time that is not limited to an instant- ‘were’ not necessarily in the c-space points 
that correspond to the sequence of configurations that you seem to experience, e.g., those in 
which someone was recently walking through the snow or those in which an apple neared the 
edge of a table.  So, because his account of the specious present must be limited to a single c-
space point and must neither introduce any fundamental temporal relations nor presuppose 
that there are sequential, linear histories, it does not seem that he can use the extensional 
model either.  
Before moving onto the second option for cashing out Barbour’s claims about our 
experience of time, it is necessary to present the retentional model in more detail and to 
mention a dominant mechanism that retentionists use in order to address the issue of how a 
set of simultaneously occurring states is experienced as successive rather than as 
simultaneous.  The purpose of this is to evaluate its plausibility in the context of Machian 
QG. 
Dainton (2010) characterizes the basics of the relational model as follows.  According 
to this model, the specious present consists of a momentary phase of perceptual experience 
and a sequence of retentions of recent experiences.  These retentions are a type of past-
directed mental representations that are automatically and involuntarily triggered after each 
momentary phase of experiencing.  The retentions and perceptual experience all exist 
simultaneously and are co-conscious. 
                                                                                                                                                        
our experience of a single snapshot, though motionless strictly speaking, can suggest motion, e.g., a static 
snapshot of an apple ¾ off the edge of a table has motion ‘painted onto’ the snapshot.  Yet, because I here aim 
to provide options for Barbour’s explicit claims about our temporal experience, e.g., it is the result of six or 
seven neutrally encoded stills at a c-space point, as well as keep this discussion relatively manageable by only 
examining in detail the options that reflect such claims, I bracket off such developments of this option. 
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This setup can easily be assimilated into Barbour’s picture.  Consider a single c-space 
point in which you seem to be experiencing the motion of an apple falling off a table.  The 
retentionist’s momentary phase of perceptual experience can be exemplified in this case by 
the content of a perceived snapshot in which the apple just fell of the table.  The set of 
retentions are the snapshots, six or seven, of the apple on its way to the edge of the table.  
Because all of the snapshots are encoded in an instantaneous brain configuration, are all 
experienced simultaneously and have no significant temporal duration, no irreducible 
temporal relations are tacked onto the c-space point.  Moreover, note that though Dainton’s 
characterization presupposes that there was a past, e.g., the retentions are said to be a 
sequence of recent experiences, which conflicts with QG’s lack of commitment to such a past 
linear sequence of events, this characterization can be easily modified.  On Barbour’s 
account, all of these snapshots are encoded in a single instantaneous neural configuration.  
So, the entire retentionist structure should be regarded as being given to one in a particular 
instant and, thus, not necessarily dependent upon there being an actual past that one has 
experienced. 
Given that we, strictly speaking, experience all of these snapshots simultaneously, 
how, then, do we seem to experience successions that appear to have some duration?  In 
terms of Barbouric retentionism, why do we seem to experience a series of snapshots, rather 
than have an odd instantaneous experience of seven superimposed snapshots?  According to 
Dainton (2011, 400-1), the dominant mechanism that retentionists use to explain the 
appearance of such succession is a notion of presence.  Unlike memories, retentions are 
regarded as having a greater presence.  All retentions have presence, but they may have it to 
different degrees.  In effect, one of the retentions in a single specious present appears to be, 
e.g., fully present, while another of its retentions appears to be slightly-in-the-past.  It is 
because of these different degrees of presence of the components of a retentional specious 
present that the simultaneous contents of an instantaneous specious present appear to have a 
sequence and seem to be temporally extended.  Thus, the retentionist may claim that their 
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specious present, though actually an instantaneous set of retentions, appears to one as having 
a temporally extended succession.
234
 
Can Barbour incorporate this mechanism without importing fundamental temporal 
relations?  It seems that he may do so as follows.  One’s instantaneous brain state could also 
somehow encode a different degree of presentness for each snapshot perhaps in terms of the 
manner in which one experiences the snapshot.  Though I am admittedly leaving to exactly 
what this presentness amounts vague, as long as presentness can come in degrees and is 
something encoded by an instantaneous neural configuration, it seems to be in accord with 
Barbour’s claims about temporal experience.   
Further, to avoid a notion of presentness that imports some fundamental temporal 
relation, the variation of this degree could be a function of the best-matching-like stacking of 
the snapshots encoded by a neural time capsule.  Recall that Barbour claims that these 
snapshots are given in a certain order.  In effect, we can regard it as part of a neural time 
capsule’s definition that such given order involves a sequential range of temporal modes that 
corresponds to the best-matching-like order of the snapshots as follows: in a neural time 
capsule, a snapshot’s degree of presentness corresponds to its appearance in a sort of 
horizontal stack of such snapshots.  In a similar fashion to the nonrelativistic best-matching 
of c-space points, it seems that a set of snap shots can be ordered in virtue of their relative 
spatial relations such as to appear to form a horizontal stack.  Thus, the location of a snapshot 
in this stack can be regarded as indicating the degree of presentness that it is assigned.  In 
effect, we do not need to make reference to or introduce a fundamental temporal order in the 
characterization of time capsules when Barbour’s experiential claims are put in terms of the 
retentional model: ONT can be upheld because presentness need not be some fundamental 
temporal property.  Moreover, because these simultaneous snapshots are given to us by the 
                                                 
234 While this mechanism is certainly not without its critics, I here want to focus on whether this mechanism can 
be incorporated in Barbour’s account, rather than contribute to this general debate directly.  For a 
comprehensive overview of this mechanism, criticisms of it and alternative mechanisms, see Dainton 2000, 
2003, 2010.  Additionally, for defence of retentionism and a development of it that incorporates 
neurophysiological features, see Grush 2005, 2007, 2008. 
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neural configuration in a single c-space point, no actual history corresponding to this set of 
snapshots is required.   
 Thus, the retentional model and the above mechanism seem to offer a means of 
developing Barbour’s claims about our experience in the context of Machian QG. 
1.2.2 Option 2: Psycho-Physical Dualism 
 Though this option might already strike one as unpalatable due to its commitment to 
irreducible nonphysical mental properties
235
, it is worth exploring for two reasons.  First, it 
can be developed along Barbouric lines, provided that ONT does not rule it out by limiting 
our ontology to stuff with physical properties, such as to offer a partial reply to Dainton’s 
criticism of it.  Second, as we’ll see below, it may offer some means of dealing with a 
conflict that arises in the case in which one is completely confined to a single c-space point 
yet one seems to have temporal experiences that extend far beyond the content of a single 
specious present.  Though this view is extended below to deal with this issue, I here only 
present the view for a single specious present generally, cast it in terms of Barbour’s account 
such that it does not introduce fundamental temporal relations and then reply to Dainton’s 
criticisms of this view.  
 In the context of presenting some options by which the block theorist, who assumes 
that time does not actually pass, may explain our immediate experience of temporal 
becoming, Dainton (2011, 288-9) discusses a dualistic option that may also be used by 
Barbour provided that the mere existence of mental properties does not violate ONT.  This 
option aims to offer an account of why one seems to move through time along a block 
universe by claiming that the mental properties are ‘housed in’ an additional temporal 
dimension.  Such an additional temporal dimension is required in order to make sense of the 
claim that Dainton dubs ‘Exclusion’: Our experiences are dynamic in a way the Block 
universe isn’t, but our experiences are not part of the Block universe.  Dainton attributes it to 
a suggestion made by Weyl, points out that it is a radical position and quickly rejects it after 
considering a few objections to it.  So, he gives the following sketch of it, which should be 
sufficient for our purposes.  The additional temporal dimension, i.e., meta-time, is along the 
                                                 
235 See Chalmers 1996 and Jackson 1982 for prominent defences of property dualism.   
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set of one’s conscious states.  However, assuming that the block constitutes the entirety of the 
physical universe, these conscious states must be nonphysical.  Thus, this account 
presupposes dualism, but it may be cashed out in terms of that between physical properties 
and mental properties, e.g., being in a particular conscious state.  In effect, meta-time is along 
a series of conscious states and is supposed to somehow offer an explanation of our 
experience of temporal becoming if in a block universe. 
 Dainton (2011, 389), however, rejects this psycho-physical dualism as a means for the 
block theorist to explain our experience of becoming because of the nature of its meta-time, 
i.e., the additional temporal dimension that he describes as ‘housing’ the nonphysical entities.  
He poses the question: What sort of time is the proposed meta-time?  He argues that if this 
meta-time parallels that of the block universe, i.e., it is non-dynamic and involves no 
objective becoming, then the meta-time offers no explanatory gain: it does not explain our 
experience of temporal becoming.  So, he claims, to do this explanatory work, this meta-time 
must be some sort of dynamic temporal dimension that involves objective becoming.  
However, he rightly points out that a block theorist would not accept this sort of meta-time.  
 This criticism seems reasonable if such a dualism is appended to a block universe.  
Yet, if this dualism is developed for Barbour’s folk theory, it can provide some explanatory 
power in the context of QG.  To support this claim, I first develop it for Barbour’s folk 
theory.  Then, I return to Dainton’s critique of its role in the block universe and see the extent 
to which a Barbouric psycho-physical dualism can overcome this objection. 
 To generate a Barbouric version of this account, let’s attempt to add irreducible 
mental properties such that the rest of his QG account is left largely unchanged.  With this 
aim in mind, it seems that the mental properties must supervene upon an instantaneous brain 
configuration.  Thus, in accord with Barbour’s somewhat vague claims about our temporal 
experience in terms of being ‘encoded’ somehow in our brain states, we can establish a 
relation between an instantaneous neural configuration and the ‘encoded’ snapshots, where 
the latter are in terms of mental properties.   
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 Plus, given our aim of preserving Barbour’s dynamics as they are, these mental 
properties are best regarded as purely epiphenomenal
236
: they do not have any causal 
influence on other mental properties or on physical properties, but merely arise from a certain 
instantaneous neural configuration.  My reasoning behind this claim is as follows.  If mental 
properties do not have any causal influence on physical stuff, then Barbour can seem to 
maintain his focus on giving an account of dynamics in terms of the relative instantaneous 
relations among stuff, where ‘stuff’ refers to only physical properties, e.g., point particles, or 
mathematical entities, e.g., manifold points.  So, he does not need to add some ‘dynamics’ of 
nonphysical properties in his account because they do not bear causal relations to each other 
or such stuff.  Moreover, one may argue that because he requires some explanation of our 
apparently temporally extended experience, he can make use of epiphenomenal mental 
properties that supervene upon an instantaneous brain configuration.  So, by introducing such 
properties, he may provide an explanation of our apparently temporally extended experience; 
however, he does not have to integrate them into the rest of his dynamics.    
 Furthermore, one way of cashing out these mental properties is in terms of Barbour’s 
suggestion that the appearance of motion corresponds to six or seven snapshots.  Perhaps the 
following set of mental properties supervenes on a particular instantaneous neural state: 
perceptually experiencing snapshot1, perceptually experiencing snapshot2,…, perceptually 
experiencing snapshot7.  To ensure that a mental property does not have temporal extension, 
we may further suppose that each such mental state is instantaneous and has no duration 
strictly speaking. 
 We do not want to introduce some sort of irreducible meta-time among this set of 
mental properties, however, because ONT would be violated.  Instead, our meta-time must be 
reducible to instantaneous relative relations among stuff.  To do so, we can use the spirit of 
the best-matching procedure as follows.  A set of mental properties can be regarded as 
something like a horizontal stack: it has a sequence that is ordered in terms of relative 
instantaneous relations among the content of the snapshots.  With this sketch, no fundamental 
temporal relation is introduced among the mental properties that supervene upon an 
instantaneous neural configuration.  Instead, it may be regarded as derivative from an 
                                                 
236 See Jackson 1982, 1986 for support, and see, e.g., Nagasawa 2009 for criticism of epiphenomenalism. 
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ordering of the set of supervening mental properties that is in virtue of the relative relations of 
the stuff in the corresponding snapshots, much like the manner in which horizontally stacked 
c-spaced points provides a derivative temporal order in nonrelativistic dynamics.  Though 
this application of something akin to horizontal stacking to nonphysical properties may strike 
one as ghastly, I should emphasise here that such potentially nonspatial properties need not 
actually form horizontal stacks.  Rather, what is essential is that such properties may have 
some sort of experienced ordering, but this ordering is fundamentally in virtue of the relative 
spatial relations among their content, rather than a fundamental irreducible temporal relation.  
Moreover, because Barbour claims that such snapshots are given to us as ordered in time 
capsules, note that we are not required to do any active ‘stacking’ of these snapshots. Instead, 
we just experience them.  Such a lack of active stacking is in accord with the above claim that 
mental properties are purely epiphenomenal. 
 With this sketch of Barbouric psycho-physical dualism, let’s return to Dainton’s 
criticism above.  I grant that, if such a reducible meta-time is appended to Barbour’s 
instantaneous neural configurations, it does not offer a means of accounting for our 
experience of temporal becoming without itself involving objective becoming.  The addition 
of such an irreducible temporal property would be in violation of ONT.  However, as 
presented above, this meta-time can be developed in line with ONT: meta-time is derivative 
from instantaneous relative relations among the contents of snaphots.   Thus, as derivative 
from apparent spatial relations, it does not introduce some irreducible temporal relation and, 
thus, does not violate ONT in this sense.  
 Additionally, meta-time can do some explanatory work in the context of QG.  
Because there is only a possibly non-stackable heap of c-space points according to QG, there 
is no derivative time that arises as in, e.g., GR, via horizontal stacks of c-space points.  
Compare this with Dainton’s depiction of the block theorist.  If the block theorist’s meta-time 
is static and involves no becoming, it seems to be the same as the time of the block itself.  
Thus, the meta-time is redundant and effectively offers no additional explanatory power.  In 
contrast, the QG heap picture lacks derivative time, i.e., that from a stack of c-space points.  
In effect, meta-time in this context at least offers some explanation of our apparent 
temporally extended experience at a c-space point in the heap.  So, at least in the context of 
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QG, we can answer Dainton’s question regarding what sort of time meta-time is such that 
ONT is upheld and that this meta-time is not explanatorily redundant. 
 Thus, psycho-physical dualism may offer another option for Barbour’s folk theory 
provided that the existence of mental properties isn’t ruled out by ONT and that stacking 
analogues can be articulated in terms of such properties.  Plus, in order to have some 
explanatory power that does not violate ONT, it seems that these properties must be 
completely epiphenomenal, supervene upon instantaneous neural configurations and may 
exhibit reducible temporal relations.  So, this option comes with some cumbersome and 
contentious metaphysical baggage, but it appears to provide a coherent option that is free 
from irreducible temporal relations and preserves his interpretation of WDE. 
 Now that we have our initial identification of the role of time in the Machian network 
as well as some development of the folk part of the Machian network via two ways of 
cashing out Barbour’s comments regarding our apparently temporally extended experience at 
an instant, we can move to the next stage in ACA in which we identify conflicts across the 
network. 
2 The Conflicts, Incoherencies and Redundancies of the Temporal Roles 
 ACA dictates that after the initial identification of the temporal roles in a network, we 
proceed to identify clashes in the roles across the table.  Recall from Ch1 that the reason for 
this move is to be able to identify time in a fashion that does not saddle us with naïve realism 
from a mere surface reading of a theory.  So, from the above identification of time in the 
Machian network, we must proceed to examine these preliminary roles, identify clashes 
among them and attempt to resolve them in the context of this network. 
 There are four clashes in the table that I highlight here, the latter two of which will be 
discussed in the next section in which I ‘engage in metaphysics’ in an attempt to resolve 
them.  
2.1 Clash 1: Time in GR and Nonrelativistic Dynamics 
 Note that there is a clash between what plays the arbitrary parameter roles in 
nonrelativistic dynamics and GR.  In the nonrelativistic column, time is depicted as being a 
single parameter that is applied to an entire stack such that each c-space point in the stack is 
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assigned a single value.  Yet, time as the role of GR’s proper time is regarded as being a 
multitude of parameters.  Each is assigned to a different set of equilocal points, rather than 
entire c-space points.  Moreover, the parameters will not necessarily have the same 
increments because the ‘strut length’ or local lapses to which they are assigned are a function 
of the particular geometry. Thus, it seems that there is a conflict between what plays the 
parameter role of the time variable in the respective dynamics.  However, this clash is to be 
expected given the different roles of time in GR and nonrelativistic dynamics as it is 
standardly depicted, which was discussed in Ch3.  Moreover, as my focus here is to examine 
the manner in which Barbour resolves the problem of time in QG, I am bracketing off this 
clash and do not attempt to resolve it below.  Additionally, I henceforth do not refer to the 
nonrelativistic column given this focus. 
2.2 Clash 2: Infinitesimal Instants and Experience 
 Let’s examine the infinitesimal instant role row.  The things that play the infinitesimal 
instant role in each of his non-folk accounts appear to have no apparent conflicts.  Because he 
put QT’s c-space points in terms of relations among medium-sized dry goods, e.g., the 
relation of a pointer on a measuring device allows such relations to be assimilated into the 
QG c-space points of 3-geometries relatively easily.  To do so, we can add matter fields, 
which would be indicative of such classical relations, to Barbour’s pure 3-geometries.  
Pooley (2001) presents the manner in which such fields could be assimilated into an account 
such as Barbour’s in a fashion that does not violate MP.  Such a field, he claims, can be 
characterized in terms of the relative dispositions of the field intensities, e.g., by the infinite 
number of facts about the relative distances and angles between particular values of a scalar 
field.  So, at least prima facie, it seems that relative relations of the field can serve as a means 
of cashing out the content of QT c-space points in terms of 3-geometries such that MP is not 
violated.  Yet, I do not intend here to present exactly the manner in which this proposal may 
be developed because I want to focus on the issue that the role of the infinitesimal instant for 
the Folk Theory column. 
 Given the depiction of c-space points in GR and QG as only having such infinitesimal 
temporal extension, it seems that a time capsule must also only have infinitesimal temporal 
extension.  Plus, a time capsule, a part or all of a single QG c-space point, has no horizontal 
stack in QG.  As presented above and as was presumed in the presentation of folk options, 
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QG’s c-space points are not necessarily stackable.  Thus, given the manner in which c-space 
points feature in QG’s infinitesimal instant role and QG’s lack of a derivative temporally 
ordered succession role, it seems that time capsules must also have infinitesimal temporal 
length yet not necessarily have other c-space points ‘preceding’ it in a stack.  Assuming that 
such infinitesimal temporal length is compatible with the actual instantaneous nature of time 
capsules discussed in the folk options above, then this resulting characterization of c-space 
points does not clearly present a clash.  By referring to his neural time capsules, Barbour can 
claim that the configurations in our brain in this infinitesimal instant correspond to those in 
which one is actually recognizing the content of the snapshot.  In effect, this content is, so to 
speak, given to one at an infinitesimal instant. 
 However, this resulting characterization of time capsules has a potentially unpalatable 
implication.  It seems that, e.g., having a perceptual experience of something, is a temporally 
extended causal process: it takes time for signals produced in one’s eye to reach one’s brain 
and for one’s brain to process such signals and produce the appropriate perceptual 
experience.  In making reference to psychophysical data, Dainton (2010) states that this 
process can take from 60ms to 500ms.  However, given the implications of the chart for time 
capsules, a time capsule is of infinitesimal temporal length.  No such temporally extended 
process can take place within a time capsule.  Moreover, because there is not some stack of c-
space points leading up to a particular c-space point with a certain time capsule, one cannot 
assert that the causal process is a product of prior time capsules.  Instead, one can only make 
recourse to the instantaneous relative spatial relations among the stuff in a single c-space 
point.  In effect, it seems that Barbour may maintain that one’s experiential perception is 
correlated with a particular instantaneous brain configuration; however, there need not be a 
correlation between the contents of the perception and any other configurations in the c-space 
point.   
 Thus, it seems that a time capsule may consist of only a certain neural configuration, 
and there need not be any non-neural configuration in the c-space point that corresponds to 
the encoded snapshots.  However, Barbour assumes throughout his presentation of time 
capsules that our mental snapshots also correspond somehow to non-neural configurations in 
the present c-space point.  For example, he (1999) presupposes that our perception of a 
kingfisher in flight corresponds to something in the c-space point, e.g., a kingfisher, part of a 
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matter field that gives rise to us seeing a kingfisher in flight.  So, if Barbour’s neural time 
capsules are intended to correspond to some non-neural configuration in a c-space point, then 
there seems to be a clash as his explicit definition of a time capsule in conjunction with the 
implications of QG’s roles for time capsules does not entail that all time capsules have such 
correspondence.   
 However, there are a few resolutions to this clash.   
 One option is to posit that Barbour’s discussion of time capsules, which is only in 
terms of them having some correspondence with a c-space point’s non-neural configurations, 
is not intended to rule out the possibility of time capsules that lack such correspondence.  
Thus, a c-space point in which there is only a certain neural configuration and a set of 
encoded snapshots is also considered a time capsule.   
 Another option is to append a further condition to the time capsule definition to rule 
out such cases as time capsules.  Here is a possible condition: the experienced content of a 
time capsule represents a configuration that is actually part of the c-space point, e.g., 
footprints in the snow, or something that would be in a best-matching set of c-space points.  
For an example of the latter, consider your experience of an apple falling off the table.  
Suppose that in this c-space point the apple is actually on the floor.  Your encoded snapshots 
are not directly correlated with this configuration; however, if there were a best-matching set 
of c-space points leading up to this c-space point, then each of those c-space points has a 
configuration that corresponds to the content of the seven experienced stills encoded in your 
neural configuration at this particular c-space point.   
 I do not here develop these options, explore their metaphysical implications or 
compare them in the context of Barbour’s QG.  Yet, it is important to note that which option 
is chosen has implications for his interpretation of the WDE.  This is due to his use of time 
capsules in QG.  Recall that the probability distribution resulting from the WDE is claimed to 
be concentrated on time capsules with the aim of giving some reason as to why we usually 
experience such time capsules.    
 Additionally, this clash highlights the problematic nature of Barbour’s time capsules.  
Given the other commitments of his QG, we must be wary of making standard 
presuppositions about there being a temporally extended linear sequence of c-space points in 
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which there are causal links across c-space points.  Barbour’s discussion about time capsules 
seems to presuppose that there are such causal links across c-space points, e.g., he assumes 
that the non-neural configurations somehow give rise to our neutrally encoded snapshots and 
dubs these ‘neural time capsules’.  However, because a c-space point in QG is infinitesimal 
and does not have a derivative sequential ordering, it cannot be assumed there are such 
perceptual processes that causally lead up to one’s current set of experienced snapshots.  
Thus, his notion of time capsules is in need of further refinement because, as this second 
clash illustrates, it may presuppose that there are causal connections across c-space points.  
Further, though I am not going to address this clash below, it is hoped that the two options 
above, though in need of development, at least give sketches as to how time capsules may be 
redefined such that this definition does not presuppose that there is a temporally extended 
linear sequence of c-space points.
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 Let’s next turn to the third and fourth clashes.  Unlike the previous clashes, I focus on 
resolving these two clashes in the next section because of their centrality to his interpretation 
of QG.  
2.3 Clash 3: The Timeless Problem of Time 
 The third clash occurs in the Derivative Temporally Ordered Succession row.  GR’s 
dynamics does allow one to horizontally stack c-space points and, thus, obtain a derivative 
temporally ordered succession in virtue of this stack.  However, as explained in the 
presentation of the table above, by extracting the background structure from QT and carrying 
this over to his interpretation of QG’s WDE, it does not seem that Barbour can reconstruct 
horizontal stacks and, thus, vertical stacks in QG.  Instead, he is left with a mere heap of c-
space points that does not appear stackable.  I am going to term this clash ‘the timeless 
                                                 
237 Also note that my use of psycho-physical dualism as a means to cash out his folk theory may also be suspect: 
epiphenomenalism usually involves there being a causal link from physical to mental properties.  But, if this 
rather mysterious causal link to nonphysical properties does not require a temporal interval, then it is not 
problematic.  Otherwise, we may have to turn to parallelism, which denies all causal interaction between 
physical and mental properties, instead of epiphenomenalism.  In turn, I’m bracketing off this possible issue, 
while regarding either route as involving another cumbersome piece of metaphysical luggage that goes along 
with the dualism option. 
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problem of time’, or ‘T-POT’.  It arises because he tries to resolve the standard problem of 
time by eliminating any fundamental temporal ordering among and background structures 
associated with QG’s and QT’s c-space points.  However, he maintains that there are 
horizontal and vertical stacks in GR.  Given that the WDE is a quantization of GR’s 3-
metrics, one may expect that GR’s stacks are recoverable. Yet, his heap interpretation of the 
WDE makes it difficult to recover GR’s stacks and, in effect, a derivative temporally ordered 
succession of c-space points.  Thus, he is faced with T-POT: because Machian GR posits that 
there is derivative temporally ordered succession, but Machian QG lacks such a role, how 
can horizontal stacks be generated in Machian QG?  I explore Machian means of resolving 
this clash in the next section and, thus, discuss whether two general manners of resolving T-
POT can be formulated such as to uphold ONT: the generation of some sort of ordered 
succession among c-space points in QG and the elimination of GR’s stacks.   
2.4 Clash 4: Extended Experience and QG 
 Finally, the fourth clash also occurs in the Derivative Temporally Ordered Succession 
row, but it is between Machian QG and Folk Theory.  In QG, there are not necessarily linear 
sequences of c-space points.  Instead, there is just a heap of c-space points, some of which 
have copies.  Barbour has given an account of the specious present at one of these points, 
which can be developed, as done above, in terms of the retentional model or in terms of a 
psycho-physical dualism.  However, because our experience seems to extend well beyond 
that of a single specious present and involves what appears to be a relatively sequential, 
ordered set of events, Barbour needs to reconcile such experience with his account of QG as 
well as its implication for personal identity as being limited to a single c-space point, as 
argued in Ch5.  So, this clash arises primarily because of the incomplete nature of Barbour’s 
folk theory.  The folk column is silent about our apparently far extending experience; 
however, claims made about our experience in the Folk Theory and the implications of QG 
clash with such apparent experience.  I examine means of resolving this clash in the next 
section by further developing retentionism and psycho-physical dualism.  Further note that 
because this clash and the third clash are in the same row, options for resolving them depend 
on each other, e.g., if ordered sequences are able to be recovered in QG, then it seems that 
our well extended experience may be along such a history.  Since, Barbour’s dynamics is 
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more fundamental than his folk theory, I discuss means of resolving T-POT first.  Then, I 
examine options for resolving this fourth clash in view of T-POT options. 
 Now that we have identified some of the major clashes in the table, ACA dictates that 
we attempt to resolve such clashes by ‘engaging in metaphysics’.  Because the first clash 
identified deals with a relatively standard difference between the role time plays in 
nonrelativistic mechanics and GR and since my focus is on the coherency among GR, QT and 
QG, I do not discuss it further below.  Additionally, I bracket off the second clash between 
the infinitesimal, non-sequential instants of QG and the characterization of time capsules that 
seems to presuppose that there are causal processes.  Though the options given to resolve this 
clash are admittedly incomplete, they at least provide some suggestions as to the manner in 
which this clash may be resolved.  In effect, I focus in the next section on the third and fourth 
clashes due to their central roles in his unification of GR and QT and interpretation of QG. 
3 Engaging in Metaphysics 
 With the clashes identified, ACA dictates that we next attempt to resolve these clashes 
by ‘engaging in metaphysics’.  This is because the role that time plays in the network exhibits 
conflicts, incoherency or redundancy.  Recall that if the concept is completely redundant, 
then one can eliminate it relatively easily.  However, barring this result, ‘engaging in 
metaphysics’ involves either the construction of a coherent, relevant and non-redundant time 
or the reduction of its role to those played by other elements in the network.  Additionally, 
recall that other than stating that it may possibly involve re-examining metaphysical 
assumptions and roles of other concepts in the theory, the exact nature of this engaging in 
metaphysics was left rather vague.  This section, in effect, provides an example of how such 
‘engaging in metaphysics’ may be done. 
 Because this is primarily a metaphysical enquiry in which we focus on conceptual 
clean-up and development, rather than one that seeks out possible mathematical mechanisms 
by which the resulting options may be presented, I aim to provide Barbour with some options 
such that he has a largely coherent and non-redundant set of metaphysical and ontological 
commitments.  Yet, I do not attempt to develop these options formally.  Whether this focus 
on conceptual clean-up and development imposes an undue limitation on metaphysical 
engagement in this context is discussed in Ch7.  Moreover, because ONT and MP are basic to 
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his network, I assume that these metaphysical principles cannot be amended over the course 
of this analysis. 
 Further, because his Folk Theory depends upon his QG, I begin by presenting 
possible resolutions to what I have identified above as the timeless problem of time.  With the 
resulting options for this clash at hand, I turn towards examining whether his folk theory can 
be made coherent in view of each option for resolving T-POT.  In Ch7, I discuss my 
‘engaging in metaphysics’ in view of the manner in which I addressed these clashes: though 
it seems that this practice would be difficult to schematize, I offer some suggestions 
regarding its scope and limitations. 
3.1 Resolving the Timeless Problem of Time 
 Recall that T-POT involves a clash between GR, which Barbour claims has c-space 
points that can be horizontally stacked, and QG, which is just a heap of c-space points that 
cannot generate such stacks.  So, we first turn to the issue of how stacks may be generated in 
QG.  After assessing the options for this route, we will turn to the route in which we resolve 
T-POT by eliminating the need of incorporating GR-ish stacks in QG. 
 Let’s begin by considering Barbour’s explicit suggestion, which is presented at the 
end of Ch5, as to the manner in which the heap of actualities is determined by the 
wavefunction in the arena of the stratified possible c-space.  Recall that he conjectures that 
the wavefunction is ‘funnelled’ onto the c-space points with time capsules because of the 
structure of possible c-space.  And, he likens the probabilities of the squared wavefunction to 
a static mist of varying intensities across c-space. 
 Can this setup be used to indicate sequential stacks of c-space points such that ONT is 
not violated?  If the wavefunction is ‘funnelled’ along, e.g., sets of hyperbolic curves, each of 
which has an end around, perhaps, the origin of a possible c-space and are ‘directed’ towards 
the other end, then the static funnelling of the wavefunction may be regarded as being 
indicative of sequences of c-space points.
238
  Assuming that this conjecture is possible, we 
                                                 
238 This mirrors a suggestion made by Hartle and Hawking 1983.  They propose that the WDE is a hyperbolic 
equation on superspace.  However, they assume that superspace has the signature (-,+,+,+,+,+) and choose a 
timelike direction in which to draw such curves.  Barbour, given ONT and his arguments against such arbitrarily 
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must determine what is doing the work in picking out such sequences and, thus, assess 
whether this mechanism is in accord with ONT.  
 This setup has three main components: the wavefunction of the WDE, stratified 
possible space, which has a structure, and the heap of actual c-space points.  The probabilities 
that the mist represents can be regarded as a product of the wavefunction.  As argued in Ch5 
in the context of making sense of Barbour’s interpretation of the probability distribution, only 
the heap of actualities exists.  If those arguments hold, then possible c-space is, perhaps, best 
regarded as merely a mathematical tool for determining the number of particular c-space 
points that there are in the heap of actualities.  Moreover, as was suggested in Ch5, we will 
assume that the stratified possible c-space may be derivative from a single actual c-space 
point and, thus, this space is not in violation of ONT.   
 Is the wavefunction compatible with ONT?  If Barbour is a realist about the 
wavefunction
239
, i.e., he holds that at least the wavefunction along with its configuration 
space features in his fundamental ontology, then he is committed to the existence of certain 
entities, i.e., the wavefunction and the stratified possible c-space in which it resides.  This 
option offers a literal reading of his suggestion, i.e., the wavefunction is an entity actually 
spread out over possible c-space.  However, on this view, the wavefunction is a fundamental 
ontological entity that, in effect, is not reducible to the relative relations of stuff.  Plus, given 
my argument in Ch5 for the conclusion that the heap of actualities must exist, we would be 
committed to the existence of not only the heap of actualities but also the possible c-space.  
Though we’re assuming such space is reducible to stuff and their relative relations, this 
picture involves a huge ontology.  But, bracketing off the resulting c-space point proliferation 
and its denial of Ch5’s conclusion that only the heap of actualities exists, the commitment to 
the existence of the wavefunction as an entity that is not reducible to stuff and their relations 
clearly violates ONT.  In effect, the wavefunction as some sort of entity spread across c-space 
                                                                                                                                                        
chosen timelike directions, which we encountered in Ch4, cannot use such a chosen direction.  Instead, as 
suggested above, the topology of possible c-space must ‘guide’ the probability distribution along such curves. 
239 For defence of wavefunction realism in the context of standard QT, see Lewis 2004 and Albert 1996.  For 
criticism, see Monton 2002, 2006, and Maudlin 2007 
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and ‘guided’ by possible c-space’s structure cannot do the work in picking out sequences of 
c-space points in Machian QG. 
 Thus, Barbour cannot accept wavefunction realism as characterized above.  However, 
note that he does claim that the wavefunction is ‘guided’ somehow through possible c-space 
via its structure.  We should enquire as to whether there is a less literal reading of this claim 
that upholds ONT. One alternative that seems compatible with ONT is to consider the 
wavefunction to be, following, e.g., Monton (2006), merely a useful mathematical tool for, in 
the case of QG, calculating the probability that indicates whether a specific number of copies 
of a certain c-space point is in the heap of actualities.  If this is the case, however, then it 
seems that, rather than the wavefunction or its mist, the structure of possible c-space is what 
indicates the probability distribution.  Rather than ‘guide’ some entity or mist, this structure 
itself is what indicates the number and types of c-space points in the heap of actualities.   
 Given the central role of the structure of possible c-space on this route, it is necessary 
to examine whether we should continue to hold our assumption that this c-space can be 
structured without violating ONT.  In view of the presentation of stratified manifolds in Ch5, 
it seems that at least the contents of each of its submanifolds may be determined without 
violating ONT, i.e., considering the manners in which one may change an actual c-space 
point can generate the set of possible c-space points.  Barbour suggests that the points in each 
submanifold are arranged in terms of the relative congruence, symmetry and volume of each 
c-space point.   If such relations can be obtained through some sort of best-matching 
procedure among possible points, then the organization of the points on each submanifold 
does not clearly violate ONT.  But, Barbour arranges his example of a stratified manifold as 
having three flat sides with a certain volume.  Other than simplicity perhaps, it is unclear why 
the submanifolds do not, e.g., curve.  In effect, it seems that he has merely chosen a certain 
topology for the submanifolds that is not clearly dictated by stuff and their relative 
instantaneous relations.  Moreover, a different topology for the same submanifolds could 
result in, e.g., a conical possible c-space.  In effect, the topology of the submanifolds and the 
shape in which they are stratified violate ONT: these features of stratified c-space do not 
seem to be derivative from stuff and their relative relations alone.  Thus, it does not appear 
that Barbour may use stratified possible c-space in his Machian QG. 
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 But, let’s grant that Barbour may find a Machian means of stratifying possible c-
space.  Moreover, let’s continue to assume that the structure of c-space may effectively 
concentrate the probability distribution along hyperbolic curves in c-space.  If c-space’s 
structure is what does the work in indicating the number of c-space points in the heap of 
actualities, then, because this space has a single structure, it must only offer a single solution 
to the WDE.  In effect, for a given stratified c-space, there is only one heap of actualities.  
This implication does not seem to conflict with Barbour’s QG generally.  Additionally, he 
(1999, 302) explicitly admits that the WDE may have one or many solutions.  So, this 
implication is in accord with at least Barbour’s claims about the WDE. 
 Now that we have some means of generating ordered sequences of c-space points via 
hyperbolas there, granting that the stratification of c-space can be Machianized, we can turn 
to resolving T-POT.  Can these sequences be used to stack the heap of actualities and, thus, 
go towards recovering GR’s horizontal stacks? No: as long as a particular possible c-space 
point along a hyperbola in possible c-space has a probability indicating that there is more 
than one copy of it in the heap of actualities, then, given PSR, one of the points cannot be put 
into the stack rather than the other.   
 Moreover, it is likely that certain regions of c-space, rather than just a number of 
relatively isolated parabolas, are assigned a higher probability.  This is because of Barbour’s 
claim that the probability distribution will be concentrated on c-space points with time 
capsules.  Since such points would likely be clustered together in a c-space that is arranged in 
terms of congruency and symmetry of stuff in its points, it is difficult to see how a single path 
could be traced through the region.  So, we may have to forgo the hyperbola assumption in 
this c-space as well.  In effect, it seems that, even in the case in which the WDE is indicative 
of hyperbolas through c-space via the space’s structure, it is not clear that these hyperbolas 
offer a means of stacking the actual c-space points such as to recover GR’s horizontal stacks. 
 Though this suggestion does not seem to resolve T-POT in a Machian framework, 
there may be another means of recovering GR’s horizontal stacks.  Begin by stipulating that 
along with a probable c-space point, its best-matching set of c-space points is also in the heap 
of actualities.   
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 One way of accomplishing this is merely to assume that there is such a set of each 
copy of a probable c-space point.  The BSW could be used to determine this set given a 
specific probable c-space point.   
 However, this setup does not offer a means of stacking because there will again be 
copies in the actual heap.  Nevertheless, one may reply that a particular set stacks in virtue of 
the fact that these particular c-space points are obtained through the specific application of 
the BSW to the probable c-space point.  There are two problems with this reply.  First, it 
assumes that the BSW is what determines which points are in the actual heap.  However, in 
this context in which actual c-space points are primary, one may claim that the actual heap 
simply exists, and the BSW is a mere calculational aid for finding out what c-space points are 
in the heap of actualities.  But, if one does not hold this role for the BSW, then this reply is 
still problematic for a second reason: this reply presupposes that there is some sort of 
irreducible particular relation among c-space points that arises only in virtue of the 
application of the BSW.  It must be irreducible because there is nothing in a particular c-
space point that would indicate that it must be best-matched with a certain copy of a c-space 
point.  Rather, it just indicates that a specific type of c-space point must follow it in a stack.  
Thus, a stack cannot be constructed without violating ONT by positing an irreducible relation 
among particular c-space points. 
 There is a second setup that one may associate with the stipulation.  Take a particular 
probable c-space point, and assume that it is part of a best-matching stack that is completely 
foliated.  This stack constitutes the heap of actualities: each c-space point in the heap is 
indicated by the solution to the WDE in the manner in which Barbour interprets it.  In effect, 
the resulting probability distribution indicates the number and types of c-space points in the 
stack.  On the assumption that this heap contains all the c-space points in a completely 
foliated stack, then the stack can be regarded as indicating where each of the points in the 
heap of actualities may fit in.  But, it doesn’t specify exactly where each one fits, e.g., where 
a particular copy fits.  Thus, we can obtain a stack such that each c-space point in the heap of 
actualities has a place in it. 
 However, this setup does not specify exactly where each c-space point fits.  Is this 
lack of specification problematic?  It does seem to be a metaphysical, rather than just an 
epistemological, issue: the relative relations of a c-space point do not indicate which stack 
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such a point should be in.  Nevertheless, this setup at least allows us to recover the general 
structure of GR stack.  Yet, to do so, it assumes that there is such a stack initially.  But, other 
than perhaps the fact that the WDE is supposed to be a quantization of GR, there is no reason 
to assume that there is such a stack.  The task here is to recover stacks given Machian QG, 
rather than to simply assume that there are such stacks in QG.  So, though this setup may 
offer some means of recovering GR’s stack, it may be regarded as question begging. 
 This discussion brings us to the second means of resolving T-POT: claim that such 
stacks are eliminable in GR.  The c-space points of GR are merely heaps and are not actually 
stacked.  However, this would be a radical interpretation of GR.  Moreover, Barbour gives an 
account of its foliated space by making reference to a horizontal stack of c-space points that 
is completely foliated and, in turn, is committed to there being the c-space points associated 
with all possible foliations of this space.  So, to determine the points in GR’s heap, one would 
need to stack a best-matching set that is a solution to the BSW and then foliate it.  However, 
this poses no inconsistency in this stackless GR.  Such a stack can have the same role as that 
of stratified possible c-space in that it only offers a means of calculating what points there are 
in the actual heap.  Such a stack does not actually exist. 
 To sum up this section, T-POT may be resolved in principle by either by 
reconstructing stacks in QG or by eliminating stacks in GR.  The latter approach, though 
radical, seems to provide a coherent Machian GR.  The former approach, in contrast, is 
difficult to formulate without violating ONT.  We went through two main attempts of 
developing this approach.  First, we considered Barbour’s suggestion of using the structure of 
stratified possible c-space as a means of indicating stacks.  However, it seems that a 
particular stratification of c-space violates ONT due to the fact that its topologies and shape 
do not appear to be derivative from stuff and their relative relations alone.  Moreover, even 
assuming that the probability distribution is concentrated on hyperbolas in this setup, such a 
hyperbolic curve does not necessarily indicate the manner in which actual points are stacked 
due to the possibility that a point along it may have copy in the actual heap.  Second, we 
considered the possibility that a probable c-space point indicates that, in addition to that 
point, the heap of actualities also contains either its accompanying best-matching set or all 
the points in a completely foliated stack in which it appears.  But, the former option does not 
allow stacks without violating ONT by introducing some irreducible relation among 
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particular c-space points.  And, the latter option, though recovering GR’s stack to some 
extent, may be regarded as question begging by assuming from the outset that there are such 
stacks. 
 So, though the viability of the former approach to T-POT is questionable, I consider 
in the next section the implications of both of these general approaches in the context of 
developing an account of our experience, which appears to have quite a long duration and 
seems largely sequential. 
3.2 T-POT’s Approaches and Extended Experience 
 In this section I consider whether Barbour’s folk theory can be developed such that it 
can account for our experience that seems to extend well beyond a specious present.
240
  To do 
so, I attempt to develop it for each of the general approaches in the previous section.  
However, note that I do not attempt to develop an account of the phenomenal passage of time 
that we seem to experience.  This is due to the fact that this issue is not unique to Barbour’s 
accounts since it also arises for, e.g., the block theorist.  Instead, I focus on coherently 
                                                 
240 Note that I am assuming here that we need some account for at least segments in which our streams of 
consciousness appear continuous.  To delineate my aim here, it may be helpful to refer to three main positions 
Dainton 2010 delineates regarding the continuity of experience.  According to the Discontinuity Thesis, 
although consciousness is commonly described as continuous, this is incorrect because our consciousness is 
highly disjointed.  According to the Modest Continuity Thesis, our streams of consciousness are continuous, 
which involve freedom from gaps and/or a significant degree of moment-to-moment qualitative similarity.  
According to the Strong Continuity Thesis, the stream of consciousness involves the relationships proposed by 
the Modest Thesis as well as there being an experiential connection among the successive brief phases of our 
typical streams of consciousness.  I do not here attempt to provide an account of the Strong Thesis.  And, it is 
difficult to see how one may hold the Discontinuity Thesis in the context of the stackless solution to T-POT.  
Because, even if our typical ‘streams’ of consciousness may be very gappy, it seems that there is some linearity 
of our experience presupposed, e.g., such gaps are not of the type in which a physician in his Canadian office 
suddenly finds himself to be the captain of a banana boat in South America.  So, though I do not have the space 
to do so here, one may make the case that the plausibility of the Discontinuity Thesis relies on there being some 
sort of linearity of actual events in the world.  Moreover, though the Discontinuity Thesis may be an option for 
the stacked route, in which there is such linearity, I here aim to show how the Modest Continuity Thesis may be 
accommodated such that at least segments of continuous experience in a stacked Machian QG context are 
explained. 
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extending the specious present alternatives given by the folk options such that they may 
explain one’s apparently linear and largely sequentially ordered experience.  Unlike block 
theory generally and even the branching worlds of an Everettian interpretation, Barbour’s QG 
does not assume that there is some sort of linear sequence(s) of events in the world.  So, the 
prospect of accounting for experience that reflects such linearity needs to be discussed here. 
 Let’s start with the first general approach in which linear stacks that are sequentially 
ordered are recoverable.  Assuming that such stacks are not superimposed
241
, then it seems 
that one may identify oneself along a particular stack and account for one’s apparently 
extended experience in relatively standard ways. 
 For the retentional model, we can append some means with which it accounts for such 
experience provided that it is in accord with ONT.  Following Dainton’s (2000) (2010) 
(2011) account of one of Broad’s proposals, one’s extended experience is made up of a dense 
succession of instantaneous specious presents.  As presented in our development of the 
retentional model for Barbour’s claims about experience, a specious present on this model 
arises from a simultaneous set of snapshots that are encoded in a single neural configuration.  
These snapshots, though, do not seem to be simultaneous because each is assigned a different 
degree of presentness.  In effect, for a linear sequence of c-space points in which one has a 
series of neural time capsules, each neural time capsule encodes six or seven snapshots.  It is 
this set of neural time capsules and their associated snapshots that accounts for our 
                                                 
241 In places, Barbour suggests this possibility.  For example, he 1994b claims that, assuming that there are such 
superpositions of stacks, this may result in one experiencing Thursday without there being a Wednesday.  
Presumably, he posits parts of such stacks may somehow annihilate some of the c-space points in the stacks.  
However, I only offer options for the extremes of there being linear sequential stacks and there being no such 
stacks recoverable.  Nevertheless, this possibility may be accounted for via one or a combination of the above 
options.  For example, if one accepts the claim that personal identity is limited to a single c-space point, then 
one may adopt the latter option for this case and perhaps claim one’s experiential contents at, e.g., at a 
superposed set of c-space points, are also superposed in a manner parallel to that of Lockwood’s 1996 picture in 
which the minds at each instant in an Everettian interpretation are superposed without there being trans-temporal 
identity.  On the other hand, if one denies this claim, then one may, e.g., use some form of the stack-friendly 
retentional model in which retentions are superposed.  Since this model has all of its retentions simultaneously 
co-existing at an instant, does not seem incompatible in principle with there being gaps in a stack. 
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experience that seems to last longer than a single specious present; one effectively is 
experiencing a series of retentional specious presents. 
 To exemplify how this may work, suppose that there are two best-matched c-space 
points in which it appears that a millipede is crawling under a rock.  At the first c-space point, 
where one sees the millipede in its entirety moving right next to the rock, i.e., no parts of it is 
under the rock, one has a neural time capsule that encodes six snapshots.  The most-present of 
these snapshots is the one in which the millipede is right next to the rock.  The slightly-less-
than-present snapshot is one in which the millipede is slightly left of the rock.  The even-less-
than present snapshot is one in which the millipede is a bit more left of the rock, and so forth 
for the other three snapshots’ contexts and temporal modes. 
 At the next best-matching c-space point, one sees the millipede moving under the 
rock.  Again, assume that one’s neural time capsule encodes six snapshots.  Here, one’s 
neural time capsule encodes a most-present snapshot in which the millipede is partially under 
the rock.  The slightly-less-than-present snapshot is one in which the millipede is right next to 
the rock.  The even-less-than present snapshot is one in which the millipede is slightly left of 
the rock, and so forth for the other three snapshots.   
 Thus, by considering a series of retentional specious presents that correspond to the 
snapshots encoded by a set of best-matching c-space points, it seems that the retentional 
model offers some means of cashing out our apparently largely linear and extended 
experience for the case in which QG has stacks.  Moreover, because we have not introduced 
anything more than the Barbouric retentional account of the specious present and since such 
an account was earlier argued to be in accord with ONT, this option does not violate ONT.  
 The dualism option in the context of this approach, however, becomes a victim of a 
horn of Dainton’s dilemma for the block universe and psycho-physical dualism.  Because 
such a static, linear sequence of c-space points is essentially a block universe, his dilemma 
applies to this approach.  And, due to our bracketing off the issue of explaining our 
experience of the passage of time, with which Dainton is concerned in his presentation of the 
dilemma, it needs to be recast in terms of explanatory power generally.  In effect, on this 
approach, there would be a derivative meta-time from a series of mental properties that has 
some sort of best-matching-like ordering.  But, there would also be a derivative time of the 
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horizontal stack of c-space points.  In effect, one can argue that the meta-time of the psycho-
physical properties is the same sort of time as that of the vertical stack of the sequence of c-
space points: both sorts of time are derivative from a best-matching horizontal stack of some 
sort.  In effect, the meta-time lacks additional explanatory power and, thus, appears to be 
redundant.  
 So, in view of the redundancy of dualism’s meta-time in this case, it seems that the 
retentional model offers the more viable account of experience in the case in which linear, 
non-superimposed stacks are recovered in QG. 
 Let’s now turn to the approach to T-POT in which stacks are not recoverable.  One 
general option for explaining our apparently linear and sequential extended experience on this 
approach is to claim that it only seems that we have such a temporally extended experience.   
 Given what this claim entails on a stackless QG, it does not seem that there are any 
other options that may be developed.  To see why this is so, consider a comparison with the 
block universe and stackless QG.  In stackless QG, ‘you’ would be statically co-existing in all 
the c-space points in which there is a ‘you’.  So, in the static co-existing respect, this picture 
parallels the block universe.  However, the block theorist could point to some spatiotemporal 
worm and claim that, strictly speaking, all of you co-exists there and this worm corresponds 
somehow to your temporally extended experience.  In a block universe it is generally 
presupposed that ‘you’ are spread across a single linear sequence.  Yet, in stackless QG, there 
is not necessarily such a linear sequence.  Instead, there may be multiple exact copies of 
‘you’ in the c-space points in the heap of actualities as well as many c-space points in which, 
e.g., ‘you’ are in a slightly different configuration from the one you seem to be experiencing.  
In turn, with the static co-existence of multiple copies of ‘you’ and variations on a single c-
space point that ‘you’ seem to experience, one cannot make reference to a single linear 
sequence in which ‘you’ appears and claim that there is a linear sequence that corresponds to 
your linear experience. 
 Thus, without any stacks to which our apparently linear experience corresponds, it 
seems that we must claim that our temporally extended experience is only apparent.  Due to 
QG’s lack of stacks, let’s attempt to develop the option that our apparently linear, extended 
experience must somehow be contained within a single c-space point.  Other than, perhaps 
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claiming that one actually co-exists in all the c-space points in which one appears, which does 
not seem to offer any explanation of why one seems to have a largely linear, sequential set of 
experiences, this appears to be the only viable option in stackless QG.  Can either of the folk 
options be developed such as to incorporate this apparently single viable option for 
explaining our apparent linear and extended experience?  If so, such an account may have the 
added bonus of making the notion of personal identity that is restricted to a single c-space 
point more palatable. 
 It seems that a general means of developing this option is to extended Barbour’s 
account of the specious present to ‘the specious lifetime’, i.e., one’s experience of one’s 
apparent lifetime as a largely linear and sequential set of experiences. 
 Recall that for a QG with recoverable stacks, we made use of the specious presents 
that correspond to the six or seven snapshots encoded in a best-matching set of c-space 
points.  However, on the stackless QG route, there are no such best-matching sets to utilize.  
So, instead of being extended over a set of c-space points, the specious lifetime must be 
restricted to a single c-space point. 
 One may believe that we can do so simply by allowing a specious present to 
correspond to an entire lifetime’s worth of snapshots, rather than just six or seven.  However, 
given that there would be a huge number of snapshots encoded in a single neural 
configuration, this puts strain on the claim that such snapshots are given by one instantaneous 
neural configuration.  But, even allowing that this may occur, recall that all of these snapshots 
are actually simultaneous.  It is the ascription of different degrees of presentness to the 
snapshots that make the specious present appear to have an extended, sequential ordering.  
The degree of presentness that a snapshot is assigned was assumed to be a function of the 
place of the snapshot in a horizontal snapshot ‘stack’ given that the snapshots can be best-
matched in virtue of their content.   
 Though this setup may seem feasible for providing an account of, e.g., motion that 
one seems to experience at a particular instant, it gives a somewhat contentious account of, 
e.g., the motion of the horses involved in an entire horse race that one seems to experience.  
Because all of the snapshots are given fixed modes in virtue of their place in the snapshot 
stack, the snapshot of Workforce rounding the final corner at Epsom Downs in 2010 has a 
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certain fixed mode, e.g., not-at-all-present.  However, when you seemed to be watching the 
race back in 2010, Workforce’s rounding the corner had the temporal mode of most-present.  
And, when one seemed to see Workforce crossing the finish line, the snapshot at which 
Workforce was at the final corner had the temporal mode of slightly-less-present.  So, it 
seems that, though temporal modes were introduced in order to provide an account of the 
specious present, such modes need to change in order to account for a specious lifetime.  In 
the retentional account of the specious present, a single, fixed temporal mode is assigned to 
each snapshot in it. However, if we claim that these modes can change, then it does not seem 
that they can be assigned merely by the location of a snapshot in the stack.  Additionally, it is 
unclear what exactly may be added to the stack that does not presuppose fundamental 
temporal relations.  So, pending the addition of something to the stack to account for changes 
in temporal modes such that it does not violate ONT, it does not seem that the retentional 
model can provide an account of a specious lifetime that is limited to a single c-space point.     
 Nevertheless, one may object to the preceding worry for the retentional model in this 
context on grounds that it presupposes that there is some sort of temporal becoming that one 
experiences.  If we deny that there is such actually becoming, then we can certainly extend 
the retentional model of the specious present to the specious lifetime.  It was incorrect to state 
above that one did in fact experience snapshot of Workforce at the final corner as most-
present.  In effect, one’s apparent sequential experience of an apple falling off of a table is 
essentially of the same kind of experience of watching an entire horse race.  The main 
difference is one of the lengths of the apparent durations. 
 In principle this seems to be a cogent response.  Because the temporal modes assigned 
to c-space points are offered as a means of explaining our experience of the snapshots as a 
linear sequence with duration, rather than all at once, it does not seem that temporal modes 
must necessarily change to account for the horse example.  And, because I do not aim here to 
give an account of our experience of the passage of time, it seems that I should concede this 
point.  So, though somewhat counterintuitive, the retentional specious present may be used to 
provide an account of such apparent motion.   
 Yet, even if this point is conceded, there is another general reason for denying that 
temporal modes must be static: not all of one’s experienced snapshots can be placed neatly 
into a single horizontal stack in virtue of their contents’ apparent relative relations alone.  To 
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support this claim, I first illustrate the manner in which a single horizontal snapshot stack is 
not clearly able to be generated.  Then, I consider a further case in which this lack of a single 
horizontal stack is problematic if static temporal modes are assigned. 
 The above example involves an idealized situation in which you did not, for a 
moment, look away from the race.  If one, say, glances down at a newspaper to examine the 
odds for the race, then this apparent experience must also correspond to a set of snapshots in 
the stack.  However, given that stacks are ordered in virtue of the relative relations of the 
content of them alone, it seems that there must be at least two stacks: one corresponding to 
your newspaper reading and another corresponding to your watching the horse race.  But, it is 
not clear that the newspaper-reading stack can be inserted into the watching-horse-race stack 
such as to reflect the order in which you seem to experience them.  Further, because temporal 
modes are assigned in virtue of the manner in which they are stacked, it is not clear that the 
temporal modes can be assigned such as to account for the order of your experience at the 
track.  Though this case highlights a problem with Barbouric retentionalism’s reliance on 
snapshot stacks as a means of assigning temporal modes, it does not highlight the problem of 
using static temporal modes.  To support this latter problem, we must turn to another 
variation on the case. 
 Assume that you seem to recall watching that race in the past.  In effect, it seems that 
by here using it as an example, its temporal mode has changed due to you recalling it now.  
This, of course, also puts strain on the claim that retentions are distinguished from memories.  
But, assuming that we can provide an account of memories in terms of a very large stack of 
retentions only, which we must do because we are restricted to using a retentional model to 
provide an account of the specious lifetime given a single c-space point only, it seems that 
temporal modes must change in order give an account of our experience.  To see the reason 
for this claim, suppose that temporal modes are static.  Perhaps one may attempt to account 
for this case on the Barbouric retentional model by proposing that your apparent memory of 
the horse race which has been recalled by the example is actually part of the stack too: in 
addition to the not-present-at-all series of snapshots associated with the race, there is a series 
of snapshots later in the stack that, though resembling the content of the horse race, have a 
different temporal mode affixed to them that reflects their memory status.  Clearly, to make 
sense of memories on this model, we must extend our repertoire of temporal modes to include 
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a mode indicative of what seems to be a memory.  Regardless, though, this proposal seems to 
use a series of retentional-ish snapshots that are each assigned a static temporal mode. 
 Nevertheless, this alternative is problematic given that temporal modes are assigned in 
virtue of their ‘position’ in the best-matching stack of snapshots.  In the sense that there 
appears to be at least two best-matching stacks corresponding to one’s experienced snapshots, 
rather than a single one, our reading of this example and recalling the race resembles the case 
in which one is reading a newspaper and watching the race.  The major difference between 
these two cases on this proposal is only the different type of temporal modes, i.e., one 
associated with a standard retention and one associated with some sort of memory retention, 
assigned to the watching-the-horse-race stack.  So, just as in the case in which you are 
watching the horse race, it is not clear exactly how the two stacks should be combined such 
as to reflect your experience, which is interspersed with reading these examples and recalling 
the race.  And, thus, it is not clear exactly which particular temporal mode, which is a 
function of a snapshot’s position in a horizontal stack, should be assigned to each snapshot.   
 Thus, barring the possibility that a sort of best-matching among ‘memory’ snapshots 
and ‘perceived’ snapshots may be developed, a possibility for which I do not have space to 
develop and discuss here, it appears that a change in temporal mode of a series of snapshots 
elsewhere in the stack is required as a means of offering an account of recollections.  
However, as argued above, there is no clear means of incorporating such change without 
violating ONT. 
 In effect, a Barbouric retentional model of the specious lifetime seems to either 
violate ONT by involving some sort of irreducible change of a snapshot’s temporal mode or 
require much metaphysical development, e.g., some sort of best-matching catered to apparent 
sequences of snapshots that must, in accord with ONT, be only in term of the relative 
relations among the stuff in the content of snapshots.  Let’s now turn to the other folk option 
and evaluate whether it offers a more viable account. 
 Psycho-physical dualism can account for the specious lifetime by claiming that a 
single neural time capsule corresponds to a lifetime’s worth of snapshots, and these snapshots 
are given by a large number of epiphenomenal mental properties, e.g., perceptually 
experiencing a particular snapshot. 
237 
 
 To account for the specious present, our Barbouric psycho-physical dualism involved 
a meta-time along the mental properties.  In that context, this meta-time is derivative from an 
ordering relation among the contents of the snapshots, parallel to that of best-matching, 
which is in virtue of the relative relations among the stuff in such contents alone.  Thus, such 
meta-time does not violate ONT. 
 If this setup is applied to a lifetime experiences, then there is a large sequence of 
mental properties corresponding to a particular neural configuration.  Such an account of the 
specious lifetime does offer an advantage over the retentionalist account: no temporal modes 
are required.  However, the resulting meta-time across these mental properties violates ONT.  
Using the same argument for the retentionalist’s lack of a single horizontal stack, it does not 
seem we can sequentially order the content of such mental properties in virtue of the relative 
relations among such content alone.  Just as we cannot put all of the retentions that one 
experiences at a horse race in which one occasionally reads a newspaper into a single stack in 
virtue of the relative relations of the experienced stuff in the contents of these retentions 
alone, we cannot order the mental properties in a sequence in virtue of the relative relations 
of the stuff in their contents alone.  Thus, the meta-time among the mental properties in a 
lifetime’s worth of snapshots is not clearly reducible to such relative relations alone.  In 
effect, the meta-time that results in psycho-physical dualism when applied to the specious 
lifetime presupposes there being some fundamental temporal relation among the snapshots.  
Thus, meta-time violates ONT.  
 To sum up the implications of this section for resolving the fourth clash: It seems that 
the retentional model is best suited to be wedded to a Machian QG in which GR’s stacks are 
straightforwardly recoverable because of the apparent redundancy of the meta-time of 
dualism in this context.   
 On the other hand, a stackless Machian QG does not presently have a viable account 
of experience that can be associated with it.  It was argued that, because some account of our 
largely sequential and linear experience is required on the stackless route for resolving T-
POT, one should attempt to make sense of a specious lifetime given only a single c-space 
point.  The resulting meta-time of the dualist account of the specious lifetime was argued to 
presuppose some irreducible temporal relations.  Thus, this option is not viable due to its 
violation of ONT.  Additionally, it was argued that the retentional model cannot account for 
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one’s specious lifetime without violating ONT or requiring much metaphysical development.  
So, an advocate of stackless QG should either attempt to develop the retentionist model to 
explain the specious lifetime or, perhaps more radically, deny that we do seem to experience 
a largely linear and sequential series of events.  Because there are no connections among c-
space points in stackless QG, this latter option is extremely radical: even granting that one 
may potentially experience a specious present, one, strictly speaking, may only experience a 
single specious present and, thus, the rest of one’s apparent experience does not occur at any 
level.  Thus, I struggle to see how this latter option can be viable at all in this context.  In 
effect, a stackless QG requires the retentional model to be developed such that it offers an 
explanation of the specious lifetime. 
 In the final section of this chapter, I make some general conclusions regarding which 
route for addressing T-POT is more viable. 
4 ACA’s Implications for Barbour’s Network 
 Before presenting the final results of ACA, it is useful to first summarize the results of 
our application of ACA to Barbour’s network thus far. 
 By ACA, we first pounded Barbour’s accounts into a single Machian network such 
that ONT and MP are upheld throughout them.  Then, we identified time via the role it plays 
in this network.  Because there are four roles that time plays, time is identified with four 
subconcepts and, thus, these four roles: being an infinitesimal instant, static existence, a time 
variable that is an arbitrary parameter and a derivative temporally ordered succession.  
 Next, we determined whether components of the temporal roles in Barbour’s network 
conflict, are redundant or are irrelevant, with each other as well as with other concepts in the 
theory.  Recall that if the role exhibits no such conflicts, incoherency or redundancy, then we 
accept this role and identify it with time.  On the other hand, if the role exhibits such 
conflicts, incoherency or redundancy, then we must ‘engage in metaphysics’.   
 Supposing that we can redefine instants such as to avoid the second clash noted above 
and given that the four clashes identified above are the only major clashes in the table, then it 
seems that there are no clashes among the infinitesimal instant and static existence roles in 
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the QG, QT and GR parts of the network.  In effect, by ACA, we can identify time with at 
least these two roles. 
 The arbitrary parameter role of the time variable, though it appears in GR, does not 
appear in QT or QG.  The question of whether there should be such a role in GR, QT or QG 
seems to depend upon the manner of resolving the third clash.  If one solves T-POT via 
eliminating GR’s stacks, then the role seems to be irrelevant and, thus, eliminable.  But, if T-
POT is resolved via recovering stacks in QG such that a variable plays this role, then time 
should be identified with this role in addition to the first two roles.  So, because the status of 
this role depends on the T-POT resolution, I leave it an open question as to whether time 
should be identified it.  
 This brings us to evaluating the clashes in the temporally ordered succession role.  
Due to these deep third and fourth clashes, we ‘engaged in metaphysics’ in an attempt to 
resolve them.  Recall that if the concept is completely redundant, then one can eliminate it 
from such a list relatively easily.  This can be exemplified by the possible treatment of the 
arbitrary parameter role in the preceding paragraph.  However, barring such a result, 
‘engaging in metaphysics’ involves either the construction of a coherent, relevant and non-
redundant time or the reduction of its role to those played by other elements in the network. 
 Because Jackson characterized such metaphysics’ aim as the creation of a list of what 
there is that is coherent, complete and parsimonious, we attempted to develop metaphysically 
coherent options such that they do not violate ONT.   
 The upshot of our attempt at resolving T-POT with this rough Jacksonian guide is as 
follows.  There are two general options for resolving this clash between GR’s having a 
derivative temporally ordered succession role and QG’s denial that there is this role: recover 
in QG stacks that play this role, or eliminate GR’s stacks.  The latter option, though radical, 
was argued to provide a coherent Machian GR.  The former approach, however, requires 
further work so that it does not violate ONT with the use of a stratified possible c-space, a 
WDE-generated hyperbola that has an ordering relation independent of the content of c-space 
points or a presupposed foliated stack. 
 Further, this engaging in metaphysics led to the following conclusions regarding 
resolving the fourth clash.  This clash is between QG’s not necessarily having linear stacks of 
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points and our experience, which seems to be largely linear, sequential and extends beyond a 
specious present.  Since Barbour’s account of our experience is only presented for the 
specious present, it seems that, at the very least, his folk account requires further 
development in order to account for such experience.  Moreover, because the resolution of 
this clash depends on the resolution to T-POT, we discussed means of resolving the clash in 
the context of both of the general T-POT options.   
 For the option in which stacks are recoverable in QG, a retentional model provides a 
viable Machian route for explaining such experience, while our dualism’s meta-time is 
redundant.  Thus, it seems that the retentional model should be chosen if stacks are 
recoverable in QG.  For the option in which stacks are not recoverable in QG, either some 
account of our specious lifetime must be given or, perhaps, biting a rather large bullet, deny 
that we seem to experience a largely linear and sequential series of events.  Due to the latter 
route’s clash with our experience and its resulting implausibility in a stackless QG context, 
the former route should be taken.  Regarding the former route, psycho-physical dualism is 
ruled out due to its meta-time’s violation of ONT.  The retentional model, though, may be 
rendered such that it does not violate ONT; however, its temporal modes and means of 
stacking are in need of much development. 
 ACA dictates that we should aim to create a coherent, relevant and non-redundant 
time, reduce its role to those played by other elements in the network or eliminate the role if it 
cannot be salvaged.  What should conclude about the Machian network from the results of 
our engaging in metaphysics given this aim?   
 The T-POT resolution in which one eliminates GR’s stacks offers a coherent and 
Machian account by effectively eliminating the derivative temporally ordered succession 
role.  However, as revealed by the fourth clash, the elimination of this role does not bode as 
well with Barbour’s account of our experience, i.e., much metaphysical development of the 
retentional model is required to explain the specious lifetime. 
 The T-POT resolution in which one recovers GR’s stacks in QG and, thus, creates a 
derivative temporally ordered succession role in QG, requires more formal and interpretive 
development of the WDE such that ONT is not violated.  However, this resolution at least has 
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a ready-made and ONT-friendly account of our largely linear and sequential experience via 
the standard retentional model. 
 So, it seems that ACA has generated two options according to which Barbour’s 
Machian network may be coherently developed.  In the former no-stack option, the derivative 
temporally ordered succession role is eliminated from his fundamental physics.  So, strictly 
speaking, there is no such role.  Moreover, pending the development of a retentional model of 
the specious lifetime that is in accord with ONT, the appearance of the role may be accounted 
for in terms of the stack-induced modes of one’s large number of simultaneous retentions.  In 
contrast, the derivative temporally ordered succession role is retained in the latter option.  
Because this role is retained, there are sequences of c-space points.  Thus, a standard 
retentional model can be used to account for our experience in this context.  However, further 
interpretative and formal work is required on the WDE is required to recover such stacks 
without violating ONT. 
 Thus, though our application of ACA to ONT has not resulted in specifying its time 
completely, we at least have a partial definition and have made clear the two complete 
concepts of time in the offing given certain developments of his network.  Plus, we have 
identified two routes in which Barbour’s network can be developed as well as the criteria 
they must fulfil such that ONT is not violated.  
 With the application of ACA to our Barbouric case study complete enough for our 
purpose of assessing ACA’s viability as a means of analysing time in Barbour’s accounts, 
let’s turn to the final chapter’s discussion of ACA’s results, method and extendibility to non-
Barbouric accounts.   
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Chapter 7: The Scope and Limits of ACA 
 To examine the viability of ACA itself, I discuss the scope and limits of ACA as well 
as its potential extendibility of ACA to non-Barbouric accounts. 
 In this chapter, I discuss the scope of ACA’s applicability to non-Barbouric contexts.  
To do so, I first address the issue of whether the ‘metaphysical engagement’ exemplified in 
the previous chapter can be generalizable.  Additionally, I examine whether the focus of this 
stage on such metaphysical engagement alone is limiting in that the possible formal 
development of a physical theory is bracketed off.  Then, in the final subsection, I discuss the 
issue as to whether ACA is actually applicable to theories that are not explicitly principle-
based.    
1 Reflections upon ‘Metaphysical Engagement’ 
 This metaphysical engagement, as exemplified in the previous chapter, does not 
appear to be rendered schematically.  There we generally attempted to spell out options that 
are in accord with Barbour’s claims and, more importantly, in accord with ONT.  In the 
processes, we made use of some existent metaphysical positions, e.g., retentionalism, and 
attempted to modify them, where required, to metaphysically develop such options. 
 Furthermore, at the beginning of the previous chapter, I flagged the issue of whether 
my focus on conceptual clean-up and development, while bracketing off the formal 
development of the resulting options, imposes undue limitations on metaphysical engagement 
in the context of conceptually analysing physical theories.  I argue that this does not impose 
an undue limitation on ACA’s scope.  Rather, once a particular option that is proposed by 
ACA is developed formally for a theory, ACA can be applied again to the resulting theory.  
Recall that if one is considering more than one theory, ACA’s first stage of obtaining the 
theory(s) that one is examining involves pounding all of the theories into a single network.  
Though a theory and a formal extension appended to the theory may not be standardly 
regarded as two different theories, it is beneficial to treat them as such by ACA: by pounding 
the theory and its formal extension into a single network underpinned by, e.g., ONT and MP, 
one can then use ACA to determine whether the combination of the original theory with a 
formal extension of it can be made conceptually coherent and non-redundant. 
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 To see the merits of this further application of ACA as well as the fact that ACA can 
be used to examine formal mechanisms that may be formulated in view of the results of its 
initial application to physical theory(s), consider its application to Barbour’s account above.  
By pounding our theories into a single network such that it fulfils certain metaphysical 
principles, i.e., ONT and MP, we are able to identify and keep track of our basic ontological 
commitments as well as make salient metaphysical commitments that result from the theories 
in conjunction with ONT and MP, e.g., all properties among c-space points must be reducible 
to the stuff and relative relations of a single c-space point.  In effect, ACA allows us to 
identify the basic metaphysical structure of the theories and their implications.  In this 
process, however, we did examine the foundational formal mechanisms of the theories, e.g., 
the best-matching procedure.  In effect, ACA’s first stage, as exemplified in Chapters 2-5 
above, does examine the role and status of formal mechanisms in a network. 
 So, though formal developments of the options resulting from our application of ACA 
may require further conceptual analysis, this analysis can be facilitated by ACA for a 
proposed formal development of an option suggested by an initial application of ACA to a 
network: ACA can be applied again to the theory with the additional or new formalism such 
that the new formalism is treated as part of a single Machian network.  In effect, though my 
engaging in metaphysics above did not endeavour to spell out possible means of formally 
developing the options proposed, an additional application of ACA to a proposed 
formalization of one of the options can be used to assess the viability of such a mechanism in 
a Machian network. 
 Furthermore, this discussion highlights the fact ‘engaging in metaphysics’ is not 
limited to this above stage of ACA.  Instead, ACA’s initial stage as accomplished in Chapters 
2-5, in which I presented Barbour’s accounts and pounded them into a single Machian 
network, also involved doing metaphysics: the basic metaphysical commitments were made 
salient at each stage for his interpretations and use of various mathematical mechanisms and 
equations.  Moreover, where development of the interpretation was required, e.g., his account 
of probability, options were suggested and their compatibility with his basic metaphysical 
commitments were assessed. 
2 Generalizability of ACA to Non-Barbouric Accounts 
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 Though we formulated ACA specifically to apply to Barbour’s accounts, it does not 
seem restricted to his view only.  However, one may consider it restricted to only physical 
theories that are principle-based.  Because the Machian network into which we pounded his 
accounts make use of such principles, one may lament that it is not clear how ACA may be 
applied to a physical theory that is not formulated in view of specific metaphysical principles. 
 This may indeed be a restriction if one is only considering a physical theory that does 
not have many metaphysical and ontological commitments.  Though a few temporal concepts 
will be delineated, such concepts may be limited to one similar to that of the arbitrary 
parameter role in Barbour’s accounts.  Moreover, it is unlikely that the table produced by 
such an application of ACA would have many clashes and, thus, may not offer much 
interesting metaphysical work to be done.   
 Nevertheless, ACA may be used to systematically evaluate a specific metaphysical 
position.  If a physical theory is not explicitly formulated in view of certain metaphysical or 
ontological commitments, one may instead use ACA as a means of analysing whether a 
particular metaphysical thesis or specific ontological commitments may be appended to a 
physical theory(s).  In effect, such a thesis or commitments can serve as the metaphysical 
principle(s) with which a network is constructed and evaluated.  For example, if one wishes 
to systematically analyse whether presentism may be appended to standard GR, the 
ontological and metaphysical commitments associated with this view may play the same role 
that ONT and MP has in our application of ACA to Barbour’s accounts.  It seems that ACA 
can be then used as a means of identifying clashes in the role the time plays in GR with that 
played in a folk theory that arises from presentism.  Thus, at least in principle, it seems that 
other physical theory’s lack of explicit principles does not completely rule out an interesting 
application of ACA to them.  But, of course, ACA needs to be applied such a physical 
theory(s) and metaphysical position in order to evaluate its actual efficacy in such a context.  
 
 Thus, it seems that ACA may be extended to non-Barbouric accounts  Moreover, 
because it allows for an analysis of more than one physical theory, ACA is extremely useful 
for generating options to explore in attempts to merge QT and GR.  In effect, ACA offers a 
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schematic and largely viable means of systematically analysing time as it appears across folk 
and physical theories. 
 To conclude, at least for Barbour’s account, ACA does indicate two ways in which his 
GR and QT may be reconciled such that his explicit Leibnizian and Machian metaphysical 
commitments are maintained.  Thus, because it works in the Barbouric case study and is 
potentially applicable to other accounts, ACA is shown to offer a method of analysis that is 
applicable to time in physical theories and that may generally aid in the unification of GR and 
QT into a coherent QG.   
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